Sept. 11's Smoking Gun: The Many Faces of Saeed Sheikh
By Paul Thompson
View the printer friendly view
DISCLAIMER: The analytical articles published on this website were written and published by “project managers” of certain investigative projects hosted by the History Commons website. Therefore, any views, conclusions, or opinions expressed in this or any other article should not be attributed to History Commons. For questions concerning an article, please contact the author(s) directly.
New documentary,
9/11 Press for Truth, based on the Complete 911 Timeline.
View Trailer |
Purchase 9/11 Press for Truth DVD
If you read just one thing at this website, please read this essay. Don’t
mind the length and complexity. Saeed Sheikh’s story is not just mildly interesting.
Understanding the history of this young man may not only explain many mysteries
of 9/11, including solid evidence of foreign government involvement in the
attacks, but may also reveal if nuclear war in the near future is likely. No
kidding. Please read! Note that this was first written in September 2002 but
has been thoroughly overhauled based on exposure to additional evidence. Also,
click to find more details about Saeed
Sheikh and his boss Mahmood
Ahmed.
A young Saeed Sheikh.
|
The ISI: “The Invisible Government”
As the London Times has put it, Saeed Sheikh “is no ordinary terrorist
but a man who has connections that reach high into Pakistan’s military and intelligence
elite and into the innermost circles of Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization.” [London
Times, 4/21/02] To understand why Saeed is so important in understanding
9/11, it is necessary to first understand the Pakistan’s intelligence agency,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI plays a much more significant
role in the Pakistani government than do its counterparts in other countries.
Time Magazine has noted, “Even by the shadowy standards of spy agencies,
the ISI is notorious. It is commonly branded a state within the state, or Pakistan’s invisible government.” [Time,
5/6/02] The ISI grew into its present form during the war between the Soviet
Union and mujaheddin guerrillas in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The CIA thought
the Afghan war could be Russia’s own costly Vietnam War, and they funneled billions
to the mujaheddin resistance to keep them a thorn in Russia’s side. The strategy
worked: Soviet soldiers withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the Soviet Union
collapsed two years later, partly due to the costs of the war. [Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, 9/23/01]
But the costs to keep the mujaheddin fighting were staggering, with estimates
ranging between $6 billion and $40 billion. [New
York Times, 8/24/98, Nation,
2/15/99] While a substantial portion of this amount came from the CIA and
the Saudi Arabian government, who were both funneling the money through the ISI,
much of the cost was deferred by Afghanistan’s opium trade. The Sydney Morning
Herald notes, “Opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistan’s northern
tribal belt and adjoining Afghanistan were a vital offshoot of the ISI-CIA cooperation.
It succeeded in turning some of the Soviet troops into addicts. Heroin sales
in Europe and the US, carried out through an elaborate web of deception, transport
networks, couriers and payoffs, offset the cost of the decade-long war in Afghanistan.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 9/27/01]
Afghan opium production ballooned from 250 tons in 1982 at the start of the war
to 2,000 tons in 1991 just after its end. The Minneapolis Star Tribune observed, “If their local allies were involved in narcotics trafficking”—the
ISI and their allies in Afghanistan—“it didn’t trouble CIA.” [Star Tribune, 9/30/01]
Although the Afghan war has ended, the ISI has continued to profit from opium.
In 1999, the United Nations Drug Control Programme estimated that the ISI was
making around $2.5 billion annually from the sale of illegal drugs. [Times
of India, 11/29/99] The drug trade helped unite the ISI and Osama bin Laden,
who was said to have taken a 15% cut of the Afghan drug trade money in exchange
for protecting smugglers and laundering their profits. [Star
Tribune, 9/30/01]
By 1994, the Taliban, a group of Muslim radicals studying in Pakistan, began
conquering Afghanistan. The Taliban had been recruited by the ISI and molded
into a fanatical force that conquered Afghanistan’s capital by 1996. CNN
reported, “The Taliban are widely alleged to be the creation of Pakistan’s
military intelligence [the ISI]. Experts say that explains the Taliban’s swift
military successes.” [CNN,
10/5/96] This support continued. For instance, in early 2001, a leading US
expert on South Asia claimed that the Taliban were still “on the payroll
of the ISI.” [Times
of India, 3/7/01] The ISI didn’t create the Taliban simply for strategic
reasons; they shared the Taliban’s extreme radical vision. As the Wall Street
Journal remarked in November 2001, “Despite their clean chins and pressed
uniforms, the ISI men are as deeply fundamentalist as any bearded fanatic; the
ISI created the Taliban as their own instrument and still supports it.” [Asia Times, 11/15/01]
Saeed’s Background
Saeed Sheikh would eventually become deeply involved in the world of the ISI,
as well as al-Qaeda. But initially he seemed an unlikely candidate for a career
in espionage and terrorism. He was born in Britain with the name Ahmed Omar Saeed
Sheikh, the son of a wealthy Pakistani clothing manufacturer. He grew up in London,
a brilliant student attending the best private schools. He studied mathematics
and statistics at the London School of Economics. While still at school, he started
a successful shares and equities business and also was a chess champion, world
class arm wrestler, and martial arts expert—a rare combination of physical
and mental prowess. [Rediff,
2/6/02, South
Asian Outlook, 3/02]
His life took a turn when he volunteered for charity work in Bosnia in late
1992. The Bosnian war was raging, and he saw atrocities committed by Serbians
on Bosnian Muslims. He returned to Britain a committed Muslim radical. Because
of his impressive abilities in economics and mathematics, as well as fluency
in English and complete understanding of Western society, he was a very valuable
asset to any terrorist group. [ABC
News, 2/7/02]
In 1993 he emerged in Pakistan as a member of a militant group fighting for
the liberation of Kashmir from India. Pakistan has been fighting India for years
over control of Kashmir, and it appears Saeed was put on the ISI payroll around
this time, to help the Pakistani cause in Kashmir. [ABC
News, 2/7/02] In 1994, Saeed began training at a training camp in Afghanistan.
He soon was teaching the classes. [Los
Angeles Times, 2/9/02] He developed close ties with al-Qaeda while training
there. By the end of the year he was known as Osama bin Laden’s “favored
son” or “my special son.” [London
Times, 8/21/02, Vanity Fair,
8/02]
Saeed in an Indian hospital shortly after being arrested in 1994. He was shot
while being captured. [Indian Express]
|
Prison and Escape
Saeed Sheikh was arrested in India in 1994 while on a kidnapping mission designed
to trade Western tourists for Kashmiri separatists. [ABC
News, 2/7/02] The ISI paid his legal fees, but he was nonetheless sentenced
to a long prison term in an Indian jail. [Washington
Post, 5/3/02] While in prison, his natural abilities soon allowed him to
become the leader of the jail’s large Muslim population. By his own admission,
he “lived practically like a Mafia don.” [London
Times, 8/21/02] It has been claimed that in 1999, British intelligence secretly
offered Saeed an amnesty and the ability to “live in London a free man” if he would reveal his links to al-Qaeda. He apparently refused. [Daily
Mail, 7/16/02, London Times, 7/16/02] Even more curiously, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review
suggested in March 2002, “There are many in Musharraf’s government who believe
that Saeed Sheikh’s power comes not from the ISI, but from his connections with
our own CIA. The theory is that… Saeed Sheikh was bought and paid for.” [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02]
In December 1999, terrorists hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft and flew
it to Kandahar, Afghanistan. After an eight-day standoff, the 155 hostages were
released in exchange for Saeed and two other three Pakistani terrorists held
by India. [BBC,
12/31/99] He must have been already highly valued by al-Qaeda, because the
hijacking appears to have been largely funded and carried out by them. [CNN,
6/13/02, New
York Times, 12/6/01] Saeed stayed at a Kandahar guesthouse for several days,
conferring with Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden. An ISI
colonel then escorted him to a safe house in Pakistan. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02]
The hijackers leave the Indian Airlines plane, under Taliban supervision.
They were given 8 hours to leave the country. [BBC] |
Saeed Keeps Busy
In his roughly two years of freedom before 9/11, Saeed was a very busy terrorist.
According to Newsweek, once in Pakistan, Saeed “lived openly—and opulently—in
a wealthy Lahore neighborhood. US sources say he did little to hide his connections
to terrorist organizations, and even attended swanky parties attended by senior
Pakistani government officials.” The US government inferred that he was
a “protected asset” of the ISI. [Newsweek,
3/13/02] In fact, his house was given to him by the ISI. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02] Even more remarkably, the media reported that Saeed was freely
able to return to Britain [Press Trust
of India, 1/3/00], just as if he had accepted Britain’s secret amnesty offer.
He visited his parents in Britain in 2000 and again in early 2001. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02, BBC, 7/16/02,
Telegraph,
7/16/02] The British citizens kidnapped by Saeed in 1994 called the government’s
decision not to try him a “disgrace” and “scandalous.” [Press
Trust of India, 1/3/00]
It as been reported that Saeed helped train the hijackers. [Telegraph,
9/30/01] Presumably this happened in Afghanistan, where he trained others
and where he traveled regularly. [New
York Times, 2/25/02, National
Post, 2/26/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, India Today, 2/25/02]
He also reportedly helped devise a secure, encrypted Web-based communications
system for al-Qaeda. “His future in the network seemed limitless; there
was even talk of one day succeeding bin Laden.” [Vanity
Fair, 8/02, Telegraph,
7/16/02]
But at the same time, much of his time was spent working with the ISI. He worked
with Ijaz Shah, a former ISI official in charge of handling two terrorist groups,
Lieutenant-General Mohammad Aziz Khan, also a former deputy chief of the ISI
in charge of relations with Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Brigadier Abdullah, a former
ISI officer. He was well known to other senior ISI officers. [National
Post, 2/26/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, India Today, 2/25/02]
How much of his work with al-Qaeda was done on the orders of the ISI is not known.
Saeed’s 9/11 Role is First Revealed
By now, the al-Qaeda 9/11 plot was in motion. Someone in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), using an alias, periodically wired money to and from hijackers Mohamed
Atta and Marwan Alshehhi between June 2000 and the day before 9/11. [MSNBC,
12/11/01] The identity of this person has been a highly disputed subject.
On September 23, 2001, it was first reported that authorities were now (finally)
looking for Saeed Sheikh, though it wasn’t explained why. [London
Times, 9/23/01] The next day, it was reported that the 9/11 “paymaster” had been found, using the alias “Mustafa Ahmed.” [Newsweek,
9/24/01] On October 1, 2001, the Guardian reported, “The man at the
center of the financial web is believed to be Sheikh Saeed, also known as Mustafa
Mohamed Ahmad,” but it wasn’t immediately clear who this person was. [Guardian,
10/1/01] On October 6, CNN revealed that “US investigators now
believe Sheik Syed, using the alias Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad, sent more than $100,000
from Pakistan to Mohamed Atta.” More importantly, CNN confirmed that this
was in fact the same Saeed Sheikh who had been released from an Indian prison
in 1999. [CNN,
10/6/01]
Enter Lt. Gen. Mahmood and the ISI
President Musharraf shakes hands with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood. [AFP] |
On October 7, 2001, Pakistani President Musharraf fired Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed,
the head of the ISI. The next day, some newspapers, mostly in India but also
in Pakistan, shockingly said he was fired for his role in the 9/11 attacks. [Press
Trust of India, 10/8/01] For instance, a Pakistani newspaper stated, “Lt.
Gen. Mahmood Ahmed has been replaced after the FBI investigators established
credible links between him and Umar Sheikh, one of the three militants released
in exchange for passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane in 1999… Informed
sources said there were enough indications with the US intelligence agencies
that it was at Gen. Mahmood’s instruction that Sheikh had transferred 100,000
US dollars into the account of Mohammed Atta…” [Dawn,
10/9/01] Indian newspapers claimed that Indian intelligence had been instrumental
in helping to establish the connection. [Times
of India, 10/9/01, India Today,
10/15/01, Agence France-Presse, 10/10/01,
Daily Excelsior, 10/18/01]
Yet this explosive story was barely mentioned in the West. [Australian,
10/10/01, AFP, 10/10/01] In the
US, surprisingly, the only mention was in a one short piece in the Wall Street
Journal, mentioning that, “The US authorities… confirm[ed] the fact that
$100,000 [was] wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed Atta from Pakistan by Ahmad Umar
Sheikh at the insistence of General Mahmood.” [Wall
Street Journal, 10/10/01] Most other Western accounts simply explained Mahmood
was fired for being too close to the Taliban. [London
Times, 10/9/01, Guardian, 10/9/01]
If true, the story would strongly suggest that the ISI played a very large
role in the 9/11 attacks. Why the silence on such an important story? One might
credit skepticism that the story was merely Indian propaganda. But a larger pattern,
detailed below, suggests there is something more to the media’s attitude: a strong
reluctance to print any evidence suggesting Pakistan was behind the 9/11 attacks.
Mahmood’s sudden and complete disappearance also seems curious. He is reportedly
living under “virtual house arrest” [Asia
Times, 1/5/02], and has refused to speak to reporters since being fired.
[AP, 2/21/02] Other former ISI Directors
living in Pakistan seemingly even more supportive of the Taliban continue to
be very vocal (such as Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, for instance [New
Yorker, 12/3/01]), and numerous other ISI officers have supported the Taliban
in seeming defiance of Musharraf’s wishes and not faced house arrest. [Guardian,
5/25/02]
Distractions Away From Saeed
Not only did Mahmood suddenly become persona non grata, but so did Saeed Sheikh,
now that he was implicated in Mahmood’s story. He was again mentioned as the
9/11 paymaster the day before the Mahmood story broke [CNN,
10/8/01], and then suddenly, all mention of him ceased (with one exception
[CNN, 10/28/01]). Since then, the
FBI has put forth a variety of alternates for the identity of the person in the
9/11 paymaster role. The story is too complicated to greatly detail here, but
the FBI and media have variously filled Saeed Sheikh’s shoes with an Egyptian
named Shaykh Saiid [Sydney Morning
Herald, 9/28/01, New
York Times, 10/15/01, Los
Angeles Times, 10/20/01], a Saudi named Sa’d Al-Sharif, said to be bin Laden’s
brother-in-law [Newsweek, 11/11/01,
AP, 12/18/01], a Kenyan named Sheik
Sayyid el Masry [CNN,
10/16/01, Trial Transcript,
2/20/01, Trial Transcript,
2/21/01], a Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi or al-Hisawi (suggesting no alias was
used) [MSNBC,
12/11/01, Wall
Street Journal, 6/17/02], a Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif [AP,
6/4/02], an Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (for some of the money transfers) [Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02], and so on. Most recently, the FBI said
the most well-known candidate, Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif, doesn’t actually exist,
but is probably a composite of Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hisawi, Shaikh Saiid al-Masri,
and Saad al-Sharif. [AP,
12/26/02] Newsweek, in describing yet another name variation, Mustafa Ahmad
Adin Al-Husawi, says the person “remains almost a total mystery,” and
no one is sure of his name or even if he is one person. [Newsweek,
9/4/02] (Note that Saeed appears to be a master of disguise, as can be seen
by the bewildering number of names he is referred to in the media: Sheik Syed,
Ahmad Umar Sheikh, Umar Sheikh, Sheik Omar Saeed, Omar Saiid Sheikh, Sheikh Omar,
etc… He opened bank accounts using many of his name variations, or even completely
unrelated names. [The News, 2/13/02])
While the FBI and media have been putting forth a series of names sounding
remarkably similar to Saeed Sheikh or the aliases he used, they have been ignoring
or forgetting solid evidence that links Saeed Sheikh to the funding of 9/11.
To do so would mean confronting Saeed’s ISI ties, and the possibility that he
was acting on orders from Mahmood, or even President Musharraf.
Aftab Ansari. [Press Trust of India]
|
Saeed, Working With Underworld Figures, Gives Money to Mohamed Atta
During the five years Saeed spent in an Indian prison, he developed friendships
with some very unsavory people. One such person was Aftab Ansari. Ansari is an
Indian gangster who was released on bail near the end of 1999 and then skipped
the country. [India Today, 2/25/02]
Saeed additionally met a prisoner named Asif Raza Khan, also released in 1999.
[Rediff, 11/17/01]
Ansari moved to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and began expanding his Indian-based
criminal network with Asif Raza Khan and others. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/23/02] By early 2001, they had organized a kidnapping network.
They would kidnap rich Indian businessmen and use the money to fund other illegal
activities. [India Today, 2/14/02,
Times of India, 2/14/02]
Mutual friend Saeed, drawing on his previous terrorist training expertise, provided
training and weapons to the kidnappers in return for a percentage of the profits.
[Frontline, 2/2/02,
India Today, 2/25/02] Ansari’s
criminal underground network would also assist the ISI in conducting terrorist
attacks inside India. [Press
Trust of India, 5/13/02]
In late July 2001, a wealthy Indian shoe manufacturer was kidnapped in Calcutta,
India. In early August, his ransom was paid to Ansari’s group, and the victim
was let go. Ansari gave about $100,000 of the approximately $830,000 in ransom
money to Saeed, who sent it to hijacker Mohamed Atta. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/23/02, Independent,
1/24/02] A series of recovered e-mails shows the money was sent just after
August 11, 2001. [India Today,
2/14/02, Times of India,
2/14/02]
Note that this $100,000 is the same amount ISI Director Mahmood supposedly
told Saeed to send to Atta. The timing of Mahmood’s order isn’t known, however.
It may refer to this early August 2001 transaction, or it could refer to a separate
approximately $100,000 sent to Atta from Dubai, UAE between June and September
2000. [MSNBC, 12/11/01, Newsweek,
12/2/01] There were probably other transactions, since it is believed the
hijackers spent between $500,000—$600,000 in the US. At least $325,000
came from the person using the alias “Mustafa Ahmed” and variants on
that name. [New
York Times, 7/10/02] The lack of banking regulations in the UAE and the secrecy
of the Middle Eastern “hawala” money transfer system has apparently
kept details of these other money transfers unknown. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/20/02] But it stands to reason that Saeed wouldn’t have
sent only one money transfer on orders of Mahmood and the rest on his own initiative.
Presumably, Saeed used Ansari’s money because it would leave even less of a paper
trail than money from a legitimate banking account.
The FBI has reported that many of the hijackers passed through Dubai and met
with the 9/11 paymaster. They would be given Visa credit cards, travelers checks,
and help in opening bank accounts. [Washington
Post, 12/13/01, MSNBC,
12/11/01, Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02, London
Times, 12/1/01, Congressional
Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02] This further suggests that the paymaster
was Saeed, since he was making frequent trips to Dubai at this time. [Guardian,
2/9/02]
Pakistan’s Support of Terrorism
Maulana Masood Azhar.
|
Why would Pakistan’s secret service openly back someone like Saeed? Pakistan’s
population is only a fraction of their arch-rival, India, and in a conventional
war they likely would fare badly. Several wars have been fought between the two
countries over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Because Pakistan’s army cannot
compete with India’s in Kashmir, it has resorted to guerrilla attacks using radical
Muslim terrorists to make up for their lack of numbers. The ISI directs the terrorist
groups fighting in Kashmir, but tries to maintain a certain level of distance
and plausible deniability. [New
York Times, 10/29/01]
It is usually maintained that the terror groups fighting in Kashmir have nothing
to do with other terrorist groups fighting other enemies of Islam around the
world. However, this distinction does not exist in reality. For instance, terrorist
leader Maulana Masood Azhar was freed with al-Qaeda help in the same 1999 airplane
hijacking swap that freed Saeed. Azhar quickly returned to Pakistan in January
2000, but didn’t face arrest. Instead, a few days after being freed, he told
a cheering Pakistani crowd of 10,000 supporters, “I have come here because
this is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have
destroyed America and India.” [AP,
1/5/00] He then toured Pakistan for weeks under the protection of the ISI.
[Vanity Fair, 8/02] Saeed had
grown close to Azhar in Indian prison. In early 2000, Saeed and the ISI helped
Azhar form a new terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammad, and soon Azhar was
behind more terrorist acts, mostly in Kashmir. [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, Washington
Post, 2/8/03] Jaish-e-Mohammad worked with the ISI, Saeed and Ansari in their
numerous attacks. For instance, shortly after the October 2001 Kashmir bombing,
Indian intelligence claims that Pakistani President Musharraf was given a recording
of a phone call between Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Maulana Masood Azhar and ISI
Director Mahmood in which Azhar reported the bombing is a “success.” [UPI, 10/10/01, Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] In early January 2002, the FBI was interested in
questioning Azhar, and a Pakistani official stated that, “The Americans
are aware Azhar met bin Laden often, and are convinced he can give important
information about bin Laden’s present whereabouts and even the September 11 attacks.” [Gulf News, 1/5/02]
The ISI, mainly through these proxy terrorist groups, has deep ties to al-Qaeda.
In 1993, the same Azhar helped al-Qaeda train and fund Somali warlord forces
so they could kill US soldiers stationed in Somalia. These attacks forced the
US to withdraw from that country. [PBS
Frontline, 10/3/02, Los
Angeles Times, 2/25/02] For years, the ISI has had Kashmiri terrorist groups
like Jaish-e-Mohammad train in the same Afghanistan training camps used by bin
Laden. [New
York Times, 10/29/01, Time,
5/6/02] In fact, in August 1998 when Clinton launched missiles to kill bin
Laden in one of his training camps, the missiles accidentally killed five ISI
officers and some twenty of their trainees. [Observer,
8/23/98, New
Yorker, 1/24/00]
Protecting bin Laden
The Pakistani government not only assisted al-Qaeda, they were instrumental
in keeping bin Laden alive. It has been widely rumored that bin Laden suffers
severe medical problems. On July 2, 2001, an Indian newspaper reported that “bin
Laden, who suffers from renal deficiency, has been periodically undergoing dialysis
in a Peshawar military hospital with the knowledge and approval of the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), if not of [Pakistani President] Musharraf himself.” [SARPA,
7/2/01] The highly respected intelligence newsletter, Jane’s Intelligence
Digest, later reported the same story, and came close to confirming it: “None
of [these details] will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who have
been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities.” [Jane’s
Intelligence Digest, 9/20/01] CBS later reported bin Laden had emergency
medical care in Pakistan the day before September 11. He was spirited into a
military hospital in Rawalpindi for kidney dialysis treatment. Pakistani military
forces guarded him. They also moved out all the regular staff in the urology
department and sent in a secret team to replace them. [CBS
News, 01/28/02] The Jane’s article added, “It is becoming clear that
both the Taliban and al-Qaeda would have found it difficult to have continued
functioning—including the latter group’s terrorist activities—without
substantial aid and support from [Pakistan].” [Jane’s
Intelligence Digest, 9/20/01]
Without a doubt, bin Laden’s safe haven in Afghanistan would not have existed
without the ISI. Two days before 9/11, the Taliban preemptively took out their
main enemy is anticipation of a post-9/11 backlash. [St.
Petersburg Times, 9/9/02] Two men posing as journalists assassinated Northern
Alliance leader General Ahmed Shah Massoud, the one opposition leader with broad
popular support in Afghanistan.[BBC,
9/10/01, BBC,
9/10/01] His assassins had ties to both al-Qaeda and the ISI. [Radio
Free Europe, 9/10/01, Newsday,
9/15/01, Reuters, 10/4/01]
The Taliban’s army had been massing for an attack against the Northern Alliance
for weeks, but didn’t attack until hours after Massoud’s assassination. A large
portion of this force was actually made of Pakistani soldiers. [Time,
8/4/02] When the US attacked Afghanistan after 9/11, the ISI secretly supported
the Taliban with military advisors and weapon shipments, despite promising the
US not to. [Telegraph,
10/10/01, Knight Ridder,
11/3/01, New
York Times, 12/8/01, UPI, 11/1/01,
Time,
5/6/02] A anonymous Western diplomat later stated, “We did not fully
understand the significance of Pakistan’s role in propping up the Taliban until
their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs.” [New
York Times, 12/8/01] But why this would not be understood is a mystery. In
June 2001, UPI reporters noted, “Despite Pakistan’s official denials, Taliban
is entirely dependent on Pakistani aid. This was verified on the ground by UPI.
Everything from bottled water to oil, gasoline and aviation fuel, and from telephone
equipment to military supplies, comes from Pakistan.” [UPI,
6/14/01]
A Curious Visit
The relationship between the US and the ISI is hard to fathom. On September
4, 2001, ISI Director Mahmood Ahmed arrived in Washington, D.C. On September
10, a Pakistani newspaper reported on the visit, saying that it had “triggered
speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National
Security Council” as well as meetings with CIA Director George Tenet, unspecified
officials at the White House and the Pentagon, and his “most important meeting” with Marc Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The article
suggested that “of course, Osama bin Laden” was the focus of some discussions.
Prophetically, the article added, “What added interest to his visit is the
history of such visits. Last time [his] predecessor was here, the domestic [Pakistani]
politics turned topsy-turvy within days. That this is not the first visit by
Mahmood in the last three months shows the urgency of the ongoing parleys.” [Karachi News, 9/10/01] In May 2001,
both CIA Director George Tenet and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
had visited South Asia. It’s not known if they met with Mahmood or anyone else
in the ISI, but according to credible news reports, Tenet had “unusually
long” consultations with President Musharraf. It is also worth noting
that Armitage is known for his “large circle of friends in the Pakistani
military and ISI” [SAPRA, 5/22/01]
as well as his connections to the Iran-Contra affair.
Of course everyone knows that politics did turn very “topsy-turvy” one day after the Karachi News article on September 10. But what many don’t
know is that on the morning of September 11, Lt. Gen. Mahmood was at a breakfast
meeting at the Capitol with the chairmen of the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees, Senator Bob Graham (D) and Representative Porter Goss (R). The meeting
was said to have lasted at least until the second plane hit the World Trade Center.
Goss is a self-admitted 10-year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine operations wing.
[Washington
Post, 5/18/02] Goss and Graham were later the heads of the joint House-Senate
investigation into the September 11 attacks, and Goss in particular made headlines
for saying there was no “smoking gun” indicating that the government
had sufficient foreknowledge to prevent the September 11 attacks. [Washington
Post, 7/11/02] Also present at the meeting were Senator John Kyl (R) and
the Pakistani ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi (note that all or virtually
all of the people in this meeting also met Lt. Gen. Mahmood in Pakistan a few
weeks earlier [Salon,
9/14/01]). Senator Graham later said of the meeting: “We were talking
about terrorism, specifically terrorism generated from Afghanistan,” and
the New York Times mentioned that bin Laden was specifically being discussed.
[Vero Beach Press Journal,
9/12/01, Salon,
9/14/01, New
York Times, 6/3/02] The fact that these people were meeting at the time of
the attacks is a strange coincidence at the very least, not to mention the topic
of their conversation!
On September 12 and 13, Lt. Gen. Mahmood met with Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage, Senator Joseph Biden, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and Secretary of State Colin Powell. An agreement on Pakistan’s collaboration
in the new “war on terror” was negotiated between Mahmood and Armitage.
[Miami Herald, 9/16/01] All
these meetings coordinated Pakistan’s response to September 11. [New
York Times, 9/13/01, Reuters,
9/13/01, Associated
Press, 9/13/01] Isn’t it strange that the terms of Pakistan’s commitment
to fight al-Qaeda were negotiated with the man who may have given orders to send
$100,000 to the September 11 hijackers?
What would happen if Saeed told all that he knew?
This picture of Saeed was taken in November 2001. He parties with government
officials while they pretend they don’t know his location. [AP] |
Saeed Still Lives Openly in Pakistan
In the days right before September 11, a flurry of money transfers occurred
between the 9/11 paymaster in the UAE—presumably Saeed—and the hijackers.
Between September 6 and 10, $26,315 was wired from the hijackers back to the
UAE—leftover money from the September 11 plot. [MSNBC,
12/11/01, Guardian,
10/1/01] On September 11, in the hours before the attacks, the paymaster
transferred $40,871 from his UAE bank accounts to his Visa card, and caught a
plane flight from the UAE to Pakistan. There are records of him making six ATM
withdrawals in Karachi on September 13, and then his trail goes cold. [MSNBC,
12/11/01] Saeed later claims to have met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan
a few days after September 11 (but has said nothing about a 9/11 role). [Washington
Post, 2/18/02, London
Times, 2/25/02]
Saeed then continued to live openly in his ISI house in Lahore, Pakistan. He
was “frequently seen” at local parties hosted by government leaders
and “made no secret” of his whereabouts. In January 2002, he celebrated
the birth of his baby at a party he hosted in the city. [USA
Today, 2/25/02] It has been suggested that after September 11 he acted as
a “go-between” for bin Laden and the ISI, which makes perfect sense
given his involvement in both groups. [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] Furthermore, “It is believed he helped
produce bin Laden’s latest taped interview” in early 2002. [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02]
A terrorist lies dead near the entrance to the Indian parliament building.
[R. V. Moorthy]
|
Meanwhile, the partnership between Saeed and the ISI on one hand and Ansari
and his Indian criminal underground on the other, continued to prove profitable
and productive. On October 1, 2001, a suicide truck-bomb attack on the provincial
parliamentary assembly in Indian-controlled Kashmir killed 36 people. On December
13, 2001, the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi was attacked by terrorists.
Fourteen people, including the five attackers, were killed. On January 22, 2002,
a crowd of mostly unarmed Indian police near the US Information Service building
in Calcutta, India, were attacked by gunmen; four policemen were killed and 21
people injured. It appears that Saeed and Ansari were behind all of these attacks.
[Vanity Fair, 8/02, Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] Ansari even called from Dubai to take credit for
the Calcutta attack. [Telegraph,
1/24/02] Jaish-e-Mohammad, Maulana Masood Azhar’s group, is also involved
in these attacks. [Vanity Fair,
8/02]
Slow Justice
As previously mentioned, it was first reported that authorities were looking
for Saeed on September 23, 2001. In fact, it appears British intelligence began
asking for legal assistance in catching Saeed Sheikh sometime during August 2001.
It isn’t clear if they were finally starting to punish him for his 1994 kidnapping
of Britons, or if this was spurred by some new activity. [London
Times, 4/21/02, Vanity Fair,
8/02] Saeed’s role in 9/11 began to be reported in late September and early
October, but an Indian magazine would note, “Curiously, there seems to have
been little international pressure on Pakistan to hand him over.” [Frontline,
10/6/01]
The strange slowness in catching Saeed continued. In November 2001, a US grand
jury finally secretly indicted Saeed Sheikh for his kidnapping of a US citizen
seven years earlier. [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] The US later claimed it began asking Pakistan for
help in finding Saeed in late November 2001. [AP,
2/26/02, Newsweek, 3/13/02]
However, it took until January 9, 2002 for Wendy Chamberlin, the US ambassador
to Pakistan, to officially ask the Pakistani government for help in arresting
and extraditing Saeed. [AP, 2/24/02,
CNN, 2/24/02, Los
Angeles Times, 2/25/02] Saeed was still seen partying with Pakistani government
officials well into January 2002. The Los Angeles Times later noted that Saeed “moved about Pakistan without apparent impediments from authorities” into February. [Los
Angeles Times, 2/13/02] The London Times said, “It is inconceivable
that the Pakistani authorities did not know where he was” before then. [London
Times, 4/21/02] It took the events relating to Daniel Pearl for Pakistan
to finally “discover” Saeed’s location.
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. |
Enter Daniel Pearl… and Robert Mueller
The ever-busy Saeed meanwhile was taking part in another kidnapping. The target
was Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Pearl had become fascinated in
a number of stories involving the ISI. On December 24, 2001, he reported about
ties between the ISI and a Pakistani organization that was working on giving
bin Laden nuclear secrets before 9/11. A few days later, he reported that Jaish-e-Mohammad
still had its office running and bank accounts working, even after President
Musharraf claimed to have banned the group. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02, Guardian, 7/16/02] He began investigating links between shoe bomber Richard
Reid and Pakistani militants connected to the ISI [Washington
Post, 2/23/02], investigating Dawood Ibrahim, a powerful terrorist and gangster
protected by the ISI [Newsweek,
2/4/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02],
and may also have been investigating the US training and backing of the ISI.
[Gulf News,
3/25/02] Former CIA agent Robert Baer later claimed he was working with Pearl
on investigating 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [UPI,
9/30/02] It is later suggested that Mohammed masterminded Reid’s shoe bomb
attempt and has connections to both Pakistani gangsters and the ISI, so some
of these explanations could fit together. [UPI,
9/30/02, Asia
Times, 10/30/02, CNN,
1/30/03] Kidnapper Saeed later said of Pearl, “because of his hyperactivity
he caught our interest.” [The News,
2/15/02]
The attempt to lure Pearl into a position where he could be kidnapped began
on January 11, 2002. [Vanity Fair,
8/02, Wall
Street Journal, 1/23/03] On January 22, FBI Director Robert Mueller visited
India, and was told by Indian investigators that Saeed Sheikh sent ransom money
to hijacker Mohamed Atta in the US. This story now broke into the press, even
being reported some in the US and Britain. [Los
Angeles Times, 1/23/02, Independent,
2/24/02, AFP, 1/27/02, Telegraph,
1/27/02] On January 23, Saeed helped kidnap reporter Daniel Pearl. Also on
January 23, Saeed’s criminal partner Aftab Ansari was placed under surveillance
in Dubai, UAE. The next day, Mueller went to Pakistan and discussed Saeed at
a previously scheduled meeting with President Musharraf. Apparently Saeed’s role
in Pearl’s kidnapping was not yet known. [AP,
2/24/02] Mueller then flew to Dubai on his way back to the US to pressure
the government there to arrest Ansari and deport him to India. Ansari was arrested
on February 5 and deported four days later. [AP,
2/10/02, Frontline,
2/16/02, India Today, 2/25/02]
Aftab Ansari in handcuffs. |
Pakistani President Musharraf must have decided that Saeed knew too much, and
needed to die before he could be extradited to the US. Around January 31, 2002,
Daniel Pearl was murdered by his kidnappers. Police investigators say “there
were at least eight to 10 people present on the scene,” and at least 15
who participated in his kidnapping and murder. “Despite issuing a series
of political demands shortly after Pearl’s abduction four weeks ago, it now seems
clear that the kidnappers planned to kill Pearl all along.” [Washington
Post, 2/23/02] Musharraf even brazenly stated, “Perhaps Daniel Pearl
was over-intrusive. A mediaperson should be aware of the dangers of getting into
dangerous areas. Unfortunately, he got over-involved.” [Hindu,
3/8/02] in “intelligence games.” [Washington
Post, 5/3/02] At the same time he could eliminate the overly-nosy Pearl,
Musharraf could punish Saeed for the deed to make sure he would keep quiet about
the ISI’s connections to 9/11.
The timing of Mueller’s visits certainly is curious. After months of doing
little to catch Saeed, suddenly Mueller is traveling all over Asia and both Saeed
and Ansari are arrested within days? Did Mueller act with Musharraf to silence
Saeed so the Indian reports of Saeed’s involvement in 9/11 could be quashed?
As shown below, the US government has acted as if this was the case ever since.
The Net Closes
Daniel Pearl before he was killed. |
To capture Saeed, it appears the police simply rounded up all of his family
members and likely threatened to kill or harm them unless Saeed gave himself
up. [AP,
2/9/02, Karachi News, 2/13/02]
On February 5, Saeed turned himself in, not to the police, but to his ISI boss
Ijaz Shah. [Boston Globe, 2/7/02,
Vanity Fair, 8/02] For the next
week, Saeed and the ISI worked “out a deal for how little he would say about
the ISI’s support for terrorist groups in Kashmir and Pakistan in exchange for
not being extradited to the United States. Neither the Pakistani police nor the
US Embassy nor the FBI who were in Islamabad investigating the kidnapping were
informed that Saeed was being held by the ISI during this period.” [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] During this time, President Musharraf was traveling
in the US. Reporter Seymour Hersh claims Musharraf knew Saeed was being held
by the ISI, but publicly claimed ignorance. [NOW
with Bill Moyers, 2/21/03]
“The deal done, a brazen Saeed Sheikh gave himself up to police, telling
them of Pearl’s capture but misleading them on every possible fact—including
his ISI linkage.” [Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02] When asked by the FBI about his connection to the
ISI, Saeed replied, “I will not discuss this subject… I do not want my
family to be killed.” He cryptically added, “I know people in the government
and they know me and my work.” [Newsweek,
3/13/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02]
He did admit to his ties to Ansari, just as Ansari later admitted his ties to
Saeed and the ISI, but both refused to discuss 9/11. [Washington
Post, 2/18/02, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, 2/11/02, Press
Trust of India, 5/13/02]
Saeed’s surrender was made public on February 13. [Newsweek,
3/11/02] He then confessed to the murder of Daniel Pearl. Yet, as Newsweek
put it, he remained, “confident, even cocky.” He told his interrogators
that he was “sure” he wouldn’t be extradited to the US and said he
wouldn’t serve more than “three or four years” in a Pakistan prison.
[Newsweek, 3/13/02] Several
others were also arrested for their part in Pearl’s murder. Like Saeed, most
had ties to both the ISI and al-Qaeda. [Washington
Post, 2/23/02, London
Times, 2/25/02] One even boasted of having once flown bin Laden’s personal
airplane. [PakNews,
2/11/02]
Saeed in handcuffs in Karachi on March 2, 2002. [AP] |
Double Cross
But Saeed and the others were tricked. Musharraf had no intention to extradite
Saeed to the US. The US Ambassador to Pakistan even reported that Musharraf privately
said, “I’d rather hang him myself” than extradite him. [Washington
Post, 3/28/02] He was simply too risky to keep him alive; his connections
to both the ISI and the September 11 hijackers were too obvious. As the Washington
Post put it, “The [ISI] is a house of horrors waiting to break open. Saeed
has tales to tell.” [Washington
Post, 3/28/02] So the prosecution sought the death sentence for Saeed, not
a light sentence. Saeed withdrew his confession. On April 5, in an article titled, “A Certain Outcome for Pearl Trial: Death Sentences Expected, Despite Lack
of Evidence,” NBC reported, “Some in Pakistan’s government also are
very concerned about what Saeed might say in court. His organization and other
militant groups here have ties to Pakistan’s secret intelligence agency [the
ISI]. There are concerns he could try to implicate that government agency in
the Pearl case, or other questionable dealings that could be at the very least
embarrassing, or worse.” [MSNBC,
4/5/02]
On March 3, US Secretary of State Colin Powell ruled out any links between “elements of the ISI” and the murderers of reporter Daniel Pearl. [Dawn,
3/3/02] The Guardian was a rare voice in calling Powell on this obvious lie.
They called Powell’s comment “shocking,” given the overwhelming evidence
that the main suspect, Saeed Sheikh, worked for the ISI: “If he was extradited
to Washington and decided to talk, the entire story would unravel. His family
are fearful. They think he might be tried by a summary court and executed to
prevent the identity of his confederates being revealed.” [Guardian,
4/5/02] A week before Powell’s comment, even Powell’s colleague Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld “acknowledged reports that Omar Sheikh may have been an asset” for the ISI. [London
Times, 2/25/02]
Collective Amnesia
Given all of the above, one might think that the story of Daniel Pearl’s murderer’s
ties to both the ISI and the 9/11 hijackers would be the subject of front page
headlines. But, outside of India and Pakistan, the media generally reacted like
Colin Powell. Most media accounts failed to mention Saeed’s ties to the ISI,
al-Qaeda or 9/11. But even stranger were the accounts that reported on one of
Saeed’s roles but not the others, as if Saeed’s different roles were done by
completely different people. In the next several months, at least 12 US or British
articles mentioned Saeed’s links to al-Qaeda [ABC
News, 2/7/02, Boston Globe,
2/7/02, AP,
2/24/02, Los
Angeles Times, 3/15/02], including his financing of 9/11 [New
York Daily News, 2/7/02, CNN, 2/8/02,
AP,
2/9/02, Guardian,
2/9/02, Independent, 2/10/02,
Time,
2/10/02, New York Post, 2/10/02,
Evening Standard, 2/12/02,
Los
Angeles Times, 2/13/02, New York
Post, 2/22/02, Sunday Herald,
2/24/02, USA
Today, 3/8/02], and at least 16 articles mentioned his links to the ISI.
[Cox News, 2/21/02, Observer,
2/24/02, Telegraph,
2/24/02, Newsweek, 2/25/02,
New
York Times, 2/25/02, USA
Today, 2/25/02, National
Post, 2/26/02, Boston Globe,
2/28/02, Newsweek, 3/11/02,
Newsweek, 3/13/02, Guardian,
4/5/02, MSNBC, 4/5/02]
But only three articles considered that Saeed could have been connected to both
groups at the same time [London
Times, 2/25/02, London
Times, 4/21/02, Pittsburgh
Tribune-Review, 3/3/02], and only one of these mentioned he could be involved
in the ISI, al-Qaeda and financing 9/11 all at the same time. [London
Times, 4/21/02]
2,000 paramilitary troops surround the courthouse in Hyderabad where Saeed’s
verdict is read. [MSNBC, 7/15/02] |
The Trial
Efforts to eliminate Saeed and forget the past moved forward. In late February,
Time reported that the second highest Taliban official in US custody, Mullah
Haji Abdul Samat Khaksar, had been waiting for months to be interviewed by the
CIA. Even two weeks after Time informed US officials that he wanted to talk,
no one had bothered to give him a proper interview. Time noted that “he
claims to have information about al-Qaeda links to the ISI.” [Time,
2/25/02] In March, the editor of an important Pakistani newspaper had to
flee the country after being threatened by the ISI. His paper had reported on
connections between Saeed, the ISI, and the recent attacks on the Indian parliament
in Delhi and Kashmir. [The News, 2/18/02,
Washington
Post, 3/10/02, London
Times, 4/21/02, Guardian,
7/16/02]
Saeed’s trial began in April. It was decided by a secret “anti-terrorism” court known for its handpicked judges, [MSNBC,
4/5/02] and took place in a bunker underneath a prison. Furthermore,
no reporters were allowed to attend. “Fear lay heavily over the court,” reported one paper. [Independent,
7/16/02] The venue had to change three times because of bomb threats and
security concerns. [BBC,
5/7/02, BBC,
7/16/02] The trial judge also changed three times. The trial, by law, had
to finish within seven days, yet it took over three months. [BBC,
7/16/02] “Forensic scientists initially refused to attend the exhumation
of the court” for fear they would be murdered. Saeed himself threatened
the judge: “I will see whether who wants to kill me will kill me first,
or get himself killed.” [Independent,
7/16/02] The key witness was supposedly a taxi driver, but turned out to
be a head constable policeman. Immediately after the trial, the government announced
new suspects and new evidence that contradicted the Saeed verdict. [Guardian,
7/18/02] One of the new suspects was said by Pakistani police and intelligence
officials to be the true mastermind of Pearl’s murder (Saeed’s role was luring
in Pearl). But the “arrests were made when the trial was already in its
final stage and the official confirmation of these crucial arrests would have
completely derailed the prosecution’s case,” a senior police official said.
[Washington
Post, 7/15/02] When the verdict came down on July 15, Saeed, as the supposed “mastermind,” of course was sentenced to death, and three others were
given life in prison. [AP,
7/15/02] Saeed has appealed the decision but a second trial has yet to begin.
[AP, 8/18/02]
Saeed: “The Americans should have realized by now that whatever happened
on 11 September, they deserved that.” [BBC,
7/5/02] |
Reaction
The American and British governments approved the verdicts. [BBC,
7/15/02] Said White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, “The Bush administration
welcomes Pakistan’s verdict in this matter… Daniel Pearl was brutally executed,
and Pakistan’s… court system has now ruled. This is a further example of Pakistan
showing leadership in the war against terror.” [Wall
Street Journal, 7/15/02] In fact, “the government’s case rest[ed] heavily
on technical FBI evidence.” [AP,
7/1/02] On May 16, Pearl’s body was found and identified, but the FBI didn’t
officially release the DNA results because official confirmation of the body
would have meant a new trial. [Independent,
7/16/02] Pakistani officials admit they waited to release the results until
after the verdict. [Guardian,
7/18/02] So it seems the US was complicit in gaining a quick conviction in
a kangaroo court.
The mainstream media slipped further into amnesia regarding Saeed’s connections.
The conviction story made headlines, and there was room for lengthy background
information and even special background articles on Saeed. However no story in
the US mentioned his al-Qaeda or ISI connections, much less his 9/11 connections.
[AP,
7/15/02, AP,
7/15/02, CBS,
7/15/02, CNN,
7/15/02, Los Angeles Times, 7/15/02,
MSNBC, 7/15/02, New
York Times, 7/15/02, Reuters, 7/15/02, USA
Today, 7/15/02, Wall
Street Journal, 7/15/02, Washington
Post, 7/15/02] By comparison, in Britain, articles connected Saeed to the
ISI [Guardian,
7/16/02, Guardian,
7/16/02, Daily Mail, 7/16/02],
al-Qaeda [Independent,
7/16/02], the 9/11 attacks [Scotsman,
7/16/02], or some combination of the three [London Times, 7/16/02, Daily
Mail, 7/16/02, Telegraph,
7/16/02] (with one exception: [BBC,
7/16/02, BBC, 7/16/02]).
Many British newspapers also strongly questioned the justice of the verdict,
[Guardian,
7/18/02, Independent,
7/16/02, [Independent,
7/21/02, BBC,
7/16/02] while only the Washington Post did in the US. [Washington
Post, 7/15/02, Washington
Post, 7/16/02] As the Wall Street Journal delicately put it, “The prosecution
overcame some significant weaknesses in the case to obtain the conviction.” [Wall
Street Journal, 7/15/02]
A month after the verdict, a remarkable story in Vanity Fair explored all of
Saeed’s connections, but the article seemed to make no impact at all. [Vanity
Fair, 8/02] In the months since, Saeed’s connections seem to have been forgotten
even in the British media. Most recently, it has been suggested that 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the Daniel Pearl murder as well,
and may even have cut Pearl’s throat himself. [Time,
1/26/03, CNN,
1/30/03] This not only shows al-Qaeda working to benefit the ISI in silencing
Pearl, but also helps confirm the theory that Mohammed has been supported by
the ISI. Since Mohammed has been “linked to almost every attack against
the United States since the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993” [Los
Angeles Times, 6/16/02], that in turn raises the possibility that the ISI
has also been involved in all of those attacks, at the very least by not helping
to arrest Mohammed.
The ISI Muzzled? No
Musharraf has been hailed for his firing on ISI Director Mahmood, and generally
has been presented as a pro-Western figure trying to root of pro-terrorist factions
of the ISI. But The Observer has called this “The Myth of the Good General
Musharraf.” [Observer,
3/31/02] On January 12, 2002, in the face of US pressure, Musharraf made
a forceful speech condemning Islamic extremism, and arrested about 2,000 extremists
around the same time. Yet, by the end of the month, at least 800 had been quietly
released. [Washington
Post, 3/28/02] Since then, “almost all” of those arrested have
been released. Even the most prominent terrorist leaders, such as Saeed’s friend
Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, have been released. Remarkably,
the US has not protested despite Azhar’s role in killing US soldiers in Somalia
and other terrorist acts. Old terrorist organizations are running strongly again,
often under new names. [Christian
Science Monitor, 12/16/02, Washington
Post, 2/8/03] Reforms have been abandoned. As one US regional expert put
it, “It is no longer a question of whether Pakistan is going backwards or
forwards. It’s a question of how rapidly it’s going backwards.” [Financial
Times, 2/8/03]
So many other countries—Argentina, Britain, Cayman Islands, Egypt, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Russia, even a Taliban cabinet minister—warned
the US about an impending attack (see the They
Tried to Warn Us essay). How it is possible that Pakistan, in the best position
to know, gave no warning? If Musharraf is in control of the ISI, then how could
he not have known of the 9/11 attack, and if he isn’t in control and didn’t know,
then what good is he as a leader?
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf took power in a 1999 coup. |
The US government and media has had an astonishing ability to turn a blind
eye when it comes to Pakistan. For instance, in late September 2001, Pakistani
officials went to Afghanistan and secretly advised the Taliban to not turn over
bin Laden, but stand up and fight the US. [Knight
Ridder, 11/3/01, AP, 2/21/02,
Time,
5/6/02] In November 2001, it was reported that the US was mainly relying
on the ISI for its intelligence information on the war against the Taliban, even
as the ISI was secretly supplying the Taliban with supplies and military advisors.
[Knight Ridder, 11/3/01]
That same month, the US allowed Pakistan to airlift thousands of its soldiers,
who had been fighting alongside the Taliban, out of the besieged Afghan town
of Kunduz. In so doing, a large number of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders were “accidentally” airlifted out as well. One US official commented that the US was supposed to
be able to interview the Taliban leaders when they arrived in Pakistan, but were
not. [New Yorker,
1/21/02] This suggests the presence of the Taliban, at least, was hardly
an accident. It has been recently suggested that even members of bin Laden’s
immediate family were airlifted out. [NOW
with Bill Moyers, 2/21/03]
A UPI editorial stated, “Al-Qaeda terrorists have long since scattered
deep inside Pakistan and in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir where they enjoy the
protection of the [ISI]… The unspeakable is that Pakistan is the new Afghanistan,
a privileged sanctuary for hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters and Taliban operatives.
Some estimates go as high as 5,000… The Pakistani—al-Qaeda connection
is visible to all but the geopolitically challenged.” [UPI,
8/28/02] Prominent Taliban leaders wanted by the US have been living openly
in Pakistani cities and yet the US does nothing about them. [Guardian,
12/24/01, Time,
5/6/02] It is now widely reported that Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
and most other prominent al-Qaeda leaders are believed to be living in Pakistan,
some of them living in the open and in luxury, with the protection of the ISI.
It is frequently pointed out that Pakistan’s efforts to find them are mostly
a charade. [Los
Angeles Times, 4/6/02, Christian
Science Monitor, 7/2/02, Los
Angeles Times, 6/16/02, Time
7/29/02, Washington
Post, 8/4/02, New
York Times, 9/15/02, AP,
11/12/02, Los
Angeles Times, 11/17/02] But still, the situation doesn’t change. As an example
of Bush’s seemingly inexplicable response to terrorism in Pakistan, Azhar’s group
Jaish-e-Mohammed had its assets frozen shortly after 9/11, but the group simply
changed its name and over a year later the US has not frozen the assets of this “new” group. [Financial
Times, 2/8/03, Washington
Post, 2/8/03]
Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Since 1997, Pakistan has been secretly supplying
North Korea with nuclear technology, in return for long-range missile technology.
Seymour Hersh has suggested that it is likely Pakistan is giving nuclear technology
to other countries as well. [NOW
with Bill Moyers, 2/21/03] Even at the end of the Clinton administration
this link between Pakistan and North Korea was known, but neither Clinton nor
Bush stopped it. [San
Jose Mercury News, 10/24/02] As the Guardian put it, “If George Bush’s war on terror were remotely rational, or even roughly reasoned, then its next
target might be Pakistan, not Iraq. It should be said that the US is not justified
in pre-emptively and unilaterally attacking either country—or any other
sovereign state for that matter. But on the basis of Mr. Bush’s own axis of
evil criteria at least, Pakistan sits squarely in the theoretical firing line.” [Guardian,
10/8/02]
There is no evidence that the US has questioned Saeed about 9/11. Indian newspapers
have pointed out that if the US were to pressure its close ally Pakistan so Saeed
could to be interrogated in his Pakistani prison, they could not only learn more
about the financing of the 9/11 attacks, but also gain valuable information about
the structure of al-Qaeda cells in Pakistan. [Indian
Express, 7/19/02] Needless to say, there’s no evidence Lt. Gen. Mahmood has
been questioned, either.
Who Did It? We Can’t Tell You
There has been widespread speculation that the September 11 attacks must have
had the backing of a state intelligence agency. Said one CIA official, bin Laden “sits in a cave in Afghanistan and he’s running this operation? It’s so
huge. He couldn’t have done it alone.” [New
Yorker, 10/1/01] In December 2002, Senator Bob Graham, co-head of the Congressional
9/11 inquiry and privy to documents censored from the general public, said he
was “surprised at the evidence that there were foreign governments involved
in facilitating the activities of at least some of the [9/11] terrorists in the
United States.… To me that is an extremely significant issue and most of that
information is classified, I think overly-classified. I believe the American
people should know the extent of the challenge that we face in terms of foreign
government involvement. I think there is very compelling evidence that at least
some of the terrorists were assisted not just in financing—although that
was part of it—by a sovereign foreign government and that we have been
derelict in our duty to track that down… It will become public at some point
when it’s turned over to the archives, but that’s 20 or 30 years from now.” [PBS
Newshour, 12/11/02]
Funnily enough, not only was Graham meeting with Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed when
the 9/11 attacks began, his office has also acknowledged Graham was given a warning
before 9/11 by a US government informant that an ISI agent named R. G. Abbas,
in New York City to illegally trade heroin for Stinger missiles, pointed to the
World Trade Center and said, “Those towers are coming down.” This agent
made other references to an attack on the World Trade Center. The informant passed
these warnings on, but he claims, “The complaints were ordered sanitized
by the highest levels of government.” Transcripts of a resulting trial that
convicted several US-based associates of Abbas were censored to eliminate all
references to Pakistan. [Cox News,
8/2/02, Palm Beach Post,
10/17/02] An NBC reporter was able to easily telephone Abbas in Pakistan,
but apparently the FBI isn’t interested in questioning or extraditing him. [MSNBC,
8/2/02]
Disturbing Questions
Saeed Sheikh, hooded, remains a great danger to Musharraf until he can be
killed. |
One doesn’t have to wait 20 or 30 years to deduce that the ISI assisted al-Qaeda
in the 9/11 attacks. The question is, why is the US government seemingly ignoring
the evidence and actively discouraging the media from pursuing these ideas? Shortly
after 9/11, Bush said, “From this day forward, any nation that continues
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime.” [Los
Angeles Times, 10/13/01] What about Pakistan’s support of terrorism, if not
9/11, then the other terrorist attacks on India since? Is the US afraid of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons? If so, what’s to prevent the ISI from planning similar future
attacks with impunity, against any country?
Perhaps the US has plans to deal with Pakistan eventually. In January 2003,
Musharraf warned of an “impending danger” that Pakistan will become
a target of war for “Western forces” after the Iraq crisis. “We
will have to work on our own to stave off the danger. Nobody will come to our
rescue, not even the Islamic world. We will have to depend on our muscle.” [Press Trust of India, 1/19/03, Financial
Times, 2/8/03] Pointing to “a number of recent background briefings and leaks” from the US government, “Pakistani officials fear the
Bush administration is planning to change its tune dramatically once the war
against Iraq is out of the way.” [Financial
Times, 2/8/03] If so, could this lead to nuclear war?
Does the US ignore Pakistani complicity in 9/11 because it might be a thread
that could unravel in other disturbing directions? For instance, there have been
reports of secret deals between rich Saudis, the ISI, and bin Laden. [Sunday
Times, 8/25/02] Saudi Arabia has supported the Taliban by paying the ISI.
[UPI, 6/14/01] Before 9/11
the Asia Times reported that Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto ruler of Saudi
Arabia, is secretly a supporter of bin Laden. Furthermore, he made a secret visit
in the summer of 2001 to Afghanistan with Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed to confer with
the Taliban on how best to prevent bin Laden from being harmed by the US. [Asia
Times, 8/22/01] Another secret meeting between Mahmood and Crown Prince Abdullah
may have taken place shortly after 9/11. [Intelligence
Online, 10/4/01] While such reports are very fragmentary and speculative,
it is interesting to note that Senator Graham said “foreign governments”—plural,
not singular—were behind 9/11. Newsweek has reported a possible connection
between the Saudi government and some of the hijackers [Newsweek,
11/22/02], and has since reported that “The possibility of a Saudi link
to 9-11 is growing.” [Newsweek,
12/9/02]
Could the thread unravel in other directions as well? For instance, what about
the suggestion that Saeed was a CIA agent? A long time regional expert with extensive
CIA ties stated publicly in March 2001 that “the CIA still has close links
with the ISI,” and repeated the claim to CNN in February 2002. [Times
of India, 3/7/01, CNN, 2/27/02]
An anonymous former senior ISI official has stated, “The biggest problem
we have [in Pakistan] are the rogue elements in the intelligence agencies, especially
those who at some time became involved with the CIA.” [Christian
Science Monitor, 2/22/02] At the very least, the ISI may know very embarrassing
facts about the US. For instance, they may know a thing or two about CIA involvement
in drug smuggling and/or support of bin Laden in the 1980s. [Star
Tribune, 9/30/01, Atlantic
Monthly, 5/96, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, 9/23/01, UPI,
6/14/01] Unfortunately, Daniel Pearl was killed before he could investigate
the connections between the US and the ISI, and no journalist seems willing to
explore such dangerous subjects since his death.
What would the American public think of the motives for war in Iraq if they
knew a country with much deeper ties to al-Qaeda that was also proliferating
weapons of mass destruction was being so ignored?