The Gloves Come Off in the U.S.-Japan Relationship

Anyone shocked by Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ blunt language in Tokyo and the equally blunt Japanese response haven’t been paying attention to the U.S.-Japan relationship lately.  That, indeed, is part of the problem, as Washington became lulled by a Japan eager to take on broader global roles under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi earlier this decade.  A succession of weak leaders after Koizumi doomed the Liberal Democratic Party, and a wholesale change in government happened last month with the accession of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).  All through that process, coordination on U.S.-Japan policy continued, yet it did not fully recognize the deeper currents of change under the surface.

The DPJ ran a campaign on domestic issues, but when foreign policy came up, it hinted at potential changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance.  I wrote about those positions here, warning that the new governments in both Washington and Tokyo could start off on the wrong foot.  Yet for months before Gates’ visit this week, it was clear that Japanese and American officials were beginning to talk past each other.  When the Japanese suggested they would reopen negotiations on moving U.S. bases inside Okinawa, the U.S. side took it merely as electoral rhetoric.  Nor did the Japanese clearly hear American diplomats stating that the negotiations, finalized in 2006 yet stretching back to the 1990s, were a done deal.

Having spent two weeks in Tokyo this month, it was even more evident that the positions on the two sides were hardening.  It was also clear that diplomats on both sides, the day-to-day alliance managers, were struggling with maintaining equilibrium in the relationship while responding to orders from their political superiors.  Some long time Japan watchers quoted in the Washington Post article linked above say they haven’t seen such public tussling and underlying animosity in 30 years.

Two new governments, each focused on domestic issues, each coming to power by tapping into new bases of electoral support.  Alliance managers on both sides should have recognized that political positions taken by both governments would not easily be massaged, and the truth is both sides misread each other.  Secretary Gates laid down the markers in Tokyo, however, forcefully stating that any backsliding in the base realignment schedule would throw off the entire agreement, which includes moving III MEF headquarters to Guam, and consolidating land currently used by the Marines for return to Okinawa.  Part of Gates’ trip, of course, was to have a clear joint understanding on next steps in time for President Obama’s visit to Japan on November 12 and 13.

Now, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano has stated that Tokyo is unlikely to make a decision on dropping its renegotiating demand before Obama’s visit.  That, to put it mildly, would ruin the optics of the trip and cast a shadow over any other political agreements reached (on climate change, for example, a favorite topic of both sides).  Long time observers of the U.S.-Japan relationship will likely bet that the Japanese accept Gates’ demands by the time Air Force One touches down, and Japan’s Defense Minister already laid the groundwork for such an acquiescence this month.  However, no one should doubt that the Hatoyama Administration recognizes this is its first real test in foreign affairs and that its credibility in crafting a more independent foreign policy will stand or fall with actions taken over the next month.  Backroom discussions will be furiously taking place in Washington and Tokyo, for sure, but public exchanges like those in Tokyo this week may be more important in determining whether the allies find the will to solve this problem in a way acceptable to both sides.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.