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The Asahi Shimbun
December 20, 2005
The number of cases in which the Self-Defense Forces provided supplies or support for the U.S. military more than tripled in fiscal 2004 from the previous year, the Defense Agency said.
The increase stems from a 2004 revision to the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), enabling the SDF to provide such assistance to the U.S. military even during routine training drills.
The agreement was originally intended only for U.N. peacekeeping operations or joint training drills.
But Tokyo and Washington have become increasingly interdependent in terms of military cooperation. In addition, enhancing Japan's role in logistics support for U.S. troops is part of an interim report on U.S. military realignment.
According to the Defense Agency, the SDF provided goods and services to the U.S. military in response to requests 212 times between April and December 2004.
For all of fiscal 2003, the figure was 67.
Of the 212 cases, 150 involved assistance approved under the 2004 revision of the ACSA.
Conventional SDF assistance, including providing accommodation, fuel, transportation and other duties during Japan-U.S. joint exercises, remained at the same level as the previous year, which was 58.
Of the 212 cases, 148 involved U.S. aircraft being refueled at SDF air stations.The Asahi Shimbun
Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
December 16, 2005
(Kyodo) _ In the early 1990s, after Japan faced criticism for its passive checkbook diplomacy during the first Gulf War, the United States sought to take advantage of Tokyo's "defensiveness and fear of isolation" to prod it to play a greater role on the global stage, according to a recently declassified U.S. government document.
The document -- a cable dated March 14, 1991, by then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost -- is part of more than 1,750 declassified documents totaling over 8,000 pages that highlight how during 1977-1992 U.S. pressure spurred Japan to increase its international contributions and resolve trade friction.
The papers also clarify the process of how the two nations worked together to deepen their defense cooperation during these critical years, which saw the end of the Cold War and the launch of the Gulf War, even though their trade and economic ties were deteriorating.
Now, more than a decade later, Japan and the United States have recently agreed on the realignment of the U.S. military in Japan to strengthen defense ties by integrating the operations of the U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force and to transform their security relations into a global alliance.
The documents were obtained by the National Security Archive, a research center and library affiliated with George Washington University in the U.S. capital.
In the cable sent to the U.S. State Department shortly after the Gulf War, Armacost said the Japanese government took an "essentially passive approach" to the war and that the Diet debate failed to "educate the pubic on the fundamental interests and principles at stake."
"Much of the responsibility belongs to the rigid parliamentary practices built up over the 40 years of single party rule and to the bureaucratic mentality" with which the government, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition parties "have traditionally approached issues," he said.
But Armacost said, "In pursuing our interests here, we have the opportunity to take advantage of Japan's defensiveness and fear of isolation in the wake of the Gulf crisis to gain greater GOJ (government of Japan) cooperation."
"In sum, we have a real opportunity to influence the direction of Japanese foreign policy and to point Japan's financial and political influence in directions supportive of U.S. interests if we devote the time necessary for consultations and if we give the GOJ some room for maneuver within the context of different approaches to achieving shared objectives," he said.
Armacost warned against "the bashing" seen in the U.S. Congress and media over Tokyo's contributions, saying that it "has fueled resentment" in Japan.
"Of more importance is the growing theme here that America's welcome new self-confidence may turn to arrogance and that the United States, unconstrained by the need to maintain alliances to contain the Soviet Union in a 'uni-polar world' and frightened by Japan's economic challenge, will now 'turn its guns' toward Tokyo," he said.
"We need to avoid an overly confrontational approach that risks provoking a backlash," Armacost said.
In a memorandum dated April 20, 1981, for U.S. President Ronald Reagan ahead of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's visit to Washington, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stressed the importance of encouraging Japan to increase its defense capabilities.
"Japan is our only Asian ally with the potential significantly to increase its defense efforts," he said. "Therefore, your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki provides a fine opportunity to urge Japan to help provide for its own defense while the United States continues to provide the offensive capability in the region."
More specifically, Weinberger advised the president to propose that Japan "approximately double your maritime and air defense capabilities in the Northwest Pacific within this decade...to protect shipping lanes north of the Philippines and west of Guam plus the air defense of Japan."
As for trade disputes, a memorandum of talks between Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig on March 23, 1981, documents the proposal officially made by the United States for Japanese automakers to voluntarily restrain their exports to resolve the auto dispute amid escalating retaliatory pressure in the U.S. Congress and industry.
"Our concern is to preempt in both Europe and the United States the protectionist trends by some manifestation in the near-term of Japanese restraint in the areas of small car and small truck exports," Haig said.
But Ito told Haig that the Japanese government "was not yet prepared to respond in specific terms," according to the document.
Asked whether Washington wanted a government-to-government agreement, Haig said, "We were not seeking a formal agreement, but rather voluntary guidelines by the Japanese on which both sides had expressed their views and had the ability to assist in developing."
Haig and Ito agreed that some steps were needed to address the issue, although they shared the view that Japanese imports were not the cause of the U.S. auto industry's problems.
The two nations eventually struck a deal on voluntary plans and resolved the auto dispute.
Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
Mainichi Daily News
December 15, 2005
If the value of all the Japanese land "occupied" by the U.S. military was combined, there would be enough money to buy all of New York City, including the Statue of Liberty, which is a symbol of how little liberty Japan actually has, according to Flash (12/27).
The men's weekly claims to be outraged by what it calls Japan's blind obedience to the United States even as it was supposed to be negotiating with its ally to reduce the burdens, fiscal and otherwise, local governments carry here to host the U.S. military.
Flash says its own independent study revealed that Japan is home to 88 U.S. military installations, which combined take up 312 million square meters with a total land value exceeding 14 trillion yen.
"Using the results of the global real estate market survey carried out in 1999 by the former National Land Agency and the Japanese Association of Real Estate Appraisal, 14 trillion yen would be a sum large enough to buy all the land in New York City, based on the standard value of residential land," an appraiser familiar with the residential market tells Flash.
Of course, the figure doesn't include New York's mercantile nature and commercial value, but that doesn't change the fact that over 14 trillion yen worth of Japanese territory is being "occupied," the weekly says.
Tokyo ranks third among Japan's 47 prefectures in terms of the amount of territory used by the U.S. military, following only Okinawa and Kanagawa prefectures. Tokyo Metropolitan Government officials are actively seeking the return of land in the capital that is currently under the control of the U.S. military.
"Bases in Tokyo should have their status reviewed, downgraded and ultimately be returned to the control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Yokota Air Field (U.S. Air Force Base) in particular is being strongly sought as the location of a third airport in Tokyo, where demand for flights increases yearly," a metropolitan government spokesman tells Flash. "As far as the metropolitan government is concerned, our policy for the time being is to continue to propose to the national government and U.S. military that the joint civilian-military use of facilities be permitted. We want the U.S. military to immediately return the Akasaka Press Center and Tama Service Annex should be opened up to as many Tokyo residents as possible."
The U.S. military presence in Tokyo also causes a decline in local land values, according to the veteran appraiser.
"Ground around Yokota Air Base is strong and able to withstand earthquakes, which makes it really good for housing. Other popular residential areas like Tokorozawa and Sagamihara are also homes to U.S. bases," the appraiser tells Flash. "Basically, what I'm trying to say is that there are these huge U.S. bases located in commutable areas within about an hour's train ride from central Tokyo and these prove to be considerable obstacles as far as things like land values and residential construction are concerned." (By Ryann Connell)
December 6, 2005
By Todd Crowell
Global Beat Syndicate
(KRT)
TOKYO—Virtually unnoticed, and without much fanfare, a historic and major shift is about to occur in Japan, where its post-war “peace constitution” may soon be revised in significant ways. This could affect the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security–the so-called “military alliance” between Japan and the United States.
But in fact, the treaty is not an alliance at all, and strictly speaking, Japan is not an ally. It is a close friend, a partner, a collaborator on the world stage. But “ally” is strictly a courtesy title.
The current treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan should it be attacked. But Japan does not have an equal obligation to help defend us if we are attacked. That is because Article 9, the war-renouncing clause written into Japan’s post-war constitution, has been interpreted as barring any kind of “collective defense.”
The newest update to the treaty are designed to promote better cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and to lessen the burden on host communities, especially on Okinawa. The new watchword is “interoperability.” One noteworthy change moves the Japanese air defense command center from Fuchu to the big American base at Yokota. The Ground Self-Defense Forces rapid reaction forces headquarters is also to move to the U.S. Army base at Camp Zama in the interests of closer coordination.
As a young Air Force officer stationed at Yokota in the late 1960s, it seemed to me the U.S. Forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force might as well have been on different planets. In nearly two years, I never met a JSDF officer. To my knowledge there was no liaison or sharing of classified information. No contact. Nothing.
When U.S. forces dealt with Japanese, it was usually with local civilian authorities over such mundane matters as off-base housing. When contingencies arose, such as capture of the U.S. Pueblo or the shooting down of an EC-121 over the Sea of Japan, Japanese forces were not a factor in any war plans.
That began to change in the 1990s. Japan had provided billions of dollars to support the Gulf War coalition, but, consistent with its anti-war principles, provided no troops. Afterwards, Tokyo was stunned at how ungrateful Washington and others were for their generous financial support.
That became the catalyst for a slow evolution in Japan’s use of its military. The Diet passed laws that allowed Japanese troops to participate in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and elsewhere. In 1996 Washington and Tokyo inked the Joint Security Declaration, in which Japan promised to provide logistical support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and which authorized joint research in missile defenses.
There is such a disconnect between reality and paperwork in Japan—and the gap has widened so much, that Japanese leaders are now seriously considering for the first time revising their constitution in a way that faces long-standing reality: for example, officially recognizing the Self-Defense forces, which have existed for nearly six decades. The draft revision is expected to allow Japan all the rights of self-defense, including forming alliances with other countries and deploying Self-Defense forces overseas.
Does this mean the existing security treaty will be turned into a real alliance? That is unlikely because, even though nearly 50 years have passed, memories remain of the riots surrounding the last revision of the treaty in 1960, riots that forced President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel his proposed state visit.
A lot has changed in Japan since then. The radical student movement that provided so many foot soldiers in 1960 hardly exists today. And it seems doubtful that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would have to ram any revisions through the Diet at midnight, like his predecessor Nobosuke Kishi.
Koizumi has a huge majority in the Diet, and the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan abandoned knee-jerk opposition to the security treaty in the interests of electability.
That leaves perhaps only the tiny Social Democratic Party to carry the flag of traditional Japanese pacificism. Seiji Mataichi, the party’s secretary general, said of the latest defense agreement, “It goes beyond the contents of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” Mr. Mataichi is almost certainly correct. But his party holds only six seats in the Diet.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Todd Crowell was a senior writer for Asiaweek in Hong Kong. He now comments on Asian affairs on his website Asia Cable.
The Asahi Shimbun
