Between November 2 and November 11, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) held large-scale military exercises intended to demonstrate Iran’s deterrent and retaliatory capabilities in the face of mounting international pressure to halt activities widely suspected to be part of a nuclear weapons program. Named “Great Prophet II,” the exercises focused on Iranian response capabilities in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman and were initiated with a series of ballistic missile tests, including the test of an
enhanced version of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Shahab-3. The missile tests took place at a time when the Security Council was addressing Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program and considering a draft resolution that would ban transfers to Iran of equipment and technology usable for its nuclear and missile programs. Against this background, the Iranian missile tests appeared to be a show of defiance against outside efforts to restrain the country’s nuclear program, an attitude Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reinforced on November 16, 2006, when he announced plans to expand Iran’s centrifuge uranium enrichment program, in spite of the Council’s demand that Iran suspend this activity.

Back-to-Back Military Maneuvers in the Persian Gulf
The “Great Prophet II” military maneuvers were the third in a series of military exercises that Iran has conducted throughout 2006, all of which appeared to be aimed at highlighting Iran’s deterrent capabilities for domestic and foreign audiences. The timing of “Great Prophet II” was significant, not only because of the on-going Security Council debate on whether to impose sanctions on Iran, but also because it came on the heels of an exercise conducted in the Gulf on October 30-31, 2006, under the auspices of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). That exercise, called “Leading Edge,” practiced the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction cargoes on vessels in the Gulf; although the PSI is not openly directed at any country, illicit procurement of unconventional weapon technology by Iran and North Korea is known to be a source of concern for PSI participant states. [1] While Iranian officials declared that the exercises were not linked, General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, commander-in-chief of the IRGC, stated that the Iranian maneuvers were executed earlier than previously planned to demonstrate the rapid response capability of the IRGC forces, strongly suggesting that their timing was advanced in response to “Leading Edge.”

Iranian military leaders also used the proximity of the two exercises to contrast their purposes for audiences in the region. While they described the U.S. military presence in the region as “the source of instability” and as presenting a common enemy for the countries in the Persian Gulf area, they declared that the Iranian maneuvers “ingeniously showed that [Iran is] highly determined to safeguard the country’s power [and] security, as well as safeguarding the region’s peace and stability.…” [2] This sentiment echoed the proposal by Iranian Minister of Defense Mostafa Mohammad Najar for a regional defense pact. [3] (See related story, “Iran and Gulf States: Foes or Security Partners?” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Iran also declared its willingness to share its missiles with other countries in the region, although General Safavi delivered a somewhat confused message in this regard. On the Arabic-language station Al-Alam, Safavi indicated that Iran is “ready to give these missiles to neighboring and friendly countries, and on that subject we have no prohibitions or reservations.” [4] However, in an earlier interview for a state-run Farsi-language television station, he qualified this willingness to share Iran’s missiles, stating that, “When we speak of friendly and neighboring countries, it means that in practical terms they should have proved the extent of their friendship during the past 27 years....” [5] (It is possible that in using this formulation, Safavi was referring to future missile transfers to Syria, which appears to be making common cause with Iran regarding Lebanon and was the only major Arab state to align itself with Iran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.)

Iran Flexing its Missile Muscles
The launch of the Shahab-3 on November 2 was the first time that the missile system was tested as part of a military exercise. While prior versions of the missile appeared to have a range of roughly 1,300 kilometers, which was sufficient to place Israel within range, the version tested during the November 2006 exercises had a range of roughly 2,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to strike Israel from additional launch sites deeper in Iranian territory and, potentially, to target a number of countries outside the region, including those in Southern Europe. According to General Safavi, the missile was said to be armed with cluster warheads with a damage radius of “more than a few kilometers;” it would therefore be used against “large garrisons, large gatherings, aircraft carrier ships….” [6] When asked if the sanctions being considered by the Security Council would have a negative impact on Iran’s missile capabilities, Safavi denied such a possibility, asserting, “…all of our missile technology including Shahab-3 is home grown.” He added, “The Defense Ministry has no need of foreign parts, fuel and navigation system for missiles.” Safavi’s assertion contradicts the widely held view that the Shahab-3 is based on the North Korean Nodong MRBM, as well as recent indications that Iran is still engaged in procuring missile technologies from abroad. [7]
(See “Special Report: Challenges of Iranian Missile Proliferation: Partnership with North Korea,” in the October 2006 issue and “Iran Exploited Turkish Trading Firm to Produce Dual-Use Goods from Western European, U.S. Companies,” in the July/August issue of WMD Insights.) Safavi refused to confirm or deny whether Iran possesses more powerful missiles, such as the Shahab-4 or -5, continuing Iran’s pattern of concealment regarding the development of longer-range missile systems. [8]

International Reactions to Iran’s Show of Force
Official government reactions to the “Great Prophet II” exercises were limited to a few concerned states, which focused on the implications of Iran’s missile tests. Commentary in the international press, particularly in the Middle East, however, tended to find Iran’s actions more alarming and clearly indicative of Iran’s aggressive intentions.

Articulating concerns regarding the test of the extended-range Shahab-3, French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie stated, “What matters with regard to conventional or nuclear weapons is their range,” suggesting that as the range of the missiles grew, they would have added security implications for France and for Europe, more generally. [9] This concern was made more explicitly by Defense Ministry spokesman Jean-Francois Bureau, who declared, “As regards the range of this missile, this [is] something which also concerns Europeans.” Commentary in the French press also suggested that the missile tests had sought to influence the domestic political debate in Iran, as the country prepared for the possibility of UN sanctions, with those who support pursuit of sensitive nuclear technology in defiance of the Security Council, such as the IRGC, attempting to demonstrate that the country was strong enough to withstand sanctions and deter any external military threats that might arise. [10]

Russian officials offered mixed messages in their response to the missile tests. First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee Leonid Slutsky suggested that Tehran’s actions may affect ongoing negotiations at the UN regarding Iran’s nuclear program, arguing, “The missile launchings in the run up to the UN Security Council voting on the resolution of the European troika [France, Germany and the U.K.] does not make easier the tasks to continue the negotiations and preserve peace in the region.” [11] However, Slutsky qualified this assessment by arguing that the tests were an “adequate reaction” to pressure from the United States, which, he added, “claims the role of world policeman.”

Remarking on Iran’s missile capabilities, both Slutsky and Russian General Staff chief Yury Baluyevsky highlighted that, according to Russian estimates, Iran does not have the capability to build a missile with intercontinental range (generally considered to be a range of 5,500 kilometers or more). [12] The two appeared to be attempting to minimize the seriousness of the threat posed by the Shahab-3, by implying that because the United States was beyond its range, Washington had little cause to be alarmed about the system. It is also possible that their comments were implicitly focused on U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe to meet the Iranian missile threat. In effect, the two were suggesting all that would be needed to meet the threat from Iran were defenses capable of intercepting medium-range systems – and thus there would be no grounds for NATO to deploy systems capable of intercepting intercontinental-range missiles of the type used by Russia for its strategic deterrent.

One analysis in the Russian press did, however, suggest that the missile launches may have harmed Iran’s case in the Security Council. The author asserted that Iran’s military exercises “would hardly have alarmed even countries neighboring Iran had it not been for the missile launches.” He added, “The successful launch of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to practically all the countries of Europe has given Washington additional arguments in its ongoing efforts to persuade Russia and China of the urgent need to adopt tough sanctions against Iran.” [13]

Israel reacted sternly to the Iranian missile tests, with Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz declaring, “Iran provoked the whole world on Thursday and it is impossible to ignore it.” [14] Prime Minister Ehud Olmert took the opportunity to chide the international community for not “standing up” to the threat posed by Iran, stating, “The enlightened world has perhaps awoken, but it has yet to stand up to thwart the danger from Iran—and we are doing all that we can to make the world take action.” [15] Israeli National Infrastructures Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer echoed this characterization of Iran’s capabilities as a global threat, arguing that the missile tests “should bother not only Israel. It should bother the Arab countries, Islamic countries, the Gulf region, North Africa and Europe. We are always warning the world about this phenomenon called Iran.”

Commentary on the “Great Prophet II” exercises in the Israeli press focused almost exclusively on the further development of Iran’s missile capabilities. Prominent Israeli analyst Ze’ev Schiff not only highlighted the extension of the range of the Shahab-3 from 1,300 km to current estimates of up to 2,000 km, but also expressed concern regarding Iran’s advancement in the use of solid-fuel technology for its ballistic missiles. In stating that “Tehran is rapidly developing a new solid-state fuel, ballistic missile with a range of approximately 2,000 kilometers,” Schiff noted that this development would allow Iran to launch its missiles on shorter notice and thereby reduce the exposure of such missiles to air strikes. [16]

Other commentary in the region highlighted fears of Tehran’s ambitions and growing military strength, as well as the potential for a military conflict between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear program. One author writing in the Lebanese paper Dar Al-Hayat called into question Iran’s rationale for its military maneuvers as bolstering regional security, as well as the sincerity of Iran’s offer of military cooperation with its neighbors. He suggested that Iran’s comparison of its maneuvers with the recent PSI exercises was hypocritical, as Iran claimed to be acting in the interest of states in the region while criticizing the “Leading Edge” maneuvers, in which many of these very states had participated. In a condemnation of Iran’s regional ambitions, the author asserted, “What is not in line with the region’s necessity is Iranian policy, which is still practiced to destabilize this area and to achieve Iranian interests and goals, at the expense of other countries and people, and to obtain nuclear weapons at the expense of the security and stability of the Middle East.” [17]

Commentary in a Turkish daily expressed concern that, in light of the significant Western naval build-up in the region and Iran’s military focus on the Persian Gulf, tensions could erupt into a military conflict centered on one of the world’s major arteries for the flow of oil. Observing that the United States and Europe have amassed “the largest force in the Eastern Mediterranean since World War Two,” the author stated that it appeared that preparations were being made to take military action against Iran, which had prompted Iran to respond with its own show of force. [18] The author concluded that, “The Gulf of Basra, where 20 percent of the world’s oil flows, is sitting on a knife edge. Unforeseen developments could occur at any time. The stress in the eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf of Basra and the Red Sea is going to blow in one way or another.”

Conclusion
Iran’s “Great Prophet II” exercises, in particular the missile tests which initiated them, appear to have increased tensions over Iran’s strategic ambitions. These heightened tensions are due both to Iran’s continued open defiance of the Security Council regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and to Iran’s increasing ability to target states inside and outside the Middle East with its increasingly-capable missile systems. While it is unlikely that the recent missile tests will sway Russia and China to support powerful sanctions sought by Washington, the tests add urgency to calls by the United States and Western European states for tough measures to constrain Iran’s strategic programs. [19] In spite of Iran’s overtures of cooperation to the Gulf states, its “Great Prophet II” maneuvers appear to have heightened regional anxieties regarding a militarily assertive Iran, which, it is feared, might either exert greater influence in the region through coercion or provoke a damaging military conflict with the West.

Peter Crail—Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies