Is there a ‘New Middle Class’ in China?
Christine Lu picks up the issue of China’s ‘new middle class’ on her blog, based on an article written by Rowan Callick in The Australian. So does Fons Tuinstra in his blog, the China Herald.
We would like to contribute to the discussion, and begin by clearing up at least one of the confusions that could be traced back to a somewhat misleading headline in The Australian: “Myth of China’s new middle class.”
As we elaborated in our last post, David Goodman’s research makes the point that China’s New Rich are not part of a ‘new middle class’ in the way it is commonly understood. Neither his research nor he himself corroborate or contend that there is no ‘new middle class’ in China. Thus, using David Goodman’s research to argue that there is no ‘new middle class’ in China would be based on a logical fallacy (a fallacy that neither Rowan nor Christine nor Fons fell for).
Until there is conclusive research that allows for a clearer conceptualization of what constitutes a Chinese ‘new middle class,’ speculations that try to use Professor Goodman’s research to argue that there is no ‘new middle class’ are merely that — speculations.
While speculations are not based on scientific “evidence,” they may still hold water.
We (somewhat) agree with Rowan Callick who concludes that
[…] promoting the new entrepreneurs and the new rich as “the new middle classes” fits well the ideological constraint of today’s rulers against celebrating conspicuous wealth. All China’s classes are increasingly portrayed as middle. It’s just that some are decidedly more middle than others.
As we elaborated here, we would argue that a minority of ‘New Rich’ (whom we don’t see as ‘middle class’ at all) are very busy reappropriating China’s wealth into their own pockets. And thus we suggest that today’s (political and economic) rulers, in China as elsewhere, are not only trying not to “celebrat[e] conspicuous wealth” but are actively trying to hide their involvement (and responsibility) in this process.
We contend that a budding ‘new middle class’ would need to actively engage with this problem of reappropriation, and that it, if it fails to do so, may just constitute a ‘new middle class’ in name, but without the political agency or even economic independence that used to come with it (at least in a traditional / pre-neoliberal western understanding).
Whether or not they are part of a ‘new middle class,’ those white collar office people Christine sees spending their disposable income in department stores and restaurants all over urban China do exist.
To advance the discussion about China’s ‘new middle class,’ we contend that an appropriate definition needs to incorporate a political element of ‘creative engagement.’ We believe that unless these urban professionals are actively engaging in politics they should not be labeled with the term ‘middle class.’ An important question emerges:
Are Chinese going to remain content with being docile consumer-citizens?
We believe that the answer to this question lies in actions on the ground that corroborate increasing ‘people power’ (see for example here or here or here).
This is not to say that discussions about the existence of a ‘new middle class’ in China are futile or irrelevant. The concept of a ‘new middle class’ is useful — if we focus on the evolving shape and form of such a politically active agency, instead of simply affirming or negating its existence.
Two things seem certain: The ever-increasing numbers of urban protests expose smoldering discontent and make people doubt propagandistic representations of a ‘harmonious society’. They also suggest a preliminary answer to the question above: No, China’s urbanites are not going to remain silent about current injustices, or content with their assigned role as docile consumers.
The importance of a ‘New Middle Class’ discussion
Emboldened by visible successes, professional salarymen and -women from all walks of life (including academics, lawyers, media people, even police officers) may sooner or later unite in their desire to become members of a ‘new middle class’ that is fighting for its rights and that is powerful enough to confront those it deems responsible to take responsibility for their wrongdoings.
In the light of such danger it is hardly surprising that today’s rulers (in China as elsewhere) prefer to disarm the explosive potential of any discussion trying to determine who constitutes a ‘new middle class.’ The preferred measures include limiting public (or even academic) discourse and defining the concept in purely economic terms.
The resulting mental limitations go a long way in suppressing the shared meanings that could evolve based on shared political views (about specific place-based issues) already held by millions of China’s professionals.
While a united ‘new middle class’ could create a more just and solidaristic society, it would in the process also question, and threaten, the legitimacy of established ruling authorities. No wonder those authorities are doing everything they can to prevent a ‘new middle class’ from realizing and nurturing the shared-ness of its opinions.
Great blog, great topics, great writing! The thing about any discussion of class in mainland China is that for so many years social identity was organized around powerful categories of class (rich, mid-, poor peasant, and so on), that when it became possible to throw them out the window after the CR and with reforms and opening, many people wanted to do so. “Class” just comes with too much baggage and legacy–for some anyway (on a related topic, I’ve been watching for years to see when and how these old uses of “class” rhetoric might be mobilized by people who might benefit from them, such as poor rural or urban workers). However, class is just one way to discuss issues of socioeconomic identity and power. There have been a whole new set of terms that have emerged to describe new kinds of economic players, which could be traced to understand stories about what “class” became and is becoming in China. It’s not just white collar, but includes everything from (the 1980s’) ”暴发户“ and ”万元户”, to today’s “老板“ and ”工薪阶层“, all terms that were simply not in existence in the early-mid 1980s. Anyway, just my thoughts for now! Keep up the good discussion!
Comment by Lyn Jeffery — January 31, 2008 @ 12:47 pm
Thanks, Lyn, for sharing your thoughts! We couldn’t agree more that in China, with its violent history of class struggle, any discussion of ‘class’ comes with heavy baggage and legacy that is very difficult to reconcile. If it was merely a matter of overcoming mental barriers related to the use of ‘class’ categorizations then maybe we could simply find a different name. However, like you, we don’t think it is that simple.
At the same time, we would argue that the alternative existing concepts you mention, such as ”暴发户” (baofahu, “the explosively rich”), are purely economic categorizations, and thus quite limiting when it comes to understanding China’s hierarchical, guanxi-based, historically Confucian distinctions between societal groups.
As you point out, (social) class may not be the best or only categorization, but as long as other categorizations limit academic discussion to purely economic considerations, we believe that class should be regarded as an indispensable component of discourse.
As we argued in our post, we contend that a notion of class that goes beyond descriptive accounts of emerging economic players is crucial for anyone who wants to scrutinize existing (shifting?) demarcations between the powerful and the powerless. Once we take into consideration China’s all-pervasive collusion between economic and political powers, the powerful ‘elites’ can no longer be regarded as merely economic elites. In other words, defining ‘class belonging’ in purely monetary terms fails to grasp the importance of political power, particularly in contemporary China where (according to David Goodman’s and others’ research) a capitalist class and class of cadre (what DG somewhat misleadingly calls “China’s New Middle Class”) are intricately intertwined and are working hard to redirect China’s wealth into their own pockets.
We have been promoting a political component exactly because we believe that it is time to break from (and concomitantly revisit) the past and (again) regard social identity in political terms. Arguably, this would facilitate our understanding of some of the current quandaries China is facing.
For one, we believe that (political) civic responsibility and solidarity are necessary components for guaranteeing the crucial balance between economic growth, environmental degradation, social stability, and political control. Therefore we do not subscribe to the notion that in our consumerist society, the concept of social class is no longer relevant in terms of shaping identity. In fact we believe that the closed system of a rich and powerful upper class can only be permeated through political activism, by groups with shared identities and organized around specific, innovative projects that are united through shared (mostly political) meanings.
The emancipatory significance of such transformative powers of innovation seems obvious. One of the most negative long-term effects of the CR is that it vilified the existence of such innovative group behaviors through imposing notions of class struggle.
Arguably, open discourse could help us understand how and in what ways such innovative powers are currently and concomitantly desired (for their economic capacity) and feared (for their political implications), by China’s contemporary party-state.
We have not (yet) come across an alternative (to engagement through open discussion) that would eventually yield the possibility of reconciling China’s historical baggage (of class struggle) with its desire to create an innovative, equitable, truly harmonious society.
Thank you again for your constructive comments that allowed us to develop a (hopefully) deeper understanding of the importance of the topic we covered in our post.
Comment by Peter Marolt & Sophia Ong — February 1, 2008 @ 12:09 pm
Peter and Sophia — I couldn’t agree more with your commitment to expanding “class” beyond pure economic terms. That’s why terms like 暴发户 are so interesting, I think, since they point to moral and political debates about money, earning, responsibility, and so on. I am a cultural anthropologist who tried to do a study of so-called 暴发户 families in the mid-1990s, only to have it more or less fall apart, at which point I turned to researching 传销, or “multi-level marketing,” which was a craze at that time across China. The topic was a great one for exploring new kinds of class differentiation practices and new stories about changing social relations based on the role of money and shifting meanings of labor. I would love to read more of your current work, especially on the Chinese-language Internet, and would be happy to send you my own, now getting old : ) but still perhaps relevant to your interests!. Please email me at the address I’ve left here, or visit our blog at www.virtual-china.org ! If you haven’t already read their work, you might enjoy J.K Gibson-Graham (a writing duo) on class and the category of the economy.
–Lyn
Comment by Lyn Jeffery — February 6, 2008 @ 2:44 am