Ulrich Beck - Rights: Beyong methodological nationalism

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Leading contemporary sociologist Ulrich Beck points to the need of rethinking human rights on a transnational level, so that all those who are affected by a particular political decision can participate in its making.

An interview to Panos Papoulias for Re-public

Panos Papoulias: In your later work you have endorsed a move from national to transnational analyses. Why is that?

Ulrich Beck: I think that social and political theory is, to some extent, still a prisoner of the nation-state. Most basic concepts of the social sciences –sociology, the state, democracy, community- are connected to the nation and to the nation-state form. This relates of course to the historical development of political thinking and of the social sciences - both acquired their modern form in the 19th century in the context of imagining national communities. Most of the social sciences are still sticking to what I call the container model of society and politics.

In the last 20-30 years we are learning from personal and political experience and from the social sciences that we are living in an interconnected world in which the meaning of borders is changing. The congruence of territorial, social, cultural, and political borders does not exist as it did before. We thus need new perspectives in order to understand contemporary interactions, decisions, institutions; we need transnational perspectives, or what I would call a cosmopolitan outlook.

P.P.: You have mentioned the different significance that borders have nowadays. However, aren’t some states more robust than they were 30 years ago? Especially, in the context of the ‘war against terror’, wouldn’t you say that at least some borders have become more rigid?

U.B.: Let’s start with a few examples. You may remember the clash over the Muhammad cartoons about a year ago. Initially, this was framed as a Danish problem, addressing Muslims in Denmark and attempting to provoke a debate over their integration in Danish society. Almost instantly, this became a global problem. This indicates that even if you try to articulate an issue as a national issue, in many fields this is not possible anymore. Because of new communication structures, new communication technologies, new transportation systems and so on, all different cultures, all different nations, and all different religions live in one present, even, if they live at the same time in different pasts and different futures. This is to some extent an integrated present, because the existing communication structures do not allow for the construction of rigid borders anymore.

This is just one example, another would be climate change. After long debates in the past, climate change is now acknowledged as a basic problem for the whole of humanity, but also for every nation and every group separately. This social construction of the urgency of climate change goes along with the interpretation that there is no national solution to it. If you want to address the future scenario that New York or London are going to be under the sea level, it is totally inefficient too look for ‘American’ or ‘British’ answers. There is the increasing perception that we need transnational or even cosmopolitan solutions. Some states may attempt today to re-invigorate their borders, or even build new walls against perceived ‘new threats’, but this constitutes a reaction. It is a reaction against the contemporary global condition where borders do not function anymore. There maybe a re-nationalisation of the nation-state, or even a new kind authoritarianism on the part of some states, but this doesn’t mean that new borders and new walls will be efficient.

P.P.: Would you say that the need for transnational perspectives can be traced as far back as the formation of the United Nations or even before that?

U.B.: Yes, of course there is a history to this development. At the beginning of modernity in relation to Marxism, for example, class struggle was framed as an international problem and this was imprinted in the establishment of the Socialist International. Then, the nation-state was invented and most communist parties begun to situate class conflict in the national sphere.

Nowadays, it’s opening up again. We are seeing that some problems which were nationalized in the 19th century can no longer remain nationalized in the 21st. This may be the difference between the social and the ecological crisis. Even within the dominant social construction of the ecological crisis, there is the consensus that climate change constitutes a transnational or even cosmopolitan problem. Even is someone is simply to address the problem of a potential climate catastrophe s/he needs to raise the question of global justice.

P.P.: Global justice is a concept that is often raised by other cosmopolitan thinkers like David Held. Is there a disparity between your views and his?

U.B.: My work does not differ in perspective from David Held’s or from Mary Kaldor’s, who together with David are organizing this research on global civil society. The normative idea of cosmopolitanism is one of the important issues, but I would also emphasise a second crucial step, what I call the critique of methodological nationalism. This task implies the invention of a new methodology which opens up the theoretical and research perspectives of the social sciences to transnational interdependencies and connections. I know that David in his book Global Transformations shows how this interconnectedness is increasing in many dimensions since the 1970s.

From the same results, I take a more radical conclusion. If it is true that the global interconnectedness is increasing, then all the research problems around globalization are transformed into an epistemological question. The question becomes what is the unit of research that we need in order to conceptualize these transnational connections. Can we still stick to the nation-state or to national societies as our basic units and just do comparative research, or do we need to define different units of research?

In my own research institute, we are trying to achieve this. For example, we are focusing on “transnational political regimes”. These are cooperative structures, which include states, civil society movements, and representatives of capital who are trying to find solutions to all kinds of risk problems. In order to move away for state-centrism and from methodological nationalism, we need to define these new types of units of research.

P.P.: Where would you locate ‘transnational political regimes’? Or, do they form a category that is not reflected in contemporary academic language?

U.B.: This is precisely the point, ‘transnational political regimes’ do not fit in any of the existing categories. So far, the basic distinctions are mainly between the national and the international sphere, and in some cases analysts bring a globalised sphere into play. These distinctions do not work anymore: we have more and more circles of interactions that do not fit in these dualisms. All these spheres overlap: the ‘transnational’ should not be conceived in opposition to the national, they co-exist. There should not be a choice, an ‘either, or’ between the national and the transnational; transnationalism signals an ‘as well as’. We have a new whole research area of transmigration, for instance.

P.P.: You often refer to your work to the concept of second modernity. In your words, it is ‘the realization that the problems of modernity present us with the inability to find a permanent solution to them’. Is it because it is hard to find that solution, or or because a single right solution does not actually exist?

U.B.: Basically, it is a historical perspective. Since, we live in the modern age and since modernity is a permanent stage of transformation in all fields, we have to realize that institutions – and this means answers to problems - have a historical background.

What I find interesting is to make distinctions between basic principles and basic institutions of modernity. An example of a basic principle is the autonomy of the individual; a basic institution is the establishment of social, civil, political rights.

The ways this principle has been institutionalized has been limited to a specific group. For example, all basic rights have been first awarded to males, excluding initially women. Citizenship has been awarded to nationals. Today, we have a new radicalization of these principles of modernity against its preceding limitations. Equality movements cannot exclude women anymore, for example. Basic changes of the institutions of modernity come from the radicalization of the principles of modernity. What we often call the crisis of modernity is actually a consequence of the victory of its principles, their radicalization.

P.P.: What would be the cosmopolitan view on the disparity between principles and institutions of modernity? Would cosmopolitans argue always in favour of more rights against tradition? Or would he need to take a more relative view?

U.B.: It is not easy to answer. First, we need to define what cosmopolitanism really means. I make the distinction between cosmopolitanism, universalism and nationalism. All of those different concepts relate to the issue of how societies manage the question of cultural difference. There is also a racist answer to this question, where ethnic groups are supposed to be valued in hierarchical terms. Its opposite is universalism where all the cultural others, all cultural differences are in all their basic aspects equal. Universalism creates equality between different ethnic, religious, national groups. However, universalism neglects difference, or at least underestimates the burden and the dignity of difference.

The principle of cosmopolitanism is that all the possible cultural divergences have to be acknowledged as being different and equal at the same time. This means that differences are not neglected, but are valued as something productive, as important to self- definitions.

Now, I come to your question: cosmopolitanism is on the one hand opposed to universalism, but on the other it needs some universal norms in order to regulate difference. Therefore, we need a basic discussion about how far the recognition of the otherness of the other is acceptable or not acceptable to everybody.

To acknowledge different cultures might be valued as long as these do not violate basic human rights. But, how to articulate these two statements is often a dilemma. There is no easy solution to the subject. In order, to answer this kind of questions you have to go into detail. Cosmopolitanism realizes that is it an open question of how to react to situations and conflicts and violent movements which do not accept human rights as procedure.

P.P.: What would be the cosmopolitan view on migration rights for example?

U.B.: First of all, the cosmopolitan view would criticize the distinction between mobility and migration. Mobility is highly valued in the national context, but when you mobility occurs beyond national borders it is termed migration and is criminalized. The concept of migration is from a cosmopolitan perspective problematic. The cosmopolitan view, as I have explained, would accept that there have to be some kind of borders. From a sociological and political point view it would be unrealistic to open up all borders. But, cosmopolitanism would advocate a policy that defines migration without criminalizing people who want to be mobile. Migrants are not potential criminals.

Currently, migrants are defined by the nation-state migration regime as criminals, while this regime produces all kinds of industries of human trafficking. You can make an interesting comparison with the prohibition of alcohol and drugs to some extent. These prohibitions, as we know from the US have the opposite effects. There is the widely held view that migrants are more prone to criminality than nationals. How could it be otherwise? Migrants need to break laws to even become simply that…migrants.

A cosmopolitan perspective needs to think about how to legalise migration. There could be different models. You could even think about a tax for migrants: they could pay a tax in order to become citizens. Migrants can of course have very positive effects on the wealth of nations. The Canadian government, for example, seems to be proud of immigration, accepting that the plurality of cultures had and still has a very positive impact on the existing national society.

P.P.: Has the coming of the second modernity brought into existence ‘new rights’ that were not there beforehand?

U.B.: I am thinking about one aspect relates to the notion of global risk. There are currently new collective definitions of risk, and these collective definitions even move beyond borders. What this means for the individual? Under conditions of global risk one has to talk about tragic individualization. On the one hand, the common saying is that the individual has the power of decision, but on the other s/he doesn’t have the information that is required in order to make that decision. We need to think about –I am not sure how to call them- risk human rights. This means that there a basic rights of information, information is not supposed to be a monopoly of specific expert institutions. It also implies the right to participate in decisions that affect these people, especially when it comes to transnational impacts in relation to risk. We have to rethink basic rights on a transnational level. This could form a part of a new important dimension of human rights.

P.P.: In terms of risk, you have mentioned the importance of individualisation. Does this point to the necessity of a liberal political organisation? In similarity, perhaps, to to Rawls’s view that one of the reasons for the need of a liberal state is the “fact of pluralism”?

U.B.: We have to understand what kind of liberalism is accepted and necessary. I generally sympathize with Rawls’ views. If I read him correctly, however, I think that Rawls is one of the explicit exponents of methodological nationalism. His concept of justice, but also his notion of liberalism is pretty much connected to the nation-state. He subsequently refers to an international dimension which is ultimately bounded to the nation form though.

Individualisation has to be understood again on a cosmopolitan level. Mobility or migration opens up, for example, a new dimension of individualization on the one hand, and transnational community construction, on the other. Religious fundamentalism is, for instance, one type of reaction against both individualization and cosmopolitanism. Other types of reaction exist as well: cosmopolitan ways of life would be one, a new pluralism that moves beyond existing borders and cultures.

We have to re-think, in other words, liberalism in connection o this new type of relations.

P.P.: Some past theoretical works, like Hobbes’ and Locke’s, also refer to the notion of ‘manufactured risks’. Would you say that from the same starting point they arrive at very different political conclusions from yours?

U.B.: I don’t agree. Hobbes’ theory is related to risk to some extent but his focus is ultimately on order. There is a whole tradition of political theory preoccupied with the construction of order.

I would distinguish between manufactured uncertainty and risk. In my view, the institutions which have the mandate to create order, produce today new insecurities and new risks. One of the basic institutions is science itself; science is not anymore producing only solutions, but it is also increasing uncertainties in many ways, it is even showing that there are unknown unknowns. This mirrors the movement from the first to the second modernity; it is the movement from risks to manufactured uncertainty.

P.P.: Is the management of these issues the primary concern of contemporary politics?

U.B.: The problem of contemporary politics is how to manage what is unmanageable, or how to govern what is ungovernable, or even how to control what is uncontrollable. This is the main problem of governance today. This does not mean there is no management of risk. The opposite is true: risk is managed everywhere. And this is true even because those uncertainties are not controllable anymore. We are faced today with ineffective modes of the governance of uncertainty.

P.P.: Is Sarkozy’s electoral victory a case of the contemporary importance of the management of risk?

U.B.: The French election campaign was pretty much centred on these issues. Royal as well as Sarkozy focused on national solutions. Sarkozy pushed more the idea of risk management and now he is going to experience the contradictions involved in his discourse. On the one hand, he is talking about climate change as a focal point of his policies, and at the same time he admits that the European Union is not ready for this type of solutions. How is his going to develop a climate politics without Europe? This is one of the main contradictions of his politics.

P.P.: How does the coming of the second modernity affect the distinction between left and right?

U.B.: This is a challenging question. The distinction between left and right has so far, been reflected on the national level. The left was and is still in favour of the welfare state, this has been the principal project of the left and of the labour movement. The welfare state has, however, excluded solidarity to the cultural other, it has excluded those who live beyond the national borders. The right has also been re-enforcing re-nationalisations of many sorts and the exclusion of the cultural other.

Both perspectives are historically antiquated. We have to place the distinction of left and right on the transnational and the cosmopolitan level. A transnational left could be understood pretty much in the way Tony Giddens has organized and thought of the third way. As something that is pretty much located inside the nation-state, but which also forms a transnational reaction to the pressures of globalization. Globalisation should be included as a basic process that shapes the perspective of the new left.

There is a transnational right as well. It is getting very powerful in Germany, for example, in the context of the opposition against the European Union. There is also a cosmopolitan left, which has not been really recognized so far. You find actors in some global civil society movements and in transnational and international organizations as well. The Stern report is an example of cosmopolitan sub-politics: a committee of experts who produced knowledge in order to change existing conditions towards a cosmopolitan direction. This cosmopolitan left has not been included in the existing party system so far. There are some elements of it, but more on an individualised basis. The cosmopolitan left has not acquired its own formation yet.

P.P.: It seems that the left has been more daunted than the right by the changing conditions of the second modernity…

U.B.: There is a dilemma here. Nowadays, diverse right movements seem to become very powerful. Their influence is not only related to Le Pen and the extreme right, but it is much broader. The majority parties in Europe have incorporated many of the agendas of the extreme right, they have made a rightist turn. All these, however, do not have a concept of the future.

In relation to the French election, if you ask how this cosmopolitan constellation could become a part of a political movement, maybe there is not one way to go about it. Since we are still living in national systems, maybe de-nationalisation could be enhanced only through a national movement. Perhaps, the main mobilisation force could be a national movement with a cosmopolitan perspective.

Further links

How not to become a museum piece

Nationalism has now become the enemy of Europe’s nations

Topics: new rights, recent articles
Tags: cosmpolitanism, cultural difference, humanitarianism, liberalism, ulrich beck | share ! | print