(cache) SSJ Forum Archive: Discussion Archives

November 12, 2007

[SSJ: 4823] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/11/12

In my "cutting and pasting," I took the wrong quote from Paul Midford and may have thus confused everyone as to what I was responding to in my last post. What I meant to quote--and disagree with--is this:

> >the DPJ needs an issue for forcing a confrontation with the LDP,
and
> the ideal is a bill that (1) the LDP can't easily compromise (2) the
>public doesn't care much about (so risks are low), and (3) is
>essentially meaningless anyway...

My apologies.

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 05:26 PM

[SSJ: 4821] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/11/10

>From: Paul Midford (paul.midford@svt.ntnu.no)
>Date: 2007/11/10
>
>The DPJ needs an issue where it can confront the LDP, show it is
>different, and force a dissolution of the Diet. If they block
>something popular like pension reform in the process they're in big
>trouble.
>

I simply don't understand this view at all. The voters repudiated Shinzo Abe because he was focusing on constitutional revision rather than issues of great concern in their day to day lives. Why, then, should the DPJ give the impression that it too is focusing on refueling to the detriment of other issues? Just because of the LDP's Diet schedule? Let the DPJ make it look as if Fukuda is too focused on the refueling bill.
In the meantime, the Upper House can certainly pass bills that help ordinary people and then blame LDP obstructionism for preventing these bills from becoming law. Or let the LDP pass them and the DPJ can take credit for initiating.

To be a government in the wings, the DPJ has to show voters what it would do if elected, that it is capable of rule, that it cares more about people's lives than the LDP, which is fighting tooth and nail to preserve a meaningless gasoline station in the Indian Ocean.

As to whether the coaliton fiasco is yesterday's news in a few weeks or months, we'll have to see. It reinforces a common premise that the DPJ is incapable of rule and only the LDP can really rule. A few years back, prior to Koizumi's ascension, Hatoyama told me in an interview, "We don't have to convince the voters that the LDP is bad. We have to convince them to trust us to govern." Part of Koizumi's appeal was that he was simultaneously LDP and anti-LDP. The DPJ still has to convince voters that it is capable of ruling. To have their leader say in public that they cannot win elections and are not ready to rule doesn't help.

The DPJ needs to take initiative on issues that voters care about and let the LDP block progress.

BTW, what wonderful things on pension reform, the minimum wage, education, conditions for part-timers and temps, etc. is the Fukuda Administration proposing?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 12:21 PM

[SSJ: 4820] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/11/10

Thanks to John Campbell and Paul Midford for their responses to my responses to Paul's original post.

I agree with Paul and John that the DPJ may be following a Goldilocks strategy of some but not too much confrontation to differentiate itself from the LDP. Thanks for clarifying that that was your position.

But I still don't understand why the Indian Ocean refueling if the point was not to appeal to voters and voters, as everyone seems to agree, weren't and aren't that interested in the issue, and are split right down the middle on. I can't help feeling there's something we don't know, related either to internal DPJ politics or their Diet strategy, that drove the selection of the anti-terrorism law rather than something else on domestic politics on which to make their stand. And, unlike many it seems, I don't see the grand coalition debacle and the anti-terrorism law as two totally separate things: the disaster of the grand coalition issue is/was very connected to the anti-terrorism law resistance (would Fukuda have offered it, if he was the one to do so, if not for DPJ resistance on the refueling law?).

And now it appears that neither party has the incentives for an early House dissolution and election.
And thus the DPJ and LDP may both be stuck, on the other hand, with letting other things play out. The DPJ now has to deliver on its opposition to the refueling measure or compromise on it. Either way I think they may pay some cost. And although it is tempting for the LDP to just let things play out for a while, what with the Moriya scandal and not much legislation going through, they could pay a cost too over time. By the time the budget bill comes up in the spring, the public may well be thinking "a plague on both your houses" or "Houses" in this case!

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 12:19 PM

November 10, 2007

[SSJ: 4819] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Yoichiro Sato
Date: 2007/11/10

Ozawa has advocated sending the Ground SDF troops into Afghanistan to join the NATO-led ISAF operation, while opposing the maritime refuelling by citing lack of clear UN mandate. He even told fellow DPJ members to leave the party if they could not support the GSDF dispatch idea.

Simultaneously, Ozawa was seeking a grand coalition possibility with the LDP. It has been reported that Hatoyama also met Watanabe Tsuneo of Yomiuri to discuss it, but he did not give a nodding. Hatoyama still talks about a possibility of joint legislation with the LDP.

DPJ has also submitted a bill to end the Air SDF dispatch to Iraq. (Yes, those planes are still there.)

The LDP government lobbied the UN Security Council to pass a new resolution to praise various counter-terrorism efforts and succeeded to include in the text an expression of appreciation to the participants of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)--which included the maritime intercept operation in the Indian Ocean. An added aura of UN legitimacy!

Hypothetically speaking, a grand coalition would have agreed on extending the MSDF refuelling, newly sending GSDF to Afghanistan, and withdrawing ASDF from Iraq.
The hard core left within the DPJ would have been an obstacle, and Ozawa wanted to shake them off. Ozawa's sentiment was shared by a fairly sizable group of DPJ members beyond his inner-circle of followers, but with a different degree of enthusiasm.

Damage to the DPJ credibility from the grand coalition debacle would not last long, and the LDP threat of a snap LH election lacks credibility.
(LDP in the LH already holds so many seats, and winning more would be extremely difficult despite the temporary setback of the DPJ. Why take such a risk?)

Yoichiro Sato

Approved by ssjmod at 12:39 PM

[SSJ: 4818] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/11/10

Many thanks to Ellis and John.

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2007/11/09

To Ellis

Paul can reply for himself, but I believe he was saying, and I agree, the DPJ needs an issue for forcing a confrontation with the LDP, and the ideal is a bill that (1) the LDP can't easily compromise (2) the public doesn't care much about (so risks are low), and (3) is essentially meaningless anyway unless one feels that saying no to the US is either immoral or invites severe retaliation [my contribution not Paul's].

Lot's of people in Japan seem to think there is a real problem if the Diet is statemated and doesn't do anything much for months or years. Of course Americans know that is a pretty minor consideration in the real world.

John Campbell's answer to Ellis represents my position as well. The DPJ needs an issue where it can confront the LDP, show it is different, and force a dissolution of the Diet. If they block something popular like pension reform in the process they're in big trouble.

Regarding confrontation versus cooperation, I am arguing that the Japanese public has goldielocks preferences regarding Diet politics: they want the two parties to be not too cooperative but not too confrontational either. This makes it hard for both the DPJ and the LDP to figure out what the right mix is, especially in this new environment where both the DPJ and the LDP hold weapons that have never been used before but don't know how the public will react.

I will however, back away from my prediction about the DPJ seeking confrontation a bit. Some are now arguing that the Ozawa resignation debacle has weakened the DPJ so much that they no longer feel strong enough to push for Diet dissolution. If so, then they might not push the confrontation as far as they could by bottling up the refueling bill for two months and running down the clock or by passing a censure motion against Fukuda. Much will depend on how quickly or slowly this debacle fades from memory. If it fades quickly we will likely see the DPJ push for Diet disolving confrontation, otherwise, they will probably let the bill pass after rejecting it, that is if the LDP can get Komeito to join them in overriding the
rejection.

One final point: I am still a bit unclear in my own mind about which DPJ weapon is more effective: running the clock down or a censure motion against Fukuda.
Anyone on this forum have any thoughts on this?

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 12:38 PM

[SSJ: 4817] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Gerald Curtis
Date: 2007/11/09

attached is my Financial Times column of November 8th on the grand coalition. Please feel free to circulate it.
Gerry Curtis

A grand coalition for Japan was a very bad idea

By Gerald Curtis

Published: November 8 2007 18:03

The aborted agreement of Yasuo Fukuda, prime minister, and Ichiro Ozawa, Democratic party president, to have their parties form a grand coalition has accomplished the seemingly impossible task of making Japanese politics even more dysfunctional than it was before.
The good news is that their effort failed. A grand coalition under current political circumstances in Japan is a bad idea, drawing too much on a false analogy with Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel.
The SPD, the junior partner in the German grand coalition, is the oldest party in Germany and the largest in membership. It has a distinct and broad social base. It can go into coalition without losing its identity and into an election with policy goals and a party image that set it apart from its conservative party partner.

That is not the situation in Japan. The DPJ is the country's youngest party and its social base is hard to distinguish from the LDP's. It is a conservative party, most of whose members are there and not in the LDP because of electoral district circumstances, and personality and factional conflict.

A grand coalition in Japan, given the state of party politics, would probably turn out to be a grand amalgamation. The LDP would entice some DPJ lower house incumbents to run in the next election on the LDP ticket, eviscerating the DPJ's numbers and further weakening its identity. Other, smaller parties would not be able to put up a fight under Japan's now predominantly -single-member district system. At the height of LDP dominance, the political opposition, even if unable to grasp governmental power, had the numbers and the energy required to provide a semblance of the checks and balances that political democracy requires. A grand coalition under present conditions would leave Japan without an effective political party opposition and the voters without a meaningful choice.

It is difficult to overstate the extent of the DPJ's predicament in the aftermath of the Ozawa caper. There were many sensible people in the party who argued that they should compromise with the LDP on important issues, especially with respect to the maritime self-defence forces deployment to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel and water to US and other ships of the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. But Mr Ozawa rejected any compromise on this or other issues.

He then did an about-face, secretly negotiating the details of a grand coalition, which, according to some reports, went as far as to specify the cabinet posts that would be allotted to each party. Criticism of his behaviour both from within the DPJ and among the public can only grow stronger. It is giving Mr Ozawa too much credit to conclude that he has a game plan. He has proved time and again that he is a tactician, not a strategist. He throws the dice without much thought as to how they will land and then reacts to the situation that confronts him. But this may well be the end of his game.

So far, Mr Fukuda has escaped criticism because everyone is so startled by what Mr Ozawa has done.
However, Mr Fukuda, too, faces the prospect of a harsh public reaction when people think about what he tried to do. It would have been one thing to have called a lower house election and, in the event that neither the LDP nor the DPJ obtained a commanding majority, conclude that there was public support for a coalition government. But the voters were never given the chance to express their will. The Fukuda-Ozawa negotiations were conducted in secrecy, giving neither party members nor the public an opportunity to express an opinion about what was intended to be a fundamental reordering of Japan's party politics.

Now that the prospect of a grand coalition has crumbled, the LDP and the DPJ have to rethink their strategies if Japan is to avoid total political paralysis. The DPJ needs to grasp the opportunity to show the public that its options are not only unbending opposition or collusion but include a readiness to seek responsible compromise on critical domestic and foreign policy issues. The LDP, too, needs to embrace a new approach to policy consultation, one that shows a willingness to forge agreements openly arrived at with the opposition. The question is whether the leaders of either party have the necessary imagination and determination to move Japan in this direction.

It is commonly said that people get the politics they deserve. But that is not a fair statement to make about Japan today. The Japanese people deserve better.

The writer is Burgess professor of political science at Columbia University Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

Approved by ssjmod at 12:36 PM

[SSJ: 4816] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/11/09

To Llewelyn P Hughes:

Grand coalitions don't entail any form of electoral cooperation in Germany. During the first two years of the current grand coalition, the CDU/CSU and social democrats actually managed to engage in some kind of policy coordination and find compromises, but with the social democrats having prematurely kicked off their election campaign for 2009 at their party convention last week by acting more like an opposition party than a part of the government, policy coordination and compromises will be more difficult to achieve as the lower house election draws nearer.

As for the situation here in Japan, I agree that in a few months, people probably have forgotten about all this Grand Coalition talk. And since Fukuda is seemingly in no hurry to call a snap election, the DPJ can hope, the electorate has other things on its mind by the time this election eventually comes around, be it in 2008 or 2009. On a side note, Hatoyama (Yukio) apparently was smarter than Ozawa. He also was approached by Watanabe and politely turned down the offer. Ozawa should have done the same thing. I don't know, whether the Indian Ocean dispatch bill is such a major issue. Sure, there is pressure from the US, but with presidential elections being only one year away the Bush administration is essentially a flock of lame ducks. And while public opinion here in Japan has slowly but surely shifted towards the government coalition's initiative of extending the refueling mission, I doubt the issue is as important as many people in Nagata-chou want us to believe. I wonder, whether it wouldn't be smart for the DPJ to just introduce its counter draft in the Upper House, while aggressively pursuing the Moriya affair. Since an LDP politician and former JDA chief (be it Nukaga, Kyuuma, Ono or whoever) has accepted invitations from this Yamada Youkou executive, there certainly is still a lot left to criticize. Meanwhile, the DPJ should just focus on introducing bills based on the promises they made before the Upper House election (because arguably the electorate cares more about these domestic issues than foreign policy). If the LDP blocks them, they have the chance to paint the ruling coalition as obstructionist.

Best regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 12:35 PM

[SSJ: 4815] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Saul TAKAHASHI
Date: 2007/11/09

Frankly, I think it is both -- DPJ definitely wanted to handcuff Ozawa to the party, but it is also very much the case that they are terrified of fighting a lower house election without him.

Lest we forget, the DPJ were basically incompetent when it came to elections. They didn't (and still
don't) have the structure, and most of them don't have serious experience in slugging it out at the local level.
There is a lot of truth to the general image that people have of DPJ as the obocchan party. They're smart, well educated, and have some fancy ideas, but they're really not the people you would invite to your barbecue -- and elections in Japan (and elsewhere) are still won at barbecues.

Ozawa changed all this; he was the streetfighter who knew how to get things done. A lot of the DPJ members don't really trust him -- and certainly this experience proves they are right -- but they know that his experience and knowhow in winning elections is what brought them this far.

Incidentally, Ozawa knows this, and has played it to his advantage. My understanding is that he has centralised power in the DPJ to an extreme degree, with nearly all decisions, especially those concerning candidates and elections, taken personally by him.
Basically, he has made sure that everybody in DPJ stays inexperienced, and that they will continue to need him for the time being. Smart operator -- if there was ever any doubt!

Saul Takahashi

Approved by ssjmod at 12:34 PM

[SSJ: 4814] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/11/09

To Ellis:

Since I am supposed to be cleaning the house I have every incentive to spin this dialogue out. Let me quote you a good deal:

> a)WHY does the DPJ need an issue for "forcing confrontation with the

> LDP?"

Because it needs to show the public that it is an alternative governing party, that it will fight.

> To force HOR dissolution
> and an election? If so, then why force dissolution that, in both
> Paul's and your words, the public doesn't care much about?

I didn't say the public doesn't care about dissolution, I said it didn't care (much, anyway) about the anti-terror bill. Compared, say, to pensions, which is a policy area full of land mines. Or agriculture/rural area policy, where the DSP's election promises are widely ridiculed (unjustly, I'm inclined to say, but I really haven't looked at it).

>
> b)if the public prefers compromise, why does the DPJ need to force
> confrontation on this particular issue?

What Paul said is this: "Ironically, the grand coalition controversy coincided with the DPJ finally announcing its own anti-terrorism law draft. While this controversy shows that a grand coalition is not popular, polls also show that voters do not want too much conflict or obstructionism."

The DPJ's bill is the way it demonstrates that it has policy alternatives and it takes them seriously, not "opposition for its own sake" as used to be said of the JSP. It is introducing a number of bills, which it will pass in the UH and say to the LDP "let's talk about these." Preferably in the Diet, though there might well be some horse-trading.

> c)The anti-terrorism bill issue is hardly "meaningless"
> given the reputational costs internationally for Japan, and the very

> real possibility (as I think has happened) of the DPJ losing
> credibility as a potential governing party who can handle
> international affairs.

Well, I don't really follow this stuff all that closely, but if I am reading the atmospherics here in Tokyo correctly, I would say that this argument was the point de jour three weeks or so ago and is no longer taken seriously, either the international or
domestic side.
The issue doesn't mean much to Fukuda either (he seems to have offered to scrap it, though of course the secret talks are murky), though he does want to show Washington he tried, hence the extension of the Diet session.

My guess is that Fukuda worries about the substance of this issue exactly as much as he worries about the substance of the abductee issue. He just has two different constituencies to avoid irritating as much as possible.
>
> My own sneaking suspicion that has begun to get stronger with time,
is
> that what the DPJ does in terms of policy stances between elections
is
> not so much motivated by rational strategies for gaining votes or
> public support as the need to find an issue that it can somehow get
> the very diverse members to agree upon.

You think that is this one? Maehara broke with Ozawa on the day after it was announced, on Sunday AM TV, until somebody apparently whispered in his ear that party unity is kind of handy. Many many DSP members see the US-Japan relationship as much as a sacred cow as anybody in the LDP, even aside from the old DSP-type defense hawks.

By the way, how about Fukuda as a deft political operator? He almost decapitated the opposition, and indeed certainly took away their momentum.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:33 PM

November 09, 2007

[SSJ: 4813] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/11/09

To John Campbell:

I await Paul's response too, but if that is what Paul was saying, your post clarifies a bit. But what I'm still not clear on is:
a)WHY does the DPJ need an issue for "forcing confrontation with the LDP?" To force HOR dissolution and an election? If so, then why force dissolution that, in both Paul's and your words, the public doesn't care much about? If not to force dissolution, then why confront again on an issue the public doesn't care much about?
b)if the public prefers compromise, why does the DPJ need to force confrontation on this particular issue?
c)The anti-terrorism bill issue is hardly "meaningless"
given the reputational costs internationally for Japan, and the very real possibility (as I think has happened) of the DPJ losing credibility as a potential governing party who can handle international affairs.

My own sneaking suspicion that has begun to get stronger with time, is that what the DPJ does in terms of policy stances between elections is not so much motivated by rational strategies for gaining votes or public support as the need to find an issue that it can somehow get the very diverse members to agree upon.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:54 PM

[SSJ: 4812] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/11/09

To Ellis

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Home; Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 03:37 PM

[SSJ: 4811] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/11/09

Thanks to Paul Midford for his post on the Grand Coalition and anti-terrorism law situation. I agree with him that in a few weeks people may not care about the whole grand coalition thing and that too much is being made of it. But I am confused by several contradictions in the post regarding the anti-terrorism law. Putting together several sentences in the post about this issue we get:

PM: Especially if it [the Grand Coalition idea] s followed by a real confrontation over the MSDF refueling mission bill, the perception of the DPJ as selling out to the LDP will dissipate. It might even have some inoculating effect, making it harder to pin the obstructionist label on the DPJ.

ESK: er, contronting the LDP over the refueling bill will make it harder to pin the obstructionist label on the DPJ?

PM: I disagree that the DPJ is wrong to focus on the refueling bill as the place to confront the LDP. They cannot do this over pension reform, because the LDP can simply agree to whatever the DPJ offers, short-circuiting any confrontation. If they would continue to confront the LDP under these conditions then the DPJ would get the blame for preventing pension reform, which really would be political death.
Voters are focusing on the credentials of the two political parties in dealing with domestic issues, not foreign policy issues.

ESK: er, if voters are focusing on domestic issue not foreign policy issues, why is the DPJ focusing on the refueling bill "as the place to confront the LDP?"

PM: Ironically, the grand coalition controversy coincided with the DPJ finally announcing its own anti-terrorism law draft. While this controversy shows that a grand coalition is not popular, polls also show that voters do not want too much conflict or obstructionism.

ESK: so why then is the DPJ taking a hard line on the bill?

PM: The LDP's new anti-terrorism bill is not popular, but voters want to see the DPJ make its own proposal and try negotiating with the LDP. I might add that the opinion polls about the anti-terrorism special measures law of the last three months show a clear
pattern: whenever politicians talk about compromise, negotiation, and watering down the contents of the law it becomes more popular. But when the lines of confrontation become clearer the bill becomes less popular.

ESK: Again, so why is the DPJ making this bill the focus of its conflict with the LDP rather than just compromising with the LDP which has shown every sign of compromising?

PM: The DPJ draft bill probably gives the party what it needs to push for confrontation over this issue without appearing too obstructionist.

ESK: Again if voters are focusing on domestic issues, don't want confrontation over the anti-terrorism bill, and compromising is more popular among voters, why then should the DPJ "push for confrontation over this issue?"

Approved by ssjmod at 03:21 PM

[SSJ: 4809] A special issue of Governance on Japan

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/11/08

I think a number of Forumites would be interested in the new (I think) Governance, which is available free at least for a time. Here is the T/C:
>
> Crises of Governance: Institutions and the Politics of Change in
Japan
> and Europe
>
> Introduction: A Crisis of Governance in Japan and Europe Ellen M.
> Immergut and Ikuo Kume Coordination as a Political Problem in
> Coordinated Market Economies Kathleen Thelen and Ikuo Kume Managing
> the Bank-System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies:
> Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan
> Torsten Svensson, Masaru Mabuchi and Ryunoshin Kamikawa Government
> Partisanship and Managing the Economy: Japan and Sweden in
Comparative
> Perspective Junko Kato and Bo Rothstein The Political Frame for
> Negotiated Capitalism: Electoral Reform and the Politics of Crisis
in
> Japan and Sweden Ellen M. Immergut and Sven Jochem

You can get it at:

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/gove/19/1

I got it via my library a couple of weeks ago and it is kyoumi fukai in my opinion.

Begin forwarded message:

> From: "Wiley-Blackwell"
>
> Date: November 8, 2007 8:41:14 AM JST
> To: jccamp@umich.edu
> Subject: Access a special issue of Governance
>
> Access this special issue of Governance:
> Crises of Governance: Institutions and the Politics of Change in
Japan
> and Europe
>
> Introduction: A Crisis of Governance in Japan and Europe Ellen M.
> Immergut and Ikuo Kume Coordination as a Political Problem in
> Coordinated Market Economies Kathleen Thelen and Ikuo Kume Managing
> the Bank-System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies:
> Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan
> Torsten Svensson, Masaru Mabuchi and Ryunoshin Kamikawa Government
> Partisanship and Managing the Economy: Japan and Sweden in
Comparative
> Perspective Junko Kato and Bo Rothstein The Political Frame for
> Negotiated Capitalism: Electoral Reform and the Politics of Crisis
in
> Japan and Sweden Ellen M. Immergut and Sven Jochem To view this
> special issue of Governance click here or visit:http://
> www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/gove/19/1.
>
>
> Does your library subscribe?
> Recommend that your library subscribe so you can access all articles

> through your library! Click here to fill out our online Library
> Recommendation Form.
>
> ________________________________________
>
> For full information about subscribing to Governance e-Table of
> Contents (e-Alerts), manuscript submission policy, and other
details,
> visithttp://www.blackwellpublishing.com/gove or call Wiley-
Blackwell
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Approved by ssjmod at 03:02 PM

[SSJ: 4807] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Sam Jameson
Date: 2007/11/08

At 11:06 07/11/07 +0900, you wrote:
>From: Steven R. Reed (srmkreed@gmail.com)
>Date: 2007/11/07
>
>I feel like I was in the middle of a chemistry experiment when a
>earthquake broke all my beakers.
>Ozawa may well have destroyed every single one of the dynamics I had
>expected to lead to a DPJ victory.
>All bets are off, at least temporarily.
>
>Ozawa is the DPJ's Koizumi and its Abe. Koizumi promised to change
>Japan by changing the LDP and came very close to doing so. Abe dashed
>all hope that the LDP would really change when he let the rebels back
>in.
>The DPJ win in the HC raised hopes that there would be an alternation
>in power and Japanese politics would change. Ozawa played a major role
>in that win and then dashed all hope that anything would really change
>when he discussed a grand coalition with the LDP, ignored the consensus
>within his party, resigned and returned.
>For voters interested in change, the message is "No matter how much you
>kick the LDP out at the polls, the LDP will always win by some other
>means. Even if the DPJ takes over the government, it will act just like
>the LDP. Abandon all hope."
>
>According to the Asahi poll, 78% of DPJ supporters approved of the DPJ
>refusing to join a grand coalition.
>A poll of prefectural officials had virtually all of the DPJ opposing a
>grand coalition. Presumably, all but one member of the DPJ's governing
>body opposed a grand coalition. Unfortunately, the single exception was
>Ozawa.
>
>Is the DPJ Ozawa or is it everyone else? By pleading with him continue
>as leader, the DPJ confused the public (including me) and destroyed any
>party image they had managed to build.

My guess would be that the party pleaded with him to continue as leader to handcuff him to the party, not to rely on his leadership -- i.e., they want to make sure he did not bolt the party with 17 or more personal followers from the ranks of DPJ members of the upper house. Seventeen would be enough to give the LDP-Komei coalition a majority in the upper house tomorrow (not three years from now).

Sam Jameson

Approved by ssjmod at 03:00 PM

[SSJ: 4806] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Shunichi Takekawa
Date: 2007/11/08

According to Asahi, former PM Mori also worked as a middleman. But Watanabe Tsuneo first saw Ozawa about two month ago.

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1108/TKY200711070387.html

Prior to that, on August 16, Yomiuri published an editorial in which they recommended the grand coalitions between LDP and DJP.

FYI. Watanabe is CEO (Kaicho) of Yomiuri Group as well as the Editor-in-Chief (Shuhitsu) of Yomiuri Shimubun.
He is the top executive of Yomiuri Shimbun's editorials and news coverage. I believe that he is not the owner of Yomiuri Group: The owner (shashu) is Shoriki Tooru. He used to be a right-hand man of Ono Banboku and has been a close friend of Nakasone Yasuhiro while he has worked for Yomiuri Shimbun.

------------------------------------------------------
Shunichi Takekawa
PhD Candidate in Political Science
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Approved by ssjmod at 02:59 PM

[SSJ: 4805] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/11/08

Thanks to Llewelyn Hughes for the further thoughts about who else might have been pulling strings.

But to answer his question about the meaning of "grand coalition," of course I can't know what Fukuda, Ozawa, or Japanese newspapers think it means, in other places, it implies nothing at all about electoral cooperation.
In fact, it probably implies just the opposite. In Germany, coalitions between the SPD and CDU/CSU have occurred twice -- once in the 1960s and now. There is no way that any German politicsian has seen either occurrence as implying electoral cooperation. Same goes for Israel, where this has been tried upon occasion, usually to avoid having to "overpay" small, single-issue parties to piece together minimum winning coalitions. But once elections roll around, it's every party for itself.

The more common forms of coalition, also do not usually entail any electoral cooperation, but sometimes do. So the LDP-Komeito "team" has cooperated electorally, as have the SPD-Green coalitions in Germany.
These usually entail mutual stand-dwn agreements to allow the stronger party in a given constituency to field the single "coalition candidate."
Mixed-member systems lend themselves to this sort of cooperation as well, since the "team" can ask voters to vote one way in the district and the other way in the PR tier.

mike

Approved by ssjmod at 02:58 PM

[SSJ: 4804] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/11/08

My take on the Grand Coalition debacle is that too much is being made out of it. Yes, if as Michael Thies suggests, Fukuda called a snap election now the LDP might be able to turn it to some electoral advantage, but in a few weeks this will be yesterday’s news. Especially if it is followed by a real confrontation over the MSDF refueling mission bill, the perception of the DPJ as selling out to the LDP will dissipate. It might even have some inoculating effect, making it harder to pin the obstructionist label on the DPJ.

I disagree that the DPJ is wrong to focus on the refueling bill as the place to confront the LDP. They cannot do this over pension reform, because the LDP can simply agree to whatever the DPJ offers, short-circuiting any confrontation. If they would continue to confront the LDP under these conditions then the DPJ would get the blame for preventing pension reform, which really would be political death.
Voters are focusing on the credentials of the two political parties in dealing with domestic issues, not foreign policy issues.

Ironically, the grand coalition controversy coincided with the DPJ finally announcing its own anti-terrorism law draft. While this controversy shows that a grand coalition is not popular, polls also show that voters do not want too much conflict or obstructionism. The LDP’s new anti-terrorism bill is not popular, but voters want to see the DPJ make its own proposal and try negotiating with the LDP. I might add that the opinion polls about the anti-terrorism special measures law of the last three months show a clear
pattern: whenever politicians talk about compromise, negotiation, and watering down the contents of the law it becomes more popular. But when the lines of confrontation become clearer the bill becomes less popular.

The DPJ draft bill probably gives the party what it needs to push for confrontation over this issue without appearing too obstructionist. Nonetheless, the way the debate plays out in the Diet will determine how voters respond to the DPJ and the LDP.
It is striking that Komeito and some in the LDP are also very worried about appearing bully-like over this issue. A top Komeito leader was quoted as saying the coalition cannot use its two-thirds majority to override an upper house veto of this bill unless they
can get at least 60% of the population to support it.

Ironically, the grand coalition controversy has united the DPJ against the idea and in favor of a more confrontational approach. However, Ozawa himself remains the wild card. As of now, it appears that Ozawa agreed to remain leader but to accept the leadership’s rejection of the coalition idea. The other possibility would be Ozawa effectively overthrowing the collective leadership and then moving ahead with a grand coalition. Given how unpopular the coalition idea is with voters and especially DPJ supporters, this would be a political disaster for the DPJ.

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science Dragvoll, Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU) Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Web: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/japan
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 02:57 PM

November 07, 2007

[SSJ: 4803] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/11/07

Although Mr Thies writes of the DPJ:
> What could it have done? If they accept, they "sell out." If they
>reject out of hand, ... they look like obstruuctionists
>(dividers-not-uniters), spurning a humble offer of compromise from a
>PM determined to solve problems.

The DPJ already had the answer in hand and in practice
-- the same answer it gave Abe: Glad to discuss the issues, but want to do it in the Diet with both sides putting forth their positions and perhaps reaching a compromise acceptable to all. And if no agreement can be reached, take it to the electorate.

It was foolish of Ozawa to agree to secret talks, although I am sure he had his reasons (ego* among them).
Instead, they should have pushed on the pension, funding, and other issues and worked to paint the LDP as the obstructionists.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

* includes being willing to talk with Fukuda but not with a child like Abe

Approved by ssjmod at 07:17 PM

[SSJ: 4802] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Llewelyn P Hughes
Date: 2007/11/07

A note on the recent posts on the mess over at the DPJ.

It is still not clear, as far as I can tell, exactly what was offered at the Fukuda-Ozawa meeting. A "grand coalition" suggests electoral cooperation, and perhaps Professor Reed can offer more on this but the likelihood of successfully arranging a single LDP-DPJ candidate in each of the SMDs strikes me as an extraordinarily difficult proposition, which suggests that actually what was on offer was policy coordination. Maybe I'm wrong on my understanding of what a coalition entails, (how does it work in Germany now, for example?) but in Japan at least, my understanding is that coalition governments have always had electoral cooperation as part-and-parcel of the deal.

It's also worth noting that the newspaper that has been doing the running on the "grand coalition" story is the Yomiuri Shimbun, including publishing supposed details on cabinet seat divisions discussed between the parties. It is not coincidental, in my belief, that the go-between for the Fukuda-Ozawa meeting was the owner of the Yomiuri, who I understand has also been a strong proponent of the idea of a LDP-DPJ coalition. The Asahi and the Nikkei, for example, have been more circumspect in how they have reported the details of the events.

Nevertheless the point Michael Thies made about Fukuda's proposal (although its content is now in doubt as the two can't agree on what was agreed upon) being well calibrated is a good one. If, as Ozawa said in his resignation press conference, he believes the DPJ is incapable of winning a majority in the next HoR election, and if Fukuda did indeed suggest something along the lines of a permanent law echoing Ozawa's position on the SDF, it would undoubtedly have been very appealing. Ozawa is now 65 years old, and is unlikely to be the leader, or perhaps politically active, in two elections time. If he wanted to achieve that long-held goal this would have seemed an extraordinarily good opportunity. (Apart from the fact that he hadn't got his colleagues to agree to it of
course!) Although it's only a hunch, I'd hazard a guess at Nikai Toshihiro's involvement; he is a skilled strategist, and was very close to Ozawa for many years so knows which buttons to push.

Llewelyn Hughes

Approved by ssjmod at 01:21 PM

[SSJ: 4801] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Shunichi Takekawa
Date: 2007/11/07

No one gives a credit to Yomiuri Shimbun that proposed the great coalition nearly three months ago or Watanabe Tsuneo, the Editor-in-Chief of Yomiuri, who might pull the strings behind the scene?

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/071103/stt0711030938001-n2
.htm

------------------------------------------------------
Shunichi Takekawa
PhD Candidate in Political Science
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Approved by ssjmod at 12:53 PM

[SSJ: 4800] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/11/07

Thanks to Steve and Ellis. I agree with both of them, and I'm especially pleased that Ellis throws a little credit Fukuda's way for wrong-footing the DPJ. Who knows if he could have anticipated just how much the offer of coalition would discomobulate the DPJ, but he knew there was no perfect answer for the DPJ. What could it have done? If they accept, they "sell out."
If they reject out of hand, as some have suggested they should have, they look like obstruuctionists (dividers-not-uniters), spurning a humble offer of compromise from a PM determined to solve problems.

Either way, they wish the offer hadn't been made.
Still, they managed to find a middle road and look like obstructionist would-be sellouts. I guess they'd have been best served if Ozawa had said no in private, with no leak that the offer had even been made. Ozawa then doubled the fun for the LDP by calling his party's bluff with the resignation "offer." They hate him but need him. Hysterical. Makes you wonder if Koizumi is advising Ozawa.

But now what? Since the HC election, the LDP has had one weapon in the face of the supposed DPJ juggernaut
- time. They don't have to call an HR election until 2009, and the DPJ could end up being blamed as the "do-nothings" if they were to try to paralyze the Diet for that long.
Declining enthusiasm, and the complete absence of any positive accomplishment during that time might well have (and might well yet) fracture the party to the point that the LDP could win that eventual HR election (yet again) as the least bad alternative available.

So, should Fukuda call a snap election today, to take advantage of the DPJ's public embarrassment, let them stew for a while, with the risk that they'll recompose themselves, or continue to wait the DPJ out, occasionally sending them gag-gift olive branches just to watch them fall all over themselves? I'm not sure what I'd advise Fukuda to do. But I'm sure having fun watching the show.

-mike

========================================================
Michael F. Thies Director, Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies University of California, Los Angeles Box 951487, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1487
(tel) 310-825-7671 (fax) 310-206-3555

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 12:02 PM

[SSJ: 4799] Re: Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/11/07

I think Steve Reed hit it on the head: Ozawa and the DPJ have not closed the window of opportunity opened by the HOC election for Japan to finally have a competitive two party system in which the other party really has a chance at power. And they closed it with absolutely stupid political strategy. They had momentum, they had an issue that Japanese really cared about and a large majority blamed the LDP for (pension reform), and bureaucrats in Health and Welfare Ministry added to all the possible things to blame the LDP for with a series of screw ups lately. Instead, they picked an issue--the Indian Ocean refueling--that Japanese public was fairly split on, was not that salient to voters, and on which the US and EU could put on indirect and direct pressure and raise in Japanese voters' minds the question of whether the DPJ could be trusted with a responsible foreign policy.
Let's recall that it's not the coalition kabuki that started the DPJ's descent into idiocy but their anti-terrorism/refueling law position and all else has followed from their intransigence.

Let's also give some credit to Fukuda who has played this just right: calm, responsible, quiet compromiser and open to discussion. The DPJ dug their own graves though; Fukuda just gave them the rope to hang themselves first. And so they did.

One has to wonder though whether the DPJ is so riven with different policy preferences among its members and executives that it has to find some position that unites them all or it can't act and that this is what drives everything it does, rather than a smart strategy toward voters. And, given how shrewd Ozawa has been (until now) one also has to wonder whether this resignation drama isn't a way for him to gain some more internal control over the party because if he responds to their begging him to come back, he can give himself more leeway in the future.

In any case, one final irony: the DPJ lost the 2005 HOR election b/c it clung to the pension reform issue and rejected the postal reform bill; it won the 2005 HOC election in part b/c of Abe's dropping the ball on pension reform issue. And now it's losing its chance at power by ignoring the pension reform issue in favor of pushing anti-terrorism law opposition. Seems the pension reform issue is a hot potato that both parties can misplay.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:26 AM

[SSJ: 4798] Grand coalitions and the future of the DPJ

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/11/07

I feel like I was in the middle of a chemistry experiment when a earthquake broke all my beakers.
Ozawa may well have destroyed every single one of the dynamics I had expected to lead to a DPJ victory.
All bets are off, at least temporarily.

Ozawa is the DPJ's Koizumi and its Abe. Koizumi promised to change Japan by changing the LDP and came very close to doing so. Abe dashed all hope that the LDP would really change when he let the rebels back in.
The DPJ win in the HC raised hopes that there would be an alternation in power and Japanese politics would change. Ozawa played a major role in that win and then dashed all hope that anything would really change when he discussed a grand coalition with the LDP, ignored the consensus within his party, resigned and returned.
For voters interested in change, the message is "No matter how much you kick the LDP out at the polls, the LDP will always win by some other means. Even if the DPJ takes over the government, it will act just like the LDP. Abandon all hope."

According to the Asahi poll, 78% of DPJ supporters approved of the DPJ refusing to join a grand coalition.
A poll of prefectural officials had virtually all of the DPJ opposing a grand coalition. Presumably, all but one member of the DPJ's governing body opposed a grand coalition. Unfortunately, the single exception was Ozawa.

Is the DPJ Ozawa or is it everyone else? By pleading with him continue as leader, the DPJ confused the public (including me) and destroyed any party image they had managed to build. Politics is a matter of choices. What will a vote for the DPJ mean in the next election? Right now there is no answer to that question.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 11:09 AM

[SSJ: 4796] Re: The Constitution revision

From: Sarah Hyde
Date: 2007/11/06

Dear Prof LeBlanc
Thank you so much for the response on SSJ. I had looked on the Harvard site and they have no direct translations, as far as I can see in English. If I have been stupid on this, please shout.
Thank you
Sarah
-----------------------------------------------
Dr Sarah Hyde
Lecturer in the Politics and IR of Japan and East Asia Dept of Politics and IR University of Kent Canterbury
CT2 7NX
(01227) 827233

Approved by ssjmod at 11:07 AM

November 05, 2007

[SSJ: 4794] Re: Grand Coalition

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/11/05

There is, of course, rampant speculation all over the media on what was offered and who offered it -- with Fukuda feeding the speculation by saying that Ozawa has enough trouble without me contraticting him, so I'm not going to say anything.

Yet regardless of who suggested what, it is obvious from Ozawa's press conference ("unfortunately, the plan was rejected") that he was in favor of it. So the question is: why?

Sure, bills have not gotten passed. But it would be easy enough to blame that on the LDP's refusal to pass the DPJ bills -- the LDP's opposition for opposition's sake -- and to vow to take these issues into the electorate. And remember that the Diet session has not been as long as it might look since there was a two-week lull in the beginning while the LDP elected a new president. (Question: will the Diet again take a two-week break to allow the DPJ to select its new
leader?)

So why was Ozawa in favor of this? One of the more interesting speculations -- heard on TBS on Monday morning -- is that Ozawa is seriously involved in the Ministry-of-Defense-Moriya scandal and this was a way for him to get off center-stage and out of the spotlight.

Will be interesting to see how it plays out.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman, who thinks he LDP is doing a good job of not gloating in public

Approved by ssjmod at 04:56 PM

[SSJ: 4793] Re: survey question help - ideologies

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/11/05

Hello.

Depending on how much of a historical/comparative perspective is required in this survey, it would be worth examing several works by Professor Yasumasa Kuroda on the politics of Diet members.

One work is Kuroda's book The Core of Japanese
Democracy: Latent Interparty Politics (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

And for a tricultural language- and religion-based perspective on Japanese politics, several chapters in his co-authored (with Hayashi) Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective (Praeger, 1997) will be of use.
The authors' comments on translation- back translation of survey questions (and answers) should be of interest.

You could even usefully go as far back as Kuroda's study of future Diet members in his "Political
Socialization: Personal Political Socialization of Law Students in Japan" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University Oregon, 162).

Vincent K Pollard
............................
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
ASIAN, U.S. HAWAI'I, WORLD POLITICS, FUTURES

Approved by ssjmod at 04:55 PM

[SSJ: 4792] Re: The Constitution revision

From: Robin Le Blanc
Date: 2007/11/05

Based on the AAS presentation I saw last spring, you might find what you want on the website for the Harvard-based Constitution Revision Research Project.
Here's the link:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~rijs/crrp/index.html

Robin LeBlanc
Washington and Lee University
leblancr@wlu.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 02:38 PM

[SSJ: 4790] Re: The Constitution revision

From: Purnendra Jain
Date: 2007/11/04

Professor Helen Hardacre at Harvard's Reischauer Institute has a long-term project on constitutional reform. Please contact her assistant Mr Kamei Ippei for information. I don't have his email address right now but guess should be available by visiting the RIJS website.
Purnendra Jain
University of Adelaide
Australia

Approved by ssjmod at 02:37 PM

[SSJ: 4789] Re: Query on Lower House Override of UH on tax bills

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/11/04

Michael Thies (thies@polisci.ucla.edu) wrote:
it would be very unusual for
a tax bill to be treated like the budget, rather than as an ordinary bill. Nearly every constitution that I know about, especially in parliamentary systems, treats the budget differently than everything else.
And that means just the spending side.

Thanks. I am curious as to whether any legal entity in Japan has ever given a clear indication. The reason is the discussion of hiking the consumption tax by PM Fukuda and some of his chief aides, especially Kaoro Yosano (now chief of the LDP's fiscal reform panel and second-in-command of its tax panel); and chief cabinet secretary Nobutaka Machimura. At an October 17 meeting of his Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, Fukuda said, "If we drag this [the tax hike] out any further, our options will become even more limited." At the same meeting, the private sector members from academia and business said it would be impossible to fund social security and balance the budget without substantial tax hikes in the next few years.

Hidenao Nakagawa has warned that raising the consumption tax means electoral defeat for the LDP, as it has in the past.Machimura retorted, "I don't think that winning an election by displaying planks pleasing to the ear is the right policy stance." Yosano sang the same tune, commenting, "An election comes around every 18 months. If we worry about them, we won't be able to accomplish anything." Yosano apparently believes the LDP can get away with the tax hike as long as the funds are devoted to social security.

But the DPJ, which once supported the consumption tax hike, is now staunchly opposed. If it takes a two-thirds override, it is very hard to see how the LDP could force that through. The Komeito doesn't like it and many LDPers are opposed for both substantive and electoral reasons. So, why is Fukuda doing this?

Here's one bit of info. As Koizumi's term neared its end, Yoshiro Mori proposed that Fukuda, not Abe, succeed Koizumi. Mori's reasoning was the Fukuda could pass the unpopular tax hike and then fall on his sword, letting Abe succeed him and not have to face that political albatross.

I'm not saying the Mori recipe is what's going on now.
But why try to push through yet another unpopular measure that can't pass?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 02:36 PM

[SSJ: 4788] Re: Grand Coalition

From: Joe M. Michael Sasanuma
Date: 2007/11/04

Besides thinking it was incomprehensible and electorally suicidal, the first thought that occurred to me when I read about Ozawa's apparent willingness to entertain a Grand Coalition was his vision for a Ho-Ho Rengo from his New Frontier Party days.

The former Socialists in the DPJ are apparently displeased with this unexpected turn of event. I can't say I blame them.

Joe M. Sasanuma
Law Clerk to the Honorable Peter E. Doyne Presiding Judge, General Equity Superior Court of New Jersey 10 Main Street Hackensack, NJ 07601
(201) 527-2606

Approved by ssjmod at 02:35 PM

[SSJ: 4787] Re: Grand Coalition

From: Llewelyn P Hughes
Date: 2007/11/04

>From 1998 to 2000 I worked for Mr. Ozawa. In my
estimation he certainly understands the costs of entering into coalition with the LDP, and is unlikely to support the idea. It would also make little sense given his long stated argument that Japan will not make the political and economic changes that he sees as necessary unless the LDP is thrown out of power.
(We can argue of course about whether his position represents personal ambition or a deeper belief in the merits of two-party government. I admit my own bias on this question.)

I have no inside information, and haven't been following events closely, but given the above my guess is that he is likely to have reserved judgment because he had not been formally given the right to make a decision by the party. At the time of the formation (and dissolution) of the LP-LDP coalition sitting members met when such a proposal was made and agreed to pass authority to the leader to make the decision on their behalf. It seemed like a bit of a charade (no-one ever voted no publicly), but nevertheless existed as a part of the intra-party decision-making process. When you also consider that Ozawa has also been at pains to be (more) inclusive of Kan, Hatoyama, and others in the DPJ (than usual), it makes sense that he wouldn't reject the idea out of hand, unless he had already been given the authority to do so.

A final point: the well-informed blogger at Shisaku notes on Nov. 2nd that it is not at all clear what was offered by the PM, so there may be some misreporting going on also.

FWIW,

Llewelyn Hughes

Approved by ssjmod at 02:34 PM

[SSJ: 4786] Re: survey question help

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/11/03

To George Ehrhardt :

Several years ago Muramatsu Michio conducted a survey of the ideologies of Diet members that might be useful for your survey as well.

I don't have the reference, unfortunately.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 02:33 PM

[SSJ: 4785] Re: survey question help

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/11/03

George,

Although I am not a social scientist myself, I wonder if you could not define the categories yourself with reference to two or three lodestone issues (e.g., revising Article 9 or not) and then ask views (strongly agree, sort-of agree, don't care, sort-of disagree, strongly disagree) on those two or three issues, which composite might give you a rough idea of where the respondent stands on the political spectrum.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 02:32 PM

November 03, 2007

[SSJ: 4784] survey question help

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/11/03

Folks,

I'm writing a survey in Japanese, and having trouble finding a good question to measure political ideology.
Similar surveys I've seen (like Ikeda et al stuff on social networks) ask respondents to rate themselves 0-10 from "hoshu" to "kakushin." But everyone I've talked to about the survey says that: a) no one uses kakushin anymore, and b) normal people won't have a clue where to put themselves on that scale. Still, I can't think of anything better.

One option, I suppose, is to break it down into two questions rather than measure them on a single continuum.

I'm hoping the collective wisdom on this list can set me right. :)

George

Approved by ssjmod at 07:17 PM

[SSJ: 4783] Re: Query on Lower House Override of UH on tax bills

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/11/03

It has never come up, but it would be very unusual for a tax bill to be treated like the budget, rather than as an ordinary bill. Nearly every constitution that I know about, especially in parliamentary systems, treats the budget differently than everything else.
And that means just the spending side. This is because if the budget does not pass, the reversion point is a government shutdown. If any other bill does not pass, the reversion point is simply the status quo.

=====================================================
Michael F. Thies Director, Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies University of California, Los Angeles Box 951487, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1487
(tel) 310-825-7671 (fax) 310-206-3555

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 03:15 PM

[SSJ: 4782] Grand Coalition

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/11/02

I have to admit, I was ready to give Ozawa props for his DPJ leadership until today. After the events of today, I'm wondering, whether the hard to comprehend decision making, he already exhibited throughout the 1990s finally got the better of him again. You would think, he learned during the 1990s, that entering such agreements with the LDP is not exactly helpful (in case he had forgotten about it, he should have called Doi Takako). Or can anybody explain to me in rational terms, why he was apparently willing to enter into some sort of grand coalition agreement with Fukuda?
For Fukuda this made at least some sense, because as PM he could come up with some good excuses, in case it didn't work out. For instance by saying "I tried everything to create a more stable government" or "I thought about the Japanese people rather than merely the LDP".
On the other hand, for Ozawa to not decline this offer right away, but to say, he would have to ask his fellow DPJ executives, and then after they voted against it, not saying "we won't do it", but "we can't do it" is just an incredibly hard to comprehend strategy, if one can even call it "strategy". Does anybody have a smart explanation for Ozawa's actions today?

Best regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:14 PM

[SSJ: 4781] The Constitution revision

From: Sarah Hyde
Date: 2007/11/02

Dear Colleagues
Teaching in a non-Japanese studies location and thus having hardly any students who read Japanese, does anyone know where there are any English translations of the 2005 suggested Constitution revision documents from the LDP and the DPJ? I have a couple who are writing dissertations on Constitutional reform and any suggestions would be most useful.
I would be most grateful for any help
Thank you
Sarah Hyde
-----------------------------------------------
Dr Sarah Hyde
Lecturer in the Politics and IR of Japan and East Asia Dept of Politics and IR University of Kent Canterbury
CT2 7NX
(01227) 827233

Approved by ssjmod at 03:13 PM

November 02, 2007

[SSJ: 4780] Query on Lower House Override of UH on tax bills

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/11/02

According to the Constitution, the Lower House can override the Upper House by a two-thirds vote on an ordinary bill and a simple majority on a budget bill.
My question concerns a tax bill, such as a hike in the consumption tax. Has "budget" in Article 60 been interpreted to mean both the spending and revenue side, or just the spending side? Is a tax hike a budget bill or an ordinary bill in terms of Article 60? Has the Cabinet Legislation Bureau or the Courts ever made a ruling that gives either a categorical answer or some hint of how they might act in the actual event?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 06:38 PM

October 31, 2007

[SSJ: 4778] Re: Question about Sources on Japanese Voters

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/10/31

To Yamada Kyohei

Regarding voting behavior in Japan, two good places to start, since they are in two quite different traditions of electoral research, are:

Japanese Voter, by Scott C. Flanagan, Bradley M.
Richardson, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Shinsaku Kohei. Yale University Press, 1991.

Japanese Electoral Politics: Creating a New Party System Steven Reed (Editor),Taylor & Francis, 2003

As you are a political science PhD student at Yale I imagine I do not have to tell you about a book in a third tradition of electoral research, Ramsayer and Rosenbluth, Japan's Political Marketplace, Harvard UP, 1997.

Approved by ssjmod at 10:45 AM

[SSJ: 4777] Re: Predicting the election

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/10/31

Peter asks a good question.

Swings in Britain were national in the 50s and 60s making the calculations easy. Since then regional variations have made it much more difficult.

There has never been a national swing (i.e., same swing across the country) in Japan that I am aware of.
Even in 2005 there were several clear exceptions to the swing toward the LDP. Hokkaido is the clearest example. My guess is that whre the DPJ has a solid organization, it can better withstand swings. There has also been significant urban-rural differences in the swing. My impression is that swings were greater in urban than rural areas throughout the years of LDP dominance. In 2005 the swing toward the LDP was much much bigger in urban than rural areas.

Probably most important factor is changes in the choice set offered the voters produce major differences by district. In 1993, there was no swing against the LDP in those districts with no new party candidate but huge swings where there was. Since 1996 the choice set has made most of the difference. For example, when the NFP broke up, the choices of the NFP candidate made a large difference in the next election.
If the NFP candidate chose to return to the LDP, his votes tended to go to the LDP. If he chose to join the DPJ, the DPJ vote went up. In rural areas, the DPJ vote goes up when an established LDP candidate (or his
son) cannot get the LDP nomination and runs for the DPJ.

My impression is that the Japanese parties have not identified swing districts or swing voters in the way British parties do. They seem to look district by district and choose those where a bit more effort would put them over the top, which is the same, but the factors are usually candidate quality and swing organizations, e.g., "If we can get the doctors'
support, we can win." (The JMA has switched to the DPJ in several prefectures and gone neutral in others.)

The broad swings in the next election will probably be urban rural. There will be a swing against the LDP in urban areas simply because their 2005 performance is unlikely ever to be repeated. The pendulum is currently at its max LDP swing and will therefore move back. The only question is how much. The secret of the
2005 success will therefore be reversed. The LDP did not do well in rural areas in 2005 nor in the HC election of 2007. The DPJ will have a better organization in rural areas in the next election simply because they have at least one HC incumbent.
They should also have the support of the Kokumin Shintou. I do not think the LDP can expect to dominate rural smds as they have in the past.

HC elections are won in the relatively rural single-member districts.
HR elections are won in the relatively volatile urban smds.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 10:05 AM

[SSJ: 4776] Re: Predicting the election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/10/31

Peter Cave as usual makes some interesting and good points about swing constituencies and identifying types of voters. Some caveats, however. The UK SMD system is a "pure" SMD system, whereas in Japan we have mixed SMD-PR (Mixed Member Majoritarian) system and the "zombie" (best loser can win seat in PR) system. This means we would have to take into account not only the "singometer" for particular SMD districts but also the likelihood that the "best loser" would also get a seat in PR which would affect the total number of seats a party got.

I haven't heard of Japanese parties identifying types of voters, but possible.I think to some extent Koizumi did that in 2005 election in that he aimed for the "Tokyo floating voter' type--the urban salary man and woman without any fixed party id who vote on the basis of issues and were the strongest supporters of "reform."
This is where the largest "swing"
and the most "marginal constituencies" are.

Such voter category identifications are not only quite common in UK but also in NZ with its mixed SMD-PR system but where seats are adjusted according to total vote % won in PR (as in Germany; Mixed-Member Proportional system). This system puts a premium on a)making sure party supporters get to the polls b)whole categories of types of voters vote for your party because number of seats you win is based on total vote % nationally. This is less true in SMD where the marginal "swing" districts are what count most. Again, though, the zombie phenomenon complicates matters and predictions for identifying categories of voters because both parties can do that and each wind up with a seat in the same district.

But does anyone know if LDP or DPJ are identifying and going after detailed categories of voters such as Peter describes?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 09:50 AM

[SSJ: 4775] Question about Sources on Japanese Voters

From: Yamada Kyohei
Date: 2007/10/31

Thank you for your attention. I am sending this email because I would like to find sources on Japanese elections and voters but have not been able to find enough of them. I thought it would be great if I could have some suggestion and help from the participants of this forum.

I conducted a project that examined voting behaviors of rural voters in Japan for the House of Councilors election in July. I am summarizing the result now and trying to present the paper not only to those who are familiar with Japanese politics but also to those not familiar with Japan or Japanese politics. Therefore, it would be very important for me to write a literature review and provide some basic information so that the readers unfamiliar with Japan would understand the context.

Specifically, I am looking for books, articles, and any kinds of sources, that contain any of the following information:

(1) Cross-national comparison of voters' attitudes and behaviors in general

(2) Similarly, determinants of Japanese voters'
behaviors and the comparisons with those in other countries. For example, how does an educational attainment affect one's probability of voting? How do we explain urban-rural disparity in turnout?

(3) Partisan and non-partisan mobilization in Japan.
For example, how do political parties in Japan mobilize voters? How many pieces of campaign mails does a typical voter receive? Is there non-partisan get-out-the-vote activity at all?

I would truly appreciate if I could have any suggestion.
Thank you very much.

Kyohei Yamada
Ph.D. Student
Department of Political Science
Yale University

Approved by ssjmod at 09:49 AM

[SSJ: 4774] Re: Predicting the election

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/10/31

I'd guess that most of the vulnerable LDP seats are the ones they won in urban areas in the Koizumi landslide. Simple reversion to the mean could cost the LDP quite a bit.

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 09:47 AM

October 30, 2007

[SSJ: 4773] Re: Predicting the election

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2007/10/29

The points made by earlier contributors to this interesting thread about small swings in SMD systems resulting in big changes in seats are well taken.
Another issue, obviously, is where the swings take place. In my recollections of British general election programmes (where the swings in particular seats are dramatically shown by all sorts of exciting devices such as the 'swingometer' - they could do with that on NHK), there are often great variations between constituencies in the swings recorded, the key being the marginal seats. This makes me wonder - where are the key marginal seats in the next Japanese general election? And, what kind of campaigning efforts are the LDP and DPJ putting into those seats?

Another question that occurs to me is that in the last couple of decades in Britain, political parties have often identified key types of voter to win over (usually designated by some term that identifies them by gender, place of residence, or even preferred make of car, e.g. Basildon Man, Worcester Woman, and Mondeo Man). I haven't heard of any Japanese equivalents (Yamagata man? Ehime woman?). Are the major Japanese parties using this kind of categorising approach, I wonder?

Peter Cave
Manchester University

Approved by ssjmod at 05:42 PM

[SSJ: 4772] Re: Predicting the election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/10/28

Fred Uleman's suggestion of matching up policies that appeal to the median voter with the proposals of each party to see which is closer is a good one, and his examples very apt. But I think two other things would have to be taken into account as well:
1)the salience of the individual issues to the median voter (not all issues are of equal importance to
people)
2)the extent to which the median voter in Japan votes according to issues (not all voters vote based on issues).

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 05:41 PM

October 27, 2007

[SSJ: 4771] Re: Predicting the election

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/10/26

This discussion of, inter alia, whether or not the DPJ is producing policies designed to satisfy the median voter would be more convincing if there were discussion of what policies would actually appeal to this median voter and then contrasting that set with what the DPJ (or LDP) is proposing.

For example,
Require all political organizations to document all of their income and outgo -- the same as ordinary companies have to do. This is something that has great appeal in the midst of political slush-fund scandals.
Which party is closer to advocating real transparency?
Admit that the pension system is broken and fix it by (1) combining the three systems and (2) financing the basic pension with taxes (and extending it to everyone, including people who have not paid into the system the requisite number of years, since this is not so much a pension as it is life support) (and setting some means-based cut-off point). This would assure median voters that they will have at least the basic pension amount if they need it. Who is closer to this position?
Looking at the cozy relationships between the bureaucrats and industry -- of which Moriya is just the latest example -- and saying that the resultant waste has to be eliminated before we can even talk about raising taxes. Guaranteed to be a hit with the median voter. Who is closer to this position?

Of course, there are still a number of other areas -- education policy coming to mind -- that are still in play and the average voter is unsure what, if any, differences exist between the two parties. But I suspect it is premature to simply write the DPJ off as not appealing to the median voter.

And I suspect another big unknown in the next election is how many people who would really like to vote for one of the minor parties but voted for the DPJ last time because they were willing to abandon their first choices if that's what it took to repudiate Abe will go back to their first choices and leave the DPJ stranded in second place.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 06:10 PM

October 26, 2007

[SSJ: 4770] Re: Predicting the election

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/10/26

In response to John, Chris, and Hiwatari-sensei,

There is a wonderful way of predicting the number of seats a party will get based on its percentage of the vote but one assumption is that there are only two parties. That wonderful way no longer works in Britain and has never worked in Japan. Fortunately, Yamamoto Kouji and I are working on the problem. Unfortunately, I would not hold my breath waiting for us to finish. I doubt it will be ready by the next election.

Chris, you are not the only one who doubts whether the DPJ can win the next election. Quite the contrary. I am the only one who is predicting a DPJ win. You are in the overwhelming majority. In my opinion that should give you and everyone else more than sufficient reason to risk 100 yen and bet with me. I wonder why that does not happen??? (I am smiling as I write this.)

I agree that Ozawa shot himself in the foot with his proposal for SDF participation in Afghanistan. On the other hand, I think iIt was an error primarily because it was his personal opinion and not the DPJ's position, not because it is a bad idea.

I also agree that the DPJ is not producing policies designed to satisfy the median voter but I think the LDP has never done so and that the party closer to the median voter will not necessarily win the next election. The party closest to the median voter in Britain is the LibDems and has been for quite a while.
I am still quite willing to be on the DPJ even if its policies do not satisfy the median voter and even if its policies are not particularly good ones.

I am sure that things that used to be kept secret are now hitting the newspapers. I am not sure why. I think that the DPJ win in the HC is one factor but I am not sure how big a factor.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:45 PM

[SSJ: 4769] Re: Predicting the election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/10/26

Hi from recently returned refugee from Souther California fires.

John asked good question. Don't know myself if can predict swing, but do know that the "majoritarian bonus" of SMD can be substantial. E.g., in 2005, LDP got all that huge seat swing with only about 4% overall swing in votes, and DPJ didn't lose very much in way of votes but lost all those seats anyway. Such is the SMD system in any country.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:44 PM

October 25, 2007

[SSJ: 4768] Predicting the election

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/10/25

A question about forecasting the election for
Winkler and Reed:
Is there any way to estimate the relationship between the "swing" or change in national vote percents for parties (in the SMDs only of course with the change in seat percentages? My ever dimmer memory suggests that was the mainstay of the series of volumes on British general
elections over the years by Butler and various others.
Clearly Japanese SMDs don't correspond directly to the UK, in that there are a lot of strong local personalities more in the US mode in Japan. Still, there has to be some relationship here--how strong I wonder? That is, how big a popular vote landslide would it take to get a majority of seats?

Approved by ssjmod at 05:33 PM

[SSJ: 4764] question re: Koban of the 1920s

From: Daniel Aldrich
Date: 2007/10/24

Dear Colleagues,

Has anyone worked with Keishicho data from the 1920s?
I am trying to locate maps of the various koban within the Tokyo metropolitan area during that period, and would very much appreciate any advice on how to locate one.

Thanks,

daniel

--
Daniel P. Aldrich, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar, Law Faculty, University of Tokyo Assistant Professor, Political Science, Purdue University http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/
Tel: 81-3-5841-3157

Postscript from SSJ-Forum Moderator,
Same posting was sent at the last Monday. However, due to server problem, some people did not receive above contribution. Please understand this situation.

Sincerely,

Shinichi AIZAWA (SSJ-Forum moderator)

Approved by ssjmod at 05:27 PM

[SSJ: 4763] Re: Competitive Politics: From greater transparencyinpolitical financing to greater civilian control

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/10/24

I wonder, whether the LDP's more offensive tone towards its old partners in crime, the bureaucrats in Kasumigaseki and Ichigaya isn't part of a new strategy.
After all, apart from Ishiba and Masuzoe, several other LDP executives, including secretary general Ibuki Bunmei have used rather bold language to criticize the MOD over the last couple of days.
In particular when thinking about the inevitable next Lower House election, the LDP might have determined, it is smarter to (at least) publically distance itself from the bureaucrats, and thereby shift the blame on them.
While the two MOD scandals certainly weren't the LDP's fault, the electorate is always going to punish the LDP for the mess, whereas the bureaucrats escape unscratched. In times, when cover - ups are more difficult to pull off, and the risk of such a scandal weakening the LDP's position vis-a-vis the surging DPJ in the next election is quite real, the LDP might have little incentive to continue its strong symbiosis with the bureaucracy, the way it has done in the past.

Furthermore, I wonder, whether I'm the only one, who is not so optimistic about the DPJ's chances of centering the next government? Even if the scandals keep coming, I'm skeptical, whether that is enough for the DPJ to defeat a large number of prominent LDP personalities in single seat election districts like they did in July's Upper House election. Now, I have to admit, I never thought Katayama Toranosuke would lose his Upper House seat in Okayama to DPJ newcomer Himei Yumiko or that the DPJ would beat the LDP so badly in its hoshu no oukoku bastions in Chuugoku, Shikoku, and Kyuushuu.
However, given the large amount of second generation politicians and former/acting cabinet members coming from these hoshu no oukoku, I think it will be very difficult for the DPJ to repeat its July success in a Lower House election. If it were to repeat its success, then it has to make inroads in traditional LDP strongholds, like Ibaraki, Gunma, Yamanashi, Wakayama, Hokuriku, Chuugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu (for reference, we are talking about approx. 100 Lower House single constituency seats across those areas) again, while retaking its traditional strongholds (which it partially lost to the LDP in 2005).

Best regards,
Chris Winkler, M.A.
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 05:23 PM

October 24, 2007

[SSJ: 4762] Re: Competitive Politics: From greater transparency inpolitical financing to greater civilian control

From: Nobuhiro HIWATARI
Date: 2007/10/24

Yes, I think the odds of a new committee are high even without the change of hands of the upper house, and thus the question is not rhetorical.

(1) Remember the Abe cabinet after being embarrassed by bureaucratic scandals rammed through measures to restrict _amakudari_ and reorganize the Social Insurance Agency at the end of the last Diet session, which the DPS opposed using lame excuses? Remember the same cabinet forced almost all active and retired SIA higher officials to give up part of their summer bonus?
Obviously, the government carried out such measures feeling the heat of electoral competition, but it also did so while still controlling the upper house. I see little reason why the current scandals would not have caused the government to take action if they exploded in its face while debating the renewal of the old anti-terror law.

(2) My question is, has DPJ's control of the upper house resulted in the presentation of policy alternatives that represent the median voter, which should now be closer to the DPJ? The current scandals are godsend for the DPJ which is going nowhere in its opposition to the anti-terror law. As everyone knows, Ozawa declared the activities unconstitutional and proposed instead participation in ISAF, which is not only unconstitutional but unfeasible. But in the frenzy to smother the blunder, the DJP proposed sending SDF medics as JICA officials to Afghanistan, protected by private security companies, which only indicates the party is desperately digging itself into deeper trouble further away from any sensible policy alternatives. Indeed, the DPJ was anxiously looking for ways to avoid or delay presenting their own anti-terror cooperation measure.

(3) Finally, I am not sure I understand why a failure of a military officer to report copying mistakes to his superior constitutes anything more than a dereliction of duty by that officer rather than an alleged cover-up, or a conspiracy, or a breakdown of civilian control. I feel the setting up of new committee to strengthen civilian control has got a lot to do with the issue being a personal embarrassment to the current Prime Minister and Defense Minister, who reported the wrong numbers. What do we expect the committee to achieve other than to install strict reporting procedures?

So far, the role DJP has played in the current DOD scandal is, as always, obstructionist tactics by embarrassing the government as a cover to compensate for their appalling lack of good alternatives. This is in spite of striding a giant step nearer to power. The party should focus on issues which they have good alternatives. The anti-terror issue was hurting the party.

Nobuhiro Hiwatari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:35 PM

[SSJ: 4761] Re: Competitive Politics: From greater transparency inpolitical financing to greater civilian control

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/10/24

Wow, someone actually reads and remembers my posts. I was just thinking about writing something along these lines. Many thanks to Paul for starting the conversation.

A good dissertation topic would be on what is was and is like being in the opposition in Japan. There are now many politicians who have experienced both, including LDPers. One big difference is clearly access to information.

Three things have opened up Pandora's box (aka LDP's
secrets) in Japan: freedom of information acts, reporting requirements for getting public funding for parties and elections, and the fact that the LDP does not have a majority in the House of Councillors. I wish I knew what the balance of the three factors was.

The pensions scandal was broken open by Nagatsuma and a TV program indicated that he merely received a few complaints, asked about them in the Diet, got some news coverage and then got a flood of complaints.

The LDP's initial response was that Nagatsuma and the DPJ were "upsetting the people". The LDP has been used to be able to keep problems under wraps. They are now having more trouble doing so.

The LDP has also had several failures due to an inability to control (or even get information out of) the bureaucracy. Michio Muramatsu and Ethan Scheiner are currently doing some excellent work on this topic.
I expect to see more surface in the next couple of years.

The most surprising part of the current events is the response of the LDP. Fukuda chose Ishiba to be Minister of Defense because he is by far the best spokesman on this issue they have. He has no trouble holding his own on the talk shows. Fortunately or unfortunately, depending upon your stance, he is also a straight arrow and perfectly willing to criticize his bureaucrats. He and Masazoe are not doing standard LDP coverups. Quite the reverse it seems. I have never heard an LDP Prime Minister criticize the bureaucracy so harshly and with such clarity. Maybe the LDP will be able to blame the bureaucracy for all the problems of the last twenty years and stay in power for another forty. For me, however, I am still betting that we will have a DPJ-led government after the next general election.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 05:31 PM

[SSJ: 4760] Competitive Politics: From greater transparency inpolitical financing to greater civilian control

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/10/24

As a corollary to Steven Reed's earlier observation about how the DPJ's control of the upper house is forcing LDP politicians to clean up their act regarding political funding I would suggest that this is also promoting greater civilian control of the SDF.
Certainly the sloppy and self-serving book keeping regarding the refueling of US warships in the Indian Ocean (switching the figures for a destroyer and an aircraft carrier) seems oddly remiscent of LDP politicians submitting the same receipt twice, etc.

You have to wonder why someone in the MSDF would first shred the log book for the Tokiwa (the refueling
vessel) and then incinerate the shreds. Japan's politics were competitive enough that the LDP needed to be saved from embarrassment, yet uncompetitive enough that someone in the JDA thought they could get away with this cover up. Of course, they also forgot what a US FOIA is (or perhaps they assumed that Bush had done away with this).

Now we see the MOD forming a committee to strengthen civilian control and Fukuda is talking about how important this is. Anyone care to speculate on the odds of all of this coming to light if the coalition still controlled the upper house?

Cheers,

Paul

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Department of Political Science & Sociology Dragvoll, Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU) Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 02:24 PM

October 22, 2007

[SSJ: 4759] ballot paper

From: Chao-Chi Lin
Date: 2007/10/22

Dear colleagues,

I was wondering if someone knows where I can get ballot paper samples. I am teaching "introduction to different political systems" and students are interested in how different countries' ballot papers (particularly the PR ones) look like. From IDEA website, I found a ballot paper for mayoral elections.
Does anyone happen to have ballot paper samples for Diet members or know any website I can look at? Thanks a lot.

Best,

Chao-Chi

Approved by ssjmod at 12:15 PM

[SSJ: 4758] question re: Koban of the 1920s

From: Daniel Aldrich
Date: 2007/10/22

Dear Colleagues,

Thanks,

daniel

--
Daniel P. Aldrich, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar, Law Faculty, University of Tokyo Assistant Professor, Political Science, Purdue University http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/
Tel: 81-3-5841-3157

Approved by ssjmod at 12:14 PM

October 20, 2007

[SSJ: 4751] Re: citation help

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/10/18

> From: Patrick Koellner (koellner@giga-hamburg.de)
> Date: 2007/10/16
>
> It might be added that the said article by Shigeo Hirano has
appeared
> in the October 2006 issue of World Politics (World Politics 58, pp.
> 51-82).

Thanks. How is that paper on election style coming?

George

Approved by ssjmod at 12:34 PM

October 17, 2007

[SSJ: 4749] Re: citation help

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/10/17

George:
I believe the person whose paper you are looking for may be Kenji Hayao at Boston College? He had written a paper on "Communities and Voting in Japan."
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:24 PM

October 16, 2007

[SSJ: 4748] Re: citation help

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/10/16

Thanks all, for the quick help.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 07:16 PM

[SSJ: 4747] Re: citation help

From: Patrick Koellner
Date: 2007/10/16

It might be added that the said article by Shigeo Hirano has appeared in the October 2006 issue of World Politics (World Politics 58, pp. 51-82).

--
Dr. habil. Patrick Koellner / Acting Director Institute of Asian Studies / Institut fuer Asien-Studien GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz-Institut fuer Globale und Regionale Studien

Rothenbaumchaussee 32 / D - 20148 Hamburg Tel.
+49-40-428874-17 / FAX +49-40-410 79 45
E-Mail: koellner@giga-hamburg.de
Internet: http://staff.giga-hamburg.de/koellner / www.giga-hamburg.de

Approved by ssjmod at 04:39 PM

[SSJ: 4745] Re: citation help

From: Yusaku Horiuchi
Date: 2007/10/16

It should be Shigeo Hirano's paper. He is currently an assistant professor at Columbia University.
http://www.columbia.edu/~sh145/
http://www.columbia.edu/~sh145/papers/electoral_reform.pdf

Yusaku Horiuchi, PhD.
Crawford School of Economics & Government ANU College of Asia and the Pacific The Australian National University J G Crawford Building No. 13 Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 2 6125 4295
Fax: +61 2 6125 5570
Email: yusaku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au

Approved by ssjmod at 02:22 PM

[SSJ: 4744] citation help

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/10/15

Folks,

I'm hoping someone can help me with a citation. At APSA in Boston in 2002 I heard a presentation on geographic vote dispersion before and after the 1994 change from MMD -> SMD. The author investigated what happened to the prior geographic concentration of votes for individual LDP members within MMD districts and whether they transferred smoothly to other LDP candidates after the district changes. Does anyone else remember who this was or any more details? I seem to recall it was a Japanese graduate student at Harvard, and this was his dissertation, but I could be totally wrong. I've tried all the Google keywords I can think of, it doesn't seem to have been posted on the APSA proceedings archive, and the Dissertation abstracts index doesn't bring it up. Any thoughts?

Thanks,

George

Approved by ssjmod at 02:13 PM

October 01, 2007

[SSJ: 4729] Re: The Debate between the LDP and the DPJ

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/10/01

As Mr Klein points out, there is the definite danger that the DPJ might be painted/perceived as obstructionist and rejected as irresponsible. However: The LDP is now making noises about narrowing the scope of the Indian Ocean Refueling Law so it only allows refueling in the Indian Ocean. Which raises the question: what else has it allowed until now? And why didn't the LDP say anything about this until the DPJ asked? Who's irresponsible?

There are a number of scandals in waiting -- waiting for the DPJ to exercise the investigative powers that control of the HoC gives it. I would not be surprised if they discovered government slush funds with ties to politicians. I would not be surprised if they discovered enough waste that eliminating it could pay for the pension reforms they propose (without raising taxes). There are many ways the DPJ can be confrontational without being obstructionist. Calling for official recognition that there was major military involvement in the many civilian suicides in Okinawa in the last days of the war would be another way to distinguish itself from the LDP's hard-right wing (and discomfort non-hard-right LDP members).

It is too early to predict any outcome, but this is likely to be an unusually interesting session of the Diet.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 01:28 PM

[SSJ: 4727] Re: The Debate between the LDP and the DPJ

From: Axel Klein
Date: 2007/10/01

I'd like to add a shade of grey to Steve's picture of the DPJ.

DPJ politicians have repeatedly stated that their major aim is a lower house election. The LDP and the mass media have already started to react to this by warning Ozawa and his party not to put their own interest first. Do not behave irresponsibly just for the sake of opposing the LDP. Do not boycott government attempts to cooperate and compromise if cooperation is needed for the good of the country.

According to other polls I have seen, public opinion on the SDF / Indian Ocean-law is pretty evenly divided.
But I wonder if - after a period of stern DPJ resistance to the new version of the "anti-terror-law"
- the focus of discussion will move away from the actual contents of the law to the question of irresponsible behavior on part of the DPJ (the LDP would find itself supported by comments from foreign governments, of course). If I do not misunderstand political culture in this country, there is at least the possibility of the DPJ finding itself sooner or later to be perceived as a disruptive, selfish party that makes it impossible for a responsible government to do its job.

There is at least one point to support this scenario:
Fukudas approval rate is 53% (Asahi) / 57% (Yomiuri), more or less average compared to numbers for other new prime ministers. According to the same polls, the major reason for people to give their support, however, is the "anteikan" they feel with Fukuda. Next to "antei", "anshin" seems to be the biggest desire of many voters (at least judging from the repetitive use of both words in political comments and reporting). A DPJ unwilling to compromise, causing "chaos" in parliament, will in a way undermine exactly those two treasured "an".

I know that there are still some "financial irregularities" of the government to take the front pages (there have already been some in the back pages last week) and some popular bills initiated by the DPJ to catch the voters' eyes, but I cannot see how the openness in which the party is striving for elections will help it. Talking in soccer terms, it seems like an own goal to me.

Best,

Axel

------------------------------------
Axel KLEIN, Ph.D.
Research Fellow
German Institute for Japanese Studies
Kioizaka Bldg. 2 Fl.
7-1 Kioicho
Chiyoda-Ku
102-0094 Tokyo

Tel.: +81-3-3222-5077
Fax: +81-3-3222-5420
www.dijtokyo.org
-----------------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 11:45 AM

[SSJ: 4726] Auschwitz and Hiroshima

From: Timothy Takemoto
Date: 2007/09/28

Auschwitz and Hiroshima....I think that comparison with Nagasaki is more poignant. Being only four days after Hiroshima, with little time for the Japanese to react - some Hisotrians claim that the Japanese got to grips with Hiroshima on the day before Nagasaki - so it might have been more peaceful to have waited a little while longer before obliterating another city.
If a speedy demonstration of the plurality of US bombing potential was important, it might also have sufficed to drop a second bomb in Tokyo Bay or on Mount Fuji for instance.

Another comparison that might be made is between Auschwitz and Fukuoka 17 http://www.lindavdahl.com/ and what Japanese and German nationalism tell us about how to maintain world peace, but perhaps that comparison has been over-played, outside of Japan at least.

>From a tourism perspective, it seems to me that tourism
destiantions such as Auschwitz and Hirohima, and Nagasaki, do contribute to the maintenance of world peace. But as far as I am aware, the site of Fukuoka 17, in Ohmuta, Fukoka, is perhaps even unmarked. Very few people go there at all.
Perhaps this is a shame?

I wish I could go to the talk.

Tim
Timothy Takemoto
Department of Tourism Policy
Yamaguchi University

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

[SSJ: 4725] Re: The Debate between the LDP and the DPJ

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/09/28

Not really in
> the stream of sleaze
department, but there was a very interesting visual on tv this evening (e.g., NHK's 7:00 news): The education minister called the sumo chief in to dress him down (about the murder of a would-be sumoist) and the visual shows the minister bowing very deeply to the sumo chief while the sumo chief (his waistline not letting him bow deeply?) works up a condescending nod.

So who's in charge, here?

video at
for now.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 11:39 AM

September 28, 2007

[SSJ: 4724] The Debate between the LDP and the DPJ

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/09/28

In a previous message I predicted that, if there were a national debate on the SDF activities in the Indian Ocean, the LDP would lose. I would not want anyone to think that what is happening right now is anything even slightly resembling a national debate.
Since the LDP presidential primary, the LDP has regained its normal dominance of the media. Right after the HC election, the DPJ was actually allowed to state its position on TV. Now we get constant updates on the LDP changing positions from many different sources and the DPJ is asked, "Are you still going to oppose the LDP bill?" Nothing beyond the "no" is reported.

The DPJ is being smart. (I know, I was also surprised.) First, they are consistently refusing to bargain behind closed doors. The LDP knee-jerk reaction to problems with the opposition is to buy them off with side-payments in a process we normally call "consensus decision making". The DPJ is saying, "Let's debate in public." Surprisingly smart move. Everyone should pull their ancient copy of Schattsneider off their shelf.

Second, the DPJ is going to pass bills in the HC and force the LDP to respond. Presumably, the media will be unable to ignore a bill passed by the HC and the public will actually hear about the DPJ position on TV.
Even more novel, the LDP will presumably be asked, "Are you going to oppose the DPJ bill?" I have no predictions whatsoever, only oodles of curiosity.

Perhaps the most surprising thing was that Ozawa did not take the problems with the Abe cabinet as yet another opportunity to split the LDP. A prediction based on Ozawa's past behavior would have missed the mark badly. (Okay, I missed the mark badly.) Instead, Ozawa instructed the DPJ to ignore events inside the LDP and concentrate on policy. "Surprisingly smart"
does not quite cover it but "miracle" might overstate the case a bit.

The Fukuda cabinet got a nice bounce in the polls but the stream of sleaze has begun again. The variable is how much time the media will spend on cabinet ministers and the prime minister himself "explaining"
away their sleazy behavior.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 07:16 PM

September 25, 2007

[SSJ: 4720] Re: Abe's resignation

From: Todd Tilma
Date: 2007/09/25

Good Afternoon All;

Thanks to George and Sam for adding more to my understanding and clearing up the issue for me.

Todd

Approved by ssjmod at 01:29 PM

[SSJ: 4718] Re: Abe's resignation

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/09/22

> From: Todd Tilma (todd.tilma@gmail.com)
> Date: 2007/09/21
> didn't get the chance to hear their conclusions. But it got me to
> wondering; is there really a codified chain-of-succession in
Japanese
> law, or is it something that has been left up to the ruling party to

> handle?
>
> Todd Tilma

There isn't a succession per se, since PM's don't have a "term" to serve like a US president, but there are acting PMs. According to Shinoda's book Koizumi Diplomacy, Article 9 of the Cabinet Law says that the PM shall designate a state minister to serve as acting PM in the event he is incapacitated. In practice, this has meant the Chief Cabinet Secretary acts as PM (as Aoki did after Obuchi collapsed).

George

Approved by ssjmod at 10:19 AM

[SSJ: 4717] Re: Abe's resignation

From: Sam Jameson
Date: 2007/09/22

On a NHK TV newscast, I saw Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano announcing that his office had studied whether something or other (a regulation?) dealing with appointing an acting prime minister to substitute for Abe while he was in the hospital and had reached the conclusion that a substitute PM was not necessary.

I took that to mean that the government has, indeed, set up a procedure to use to appoint acting PMs -- which didn't exist when Ohira was hospitalized after suffering a heart attack and then died in 1980. At that time the chief cabinet secretary visited Ohira in his hospital room and came out to tell newsmen that Ohira had asked him to serve as acting prime minister.
Everybody, in essence, said, "ah so desu ka?" and the chief cabinet secretary took over as PM without protest. The position because potentially very important when Ohira died and the chief cabinet secretary-acting prime minister wound up making all the decisions on how a successor would be chosen.

I don't know whether a procedure existed in April 2000 when Obuchi suffered a stroke. But if one existed, it wasn't used. Mori and a few others kept Obuchi's incapacitation secret while they agreed to pick Mori as his replacement and again everybody seemed to respond by saying "ah so desu ka?" Even Kato Koichi, who six months or so later threatened to vote for a non-confidence motion to oust Mori, joined in chorus.

Sam Jameson

Approved by ssjmod at 10:18 AM

September 21, 2007

[SSJ: 4716] Re: Abe's resignation

From: Todd Tilma
Date: 2007/09/21

Morning all;

Yesterday afternoon, about the same time that Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano was making his statement about PM Abe needing to effectively come clean about his health condition, I overheard a very interesting discussion by some foreign correspondents. Their fundamental concern seemed to revolve around the official succession policy for an incapacitated PM.

Now, there was no direct mention of former PM Obuchi's situation, and the LDP machinations that resulted in the Aoki to Mori governments, but rather their discussion seemed to revolve around the legal infrastructure that codifies the government's response when a still-sitting PM is hospitalized for an extended period, possibly with periods of incapacitation (induced by anesthetics or such things), or the lack thereof.

The fact that I didn't hear the end of the debate (I left the area to go to another meeting), means I didn't get the chance to hear their conclusions. But it got me to wondering; is there really a codified chain-of-succession in Japanese law, or is it something that has been left up to the ruling party to handle?

Todd Tilma

Approved by ssjmod at 02:51 PM

September 18, 2007

[SSJ: 4714] Re: sue the LDP?

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/09/18

EK's point is well taken. Of course you can't sue the politicians. Why not? Because the law says so. And who made the law? Of course you can't sue them.

That said, perhaps you can sue the party as an organization. After all, the need to elect a new President is party business. It is the party that is keeping the politicians from going about their rounds.
So, ... Unlikely, I know, but worth getting out into
the media to remind people of the irresponsibility and waste.

And note that the DPJ is lending its voice to this cause when it says, and here I paraphrase, "Oy, oy!
The Diet's supposed to be in session. So why not appoint an interim Pres/PM so we can get some work done already? What's the LDP doing holding up the people's business?"

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 04:47 PM

[SSJ: 4712] Re: sue the LDP?

From: Sumiko SEKIGUCHI
Date: 2007/09/18

To Fred Uleman-san:

I was surprised to see your question (sue the LDP?) at first, but come to think of it, why not? (I am not sure technically, though. Sorry) One could say that the LDP and the related media have stolen the show now, and replaced the Diet deliberation with speech rallies in big cities of two candidates to succeed Abe. It reminds me of the national election, but, in fact , most of the audience have no vote.

As for Abe's potential money scandal, Axel Klein-san kindly showed us, it is now an open secret. I had read it on the internet (Mainichi Shinbun), but the article has disappeared, so I could not quote. I've found that Yomiuri Weekly just after Abe's resignation wrote (as I recall it): after the deadline, Shukan Gendai was about to write an article on his inheritance tax scandal; the reporter is a former Nikkei Shinbun reporter; and he is associated with the DPJ; the DPJ had saved it to use it as a bomb in the Diet deliberation in case Abe will not resign.
But today no one on the main stream media talks about that, as if nothing had happened. The reason may be:
first, Ozawa himself has been very careful not to be labeled as a bully; second, it is a delicate issue for the LDP, that is, instead of helping PM in need, the LDP Secretary General might have tried to take advantage of it. The LDP's overnight change is believed to be motivated by criticism against Aso, aside from the obvious fact that everyone rushed to jump on the wagon.

I didn't want to go into the individual human factors in detail, but I feel this is an exceptional case and period,when politics moves very quickly, so I've written this.

Then why not say 'Give the taxpayers money back'?

Cheers,

SEKIGUCHI Sumiko ssumiko@hosei.ac.jp
Professor of Asian Political thought and Gender Studies, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Hosei University TEL +81-3-3264-9375 FAX+81-3-3262-7822

Approved by ssjmod at 01:37 PM

[SSJ: 4711] Abe's "financial scandal"

From: Axel Klein
Date: 2007/09/18

Dear colleagues,

for those of you who have not had the chance to find out more about the weekly magazine's "scoop" (by now it is sold out in most places), you may want to check the website of Kodansha's "Shukan Gendai"
(http://kodansha.cplaza.ne.jp/wgendai/article/070917/top_01_01.html),
though if you want the whole article you will have to subscribe to their website-subscription service.

According to the magazine, one of Abe's "seiji dantai"
evaded taxes (Yen 300 Million) and allegedly there is even twice the problem (= amount) left as a legacy of Abe's father.

The magazine claims they have researched Abe's seiji dantai for a year, because they received a hint from a senior political journalist. This journalist had been wondering where the huge amounts of money (about Yen 670 Mio.) had gone that Abe's father Shintaro had collected when he tried to become prime minister. But Shintaro died in May 1991 and Shinzo took over, allegedly laundering much of the money into his own seiji dantai. The financial report of that particular seiji dantai for 1993 says that 93.8% of all income (almost Yen 500 Mio.) consisted of donations below 1.000.000, and back than you did not have to name the generous contributors if they gave less than one million. The magazine concluded: There is story behind this one, and here we are.

As Sekiguchi-sensei posted, Shukan Gendai asked Abe to comment on their findings until the 12th (the day on which he announced he would resign), but obviously he did not - at least not directly.

Best,

Axel

P.S.: There is another Abe-"scoop" in this week's Shukan Bunshun.

--
------------------------------------
PD Dr. Axel KLEIN
German Institute for Japanese Studies

Kioizaka Bldg. 2 Fl.
7-1 Kioicho
Chiyoda-Ku
102-0094 Tokyo

Tel.: +81-3-3222-5077
Fax: +81-3-3222-5420
www.dijtokyo.org
-----------------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 10:55 AM

[SSJ: 4710] Re: Abe's Resignation: A statistical model versus the chattering classes

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/09/17

Did the chattering classes predict Abe's resignation?
Not at all.

It appears from my earlier post that the chattering classes did predict that Abe would not resign after the HC election loss but my statement was misleading.
Sorry, I was trying to poke a couple of jabs at the chattering classes and got carried away. The only people saying Abe would not resign were Abe supporters, most notably Aso and Nakagawa. I was telling the press not to believe them because they had good reason to say such things whether they were true or not. Most of the chattering classes were agreeing with me and saying that he would follow the pattern set by Hashimoto and overlooking the most relevant case, Koizumi in 2004. (I was surprised and embarassed when I pulled the front page of the paper right after the
2004 election out of my files and saw Koizumi saying, "Even so I will not resign." The issue on which he lost was pensions.)

My count has chattering classes 0 for 2 and statistical model 1 for 2. The decision goes to statistical models, which are of course, only statistical.

That said, I think Paul is correct in thinking that it is getting harder not to resign. Parameters are shifting. After a few more cases, Masuyama might want to update his data and test for parameter changes.

Paul clearly does not make the following error but there is a mode of argument common in Japan that drives me up the wall. Abe, for example, argued that the people are not always right so I can choose to ignore the people. I also hear science is not always right so I can ignore science. What is always right?
Nothing. The question is not who is always right but who you are going to place your bets on. How many want to bet on Abe? How many want to bet on Japan's elite bureaucracy? I put my bets on elections knowing full well that they are not always right. Similarly, I will bet on statistical models knowing full well that they are not always right.

Who did predict Abe's resignation? No one did so publicly. Did people who knew about his illness predict his resignation? No. Is sickness a possible reason. Of course, but there are also many exceptions.
Did people who know about his impending scandal privately predict his resignation? I doubt it and, even if they did, LDP history is full of exceptions to this hypothesis. Actually, I find it difficult to get interested in the question of why Abe resigned even though I really do want to know why prime ministers (or even Japanese prime ministers) resign. I am, however, looking foward to hearing about the scandal.

On a completely different topic, Germany is having similar problems with their part of the War on Terror.
Support for German troops helping in Afghanistan is dropping and the German parties are faced with a choice of living up to their international committments or listening to the voters:
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/16/europe/germany.php

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 10:54 AM

[SSJ: 4709] Re: Abe's Resignation: A statistical model versus the chattering classes

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/09/17

To Paul Midford:

> The problem with this [Abe won't resign] argument is that there are
> no identifiable causes distinct from the disastrous July 29th upper
> house election that can explain Abe's resignation, such as a new large
> political scandal engulfing Abe himself.

ESK: I think Prof. Sekiguchi's post indicates that there might well be such a scandal.

> Rather, it appears to be the accumulated weight of public and perhaps
> elite disapproval at Abe's decision to stay on despite suffering such
> a huge loss, when predecessors had chosen to resign under such
> circumstances. This outcome would seem to suggest that ideas or norms
> about what a PM should do when his party looses big in an upper house
> election (or to cast this more narrowly, looses control of the upper
> house) have triumphed over constitutional and legal distributions of
> power and over the power of the president in an LDP that has become
> less factionalized
> and more centralized.

ESK: The only problem with this "new norm" argument is that according to polls 70% of the Japanese public think that Abe's sudden resignation was "irresponsible."

Clearly, Abe could have, and intended to, stay on (otherwise why appoint a new Cabinet only a month ago) as he said. He probably could have toughed it out, at least until the Indian Ocean deployment bill was finally defeated. And, like Bush's justifications for invading Iraq, his explanations for the resignation (apparently each gullibly accepted by the Japanese
press) changed daily post-facto. Odds are that it was the likelihood of financial scandal or the latter plus health etc. that finally induced him to resign, not a new "norm" held by the public, however good a democratic norm that would have been.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:53 AM

[SSJ: 4708] Re: sue the LDP?

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/09/17

To Fred Uleman:
Er, Fred, if citizens of democracies could sue their elected leaders for non-action on the people's business, U.S. taxpayers would reap enough back from the Treasury to multiply our already massive national debt ten times over! And that's in litigious America, not in non-litigious Japan.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:52 AM

September 16, 2007

[SSJ: 4707] sue the LDP?

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/09/15

Question for political science people:

Asao and others have mentioned that the LDP needs to select a new President (who will then be PM) quickly because the Diet is in session and the meter is running.

Of course, there is lots of Diet business that could be done even while the LDP is selecting Abe's replacement (e.g., passing a law mandating that all political organizations track income and outgo to the last yen and provide actual receipts for outgo), but the Diet is basically in limbo. I assume that means per-diems are being paid and all even though nothing is being done.

So the question: Assuming this is the case, would it be possible for a group of taxpayers to sue the LDP demanding the LDP reimburse the national treasury for the money that is being spent/wasted because the Diet is in session but unable to do anything?

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 09:30 PM

[SSJ: 4706] Abe's resignation and the rise of Fukuda

From: Sumiko SEKIGUCHI
Date: 2007/09/14

Dear colleagues,

As far as I know, the most plausible reason for Abe's sudden resignation is a potentially explosive money scandal. A gossip-loving weekly magazine had set the deadline for him to answer a question on the 12th. I don't know why this news has disappeared, but anyway we will know the reason before long.

If Fukuda becomes the PM, I guess the DPJ will lose some of its steam it enjoys now to change the government. The reason is: first, Fukuda is not so stupid, he is as smart as Ozawa; second, Ozawa's tactics is sometimes to spot a weak in the LDP and put it into a corner. Then things will not turn out so well from now on.

Anyway, the DPJ says it is now brushing up policies, then, after some confusion, we might see the two-party system becomes a reality in Japan, instead of too drastic(and destructive) change of the principles after even too ideological showdowns.

SEKIGUCHI Sumiko ssumiko@hosei.ac.jp
Professor of Asian Political thought and Gender Studies Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law Hosei University TEL +81-3-3264-9375 FAX +81-3-3262-7822

Approved by ssjmod at 09:29 PM

[SSJ: 4703] Abe's Resignation: A statistical model versus thechattering classes

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/09/14

In early August Steven Reed brought the following to our attention:

"Second, has everyone seen the wonderful article by Masuyama in SSJJ? I had just told a journalist that Abe would resign no matter what the chattering classes were saying when Masuyama's article arrived using a statistical model that predicted Abe would not resign.
Needless to say, Masuyama won and I lost. Betting against the chattering classes works pretty well but betting on data analysis works much better."

In light of Abe's resignation this week, can we conclude that the chattering classes have, in the end, triumphed over Masuyama's statistical model? I for one am inclined to so conclude.

One could argue that because Abe waited six weeks and formed a new cabinet that the hypothesis that a PM will not resign just because he looses control of the upper house has been confirmed. The problem with this argument is that there are no identifiable causes distinct from the disastrous July 29th upper house election that can explain Abe's resignation, such as a new large political scandal engulfing Abe himself. In other words, it's hard to draw out a counter-factual scenario under which Abe would have resigned had the coalition maintained its upper house majority. It's also hard to believe that an upset stomach and fatigue would have prompted Abe to resign had he maintained this majority.

Rather, it appears to be the accumulated weight of public and perhaps elite disapproval at Abe's decision to stay on despite suffering such a huge loss, when predecessors had chosen to resign under such circumstances. This outcome would seem to suggest that ideas or norms about what a PM should do when his party looses big in an upper house election (or to cast this more narrowly, looses control of the upper
house) have triumphed over constitutional and legal distributions of power and over the power of the president in an LDP that has become less factionalized and more centralized. Abe's resignation would also seem to make it harder for a future PM in the same position to avoid resigning.

Of course this question is also about how we code results to determine when a test has been passed or failed when reality is complicated and messy.
Steven Reed has contributed much to this discussion on this forum, and I am certainly eager to know how he and others on SSJ would answer this question.

Yoroshiku,

Approved by ssjmod at 09:26 PM

[SSJ: 4702] Re: JCP electoral strategy

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/09/13

Yes. That's what I meant.

> From: Michael Thies (thies@polisci.ucla.edu)
> Date: 2007/09/13
>
> I'm not sure I understand Ehud Harari's meaning here.
> The JCP fielded a candidate in nearly every district for years under
> SNTV, no matter how dismal their prospects, and even when it diverted
> resources away from candidates who might have won seats with a little
> extra help. Is that what you meant by "preceded the change?" If so,
> I guess we agree. The explanations I've heard have been about
> recruiting new members, selling Akahata and other "literature," and
> generally using the election as a bully pulpit for protest, and not
> worrying so much about maximizing their seat share.
>

Approved by ssjmod at 09:25 PM

September 13, 2007

[SSJ: 4701] Re: JCP electoral strategy

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/09/13

I'm not sure I understand Ehud Harari's meaning here.
The JCP fielded a candidate in nearly every district for years under SNTV, no matter how dismal their prospects, and even when it diverted resources away from candidates who might have won seats with a little extra help. Is that what you meant by "preceded the change?" If so, I guess we agree. The explanations I've heard have been about recruiting new members, selling Akahata and other "literature," and generally using the election as a bully pulpit for protest, and not worrying so much about maximizing their seat share.

======================================================
Michael F. Thies Director, Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies University of California, Los Angeles Box 951487, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1487
(tel) 310-825-7671 (fax) 310-206-3555
Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 10:37 AM

[SSJ: 4700] Re: JCP electoral strategy

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/09/13

The JCP practice of fielding a candidate in every electoral district preceded the change of the electoral system to the HoR from SNTV to the mixed system first applied in 1996. The explanation was:
energize the activists/members.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 10:07 AM

September 12, 2007

[SSJ: 4699] Abe's resignation

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/09/12

Just a few brief comments on Abe's resignation:
The obvious question is who will succeed Abe. Asou, Nakagawa (Shouichi), Tanigaki Sadakazu and Nukaga Fukushirou have more or less directly expressed their intention to seek the LDP presidency in the past.
While Asou probably still has the best chances of the four men, he (just like Nakagawa) is yet another hawk, prone to slips of the tongue. Tanigaki, who has in the past argued for hiking the consumption tax, probably is an even less likely candidate. In the "good old days" Nukaga in his position as acting chairman of the Heiseikenkyuukai (the Tanaka - Takeshita faction) might have been a viable candidate, but the slow decline of his faction certainly is not helping his chances. The alternative to the names mentioned above would be a caretaker. If the LDP was still ruling this country under the 1955 regime, the best bet would be Koumura (seeing how he is Miki and Kaifu's successor).

If the LDP was indeed looking for a caretaker, Fukuda might be the most logical choice, even though there is the question, whether the other factions will again support a candidate from the Machimura faction (after Mori, Koizumi and Abe) this time around.

Admittingly, these more or less elaborate guessing games are fun, but what I'm more interested in is the question, how drastically has the LDP really changed over the last couple of years. To give a few concrete examples of what I'm thinking about: Apart from the intriguing question of how strong the factions still are these days, will the LDP re-adjust its policy again like it did in the post - Kishi era and henceforth opt to focus more on (comparatively
nonideological) issues of the economy rather than say, constitutional reform or the fundamental law of education? Also, even if they decided to go down that economy - first road again (as much as the ever changing international environment allows this course of action in present times, obviously), there is the question, how can they bridge the gap between the growing frustration in their former strongholds (the rural areas) and those calling for continuing Koizumi's reform agenda. After all, a part of the disgruntled "Koizumi Children" is already moving to establish its own faction in order to make their voices heard more clearly again. Put differently, how strong is Koizumi's legacy really?

Best regards,
Chris Winkler, M.A.
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 06:34 PM

[SSJ: 4698] JCP electoral strategy

From: Justin Reeves
Date: 2007/09/12

I've often heard the argument that the logic behind the JCP's decision to field candidates in every SMD was that it served to increase their PR votes by by keeping them more visible to voters as a competing and viable party.

I was wondering, in light of recent developments:

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20070909TDY01005.htm
and
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070910a3.html

if anyone studying these matters considers the above explanation no longer tenable?

Thanks,
Justin Reeves

Approved by ssjmod at 06:33 PM

[SSJ: 4696] Re: DPJ and ideology

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/09/11

To Ronald Dore:

VERY interesting question. Thanks for asking it. I am by no means an expert on the DPJ (and there are few of them around) and maybe someone who knows more about it can answer your question better. But let me make a "guess" that those pushing the Japanese withdrawal from the Indian Ocean overlap with those opposed to economic "liberalization" in at least two groups:
a)those dwindling numbers of former socialists in the party b)the new HOC members elected from rural areas in the recent election. But others do not, as there are some in the party who are actually more strongly in favor of further economic liberalization than even many in the LDP and many of these may just be going along with Ozawa for tactical reasons?

Views of others who know more about the party workings?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 06:31 PM

September 08, 2007

[SSJ: 4692] DPJ and ideology

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2007/09/08

Could I ask the people from whom I have learned a good deal about the DPJ in recent weeks, the following question. It is partly inspired by watching Gordon Brown, slowly and unostentatiously trying to de-poodleise Britain.

There would seem to be a certain (ideological?
emotional?) congruity between the DPJ's risking American hostility by bringing the ships home from the Indian ocean and its emphasis on the malign effects -- provincial impoverishment, increasing inequality -- of deregulatory "reforms" a la Koizumi/Takenaka which are widely seen as Americanising the Japanese economy -- the congruity lying in the desire to deepen the blue water between Japan and the US. One might indeed call it an ideological congruity, given that having a pro or anti American emotional bias has (understandably) in many parts of the world almost replaced any other redefinition of right and left.

So, my question: would the supposition of such a link be borne out if one did an opinion survey of DPJ diet members? Would one find that the people in this incredibly heterogeneous party who are most firmly opposed to renewal of the terrorist act are also the people most critical of deregulation? And the market fundamentalists (the Maeharas, etc,) the most uneasy about cocking a snook at Washington?

Two other correlations I would be curious about: how far is either view related to having had or not had part of one's education in the US, and how far does hostility towards US dominance correlate with friendly feelings towards China.

Informed guesses would be appreciated.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:39 PM

September 06, 2007

[SSJ: 4689] Re: Money

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/09/06

And it would provide ready refutation of the oft-trotted-out charge that the DPJ is only against things. This is something they could be proactively for, including passing a bill in the HoC, challenging the HoR to do the same, and discomforting innumerable LDP legislators.

Even given the very real risks of backfire, it would be a neat way to start the session off.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 04:08 PM

[SSJ: 4688] Re: Money

From: Jean-Christophe Helary
Date: 2007/09/06

> From: Chris Winkler (chris_winkler@gmx.de)
> Date: 2007/09/05
>
> DPJ, nothing is going to change. Hence, unless the DPJ can verify
that
> their own ranks are 100% clean (which probably is hard to
accomplish),
> such a move has the potential to back fire.

If the DJP announces that it knows it can backfire and will take responsibility for people in its ranks then if will certainly gain popularity regardless of the results.

Plus, considering the proportion of JA (and others) connections in the LPD, it is likely to affect them more than the DJP.

Jean-Christophe Helary

Approved by ssjmod at 03:45 PM

[SSJ: 4686] Re: Money

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/09/05

In response to Fred Uleman's post:

This certainly would be a popular move, even though there is a big risk attached to it as well. If one digs deep enough into the finances of politicians and their support organizations, there is always the chance that "irregularities" might also surface within the DPJ's own ranks. Should this happen, the party would not only look hypocritical, but it would also re-confirm the problematic, yet wide-spread sentiment, that regardless of whether one votes for the LDP or DPJ, nothing is going to change. Hence, unless the DPJ can verify that their own ranks are 100% clean (which probably is hard to accomplish), such a move has the potential to back fire.
Therefore, blocking the extension of the Indian Ocean support law might be a safer bet, with less risk attached to it.

Best regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 01:21 PM

[SSJ: 4685] Money

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/09/04

I suspect the smartest thing the DPJ could do once the Diet session starts would be to introduce a bill on day one, if not sooner, mandating that all political organizations must file financial reports (e.g., how much came in from where, where how much went, and how much is left) with receipts (no copies
allowed) attached for any and all outgo, even down to the last yen. And if these financial reports could be due every quarter, say, within a month of the end of the quarter, so much the better.

The Indian Ocean confrontation is sexier, but this would show the DPJ is serious about addressing an issue that is a real voter concern/frustration -- especially with many LDP people wanting to keep the rules as "flexible" (read: ineffective) as possible.

Any chance it'll happen?

Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 01:20 PM

[SSJ: 4683] Opinion Polls and the MSDF Indian Ocean Deployment

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/31

An opinion poll conducted by Asahi this week reveals continued public opposition to extending MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean. By a margin of 53% to 35% they oppose extending this mission. Besides initially confirming Ozawa's intuition that this would be a relatively safe issue (I would add, not absolutely safe, since there is no such issue, although not confronting the government has its own dangers) on which to confront the Abe cabinet, it belies Koizumi's often stated view that public opinion moves left, moves right, but will back the government in the end.
In contrast to this image of an unstable and moldable public, what is remarkable is how little public opinion has shifted since Asahi last asked this question in 2003, and before that in 2002. The difference between the current poll and the 2003 poll must be well within the margin of error (although Asahi, like other Japanese newspaper polls, almost never prints a margin of error statistic). This also suggests that Amb Schieffer's interview after meeting Ozawa and Asahi interview, and other US efforts, have not had any effect to date. LDP statements have not either, although they will presumably intensify once the Fall Diet session begins.

Of course, public opinion does shift in reaction to changes in the real world, and moved a lot during the first two months after the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures act was first introduced in Fall 2001, but since then, opinion has been very stable. Having said this, we must be careful about selectively picking a single poll that supports our view and drawing general conclusions from this. A recent article in the Japanese Journal of Political Science used a single poll result from Fall 2001 to argue that Japanese public opinion "overwhelmingly supported" the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures act. After reading this conclusion, one could only be baffled by the current debate over the MSDF Indian Ocean deployment.

Finally, in a separate quibble in reaction to a recent quibble by Professors Hiwatari and Reed, I don't think it's accurate to claim that opinion polls failed to predict the outcome of the July upper house election until less than a week before the election. I do not want to suggest that opinion polls are all mighty, they are certainly not, but this time at least, they were right on target. Major opinion polls (Asahi, Yomiuri, and Kyodo) were all predicting the outcome
2-3 weeks before the election, and arguably, even before then, when they showed the DPJ's growing momentum and the LDP's growing weakness. The main difference between weeks 2-3 and week 1 is that by week 1 estimates of retained LDP seats had dropped below 40, whereas before they were around 40-45. Of course, if one expects opinion polls to predict precisely how many seats will be won 2-3 or more weeks out from an election one can fault the polls or speak of a fickle public. On the other hand, isn't it reasonable that we see some shift of opinion during a campaign? After all, isn't that why we have election campaigns?

Cheers,

Paul

Paul Midford
Associate Professor Director,
NTNU Japan Program Department of Sociology and Political Science Dragvoll, Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU) Office # 10504 NO-7491 Trondheim Norway
Web: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/japan
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64 Cell
Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 01:17 PM

August 28, 2007

[SSJ: 4679] Faction Leaders in the Cabinet

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/28

In response to Chris Winkler's note about all the heavyweights in the cabinet: remember LBJ, "It's probably better to have him inside the tent pissing out, than outside the tent pissing in." (1971, re J. Edgar
Hoover).* But given the low regard these people seem to have for Abe, I'm not so sure he should count on their aim. Examples don't come readily to mind but I am pretty sure that over the years some PMs have been quite sorry they appointed some big shot or other to a cabinet or top party job.

*An advantage of being able to look up quotes instantly is running into other good ones. Though quite off the point I can't help sticking in another LBJ vulgarity:

Did you ever think that making a speech on economics is a lot like pissing down your leg? It seems hot to you, but it never does to anyone else.

__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 08:27 PM

[SSJ: 4679] Faction Leaders in the Cabinet

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/28

*An advantage of being able to look up quotes instantly is running into other good ones. Though quite off the point I can't help sticking in another LBJ vulgarity:

Did you ever think that making a speech on economics is a lot like pissing down your leg? It seems hot to you, but it never does to anyone else.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:48 PM

[SSJ: 4677] Re: Koumei's Future / Rural Voters

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/27

Since Abe finally reshuffled his cabinet and the LDP's top three executive positions today, just a brief thought on that one:

First of all the reshuffle looks almost like a Koizumi cabinet, seeing that four new appointees (Nukaga, Yosano, Machimura, Nikai) already held cabinet posts during the five years of Koizumi's tenure. Also, making former governor of "Ozawa no Oukoku" Iwate, Masuda interior secretary minister was an interesting move, that slightly reminded me of Koizumi's appointments of Kawaguchi Junko and Takenaka Heizou, even though it remains to be seen, what kind of profile Masuda will develop in his new role.

Furthermore, with Asou, Koumura, Ibuki, Machimura and Nikai five faction leaders are represented in this new cabinet and the party's top three executive posts.
Also, while not nominally a faction leader, Nukaga certainly is one of the few powerbrokers and hopefuls the Heiseikenkyuukai has left within its own ranks and has often been mentioned as a potential future PM.

Being supportive of Abe has apparently has paid off for the Koumura faction and Nikai group, as Koumura, Nikai and Izumi all were given cabinet posts.
While this could be seen as the usual "thanks for the support, guys", this cabinet reshuffle obviously was less about rewarding people (regardless of their
experience) for their support than about getting
(almost) everybody involved again. The clearest sign for this shift (which obviously was a reaction to the first cabinet's problems and the resulting election
loss) is that this new cabinet features three members of the good old Heiseikenkyuukai (Nukaga, Hatoyama and Kamoshita).

Best regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:00 PM

[SSJ: 4676] The Future of Koumei

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/27

Ehud Harari wrote: I have been under the impression that Koizumi succeeded in getting Koumei to have its supporters vote for LDP candidates in the single member districts, where Koumei candidates hadn't had a chance of winning, while, of course, voting for Koumei in the PR districts. Moreover, I have been under the impression that kouenkai of LDP members had worked hard to getthe Koumei supporters' vote in their SMDs.
>From what you say, that has been a wrong impression.
Thanks.
You are correct. Cooperation between the LDP and Koumei "failed" because Koumei wound up with fewer PR votes this time, presumably due to the failure of some LDP candidates to campaign hard enough for them. It did not fail in the sense that it fell apart. In several cases the LDP nominated people to HC PR that were obviously going to draw votes from Koumei. The LDP nominee in Ibaragi decided not to seek a recommendation from Koumei because they asked for too much in return.
Nevertheless, overall cooperation still occurred and most candidates worked hard to fulfill their part of the bargain. Sorry for not being clear. Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:58 PM

[SSJ: 4675] Re: Koumei's Future / Rural Voters

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/27

In response to Aurelia George Mulgan's question:

In one word, the same old drama about the quest for power, that makes the politics so interesting, is probably the single biggest reason for this trend.
Without going into too much detail, this was the reason why the old Abe (Shintarou) faction began splitting up in the 1990s (until Kamei Shizuka left to join the old Nakasone faction). Same for 2000's infamous Katou no Ran: Katou, who had previously clashed with the Heiseikenkyuukai about his wish to become party president instead of Obuchi, wanted to oust Mori with drastic means, a vote of no-confidence together with the DPJ. While one part of his faction (the old Kouchikai) went along (the current Tanigaki faction), the rest refused to follow his lead (which led to the creation of the current Koga faction). It should be noted though, that this change away from the traditional five faction system is nothing recent. In fact, most of the breakaways and splits occurred from the early 1990s until 2000. Hence, one could argue the harsh reality of the post 1955 regime period was certainly not helpful to keep the factional unity.
Furthermore, after that party's dissolution in 2003 former Hoshu Shintou elements have essentially created their own faction, the Nikai Club, which added yet another faction to the growing list.

Be regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:57 PM

August 27, 2007

[SSJ: 4674] Re: Koumei's Future / Rural Voters

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/26

Apologies if this question has already been answered somewhere along the line. Can anyone tell me why the number of factions in the LDP has risen to nine (several of which are quite small), which, from memory, is about double the figure of 10 years ago?

Many thanks,

AGM
UNSW@ADFA
Canberra

Approved by ssjmod at 10:52 AM

[SSJ: 4673] Re: Koumei's Future / Rural Voters

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/25

> From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
> Date: 2007/08/25
>
> First, on Koumei:
>
Koumei was doing fine
> by getting LDP supporters to vote Koumei in PR until this election,
> when that strategy failed.

I have been under the impression that Koizumi succeeded in getting Koumei to have its supporters vote for LDP candidates in the single member districts, where Koumei candidates hadn't had a chance of winning, while, of course, voting for Koumei in the PR districts. Moreover, I have been under the impression that kouenkai of LDP members had worked hard to get the Koumei supporters' vote in their SMDs.

>From what you say, that has been a wrong impression. Thanks.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 10:52 AM

August 25, 2007

[SSJ: 4672] Koumei's Future / Rural Voters

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/25

First, on Koumei:

Koumei came out today in favor of returning to the old electoral multi-member electoral system (MMD). This proposal has always stayed very low on the media radar but has never gone away. One of, if not the main, bait that the LDP used to get Koumei into coalition in the first place was a promise to consider returning to MMD.
The demand was renewed every time a new LDP leader was elected at least until Koizumi. Koumei was doing fine by getting LDP supporters to vote Koumei in PR until this election, when that strategy failed. Renewing their demand for a return to MMD now is probably another sign of frustration with the coalition and with the strategy of getting LDP votes in PR. No matter what Koumei does, LDP-Koumei electoral coalition has reached the point of dimishing returns in terms of votes, which is another reason I predict that the LDP will lose the next general election.

They want 3-member districts in urban areas where they come in third. Not dumb. Also no chance.

Second, on rural voters:

George Erhardt's analysis is a great start! Keep it up and keep us posted.

All of my comments below are based largely on Aurelia George Mulghan's work so she probably has more to say than I do. One of the secrets of LDP longevity is that they managed to hang on to rural voters despited following an agricultural policy opposed by most farmers. There was a farmers' rebellion (noumin no ran) in the late 60s (I should probably check the dates) that failed and the LDP retained the support of rural areas. There are, as always, many possible reasons for this failure. My favorite is highly predictable: lack of alternatives, a choice set that broke down into support an opposition party and lose or support the LDP and at least have a voice inside the ruling party.
One other possibility that is more policy based is that the LDP abandoned agriculture but not rural areas.
The rebellions were led by younger more professional farmers. The LDP retained the support not of farmers but of Noukyou, which turned itself into an insurance agency etc instead of a farmers' organization. The LDP also used rural construction companies as campaign organizations, building useless dams and development projects that have since gone bankrupt. George's preliminary analysis fits this story neatly. The DPJ should be able to get the farm vote pretty easily. The rural vote might prove more difficult.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 09:05 PM

[SSJ: 4671] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/08/25

Thanks for your clarifying question, Joe.

Well, I didn't necessarily mean anything about the quantity of laws produced when I used the word "smoothly." But now that you mention it, of course that should be one implication. If two parties have to agree to pass a law, and they want opposite things (relative to the status quo), then fewer laws should be forthcoming. That's true in the U.S., and as Tsebelis has shown, it's true all over Europe as well.
Of course, on some matters, the DPJ and LDP are probably not that far apart, and might be on the same "side" of the status quo, just quibbling over how far to change something. In those areas, absent countervailing incentives to not be seen sleeping with the enemy, there is plenty of room for agreement.

But what I meant was actually less precise - just that I can imagine this will be a somewhat rancorous period.
Each party will try to outbid the other in the court of public opinion, blaming the other for intransigence or high-handedness. And in the specific area of economic reform/restructuring (you know, Koizumi stuff), I wouldn't hold my breath for the next big step.

It's actually quite interesting. One supposed lesson from the 2005 brouhaha was that Koizumi wrong-footed the DPJ into opposing reform, even though their unsuccessful rebuttal was that his reforms didn't go far enough. So how does the DPJ win the 2007 HC election? At least in part, by taking the anti-reform ball and running with it, promising to roll back some of the reforms that have angered farmers. I really can't believe this is a winning strategy in the long run, but who knows, if the LDP keeps poking themselves in the eye, there might just be an alternation in power before everyone figures out that Ozawa is sounding like the true heir to Tanaka (and let's face it, isn't that what we thought he was before he became a born-again reformer back '93)?

I should say that I don't really think that Ozawa is Tanaka-light. I think he's just a short-term opportunist with a keen sense of tactics and public mood.

Ah, but we do live in interesting times, don't we?

=================================================================
Michael F. Thies Director, Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies University of California, Los Angeles Box 951487, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1487
(tel) 310-825-7671 (fax) 310-206-3555

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 09:04 PM

[SSJ: 4670] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/08/25

Ellis Kraus wrote:
As you know, many have wondered why the CGP didn't play or threaten to play the option of going with the DPJ since it's policy positions have been closer to CGP's generally. The answer has typically been that this made no sense since they still, combined, couldn't take power so what was the sense of going into opposition when you could enjoy the benefits of being a government party?

RK replies:
That certainly has been the logic up until now. But the benefits may be diminishing and the costs rising.
I'm raising the possibility that, at some point, it might be better for the Komeito to be out of any ruling coalition than in alliance with the LDP, or at least an Abe-led LDP. What profiteth it a party to gain a seat at the table of power if it is merely tossed a few crumbs and if it loses its financial and electoral base?

EK wrote:
In any case, I'd expect the CGP will not abandon the LDP before the next HOR election.

RK replies:
I think you're probably right, but what are the odds that the Komei might demand that Abe be tossed overboard as the price of sticking with the LDP?

Chris Winkler wrote:
[Komeito] party leadership has now decided to adopt a new style, that will see them "say what needs to be said" (to the LDP).

RK replies:
According to some press reports, some restive members of the party, such as prefectural assembly members, regard this as a mere sop. The Tokyo Shimbun reported:

In examining the causes of the defeat, {Komeito leader] Representative Akihiro Ota also cited the Abe cabinet's poor crisis management and its wrong priority order of policies as the causes of the [New Komeito's] defeat. Ota stressed: "From now on we will become prompt to check the cabinet."
However, there was a burst of complaints about policy cooperation with the LDP by participants. One participant argued: "Why do we have to offer excuses for the LDP's misconducts?" Another contended: "The New Komeito should reflect its own assertions in [the policy cooperation]."
A certain local assembly member complained, "In the recent election, even those who were usually in supportive of our party had strong reactions against our party," revealing that the New Komeito's power base, Soka Gakkai members also were highly discontent with the party's joining in the coalition government with the LDP. Particularly eight incumbent Lower House members elected in single-seat constituencies were strongly concerned about the recent election results that the party put up candidates in five constituencies, but that only two won seats. One Lower House member sounded an alarm, arguing, "The fate of our party hinges on the next Lower House election."

On the interests side of the equation, in the era of budget cuts, aging and slower growth, the LDP is no longer able to play the catch-all-coalition role by tossing out goodies to every constituency. These days, giving to one group means taking away from another.
E.g., sustaining social security payments may require a hike in the consumption tax. It seems to me that this is the structural dynamic behind the day-to-day difficulties of the LDP.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 09:03 PM

[SSJ: 4669] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/08/24

Dear Colleagues,

Following up on Chris Winkler's contribution, is anyone willing to predict that Komeito will follow a pathway like the post-1989 JSP's road to irrelevance within the next two or three House of Representatives elections?

I am still somewhat amazed that it seems to have taken so long for Komeito's embrace of the LDP to cost it seriously at election time. However, I have likely underestimated the organization's internal cohesiveness and control.

Vincent K Pollard
............................
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

Approved by ssjmod at 09:02 PM

[SSJ: 4668] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/24

To Ellis:

Kochira koso, thank you for your extensive responses in our dialogue. Regarding John Campbell's observation about otaku sitting in front of computer screens all day tapping out messages to SSJ Forum, I resemble
that remark.

ESK: I'm not saying they would "punish" the DPJ directly for not supporting the MSDF mission; I am saying that opposition to the MSDF mission could wind up undermining in the longer-term the DPJ's claim that it could be a responsible governing party and make the public a bit insecure that DPJ might not be able to be trusted with handling the US-Japan alliance and Japan's role in the international community.
Voters don't vote on one issue usually, anywhere. But it could contribute to helping to check the DPJ's current "surge."

PM: This would mean that a significant number of voters who oppose the MSDF extension would later decide the DPJ was not fit to govern because they had backed their own policy preference. I would not bet on this, but it is certainly conceivable. Again, I wonder whether Ellis or others can point to comparable cases in the past?

ESK: Again, you are narrowing what I am saying down to showing immediate and direct "damage."

PM: Can we come up with examples of long-term and indirect, but clear, damage? Of course, if this damage is too subtle or indirect, it will have little political significance within Japan.

ESK: Further, I find a broader contradiction in some of your arguments: you seem to feel that the beliefs of the public influence a lot, but the beliefs of the elite are somehow dismissed as not really having any concrete consequences.

PM: I thought we were discussing whether elites and the US can influence Japanese public opinion to have an impact on the DPJ?

ESK: What elites believe--e.g., that not participating with more than cash in Gulf War I severely damaged Japan's credibility with the US and the international community, has influenced their behavior ever since.

PM: I don't disagree that elite beliefs matter. LDP elite preoccupations such as the post Gulf War "never again" syndrome matter most when policies can be made that do not require a vote in the Diet or can be flown under the radar of public and media attention. When these broad loop-holes don't apply elites can be constrained. Of course, we need to keep in focus that we are talking about competing elites vying for public support. LDP elite preoccupations such as the post Gulf War "never again" syndrome matter most when policies can be made that do not require a vote in the Diet or can be flown under the radar of public and media attention. The MSDF deployment was flown under the radar before last month's election, but cannot be any more.

ESK: And as for "damaged relations" warnings, I believe as I recall that such things did in fact have some effect during the US-Japan trade friction of the 1980s?

PM: True, but I believe 1980s trade friction was a totally different situation, since many important actors in the US were looking for any excuse to impose tariffs on Japan, a situation that still existed during the first Gulf War, but which does not exist any more.

PM: Ellis's point about European lobbying of Japan regarding this issue seem to have been confirmed.
Today's Yomiuri contains an op ed piece by the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband. However, Miliband's message was quite from Amb. Schieffer's narrow focus on the MSDF deployment. Not only were there no warnings about damaged relations, but the focus was on Japan's overall contribution to efforts in Afghanistan, not just the MSDF deployment. He praised Japan's involvement in the UN's counter-narcotics fund for Afghanistan, NATO's provincial reconstruction teams, and disarmament programs for illegal militias.
Reading between the lines one gets the impression that this piece reflects a concern that Ozawa wants to pull the plug on all support, not just the MSDF mission.
Certainly, if the DPJ pulled all forms of support this would have negative international repercussions.
On the other hand, the Miliband piece creates the impression that the UK would continue to value Japan's contributions even without the MSDF deployment, especially if the DPJ beefed up other contributions as they are apparently considering. Overall, this piece does not suggest united international community focus and pressure on the MSDF mission.

This op ed reminds me of a recent interview with a young LDP maverick specializing in security issues, who opposes the MSDF deployment because he thinks there are more useful ways for Japan to contribute to the war on terrorism. He thinks Japan can contribute more by greatly boost Japan's presence and aid to Palestine.

ESK: Absolutely NOT! The Indian Ocean deployment got Japan lots of credit with none of the risk that a ground operation in Afghanistan would have brought!

PM: I was talking about the GSDF mission to Afghanistan as an alternative to the GSDF mission in Iraq, not as an alternative to the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan looked safer than Iraq for the GSDF in 2003, although admittedly Afghanistan doesn't look safer today. However, I believe the public would have been more supportive of the deployment, including potential casualties, than in the case of Iraq. Oh well, we will simply have to agree to disagree here.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 09:01 PM

August 24, 2007

[SSJ: 4667] Ideas or Interests? (with data!)

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/08/24

Some people might remember the rural voter question I raised after the election. I gathered a bit of data, messed with it some, and got results that I think are relevant to the discussion Ellis started about policy-based voting. In order to put the 2007 results in context, I compared them to the 2004 results.
Those two elections straddled most of the Heisei Gappei, which made data collection a lot of work, so for now, I only looked at election results and demographics from each town/village/city/ku in Miyagi, Tochigi, Ishikawa, Gifu, and Osaka.

Contrary to what I expected, the DPJ's plans to protect agriculture did succeed in getting farmers
to vote for policy reasons. If ruralness is
defined as low population density, then it had no effect on voting. If we use elderly population as a proxy for ruralness (which seems reasonable), ruralness creates a pro-LDP bias. However, if we define ruralness as percentage of people engaged in primary industry, then it creates a pro-DPJ bias. In other words, if we compare two nearly identical villages across the 2004 and 2007 elections, the one with more farmers will have shifted more towards the DPJ. The elderly effect is bigger, so if we look at villages in the countryside (that tend to be old), they vote LDP, but those villages with more farmers than others tend to support the LDP less than villages with fewer farmers. This means that the particular demographic the DPJ targeted with its policy proposal responded by voting for the DPJ, which sure looks like they are voting on the basis of policy, not traditional group identification.

However, these results also provide evidence of the continuing strength of personal support networks, even in prefecture-wide elections. As I was doing the analysis, the results kept bothering me. It wasn't until I gave up on STATA and went back to the original results that I figured it out. Consider Gifu and Ishikawa in the last two elections. In Ishikawa 2004, the LDP's biggest majorities were in Kanazawa, the capital, and Hakusan, an adjacent agglomeration of communities in the southern corner of the prefecture. In 2007, those two cities provided the DPJ's biggest margins. Granted, those two are big for Ishikawa, but Hakusan isn't significantly bigger than Komatsu or Kaga-certainly not enough to account for the size of the shift.
Looking at the big picture, the LDP did well in the south in 2004, and the DPJ did better in the north.
In 2007, the picture was completely reversed, with the DPJ cruising in the south, and the LDP picking up more votes in the north. In Gifu 2004, the LDP won Gifu city and places west, the DPJ places north and east. In 2007, the DPJ won Gifu city and places west, and the LDP won were the DPJ had previously. So both prefectures saw a 180 degree shift that cannot be explained by demographics or policy, since each broad area contains a wide variety of interests/demographics.
What changed?

In 2004 the LDP candidate was from Gifu City, in 2007 the DPJ candidate was from Gifu city and the LDP candidate was from eastern Gifu. In Ishikawa, the LDP candidate in 2004 was from Kanazawa, and the DPJ from outside Ishikawa. In 2007, the DPJ candidate was from near the Kanazawa/Hakusan border, and the LDP candidate from up North towards the Noto
Peninsula. These home towns match perfectly with
the shifts in voting. In other words, proximity to the candidate's home town appears to have overruled any policy interests that rural/ urban dwellers might have had.

On the other hand, Tochigi and Miyagi do not show similar geographical patterns. They may, be, however, exceptions that prove the rule. In Tochigi, for example, both 2007 candidates were from other prefectures, which implies their personal networks would be weak, so the geographic patterns shouldn't show up--which . Voters in Miyagi seem to have voted pretty much the same in 2004 and 2007 (with a universal bump for the DPJ across all localities); I know the 2007 DPJ candidate was from out of prefecture, but I don't know about the other 3 candidates (yet).

I know some other people have been working on similar topics, and I'd love to hear them speculate about what these results mean. Of course, they are only from the five prefectures, and a nation-wide study may produce different results. If anyone would like to see a longer explanation of methodology and results, send me email off-list and I'll be happy to send it in a few days.

George

PS: John speculated that the Kakusa issue played an important part in the election. My limited data provides weak support for his assertion. In the 4 rural prefectures, the DPJ share of the vote averaged 10% higher than it did in Osaka (t-score>11).
Unfortunately, when I used the urban/rural prefecture as a dummy variable in regression using individual localities, it dropped in and out of significance depending on model specification, which raises doubts about its effect.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:16 PM

[SSJ: 4666] Re: Responding to Quibbles

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/24

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2007/08/24

> From: Anthony D'Costa (dcosta@u.washington.edu)
> Date: 2007/08/24
>
> Sorry for this remark: But I am curious if this is the only kind of
> discussion that takes place on a Social Science Japan Forum?

Good question. Recently the group has had an otaku
flavor.*
Variations on a narrow range of old topics largely among people who know each other pretty well. Some of the long arguments might well seem nit-picking and/or hair-splitting.

The most notable point, though, is that the group has been really active for a month or so, where for quite some time there were few messages and many of those just notices of something. What happened was the election, which tends to wake up political scientists, and for whatever reason this particular email group has always had a lot of political scientists. Tends to be self-perpetuating.

Having said that, over a couple of years quite a few topics have been discussed. I'd bet that a provocative question or comment on almost any topic roughly within Japan social science would get a response.

Groups tend to find a niche. The three I know in Japanese studies these days are SSJ, NBR Forum, and H-Japan. H-Japan is mostly notices and tends toward humanities. NBR Forum can be very combative, largely on foreign affairs and economics, plus all the "historical memory" and lots of "cultural" topics.
SSJ is much more academic and, as noted, tends toward political science as taught in (American)
universities--but it has been much broader on occasion.
Some new topics would be welcome.

*For any non-Japan people, otaku implies hobby, geek, obsession, sitting alone in a room with a computer as indeed I have been doing all day . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 05:05 PM

[SSJ: 4665] Re: Responding to Quibbles

From: Anthony D'Costa
Date: 2007/08/24

Sorry for this remark: But I am curious if this is the only kind of discussion that takes place on a Social Science Japan Forum?

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Anthony P. D'Costa, Professor Currently
Comparative International Development Senior Visiting Research
Fellow
University of Washington Asia Research Institute
1900 Commerce Street National University of
Singapore
Tacoma, WA 98402, USA 469 A Tower Block
Phone: (253) 692-4462 Bukit Timah Road #10-01
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http://tinyurl.com/yhjzrm Ph: (65) 6516 8785
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Approved by ssjmod at 05:03 PM

[SSJ: 4664] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/24

Just as a follow-up to this recent debate on Komeito:
As others have already, party leadership has now decided to adopt a new style, that will see them "say what needs to be said" (to the LDP). This is a logical decision on their part, as their uncritical and total support for their coalition partner clearly cost them votes during the Upper House election.
Should Komeito decide to stick to this strategy for the foreseeable future however, there is a real risk, that this new strategy will complicate things not only for the coalition, but also for the party itself.
For instance, what will happen, if the DPJ introduces a bill that Komeito is in principle in favor of? By following their new strategy, they theoretically would have to back it. The Asahi Shimbun posed that question to a Komeito executive the other day and the poor guy could say, in such a case the party would be really troubled. In the end, I think, Ellis Kraus'
assessment is correct and for the foreseeable future Komeito will not bold from the coalition, if only for its "will to (stay in) power", but Ozawa could put serious pressure on Komeito by pursuing this strategy.

Best regards
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 05:03 PM

[SSJ: 4663] Responding to Quibbles

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/24

First, John, sorry I got part of your cop comment wrong. I should have checked back at the original instead of depending on my memory.

> From: Nobuhiro HIWATARI (hiwatari@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
> Date: 2007/08/24
> I have a very minor quibble with Steve Reed last post.

Great quibble!! You make several really important points.

> Now, how long is "a trend long in place?" As far as I recall, the
> support rate for the DPJ was below LDP even during run up to the
> election, when a large number of voters expressed their intention to
> vote for the DPJ. So what is the nature of this trend. Do trends
> determine elections? Why wasn't the outcome unpredicted until less
> then a week before the election?

How long is long? I always say since 1993 but I have not really checked it out thoroughly. This is a chat group and I would do a more thorough analysis before publishing this idea. The trend is in the lead of the LDP over the DPJ. In PR it dropped into the negative range in 2003, i.e., the DPJ led the LDP. All the DPJ needed to win n 2003 was more qualified candidates in the SMDs. The HC 2004 election was similar. The biggest difference between 2004 and 2007 was that the DPJ had more qualified candidates in rural prefectures.

I was predicting a major LDP loss ever since the rebels were let back into the LDP, but only a few journalists know this and they listened to the consensus and did not print it. My logic was the one I have stated here several times. I feel cheated out of my natural experiment by the incompetence of the Abe administration. I think, but can now never prove, that the loss would have been about this bad even without all the incompetence.

Why did the polls not predict the outcome until less than a week before the election? The DPJ always does better than its polls (except in Koizumi miracle elections). My theory is that, as an election approaches, many nonpartisan voters ask themselves, "Who is the alternative to the LDP this time?" and vote for that alternative. Twice Koizumi was able to portray himself as the alternative to the LDP.
Otherwise, the DPJ gets those votes.

> Secondly, why is this election not an Ozawa miracle?

The reason I call the Koizumi miracle elections miracles is that Koizumi managed to portray himself as the alternative to the LDP. It is not easy to successfully run against your own party. As far as I know, only Koizumi has done it twice, once while party leader and prime minister. That counts as a miracle in my book.

> Also, if the DJP was truly an viable alternative, why did Ozawa rank
> below the now unpopular Abe as the choice of the next PM. I think he
> even ranked below Aso. The polls Steve cites (there were several
> similar ones) did not ask Ozawa's ability as national leader but his
> ability as effective party leader.

I look at change, not snapshots. Has there ever been a time when the leader of an opposition party in Japan was ranked higher on leadership of any kind than the sitting prime minister? I have not checked but would be glad to know if I were wrong. For the first time in my memory, the leader of the major opposition party seems more competent than the Prime Minister. That is why I was impressed.

> Finally, Steve believes "[fewer and fewer voters believe it is
> necessary to "hold your nose and vote LDP" (a phrase borrowed from
> Italian politics). If where were no credible alternative to the LDP
> why would the voters have to hold their nose and vote LDP."

In the scandal elections of the past, the alternative was the JSP so voters held their noses and voted LDP anyway, though often for new LDP candidates and new LDP leaders. That phrase is cute and makes the point well but the more accurate way of phrasing it would be that voters now have a different choice set. A choice between the JSP and the LDP is not the same as a choice between the DPJ and the LDP.

> The "hold your nose and vote LDP" does not square with the most widely
> held belief in Japanese politics that voters voted out of distributive
> interest group politics.

I do not agree with "the most widely held belief in Japanese politics." There are several parts of the standard wisdom about Japanese politics that I do not share. That is one reason my comments on this forum tend to disrupt the flow of the conversation. Sorry.
And, of course, the way I would like to resolve such disagreements would be to predict elections and see whose predictions are more accurate.

Thank you Hiwatari-sensei for a most stimulating set of quibbles.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:37 PM

[SSJ: 4662] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/24

Thanks to Mike Thies for further follow-up on the hakuchuu jidai issue of "majorities" and divided government.

He is absolutely right on concerning the reason the LDP had to give up some Chairs. I'm not sure, however, that simply using its majority to change all the odd numbered committees to even-numbered ones would have been that simple. First, for the reason he mentioned, being able to count on every single LDP member voting and voting for it (this is the other reason, by the way, I think that the LDP compromised with the opposition party instead--couldn't always count on every one showing up for every vote and therefore using its majority effectively every time). Second though, it would have been seen for exactly what it would have been--an opportunistic, self-interested change of long-standing HOR tradition and a change in structure and procedure solely to help keep the LDP in power. I'm sure that even the attempt would have provoked opposition party boycotts, massive press and public criticism, i.e., very high "audience costs"--too high to even think about. As it turned out, the strategy they did adopt proved quite effective.
And third, it also turned out that opposition party Chairs wound up working HARDER to get government bills passed to fulfill their roles and obligations as Chairs, i.e., essentially, giving opposition party people the Chairs was a great cooptation strategy.

Incidentally, the person I recall who came up with the "divide and conquer" compromise with the opposition party strategy was none other than Ohira.
Interesting in light of Mike's noting the LDP "civil war" between Fukuda and Tanaka/Ohira was looming. He might well have been worried about keeping the party disciplined, for good reason!
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:31 PM

[SSJ: 4661] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/24

To Richard Katz:

All great questions about the Komeito. As you know, many have wondered why the CGP didn't play or threaten to play the option of going with the DPJ since it's policy positions have been closer to CGP's generally.
The answer has typically been that this made no sense since they still, combined, couldn't take power so what was the sense of going into opposition when you could enjoy the benefits of being a government party?
But if this is the main reason the CGP stuck with the LDP, IF the DPJ really does get close enough to enough seats (but not a majority otherwise what's the sense of the DPJ taking CGP into coalition?) but not quite enough to have a majority, and the LDP does not get one either.... then I think that will be a good test of whether it is purely the calculus of power that has kept the CGP loyal, or not.

In any case, I'd expect the CGP will not abandon the LDP before the next HOR election. More likely to happen afterwards with the scenario above, I think.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 01:45 PM

[SSJ: 4660] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/08/24

On 1970s hakuchu:

I've never bought the idea of a material difference between a simple parliamentary majority and the supermajority (what was it called, a "stable majority?
- I forget) sufficient to chair every committee AND have a majority on every committee. This distinction occurred only because some committees had an even number of members, from which (but not by which) the chair would be chosen. So if near parity overall meant, say, a 10-10 LDP-Opposition split on a given committee, the LDP had to choose whether to take the chair and allow a 10-9 Opposition majority (chairs only vote to break ties) or surrender the chair and control the voting.

But this "dilemma" would have disappeared had the LDP just used its simple majority to assign every committee an odd number of members. Then, say, a 21-person committee could have an LDP chair breaking 10-10 ties all session long.

That the LDP didn't see fit to make this perfectly legal change is, to me, more evidence of the weakness of committees. And they were institutionally very weak. Discharging bills or bypassing committees altogether was, under the rules, simple, as was changing the rules.

That the party chose to give up some chairs and make deals with other parties is interesting, but it wasn't necessary. A bare majority still implied complete control in the Japanese Lower House, as long as party discipline held. Has anyone ever hypothesized that it was worries about discipline within the LDP that led to this choice? The LDP "Civil War" was just around the corner, but I've never seen any suggestion that the party was worried about discipline in committee or floor votes (well, until the no-confidence vote that felled Ohira).

Cheers,
mike

==================================================
Michael F. Thies Director, Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies University of California, Los Angeles Box 951487, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1487
(tel) 310-825-7671 (fax) 310-206-3555

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 01:44 PM

[SSJ: 4659] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Brian James Masshardt
Date: 2007/08/24

Permit me to provide a some answers to Paul Midford and Phil Deans.

As to the trend of cabinet minister/member visits.
Here is the data from the Yasukuni newsletters from 1981-1999. As Professor Midford noted in my earlier totals, these as well are sans PM visits.

1981-82 - 17; 1983 - 14; 1984 - 13; 1985 - 14; 1986 -16 All cabinet members visited sometime on the 15th.

1987 - 17
All visited sometime on August 14th

1988 - 14; 1989 - 16
All visited sometime on August 15th

1990 - 18
All visited sometime between August 13-15th

1991 - 14
All visited sometime between August 7-15th

1992 - 15
All visited sometime between August 10-15th

1993 - 5
All visited sometime between August 14-15

1994 - 8
All visited sometime between August 2-15

1995 - 10
All visited sometime between 14-15

Note: From 1996-present, the shrine newsletter indicates which minister visited and on which day the visit occurred. Prior to this, the publication did not list the names of every minister; only a selected few from time-to-time but mostly just used the term kanryo I once asked a librarian at Yasukuni why this occurred but he was unable to provide an answer. If someone out there knows, I'd be grateful if you could share the rationale with me.

1996 - 9 (3 before 15th/6 on 15th)
1997 - 12 (4/8)
1998 - 13 (5/8)
1999 - 9 (1/8)

And of course you have the totals from my previous post.

On the use of Chidorigafuchi, Koizumi visited every year while he was PM, and it surprised me that, to my knowledge, he did not use his Chidorigafuchi visits more often in his press statements and in defense of his war memorial preferences. In fact, in 2006, he managed a memorial trifecta of sorts by visiting Chidorigafuchi, Yasukuni and the national memorial service at the Budokan. Koizumi was quite adept in his handling of visits to Jap an's memorial spaces during his tenure.

I have yet to find a source that indicates if any of Abe's cabinet attended Chidorigafuchi with him. I believe Koizumi would always go alone.

I flipped through the Yasukuni newsletters looking for any mention of Abe's April 2006 surprise but could find none. Professor Midford is likely correct in his conjecture; after all, the shrine is a private entity.
In addition, I should note that Nippon Kaigi's monthly publication did not tout this visit either.
Interesting, I think, given the group's role as an advocate of the shrine.

I hope this has been helpful.

Best,

Brian

Approved by ssjmod at 12:20 PM

[SSJ: 4658] Voting Behavior

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/24

Dear SSJrs--

Steve Reed just replied to a message of mine that apparently was sent out last night, but I never received it. Aizawa-san tells me there were some internet problems last night that might have interfered at least for some patrons. Accordingly, I take the liberty of submitting it again (if only so you can see what Steve was talking about). Given the chance, I also improved the writing a little bit.

And one apology: Steve said that both Tanaka and Koike had appointed cops, citing me, but so far as I remember Tanaka never actually appointed an ex-Policy Agency person to a MOFA post. I just meant that, like Koike, she was emphasizing attacks on bad behavior by bureaucrats over the organization's main task. That was a lot of what Muraya was accusing Koike about, and was the main criticism of Makiko too.

---------------------------------------

Replying to Ellis and Steve:

Politics is like sports--after a loss, all sorts of explanations are offered for why. Maybe the best explanation for the loss is "the LDP didn't really come to play." There really isn't much to be gained by guessing which among all the possible causes have much explanatory
power.*

Having said that, personally I doubt the gaffes had any independent effect other than as one more thing bad for the image (and I think that was true in earlier years too, no particular change). I agree with Steve that "the LDP hasn't changed" was an important cause of the defeat, with the return of the postal people** a big symbol.

But I notice that some neo-lib types are claiming that the lesson of the defeat is that Abe gave up on the Koizumi reforms. Maybe that's true about image, but not about substance.

That is, to pick up on another piece of post hoc conventional wisdom, I do think the kakusa issue was quite important, and that lots of people associated it with the Koizumi reforms going too far. Ozawa has been much criticized for going with the old LDP policies (notoriously in agriculture, and regional disparities), but whether or not that ploy makes sense in policy terms, it worked for the election.

Without looking back for evidence, it is my impression that Koizumi's substantive reforms (such as they were) never had much substantial public support beyond projecting a positive image. Heaven knows that was true of the post office business.

I remember arguing some years ago, replying to some claim that "policy" was becoming a much more important important factor to the Japanese electorate, that mostly it was just a candidate (Diet or PM) projecting an image that he was interested in policy. For policy itself to matter it needs to be a position issue and voters need to be able to tell the parties apart.
Leaving aside the old "cultural politics" split (Emperor, security treaty, etc) that long predicted a lot of the vote divide between LDP and JSP, I think there had been very little policy voting in Japan.

Until this election. In the abstract, kakusa is a valence issue (nobody is in favor of it), but actually I think there is a real difference of opinion between market-oriented growth-first policies versus fair distribution policies (whether one thinks of the latter as Krugmanesque leftism or the old LDP spoils system), and voters can reasonably identify one with Abe and the other with Ozawa. Actually I think Abe even managed to turn what is usually a valence issue for most--utsukushii Japan, kids need better morals, etc--into something of a positional issue for some voters anyway.

Abe (like Bush in 06) lost on both image and policy substance; substance amounted to more than usual.

Finally, I'm not so sure a coalition would work against the DSP. It might be a prophylactic against the DSP really screwing up its somewhat tricky "constructive opposition" role.

Or really finally--can't the Koumeitou come up with something better than "we will try to have Abe listen to us more?" They could use some gutsier leadership (as they had in their first decade). No reason to be Abe's wanwanchan, to paraphrase the British insult.

* Actually my favorite example is the failure of the Clinton health care reform. I went to an expert post-mortem panel discussion and counted over twenty explanations for why it happened--each presented as sufficient, most sounding quite reasonable, no suggestion about how to rank or choose among them.
Indeed all those explanations should have been just as reasonable six months earlier, when virtually everybody in Washington assumed the reform would succeed.

**Interesting that "postal" has such different connotations in the US and Japan.
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:19 PM

[SSJ: 4657] Voting Behavior

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/24

John has again come up with two great points. Before turning to his new great points, I should note that one of his old great points is looking good. He pointed out that both Tanaka's controversial appointment at MOFA and Koike's controversial appointment at the Boueishou were cops. The compromise in the latter case was to fire the guy Koike wanted fired but hire an insider instead of a cop. Someone should study cops in politics. There are quite a few ex-cops in the Diet. I wonder if they have a particular role inside the bureaucracy.

On to the new great points.

Warning: I am about to give my standard sermon.

John is aboslutely correct about there always being about twenty perfectly reasonable explanations for any outcome. That is why we need to predict. Not only is there a perfectly rational explanation for any possible behavior, there are twenty perfectly rational explanations for any possible behavior. The idea is to eliminate some of the possible explanations and rationality is of no help in this task. Waiting until after the fact and then dreaming up reasons that fit the outcome is too easy. Any college sophmore can do it. Political scientists should be involved in more serious activities and prediction (not forecasting) would force us to do exactly that. Analysis of systematically collected data also serves the purpose after the fact but takes longer. We should be making predictions in public fora and rejoiching when we are wrong because that means we can learn something.

End of sermon.

The second new great point is that the LDP's interpretation of why they lost will predict LDP behavior better than the real reason why they lost.
The LDP believes that all of those little scandals was the reason and thefore insists that new cabinet members get their accounting straight. I think the LDP is wrong in its analysis but am happy that they are getting their accounts straight. If the LDP decides that the kakusa issue hurt them, it will change their behavior whether it is true or not.

My guess on the kakusa issue is that it did hurt but primarily by uniting lefties inside the DPJ who are concerned about the gap between the rich and the poor with righties both inside the DPJ and in the Kokumin Shintou who are concerned by the gap between urban and rural. Kakusa now gives the DPJ a rural base. The DPJ could not have won in Shikoku without the kakusa issue and thus the support of those voters and candidates who opposed postal reform. I further speculate that, if the LDP decides to steal the DPJ's kakusa issue, as T.J Pempel might well predict, it will not work, even though the urban-rural kakusa is originally an LDP issue. I think Japan already has two party dynamics, even if neither of the parties are up to the task of being one of two major parties and even though we have yet to have an alternation in power. I think that attempts to be all things to all people, the standard LDP knee-jerk reaction to losing, is doomed to failure under the present system.

We'll see soon enough.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 12:17 PM

[SSJ: 4656] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Phil Deans
Date: 2007/08/24

It is very difficult to demonstrate consistent quarterly visits by Japanese PMs - in part because of their high turnover/short tenure.
Until the 1970s PM visits to Yasukuni tended to be bi-annual, typically at the spring and autumn festivals (April and October). The first PM to attempt quarterly visits was Miki Takeo, who was also the first PM to sanpai on 15 August. The highest visits/tenure ratio is Suzuki Zenko; Kishi only visited twice.
(Data from Sven Saaler's excellent site
http://www.svensaaler.de/ENG/YasukuniSanpai.htm )

(To self publicize, I've written up an analysis of the visits which will be published in 'East Asia: an international quarterly' in December this year along with articles on Yasukuni by Brian Masshardt and Jeff
Kingston)

The Chidorigafuchi visit is very important as this broadly conforms with the Asahi/Yomiuri joint position that emerged in 2006 (see Asahi Shimbun 7 Feb 2006).
These visits are uncontroversial, both at home and abroad - except for the occasional individual such as the man who was arrested yesterday for cutting off his finger and mailing it to the PM in protest.

There's no pleasing some people.

Phil

Approved by ssjmod at 12:16 PM

[SSJ: 4655] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/08/24

Steve Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp) wrote:
On the possibility of a grand coalition: The LDP has every reason in the world to form a coalition with the DPJ. The DPJ has no reason in the world to accept an offer.

I've found the recent SSJ dialogue very helpful. Keep it up.

I'd like to toss into the pot the question of how worthwhile it is to the Komeito to remain in coalition with LDP, or at least in coalition with Shinzo Abe. The Komeito faces two possibly conflicting logics.

On the one hand, it would seem to pay the Komeito to be in coalition with the ruling party, if they can use that either to dispense goodies to their constituents, influence policies in ways that are favorable to their base, keep Soka Gakkai in the good graces of the government, and help themselves in elections.

On the other hand, some minority parties are quite content never to be in power because their base prefers purity to power. The JCP comes to mind. If the price of being in power is to make compromises with the LDP that alienate the Komeito base, then the party
leadership may find that price too high.

What, if anything, did the last election results tell us about this conflict. Firstly, the LDP appeared not to deliver the votes that the Komeito was expecting. Secondly, a lot of Komeito supporters were upset by Abe's stance and priority on constitutional revision. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for the second logic, the Komeito vote went down in the PR portion to
7,765,000 from 8,620,000 in 2004.

The press reports restiveness among the party base and prefectural assembly members.

Right now the Komeito leadership is pressing the party to stick with both the LDP and Abe. What if it decides to tell the LDP that the price of sticking with the LDP is that Abe must be dumped? What are the odds of it abandoning the LDP before the next LH election. What is Ichiro Ozawa thinking and scheming about all of this?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 12:13 PM

[SSJ: 4654] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/24

On the question of "divided government" precedence in Japan and its consequences on bill passage:

Actually as some may recall, from 1977-1979 there was a form of "divided government" in Japan during the 'hokaku hakuchu jidai" (nearly equal power era) when the LDP had only a few seat majority in both houses and the opposition parties chairing some HOR committees. The way they LDP handled it then was to negotiate separately with each of the opposition parties on each bill (essentially a 'divide and conquer" strategy) forming different coalitions each time. And it generally worked with passage rates of government bills actually going UP during this period.
But I don't expect that this necessarily will be the case this time as a)the CGP is in 'permanent"
coalition with the LDP already b)the JCP and SDPJ are too adamantly opposed to the LDP now (the old DSP was closer to the LDP on policy) c)the DPJ isn't going to allow itself to be bought off.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:42 AM

[SSJ: 4653] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/24

To Paul Midford:
Thanks for your extensive responses in our "dialogue."
My responses below.
Best,
Ellis

At 06:37 PM 8/22/2007, you wrote:
PM: When Ellis talks about consequences he is suggesting that another portion of the elite, the LDP, will not only succeed in turning public opinion from opposition to support of extending the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean, but also push public opinion to punish another group of elites, the DPJ for not shifting their position as well.

ESK: I'm not saying they would "punish" the DPJ directly for not supporting the MSDF mission; I am saying that opposition to the MSDF mission could wind up undermining in the longer-term the DPJ's claim that it could be a responsible governing party and make the public a bit insecure that DPJ might not be able to be trusted with handling the US-Japan alliance and Japan's role in the international community. Voters don't vote on one issue usually, anywhere. But it could contribute to helping to check the DPJ's current "surge."

PM: Practically speaking, does Ellis or anyone else see Abe acquiring Koizumi-like persuasive powers by this Fall?

ESK: Again, that's not my point. And I'm not sure Mr.
Abe will acquire even a decent Cabinet by this fall, much less "Koizumi-like persuasive powers!"

PM Saying this is a two-level game raises the same
question: when has the US ever wielded this sort of influence on Japanese public opinion? Giving Koike the royal treatment undoubtedly impresses some elites, but does this translate into influence with the public?
What levers can the US use? Again, what evidence is there that NATO or EU countries, are actually trying to influence Japan and its public? Do US or Japanese general warnings about "damaged relations" ever lead to much?

ESK: Again, you are narrowing what I am saying down to showing immediate and direct "damage." Further, I find a broader contradiction in some of your
arguments: you seem to feel that the beliefs of the public influence a lot, but the beliefs of the elite are somehow dismissed as not really having any concrete consequences. What elites believe--e.g., that not participating with more than cash in Gulf War I severely damaged Japan's credibility with the US and the international community, has influenced their behavior ever since. And as for "damaged relations"
warnings, I believe as I recall that such things did in fact have some effect during the US-Japan trade friction of the 1980s? Depends on how they are done--could provoke counter-reaction if done clumsily; but if done more subtly it can have an indirect influence as I mentioned above.

PM: Given how much Ellis has emphasized the differences between wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the disastrous nature of the former, I wonder if he would now agree that the Iraq dispatch has become a negative example in Japanese politics hindering further SDF overseas dispatches rather than making them easier?

ESK: Yes, I do agree on that. The Iraq War has had many, many, many disastrous and negative consequences around the world and led people I think (and this is what we are debating here and my original point) to unfortunately and mistakenly lump Afghanistan and Iraq into the same category. I personally would be wiling to bet that if Bush had not stupidly invaded Iraq, there would be a pretty wide consensus in almost all countries on Afghanistan and a lot more resources and effective policy would have been devoted to succeeding there.

PM: I wonder whether Ellis would also now agree that Koizumi made a historic mistake in 2003 by not sending the GSDF to Afghanistan instead of Iraq?

ESK: Absolutely NOT! The Indian Ocean deployment got Japan lots of credit with none of the risk that a ground operation in Afghanistan would have brought!

PM: In a recent post he emphasized that Koizumi and his coterie believed the Iraq dispatch to have been a great policy success for a number of reasons. I find this characterization to be right on target, but I wonder how Koizumi et. al. view it now.

ESK: Probably the same way. The "success" is that they pulled it off without a disaster, satisfying Bush at a key time, even in the face of relatively skeptical public opinion. Which they did. Otherwise, I'm not sure what the point is here. As long as we are talking about "punishment" your assumptions seem to be that Iraq and Afghanistan somehow are some of the main causes of Abe's problems now? The HOC election was NOT about Iraq and Afghanistan--it was about Abe's poor leadership on the domestic front, the pension problem, corruption and an incompetent cabinet, etc.

PM: In any case, from the perspective of evaluating Japanese foreign policy and making policy recommendations, isn't it reasonable to argue that already in 2003, with clear differences in perceptions of the legitimacy of the two wars evident both in Japan itself and internationally, that choosing Iraq over Afghanistan was a mistake?

ESK: I'm not arguing that Koizumi should have sent SDF to Iraq. I don't think he should have, but all I'm saying is that given his goals and what he wanted to accomplish, he took a large risk but succeeded in those (his) terms. Again, Koizumi did NOT choose Iraq over Afganistan. He did BOTH! And he was smart NOT to send ground SDF to Afghanistan.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

[SSJ: 4652] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Nobuhiro HIWATARI
Date: 2007/08/24

I have a very minor quibble with Steve Reed last post.
(And only a blithering idiot lime myself is capable of such a long quibble).

I do agree that DPJ has grown into a better alternative than its predecessors and that they have a good chance of gaining power in the next HOR election.
That said, my problem is the following sentence: "2007 was merely a continuation of a trend long in place I interrupted only by the two Koizumi miracles."

Now, how long is "a trend long in place?" As far as I recall, the support rate for the DPJ was below LDP even during run up to the election, when a large number of voters expressed their intention to vote for the DPJ. So what is the nature of this trend. Do trends determine elections? Why wasn't the outcome unpredicted until less then a week before the election?

Secondly, why is this election not an Ozawa miracle?
Could someone else other than Ozawa have produced the same results? Why was 1989 NOT the Doi (or Madonna) miracle? Why is Koizumi the only person in our mortal world who is capable of miracles? Why did Koizumi face defeat three years ago when a different pension scandal broke out? If there is a tendency to use the HOC elections to punish the government (somewhat like the U.S. Midterm elections) as argued by Ikuo Kabashima (I think), or if there is a tendency that party leaders have become more salient (in line with the "presidentialization of party leaders" argument, supported by the importance of PR firms in elections), wouldn't these explanations undermine the "trend long in place" notion? Also, one should recall that Abe popularity actually picked up before the pension problem exploded, which implies to me, DPJ's landslide was determined mostly by the pension issue and happenings during the campaign and not any long term trend. What if Abe didn't mess up the pension scandal?

Also, if the DJP was truly an viable alternative, why did Ozawa rank below the now unpopular Abe as the choice of the next PM. I think he even ranked below Aso. The polls Steve cites (there were several similar
ones) did not ask Ozawa's ability as national leader but his ability as effective party leader.

Finally, Steve believes "[fewer and fewer voters believe it is necessary to "hold your nose and vote LDP" (a phrase borrowed from Italian politics). I believe that the reason there is not such phrase in Japanese is because that is not the reason why most people vote for the LDP. The phrase implies voters voted LDP because they were afraid the Socialist or whomever would win power. This does not square with Steve's early claim that now Japan has a credible alternative, If where were no credible alternative to the LDP why would the voters have to hold their nose and vote LDP."

The "hold your nose and vote LDP" does not square with the most widely held belief in Japanese politics that voters voted out of distributive interest group politics. At least the politicians of both parties blame the Koizumi and Abe reforms for suffocating the flow of cash to rural areas. In other words, criticism of Abe's policy within and without the LDP, sound to me a reactionary request to return to distributive politics. And that is what makes Ozawa and his DJP a credible alternative.

On a different note: there is something about my fellow citizens that truly fascinate me. As Steve says the return of the postal rebels was very unpopular.
The reason given was, it was a ploy to win the elections. Similarly, the pension bills and the Social Insurance Agency reform bill rammed through the legislature as a desperate move to turn around the Abe's falling support rate was quite unpopular because, a lot of people and the media told me,it was a transparent move to win elections. Why are voters who expect the local representatives to deliver pork get tuned off when elected representatives pass bills to win elections (at least in the latter case)?
I am bewildered, honestly.

Nobuhiro Hiwatari
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

August 23, 2007

[SSJ: 4650] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/23

Replying to Ellis and Steve:

Politics is like sports--after a loss, all sorts of explanations are offered for why. Actually my favorite example is the failure of the Clinton health care reform. I went to an expert post-mortem panel discussion and counted over twenty explanations for why it happened-- each presented as sufficient, most sounding quite reasonable, no suggestion about how to rank or choose among them. Indeed all those explanations should have been just as reasonable six months earlier, when virtually everybody in Washington assumed the reform would succeed.

So: I doubt the gaffes had any independent effect other than as one more thing bad for the image (and I think that was true in earlier years too, no particular change). I agree with Steve that "the LDP hasn't changed" was an important cause of the defeat, with the return of the postal people* a big symbol.

But I notice that some neo-lib types are claiming that the lesson of the defeat is that Abe gave up on the Koizumi reforms. Maybe that's true about image, but not about substance.

Abe (like Bush in 06) lost on both image and policy substance; substance amounted to more than usual.

Finally, I'm not so sure a coalition would work against the DSP. It might be a prophylactic against the DSP really screwing up its somewhat tricky "constructive opposition" role.

*Interesting that "postal" has such different connotations in the US and Japan.
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 05:45 PM

[SSJ: 4649] Re: Designating a new prime minister

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/23

isn't it
> the case that the House of Councillors may only delay -- but not block --
> a decision by the House of Representatives if the Diet is confronted
> with the necessity of designating a new prime minister before the next
> election of the lower house?
>
> Or do statutes implementing Article 67 of the Constitution require
> modification of that interpretation?

To my understanding, both houses vote simultaneously but separately. If one house elects one individual and the other house elects another individual, the choice of the HR stands.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:40 PM

[SSJ: 4648] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/23

Many thanks for the very informative responses to my post, especially to Brian Masshardt.

The numbers Brian cites obviously do not include visits by the prime minister: 2006 would be 2 if we include Koizumi. When we add in PM visits, the difference between recent years, especially last year, and this year, becomes noticeably bigger. Also, although secret and private, Abe visited Yasukuni in April 2006 as Chief Cabinet Secretary, raising the
2006 number to at least 3 (I guess the Yasukuni monthly newsletter withheld this information at Abe's request?). Nonetheless, the trend Brian identifies is striking.

I wonder how many ministers besides the PM were visiting before and after PM visits stopped as a result of Nakasone's August 1985 visit?
Another trend I found is that PMs tended to visit 4 times a year before Nakasone's fateful visit, so even Koizumi did not return to the pre-1985 status-quo.

Regarding Chidorigafuchi, the symbolism of Abe going there is quite different. The Chidorigafuchi tomb of the unknown soldier has the status of a potential secular war memorial alternative to Yasukuni, and Koizumi often avoided going there. Communists, Socialists, Christians, all sorts of groups to Chidorigafuchi to pray or conduct services, suggesting a far more diverse and inclusive image for Japan's national identity.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 05:39 PM

[SSJ: 4647] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/23

Ellis asks:
> "was it the sheer number of such incidents that got the public's
> attention and that this was, as the British
say
> a "one-off" unique thing? Or has something really changed in
Japanese
> voters'
> consciousness and behavior, for example, because of the increasing
> importance of the media and attention to policy issues (partly
because
> of the new electoral system)?"

Recalling Steven Reed's argument that in the pre-1993 era many scandals had not had not had a notable impact on the party system because (a) they had not been both intense and dense, and (b) the opposition had not appeared to be a realistic alternative, I would suggest that in the recent elections both conditions existed. I also agree that the public has become more attentive to policy issues; and as I suggested in a previous post, the electoral reform has had an effect on the viability of the DPJ, despite its routing in the Koizumi 2005 elections.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:38 PM

[SSJ: 4646] Designating a new prime minister

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/08/23

Dear Colleagues,

Without predicting Prime Minister Abe's ultimate fate, isn't it the case that the House of Councillors may only delay -- but not block -- a decision by the House of Representatives if the Diet is confronted with the necessity of designating a new prime minister before the next election of the lower house?

Or do statutes implementing Article 67 of the Constitution require modification of that interpretation?

Vincent K Pollard
............................
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

Approved by ssjmod at 04:59 PM

[SSJ: 4645] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence (correction)

From: Brian James Masshardt
Date: 2007/08/23

My apologies for the following two mistakes:

In 2003, it should be Konoike instead of Kutsukake.

In 2006, it should be Kutsukake instead of Mizote.

Sincerely,

Brian

Approved by ssjmod at 04:49 PM

[SSJ: 4644] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Sam Jameson
Date: 2007/08/23

At 10:49 07/08/23 +0900, you wrote:
>From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
>Date: 2007/08/23
>
>Questions on another dimension of the recent LDP HOC
>defeat that I don't think has been discussed yet.
>Polls show now that a fair percentage of the Japanese
>public believe that in appropriate statements and
>behavior by members of Abe's Cabinet were a reason for
>the LDP's defeat. Cabinet members have been making
>inappropriate (and often incredibly stupid and
>insensitive statements and engaging in inappropriate
>behavior, e.g., corruption) for a long time in
>Japanese politics. Yet these never seemed to have much
>impact on elections, even after the new electoral
>system was established.

Very seldom do opinion polls allow respondents to write in answers. Instead, polls ask respondents to reply to alternatives listed in the poll. Therefore, one possibility for the difference in "shitsugen
(gaffe) and haughty behavior impact" from past elections could be simply that polls in the past failed to list "shitsugen/haughty behavior" as one of the possibilities from which respondents were asked to chose.

Another possibility is that the media covered pre-election "shitsugen/haughty behavior" more intensively than in the past.

Still another possibility is that what really angered voters the most was Abe's consistent defense of statements by party officials and cabinet ministers
-- including calls by Aso and Nakagawa Shoichi to consider nuclear weapons in debating how to defend Japan against a North Korean nuclear threat. I cannot recall a previous equivalent of Abe's steadfast defense of Matsuoka's haughtiness for more than two months before Matsuoka committed suicide. Abe even stood by Kyuma for one day after Kyuma committed the ultimate anathema in Japanese politics by appearing to have defended the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as necessary to end the war.

I have seen some commentary in the Japanese media on Abe's ineptness not only in choosing but also in handling his ministers.

Sam Jameson

Approved by ssjmod at 04:48 PM

[SSJ: 4643] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/08/23

To Michael Thies' statement that:
> THIS is the first real experience of divided government in Japan,
and
> I don't anticipate it going smoothly.
Joe Sasanuma responds:
> I'm guessing by "smoothly" it was meant that fewer bills will become
> law.

I assume he meant that "less smoothly" means fewer bills becoming laws.

But that aside, I hope we are not judging a government's efficiency by the number of bills that become law. There is much to be said for NOT enacting some laws.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 04:37 PM

[SSJ: 4642] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/23

Ellis's question is really important. I have no answer but I do have several thoughts.

First, I don't think all the slips and scandals were the cause of the defeat, thus disagreeing with the majority of the public. As I stated earlier, 2007 was merely a continuation of a trend long in place interrupted only by the two Koizumi miracles.

Second, Asahi asked whether respondents believed that the LDP really had changed as Koizumi had promised.
The percentage that thought the LDP had changed hit a high in the 2005 election, over 70 per cent if I remember correctly. All the slips and scandals simply convinced people that the LDP had not changed. The big drop in poll ratings occurred after Abe let the postal rebels back in. Even Matsuoka's suicide didn't have that much of an effect.

Third, the big difference now is the presence of a credible alternative. The polls that impressed me most showed that Ozawa was rated higher on leadership than Abe. Granted Abe lowered the bar but the DPJ is not the old JSP. Fewer and fewer voters believe it is necessary to "hold your nose and vote LDP" (a phrase borrowed from Italian politics) because the alternative is unthinkable.

In response to Ehud: Isn't it interesting to see the failure Mori advising the failure Abe on why the latter failed. Mori, and presumably a large number of LDP veterans, want to ignore the changes that have occurred since 1993 and get back to normal LDP practice. Since 1993, however, normal LDP practice has produced election losses. I think the era of LDP dominance is coming to an end and would not be surprised if we saw a change in power at the next election.

On the possibility of a grand coalition: The LDP has every reason in the world to form a coalition with the DPJ. The DPJ has no reason in the world to accept an offer.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:50 PM

[SSJ: 4641] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Joe M. Michael Sasanuma
Date: 2007/08/23

I'm sorry to be responding to a post more than two weeks old, but I had a question about Michael Thies' statement that:

"THIS is the first real experience of divided government in Japan, and I don't anticipate it going smoothly. My past work with James Druckman shows that governments that lack UH majorities tend to collapse sooner as well, although the coincidence of single-party control in the Lower House and "opposition" control in the Upper House is even more unusual."

I'm guessing by "smoothly" it was meant that fewer bills will become law.

My familiarity is more with the U.S. system, so can someone clarify whether one would expect a divided government to go less smoothly in a parliamentary system than in a presidential system? If so, why? The only reason I can think of is that in a parliamentary system, because the head of state is chosen from the legislative branch, the party that is not in power has less incentive to collaborate with the one in power, in order to force an election.

Thank you.

Joe Sasanuma

Approved by ssjmod at 03:49 PM

[SSJ: 4640] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Phil Deans
Date: 2007/08/23

Further to Brian Masshardt's email, the Asahi Shimbun (English Edn) on 16 August claimed that originally NO cabinet ministers were planning to attend Yasukuni on August 15th this year. I do not have a copy of the article to hand, so I cannot provide the exact language, but the Asahi claimed something along the lines of Takaichi Sanae's visit was arranged at the last minute to avoid the appearance of full cabinet abstention.

The Asahi also carried a picture of Abe paying homage to the dead at Chidorigafuchi national cemetery on the
15th: I wonder if Brian has any idea how large the cabinet entourage was?

More broadly, opinion polling on the Yasukuni issue suggests that it a marginal concern for most voters, with no clear majority for or against PM level visits.
Perhaps some in the LDP heard the message of the Upper House elections that many Japanese voters are concerned about other issues.

Phil

Professor Phil Deans, PhD,
Director of Research,
Temple University, Japan Campus,

Approved by ssjmod at 03:48 PM

[SSJ: 4639] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/23

In response to Ellis Krauss' question:

I do believe that one part of it was certainly just the high frequency of those slips of tongue and seiji to kane problems throughout the Abe administration's term. However, in the eyes of the electorate the administration probably made things worse by rarely reprimanding and sometimes even defending those involved in it. Shiosaki's standard comment in response to yet another slip of the tongue was "that is said person's personal opinion. Hence the government won't comment on it". So basically one could get the impression that with the Abe administration "everything goes", which in a country like Japan, where taking (or being forced to take) responsibility one way or the other after a mistake is considered the usual thing to do, probably was not so well - received. Not to mention, that such a laissez faire state of affairs also reflects badly on the prime minister and his leadership qualities, or the lack thereof. In particular, since people were used to five years of Koizumi's forceful "I do it my way"
leadership.
Back in the 1980s a lot of cabinet members lost their jobs after making political incorrect or controversial statements. And even two years back, Koizumi and his chief cabinet secretary Hosoda were quick to strongly reprimand the acting Minister of Education, Nakayama, after he had made a controversial remake about comfort woman. You hardly heard about Abe reprimanding anybody, with the possible exceptions of Yanagisawa and Kyuuma, the latter of the two eventually chose to resign anyways.

Best regards
Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:47 PM

[SSJ: 4638] Re: Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Brian James Masshardt
Date: 2007/08/23

Just a quick post on this issue.

Maybe it is not too surprising. Data from the Yasukuni monthly newsletters shows the following trend on Minister visits since 2000:

2000 - 10

2001 - 9 Katayama, Murai, Hiranuma, Nakatani, Takebe (on 15th) Takenaka (08/04), Shiokawa (08/11), Yanagisawa & Omi (08/14)

2002 - 8 Katayama, Murai, Hiranuma, Nakatani (on 15th) Takenaka (7/28), Takebe (08/6), Yanagisawa (08/7) & Shiokawa (08/08)

2003 - 6 Kutsukake, Kamei, Hiranuma & Tanigaki (on 15th)
Shiokawa & Katayama (08/14)

2004 - 5 (Kamei, Nakagawa, Koike, Ono, Kaneko (08/14)

2005 - 3 (Koike, Otsuji, Nakagawa (08/14)

2006 - 1 (Kensei Mizote)

2007 - 1 (Takaichi Sanae: one of Nippon Kaigi's poster politicians)

Readjusted, taking out those who did not visit on the 15th, we get:

2000- 9
2001 - 5
2002-04 - 4
2005 -2
2006-07 -1

So Minister visits were decreasing even under Koizumi's watch, and the nationalists (led primarily by Nippon Kaigi backed politicians) have been disappointed with the politician's use (or rather lack
thereof) of Yasukuni ever since Koizumi himself stood down on his August 15th pledge. As such, Yasukuni is really is not the political touchstone some would like it to be.

Also, I think we have to account for individual preferences as well particularly as it relates to family ties to Yasukuni. I would argue that visiting Yasukuni is more a personal than political choice.
Now that may change, particularly among younger politicians who do not have a relative enshrined at Yasukuni.

Best,

Brian

Approved by ssjmod at 01:11 PM

[SSJ: 4637] Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/23

Questions on another dimension of the recent LDP HOC defeat that I don't think has been discussed yet.
Polls show now that a fair percentage of the Japanese public believe that in appropriate statements and behavior by members of Abe's Cabinet were a reason for the LDP's defeat. Cabinet members have been making inappropriate (and often incredibly stupid and insensitive statements and engaging in inappropriate behavior, e.g., corruption) for a long time in Japanese politics. Yet these never seemed to have much impact on elections, even after the new electoral system was established. If so, this leads to my
questions: was it the sheer number of such incidents that got the public's attention and that this was, as the British say a "one-off" unique thing? Or has something really changed in Japanese voters'
consciousness and behavior, for example, because of the increasing importance of the media and attention to policy issues (partly because of the new electoral system)?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:00 AM

[SSJ: 4635] Yasukuni Abstinence

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/22

Am I the only one surprised that only one cabinet minister went to Yasukuni on August 15th? Based upon Abe's behavior last year, I expected him not to go, but I never expected something close to a cabinet boycott. This August 15th had the poorest attendance since sometime in the 1950s. I would hypothesize this outcome is due to last month's election, and that if the LDP had done significantly better, more ministers (although not Abe himself) would have gone.

One interpretation is that this reflects a certain culturally specific logic one hears in Japan:
politicians who have been reprimanded by the public should not do anything controversial or "medatsu" for a certain probationary period. By way of comparison, I remember after the JR accident on the Fukuchiyama line two years ago JR West started pulling down travel package adverts, because I was told, this was too "self-indulgent" at such a time.

Another hypothesis is that Abe is actually trying to shed his image as a hawk and nationalist, thinking that this angered the public; an interesting interpretation of the election results. If so, we should see a radical shift away from expanding Japan's security role and pushing a nationalist agenda. I find this hypothesis a bit farfetched, but one thing is for sure: by almost boycotting Yasukuni the Abe cabinet has damaged its standing among nationalists and the right. I would have expected Abe to respond to an election defeat by becoming more nationalist, not less.

I hope others on this forum will share their thoughts and insights on Yasukuni abstinence.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 10:58 AM

[SSJ: 4634] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/22

To Ellis Krauss and Kiichi Fujiwara

Many thanks to both of you for your thoughtful posts.
In response, I will concentrate on the issue I find most meaningful in this exchange, the relationship between elites, the public, and policy.

ESK: ....I think we still sometimes talk past each other because he puts such great faith in public opinion as a complete check on elite behavior, whereas I think it is more flexible and manipulable than he does (refer Koizumi).

Public opinion no longer needs to act as a check on elites, since elites with ostensibly the same view of SDF deployments overseas now control the upper house.
When Ellis talks about consequences he is suggesting that another portion of the elite, the LDP, will not only succeed in turning public opinion from opposition to support of extending the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean, but also push public opinion to punish another group of elites, the DPJ for not shifting their position as well. That would be an amazing exercise of influence, especially over a foreign policy issue, one that would put even Koizumi to shame. Again, can Ellis or anyone else come up with comparable examples from the past? Practically speaking, does Ellis or anyone else see Abe acquiring Koizumi-like persuasive powers by this Fall?

ESK: Second, I don't think you can isolate the domestic consequences of the DPJ opposing the anti-Terrorism bill from the international ones, as Paul seems to do.
This really is a two-level game and as I pointed out in the start of this discussion, I think the US and EU can themselves do various things to try to influence public opinion about the potential loss of Japan's international credibility (Note: Ambassador Schieffer's public interview last week emphasizing that).

Saying this is a two-level game raises the same
question: when has the US ever wielded this sort of influence on Japanese public opinion? Giving Koike the royal treatment undoubtedly impresses some elites, but does this translate into influence with the public?
What levers can the US use? Again, what evidence is there that NATO or EU countries, are actually trying to influence Japan and its public? Do US or Japanese general warnings about "damaged relations" ever lead to much? Apart from paying out $13 billion, it's hard to trace out the specific costs Japan paid (elite traumas not withstanding) when it refused to send troops to the first Gulf War. Moreover, the shoe could now be on the other foot since the US has angered Japan in several ways lately: the ianfu resolution, cutting a deal with North Korea (at least with right-wing opinion), refusal to sell the raptur fighter, tepid support for a UNSC seat, etc. Does the public suddenly forget about these issues when it
listens to the US ambassador?

Given how much Ellis has emphasized the differences between wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the disastrous nature of the former, I wonder if he would now agree that the Iraq dispatch has become a negative example in Japanese politics hindering further SDF overseas dispatches rather than making them easier?
Even if Abe ultimately wins and the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean is extended, won't this be despite rather than because of the SDF deployment to Iraq? The DPJ supported the first MSDF Indian Ocean deployment plan before the Iraq deployment (although they opposed the original Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill), but opposed subsequent deployment plans after the Iraq deployment. For myself, I would bet against Abe using the "successful" SDF deployment to Iraq as a talking point to persuade the public to support the MSDF deployment in the Indian Ocean. And I would expect Ozawa to point to the SDF deployment to Iraq as a reason to oppose other rear-area support missions for the US, such as Afghanistan; in fact he has already hinted at this. Strikingly, an article in today's Yomiuri defends the MSDF Indian Ocean mission by trashing the Iraq War. It richly deserves to be trashed, but until recently Yomiuri would never have done this.

I wonder whether Ellis would also now agree that Koizumi made a historic mistake in 2003 by not sending the GSDF to Afghanistan instead of Iraq? In a recent post he emphasized that Koizumi and his coterie believed the Iraq dispatch to have been a great policy success for a number of reasons. I find this characterization to be right on target, but I wonder how Koizumi et. al. view it now. In any case, from the perspective of evaluating Japanese foreign policy and making policy recommendations, isn't it reasonable to argue that already in 2003, with clear differences in perceptions of the legitimacy of the two wars evident both in Japan itself and internationally, that choosing Iraq over Afghanistan was a mistake? Isn't the lesson that perceived legitimacy is key when making decisions about which wars to support? My counter-factual speculation is that in 2003 the DPJ could have been persuaded to support a deployment to Afghanistan.

Professor Fujiwara is right that the Afghan war has never been popular in Japan, but it has not generated overwhelming opposition either. In Fall 2001, the public was essentially evenly split, with @45% opposing and @45% supporting the US war in Afghanistan.
In other words, this war was right on the public's policy indifference curve. Opposition to the war in Iraq, on the other hand, almost never dipped below 60%.

The pluralist approach to public opinion grew out of the Vietnam War when some scholars found that public opinion seemed to have greater consistency and coherence toward the war than elite opinion. Looking at Japanese public opinion toward the Iraq War, it's hard not to reach the same conclusion.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 10:57 AM

[SSJ: 4633] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/22

To Jean-Christophe Helary:

From: Jean-Christophe Helary (helary@eskimo.com)
Date: 2007/08/21
We are not debating my views but the possibility for the DJP to act according to what the Japanese public opinion thinks of what is going on in Afghanistan and Irak.

ESK: Correct, but your anti-American conspiracy theories obviously influence your views about Japan and Japanese policies toward the US and Afghanistan.
Clearly, the Japanese people and government who widely support the alliance with the U.S. disagree with your assessment of the U.S. in general, and are anti-terrorist, even if they may not want to get involved in Afghanistan or Iraq. And a very high proportion of them had a very different view of 9/11 than you do. I do agree, therefore, that the "Japanese people have a very good understanding of such power relations."

Ellis Krauss

Approved by ssjmod at 10:56 AM

[SSJ: 4632] Re: The New Abe Cabinet

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/21

> From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
> Date: 2007/08/21
>
> Abe faces two incompatible requirements in appointing his cabinet.
> First, he must please the party. He does not have Koizumi's
popularity
> or his image as an election winner to protect him from a rebellion.
> One thing that Mori said that was interesting was that "it is not
> enough to be young". I interpret this to mean, "We passed over many
> qualified guys to get this young guy so he would win elections. Look

> how that turned out!"

Apropos Mori, he also had something else to say, in reference to Shiozaki, "It's not enough to graduate from Todai and Harvard."

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 10:55 AM

August 21, 2007

[SSJ: 4628] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Jean-Christophe Helary
Date: 2007/08/21

On Aug 21, 2007, at 2:32 PM, Ellis Kraus wrote:

> ESK: If you really believe that the invasion of Afghanistan had
> nothing to do with 9/11 and a real terrorist threat and had no
"clear
> purpose" except to put American bases near Russia, then I think
> perhaps your have made your anti-American world view quite apparent
to
> everyone on the SSJ forum, an there is no sense in continuing to
> debate this question.

We are not debating my views but the possibility for the DJP to act according to what the Japanese public opinion thinks of what is going on in Afghanistan and Irak.

(Side question: do discussions on this forum _imply_ a pro-american position ? I thought we were discussing Japan here... As for penetrating the Russian periphery that is pretty obvious to anyone who looks at where US bases are located today, sorry to have to mention such trivia on this forum.)

It is very clear that the US looked for Al Qaeda (let by a CIA trained individual) in Afghan caves where it had the support of the Taliban (financed by the US to fight the USSR) and where it was protected by Pakistan (an US ally). It is also very clear that the actors in
9/11 were overwhelmingly of Saudi origin (another US ally).

What else shall be said ? We have a saying in French (you must have something similar in English): Qui seme le vent recolte la tempete.
For some reason, US policy in the area was a mess and we wonder why it blew up in its face ? (And please, no horrified mention of the 6000 or so innocent WTC victims; there has been literally _100_ times more innocent victims in Irak alone since WoT 2.0 started).

Also, it has to be noted that before 9/11 the Taliban had been fought by a relatively successful coalition of Afghan clans led by Massoud, that had a very hard time gather international support. But who cared at the time ?

Now, let us see the terrorist attacks that have happened since 9/11 (none inside the territory of the
US): _all_ are related to involvement with the Afghan or Iraki theater.

What anti terrorist measure creates more terrorism than it fights ?
Doesn't it sound like the war on drugs that has been going on for the last 30 years without any concrete results except for spending billions of dollars on nothing ? Well, in fact, not exactly nothing.

There is a very interesting link between the war on drugs and the war on terror that shows how both approaches are fundamentally flawed and inefficient.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/17/
AR2007081701716.html

(quote)
In the past two years, the drug war has become the Taliban's most effective recruiter in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's Muslim extremists have reinvigorated themselves by supporting and taxing the countless peasants who are dependent one way or another on the opium trade, their only reliable source of income. The Taliban is becoming richer and stronger by the day, especially in the east and south of the country. The "War on Drugs" is defeating the "war on terror."
(/quote)

See ?

The war on drugs is actually helping the Talibans.
Billions of dollars spent on "anti-drugs measures" are directly supporting the same people who are the target of the "anti-terrorism measures" that cost even more billion dollars. Funny way to spend tax payers' money...

So, tell me sincerely, why, in the light os so much evidence, would the Japanese public support involvement of its military with anything as farcical as that ? Why would it be so hard for the DJP to pull such a trick ?

There is something the US has been lacking of lately (and I'm willing to think that Japan still has a good stock of that) it is finesse.
Playing thug with intelligent people does not work.
And terrorists (at least the leaders) are _very_ intelligent, otherwise, they'd be gone already.

I think Japanese people have a very good understanding of such power relations. I am not going to say that it is "cultural" though... But since the Japanese do not seem to have such a high opinion of themselves (at least compared to US citizens), I'd argue that they'd understand _right away_ that any terrorist attack on the Japanese territory would be in _direct_ relation to the Japanese government involvement in US "anti-terrorism" support activities. And I would not like to be in the shoes of the PM at that moment.

Jean-Christophe Helary=

Approved by ssjmod at 04:08 PM

[SSJ: 4627] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/21

To Jean-Christophe Helary :

At 06:57 PM 8/20/2007, you wrote:
"And the common patterns with Irak are obvious.
And ex US creature that eventually ceases to be useful, a pretext for a brutal attack and a lengthy occupation without any clear purpose (besides for implanting American bases as close as possible to the Russian border)."

ESK: If you really believe that the invasion of Afghanistan had nothing to do with 9/11 and a real terrorist threat and had no "clear purpose" except to put American bases near Russia, then I think perhaps your have made your anti-American world view quite apparent to everyone on the SSJ forum, an there is no sense in continuing to debate this question.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:34 PM

[SSJ: 4626] The New Abe Cabinet

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/21

Abe faces two incompatible requirements in appointing his cabinet. First, he must please the party. He does not have Koizumi's popularity or his image as an election winner to protect him from a rebellion. One thing that Mori said that was interesting was that "it is not enough to be young". I interpret this to mean, "We passed over many qualified guys to get this young guy so he would win elections. Look how that turned out!" Second, he must impress the public. Koizumi impressed the public by angering the party. I don't think Abe is capable of using that strategy.

Abe and the LDP have learned something from the
election: they are asking potential cabinet members if their financial accounts are in order. Several hopefuls have already filed revised financial reports.
This may also mean Shiozaki's exit, as he is the latest to get caught filing the same receipt multiple times. If wonder who in the LDP can pass the test of proper accounting. In any case, however, the reporting requirements are indeed helping clean up Japanese politics.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 12:27 PM

[SSJ: 4625] Re: Election?

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/08/21

Even more tellingly, having lost the HoC election, Abe moved quickly and decisively to reshuffle his Cabinet a month later as originally planned.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 11:32 AM

[SSJ: 4624] Election?

From: Kiichi Fujiwara
Date: 2007/08/21

Mr. Abe reminds me of this old joke:.

The government lost confidence of the people, so the government decided to dissolve the people, and appoint another one.

Kiichi Fujiwara
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 11:22 AM

[SSJ: 4623] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Jean-Christophe Helary
Date: 2007/08/20

To Ellis Kraus:
> I agree with you about Iraq. But you make the same mistake I think
> that Paul Midford does in confounding Afghanistan and Iraq. They are
> totally different.

I don't think the Japanese public needs a very strong exposition to Fahrenheit 9/11 to be convinced that the difference is not that big.

The DPJ can very easily find arguments _against_ any participation (direct or indirect) _anywhere_ (ie currently in Irak and Afghanistan) without resorting to any anti militarist credo.

As a matter of fact, one of my cousins has been there for 6 months as a communication technician in the French Army and he reported that the situation was ugly. And he has worked in quite a few problematic areas (including Kosovo).

Not only the current situation is a nightmare but the premises are very problematic too. And the common patterns with Irak are obvious.
And ex US creature that eventually ceases to be useful, a pretext for a brutal attack and a lengthy occupation without any clear purpose (besides for implanting American bases as close as possible to the Russian border).

The logic would say that an international coalition would have been better used (and Japanese people more easily convinced) if Pakistan or Saudi Arabia had been targets.

Jean-Christophe Helary

Approved by ssjmod at 11:20 AM

[SSJ: 4622] Re: LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/20

> From: Kiichi Fujiwara (kkfujiw@attglobal.net)
> Date: 2007/08/17
>
> The Yomiuri proposal will not fly, because DPJ, at least as of now,
> wishes to kick JDP out of power. A few DPJ members of parliament
that
> I have spoken with are confident that if they could force the LDP to

> hold an election for the lower house, they will win, with more than
> 250 seats.
>
> It is of course unclear whether their hopes will come true.

Agree. It would be a colossal folly on the part of the LDP to dissolve the HR and call for a general election before the four-year term has ended.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 11:19 AM

[SSJ: 4621] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/20

To Paul Midford and Aurelia George Mulgan:

First, my thanks to Paul for his extensive responses to my posts on Japan and Afghanistan. I won't reply to all of them here, or even a few, except to note that I think although we are closer in our views of Iraq (very, very negative) and Afganistan (he's more mildly supportive of the need for success here than my stronger support), I think we still sometimes talk past each other because he puts such great faith in public opinion as a complete check on elite behavior, whereas I think it is more flexible and manipulable than he does (refer Koizumi). Second, I think at times he continues to confuse consequences and intent (the fact that Japan doesn't stand much chance of a Security Council seat doesn't mean its foreign policy elites have given up on that) and consequences and goals (e.g., the fact that the US operations in Afghanistan are clumsy and often counter-productive, or not succeeding as well as they did before, doesn't diminish the importance of the goal of securing the country against the Taliban).

Second, I don't think you can isolate the domestic consequences of the DPJ opposing the anti-Terrorism bill from the international ones, as Paul seems to do.
This really is a two-level game and as I pointed out in the start of this discussion, I think the US and EU can themselves do various things to try to influence public opinion about the potential loss of Japan's international credibility (Note: Ambassador Schieffer's public interview last week emphasizing that). And speaking of the EU, I'm not sure what the meaning was about " I should have pointed out in my last post tha the EU is not involved in military issues outside of Europe." My point was that NATO forces are fighting and dying in Afghanistan and NATO forces, many of them European, are heavily committed to that struggle. I very much doubt that Japan's potential withdrawal of all support for it would be viewed benignly in some quarters in the EU.

Third, clearly we disagree about the implications of Japan's MSDF contribution to the efforts in the Indian Ocean. I am not an expert on this. Not sure Paul is either. But in any event, this is an empirical question but also one of judgment. I for one don't believe that the Afghanistan effort is just "window dressing" cover for the Bush administration as sending SDF to Iraq was, to prove that there was a "coalition"
in the "coalition of the willing" (or the stupid, take your choice). I think that Japan's contribution is more substantial than that and if not absolutely vital, at least useful.

Finally, to both Paul and Aurelia, looking back on the part of Tanter's message I cited, I think he made too sudden a transition from the MSDF to all the coalition forces activities in the Indian Ocean. I think the statistics about boardings and arrests was about all the coalition and not the MSDF's involvement. His statements on that point were vague and confusing I agree. Sorry.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:18 AM

August 20, 2007

[SSJ: 4619] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/19

On 17/8/07 1:51 PM, Ellis Krauss wrote:
> ESK: Again, from the Tanter article:
> Between 2001 and mid-2005, according to the Asahi, forty seven MSDF
> ships have participated in thirteen rotations on station. By October

> 2005 MSDF supply ships had supplied 552 ships in the multinational
> force, dispensing fuel worth 155 hundred million yen.[2]...
> But the Japanese mission is not limited to supplying fuel. The Asahi

> articles make clear that one part of the MSDF contingents duties has

> been interception of vessels regarded as suspicious. The Asahi cites

> JDA statements about 11,000 inspections, and "many crews"
> arrested.
>
> ESK: Seems like something to me

I tried to check out Tanter's original sources in the Asahi Shinbun, but he does not provide any of the necessary details. I don't quibble with the rotation data, but I do quibble with the interception/inspection/arrest of crews data. The question is whether such activity is authorised by the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML). If not authorised by the law (or the Basic Plan, which implements the law), the MSDF can't do it. Even if, as Tanter says, ['the JDA made statements about 11,000 inspections and 'many crews' arrested'], it was not necessarily taking ownership of these activities. It could have been making a general statement about the activities of the other multinational forces (to which it was providing support in a fuel supply role). And as my PhD student, Chris Kevork, points out, over a four-year period, 11,000 ships comes to an average of
7.5 ships a day, which, given that that MSDF only had a few ships in the Indian Ocean (up to two supply support ships and up to three escort ships at any one time), and given their primary fuel supply role, sounds difficult. More importantly, we have been unable to find where in the ATSML and Basic Plan such activities are authorised. Although Tanter says ['In fact, a great deal is unclear about the Japanese activities in "Operation Enduring Freedom -- Maritime Interdiction Operations (OEF-MIO)." The precise guidelines the MSDF is using are not known....the precise Rules of Engagement and legal framework under which the MSDF is operating in these interdiction operations is not known, nor is the fate of those "many crews" arrested.'], it's easy to get a copy of the ATSML and the Basic Plan, where all the officially authorised activities are laid out in detail. In the Basic Plan, reference is made to 'Search and Rescue activities', but this only provides for 'assistance to combatants in distress...[and] persons in distress'.
It's a far cry from interception/inspection/arrest of crews. In fact, Tanter himself says: ['The Asahi cites an example where the boarding of a ship was left to a Canadian navy ship, apparently authorised to do so where the MDSF was not.']

Given that the SDF is so conflict-shy, it would greatly surprise me to read properly substantiated evidence that the MSDF had engaged in such 'offensive'
activities as boarding ships on the high seas, inspecting cargoes and seizing crews (who could potentially retaliate with force).

Aurelia George Mulgan
University of New South Wales
ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 11:11 AM

[SSJ: 4618] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/19

Although I do not believe that SSJ Forum is the appropriate venue to discuss or debate our views about the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the war on terrorism per se, I nonetheless decided to answer Ellis' first question, as well as other points he raises below that
are along the same lines. I believe the focus of
this discussion should stay upon Japan's responses to these wars, rather than the wars themselves.

ESK: 1)Do you personally oppose the US, Japanese, and NATO UN-authorized operations in Afghanistan? And if so why?

PM2: I support the Afghan War as a legitimate war of self-defense, especially as it was launched in 2001.
Unfortunately, this war has now taken on some sad commonalities with Iraq, namely it is often mismanaged.
To take two recent examples: When US installed President Karzai openly criticizes the US for bombing operations that produce significant civilian casualties you can tell there is a problem. When a commander from your top ally, Britain, asks US special forces to withdraw from his sector because they are producing too many civilian casualties and turning the local population hostile you know there is a problem.
Apart from Rumsfeld's famous question about whether US military operations end up creating terrorists faster than they kill them, these characteristics of the war as it is currently being fought do not make it such an easy sale in Japan, or perhaps elsewhere. The Japanese government might actually have better luck selling the MSDF deployment as supporting other navies'
efforts to catch Al Qaeda elements at sea, which is actually closer to the truth.

I gather Ellis supports the war in Afghanistan, which is understandable. But we have to remember that policies that we find very plausible might not be in the eyes of others, especially in a country such as Japan, where beliefs about military force, although not pacifist, remain very different from those found in the US.

2)If not, are you basing all of your arguments on Japanese poll data, when we know that these can change and public opinion be influenced by elite (and foreign) actions?

PM2: This seems to be a rhetorical question, but my answer is yes, I am basing these arguments on opinion polls, but no, I don't think public opinion is so easily influence by elites, foreign or domestic.
Events in the real world clearly do influence the public, but whether do they do this in a desirable or controllable direction is another question.
Supporters of extending the dispatch can point to polls in August 2002 and July 2003 showing almost 50% positively evaluating the MSDF deployment, versus about 40% who negatively evaluated it. On the other hand, when asked in July 2003 about extending the MSDF deployment, 55% opposed versus only 32% who supported.
This is the same pattern we saw in Iraq: GSDF activities in Iraq were evaluated highly, but the public didn't want them there. (Despite high evaluations of GSDF activities in Iraq, as of May 2007, 60.3% opposed continuing the ASDF mission there, as opposed to 29.6% who supported). It's hard to find cases of significant opinion shifts relating to the SDF brought about by elite efforts, especially in the short-run (3 years or less), and harder still to find cases of opinion being led from opposition to retrospectively punishing a yato party for continuing
to oppose a policy.

3)Do you think there is absolutely no political risk to the DPJ in opposing the renewal of the anti-Terrorism Law and no "costs" internationally to Japan for withdrawing all its forces from the Indian Ocean?
PM2: In terms of the policy itself, there is very little risk domestically. Indeed, the risk would be much greater if the DPJ flip flopped after consistently opposing extensions (although they did vote for the original dispatch plan in November 2001).
The main risk the DPJ faces is procedural: if they sit on this or any other bill for two months in order to kill it will the public view this as obstructionism?
One DPJ member I know who supports the MSDF mission thinks the DPJ should vote the bill down quickly to give the LDP time to override it (assuming Komeito can be convinced to join them). Shakaito suffered in the
1992 upper house election not because voters supported the just passed PKO bill, which was not especially popular, but because their use of the famous ox-walk was seen as obstructionist. That said if the DPJ obstructs something voters have a strong interest in, like pension reform, the consequences for the DPJ would be far worse. International costs: I don't see large costs here, in part because similar withdrawals by other states have not appeared to generate adverse consequences, in part because the MSDF mission is not really contributing that much to Afghanistan or the
war on terrorism.

PM:
Yomiuri and undoubtedly the Abe administration will play up the argument that Japan will no longer be a respected member of international society unless it continues the Indian Ocean deployment. Polling doesn't suggest that these arguments work very well with the public, status insecurity seems to be more of an elite preoccupation. Externally, it's pretty clear Japan's position in the "international community" will not be affected. Last time I checked various European states such as Spain and Sweden were still respected members, despite playing no military role in the War on Terrorism at present.

ESK: Spain and Sweden is not Japan, the world's second largest economy, bucking for a seat on the Security Council and with possibly the world's second most powerful naval forces.

PM2: As I think Ellis would agree, Japan has no chance to gain a permanent Security Council seat. For the US or Japanese officials to raise this issue is potentially damaging for the alliance, since it only serves to highlight the fact that the US puts higher priority on keeping Germany off the Council than letting Japan on.

ESK: That's a Spain-NATO problem. Japan
is Japan alone. Makes a big difference.

PM2: Many Japanese voters don't think the US will defend them anyway, so I am not sure this makes a big difference. Also, is it really in the US interest to play on this sort of insecurity over something as small as the current MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean? One result of feeling alone may be a decision to become a more independent military power.

But it is not just distance and absence of concrete information that explains the relative acceptance of this deployment. Much more than the Iraq deployment, the MSDF deployment can be presented as part of Japan's contribution to international cooperation against transnational terror, thus gaining the crucial legitimacy in Japan of association with legitimate United Nations-linked activities.

PM2: If linked more toward rear area support of efforts to capture Al Qaeda elements at sea, this might be more sellable domestically in Japan, although these naval operations are being wound down anyway.
On the other hand, the more the MSDF mission is linked to rear area support of actual fighting in Afghanistan, the harder it will be to garner support. As for the legitimacy of a UN imprimatur, Koizumi used it in the case of Iraq, and may have damaged its value as a result.

ESK: Maybe not yet, but NATO is heavily involved and it wouldn't surprise me to see EU putting some either subtle or public pressure on Japan too soon. We'll see.

PM2: I should have pointed out in my last post that the EU is not involved in military issues outside of Europe. How is NATO pressuring Japan over the MSDF deployment? I continue to see this as a "face" or a political issue only for the Bush administration, not a military issue.

PM: We should remember that Koizumi had already slashed the MSDF deployment two years ago (MSDF provision of fuel and water to allied ships is way down over the past two years), and at least part of his reason for doing so was the winding down of US and allied operations in the Indian Ocean.

ESK: Since that time the situation in Afghanistan has worsened, not improved.

PM2: Yes, but allied, including MSDF operations in the Indian Ocean were nonetheless reduced, again suggesting the lack of a connection.

ESK: As for being political rather than military, I cite the following from an online article on Japan in the Indian Ocean on ZNET by Richard Tanter [http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=9990 ] Secondly, the primary reason for dispatching the

PM2: It is worth noting out that Tanter's main point is to raise doubts about the legality and legitimacy of the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean, doubts that, if valid, would undermine the political viability of extending the mission.

Kongo-class Aegis ships in the first place was not, as was stated by the government at the time, air defense for the supply vessels. The smaller but still highly competent Shirane- and Murakame-class destroyers were more than capable of handling any conceivable local area ocean air defense. The real reasons are not completely clear, but undoubtedly have to do with the prodigious area-wide surveillance and tracking capacities of the Aegis air defense system operated by the Kongo-class ships . These would have enabled the MSDF ships to cooperate with both US and UK navy and air units operating not only in the Indian Ocean, but possibly over Afghanistan itself. ....

PM2: The Koizumi administration publicly promised that the Aegis destroyers (sources I read said there were only two in total) dispatched to the Indian Ocean would not engage in information sharing related to combat. If they did do this, and it comes out during the debate, this would likely damage the prospects for extending the MSDF deployment. On the other hand, the military value of extending radar coverage over Afghanistan is unclear since there was never any air-to-air combat.

ESK citing Tanter: More generally, the Indian Ocean
deployment has been of enormous value to the MSDF itself, by providing a very large portion of the MSDF's ships and personnel with war zone experience.

PM2: It's not really war zone experience per se, but it has been a useful long-term out of area experience for the MSDF. It does show that in most respects Japan can guard its oil SLOCs all the way to the Persian Gulf by itself, if need be, implying less dependence upon the US for security. Yes, this mission did have training value, but the experience has already been gained, and there was not more to be gained after Koizumi slashed the MSDF presence there two years ago.

PM: They are simply not doing much any more in the way of monitoring ship traffic. In other words, this deployment actually has little to do with what's going on in Afghanistan.

ESK: Again, from the Tanter article:
But the Japanese mission is not limited to supplying fuel. The Asahi articles make clear that one part of the MSDF contingents duties has been interception of vessels regarded as suspicious. The Asahi cites JDA statements about 11,000 inspections, and "many crews"
arrested.

ESK: Seems like something to me

PM2: Allied navies are doing this, not the MSDF; the MSDF has been supporting these allied operations with fuel and water. If the MSDF did ship "inspections"
(beyond something modest like a radio message asking for identification) and arrested crews they would be exceeding the legal authority of the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Act. Again, this has little connection to the fighting in Afghanistan, unless Al Qaeda or Taliban members are trying to flee Pakistan to Somalia, etc. This would be a reasonable mission, but then you have to ask why are the US and allies scaling back, if not winding up, this mission?

PM: In terms of impressing the Japanese public, distrust of the US in Japan has risen so much as a result of Iraq that I am not sure they can be very persuasive; even in better times the US has had difficulty directly influencing Japanese public opinion. If the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law is shot down what can the Bush administration reasonably do other than express disappointment? When Spain executed an in-your-face withdrew three years ago from Iraq, the then much stronger Bush administration wasn't able to impose much cost on Madrid.

PM2: It's worth pointing out the opposite is true
too: the US depends much more on Japan than on Spain for its security. Without Japan's cooperation dealing with North Korea and missile defense become significantly harder.

PM: The DPJ's decision to target the MSDF deployment is a long-term cost of Koizumi's decision to deploy the SDF to Iraq. The MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean looks like and can be easily confused with the just extended ASDF mission in Iraq.

ESK: My point was that these are very, very different.
Might the Japanese public or part of it confuse them?
Possibly. But there are very good arguments to be made that they are quite different and again, it's possible that the US and EU may start making these publicly.

PM2: Sure, they are different wars to a significant extent. The question is whether the focus is the nature of the two wars or the initiator of the two wars? Japanese and others can rationally ask, if the US made such a blunder in Iraq, how can they be trusted not to make similar blunders in Afghanistan and elsewhere? We can hope, as Ellis suggested, that all mistakes will be attributed to the Bush administration alone. In the short-run, however, this is still problematic, since, to paraphrase Rumsfeld, you continue your wars with the president you have.
There is also the danger that the US ends up with a sticky long-term reputation as a power incapable of pursuing reasonable security policies. This would not necessarily be an unreasonable inference since the US political process produced both the Bush administration and the Iraq War. During the Vietnam War there was widespread opposition to the war in Japan, and not just from the left. Fortunately, perceptions of the US recovered after the US withdrew.
We can hope for the same again, but we should not count on it.

PM: Although not related to the non-combat MSDF deployment per se, the broader souring of the Japanese public toward an expanded overseas role for the SDF can be seen in a regular Yomiuri poll on public support for recognizing Japan's right to collective self-defense.

ESK: "..an expanded overseas role for the SDF" and a poll on "collective self-defense" are not at all synonymous. Everyone knows "collective self-defense"
is a code word for defending the U.S. around the world.
SDF's overseas role could include operations under UN mandate or authorization as you have written about.
The poll is measuring apples not oranges!

PM2: When we talk about rear-area logistical support for US military operations this gets very close to "collective self-defense," as even the Koizumi and Abe cabinets acknowledged. At the very least, shrinkage in the number of voters supporting the right to collective self-defense shrinks the pool of voters reliably certain to support rear-area logistical support for US forces, since it's not plausible that one could support the former without also supporting the later.

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science Dragvoll, Norwegian Univesity for Science and Technology (NTNU) Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Web: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/japan
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 11:10 AM

[SSJ: 4617] Re: LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/19

The JSP-LDP coalition turned out to be one of the best things that ever happened to the LDP. Had they not got back into power they probably would have collapsed within six months. Instead, they exploited the Socialists and have been power ever since. I think it was former PM Takeshita who once said something like "we have swallowed the Socialists and are now digesting them."

The interesting question is would the LDP do the same to the DPJ as opposition voters dumped the DPJ, or would the DPJ, with its greater party discipline survive and digest the LDP?

Approved by ssjmod at 11:09 AM

[SSJ: 4615] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/18

To Jean-Christophe Helary:

I agree with you about Iraq. But you make the same mistake I think that Paul Midford does in confounding Afghanistan and Iraq. They are totally different. The former was a harbor for terrorist activity, a true multilateral coalition under UN auspices is in that country, it involves NATO as well as the US, and I believe was a legitimate target for multilateral action after 9/11. If you are not going to fight terrorism under these conditions, when are you going to? And do you really think that with BOTH Afghanistan and Iraq either in chaos (the latter) or under Taliban control again (the former), that Pakistan is going to be far behind? Iraq is one thing--an illegitimate invasion by essentially one or two countries (US and UK), for spurious purposes (WMD and connections to 9/11, neither of which existed), a totally botched occupation, and religious civil war. Afghanistan is a very different matter with a legitimate multilateral invasion, an occupation that was making progress for a while, and a clear enemy supporting terrorism (Taliban).
It is simplistic in the extreme to equate the two, and in fact, in my opinion is similar to the very same mistake that the Bush administration made when it went into Iraq.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:07 AM

[SSJ: 4614] Re: LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Austin Uzama
Date: 2007/08/17

A coalition between the LDP and DPJ is not unthinkable as some will think. Nobody ever predicted the coalition between the LDP & SDPJ in the 90s. But that coalition brought the dead of SDPJ which some are still to this day hoping it will rise again. But considering the visible (Japan Press) and invisible (foreign residents) forces behind the DPJ winning big on 7/29, there might be difficulties forming a coalition with the LDP this time around. While Japan Press as usual might sing the national harmony anthem as its already begin to be heard, it will be difficult to sell this coalition issue to various foreign resident associations that are feeling the impact (anti-foreigners laws & gaijin harassment/gai-hara) of the LDP government. To my knowledge, Ozawa, Hatoyama & Kan have stated openly that the Abe administration and the LDP is a party that must be remove from power. To that effect, my guess is that, DPJ executives including former PM Hata will continue woo moderate lower house LDP members especially those not supporting PM Abe.

Again, there is the public relations issue that the DPJ has been very good at. Ozawa used this medium offen in the past to seek publicity (fightings during delibration on important bills) and courting the Press(using ancient & famous scholars courteous Japanese proverbs), he might rely on this very powerful weapon again. The Press in Japan can CREATE, KILL & BURY an issue/person/organization. As for Abe and the LDP, contrary to what lots of Japanese scholars have discussed here, I strongly believe the Press was the main active force behind LDP's fall, we foreign residents here were just waiting for 7/29 to come to formally bury the party in the upper house.

LDP/DPJ coalition will be difficult this time; considering the outcome of past LDP/SDPJ coalition and the consequences to the SDPJ today; the closeness of Ozawa taking over political power from the LDP again with strong poll ratings and the strong outcry that might arise from DPJ grassroot supporter groups if the party goes into coalition with LDP.

Cheers!

Austin Uzama

Approved by ssjmod at 11:06 AM

[SSJ: 4613] Re: SDF operations

From: Kiichi Fujiwara
Date: 2007/08/17

On the extension of SDF opeerations, I am sure that Nagatacho community will make the most of it, although I doubt if that will be successful.

1) The Nagatacho consensus rules that any party that aims for action against the US-Japan alliance are unrealistic and therefore not fit to govern Japan.
This consensus is shared by not only LDP, DPJ, but even Shaminto and JCP members of parilaiment.

2) Thus, to keep power away from DPJ, the LDP and part of the media that suport LDP will put the utmost emphasis on the security issue so that the divisions within the DPJ will lead them astray.

3) Public opinion, however, does not share this Nagatacho consensus. The war in Afganistan has been unpopular all the way. Not as bad as Iraq, but unpopular nonetheless. Ozawa's decision to vote against the extension of SDF operations in the Indian Ocean.

4) The outcome is uncertain, but I believe the DPJ will propose an amended version of the Tokusoho, the bill that allows the SDF operations, in the coming session. To make it simple, SDF operations are okay so long as endorced by an explicit UN resolution; Afganistan is all right but not Iraq; no military operations will be endorced if only based on the principle of collective defense.

As for myself, I do not take issue with SDF overseas operations in general, but I very much doubt if the operations in Afghanistan has been, or will be, successful. Instead of a debate on whether Tokyo should issue a blank check to Washington or should totally withdraw, we ought to reorganize the operation which, up to this day, has only brought back the Taliban forces back to power. Alas, that does not seem to be the concern of the majority here.

The talk of the day is "KY", which means "out of touch,"
or for a more truthful translation, "unable to read the atmosphere." This KY was a word commonly used by school children, including my junior high school daughter; nowadays it means our prime minister. Mr.
Abe really is out of touch.

Kiichi Fujiwara
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 11:05 AM

[SSJ: 4612] Re: LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Kiichi Fujiwara
Date: 2007/08/17

The Yomiuri proposal will not fly, because DPJ, at least as of now, wishes to kick JDP out of power. A few DPJ members of parliament that I have spoken with are confident that if they could force the LDP to hold an election for the lower house, they will win, with more than 250 seats.

It is of course unclear whether their hopes will come true. As of now, however, they do seem to have a chance, because Abe has decided to stay.
New numbers are not out yet, but I have heard that the support for the Abe cabinet is between 25% to 19%.

Kiichi Fujiwara
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 11:04 AM

August 17, 2007

[SSJ: 4610] Re: LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Paul J. Scalise
Date: 2007/08/17

The Yomiuri proposal sounds like the 1994-96 JSP-LDP Tomiichi Murayama Cabinet all over again, no? And we all know what a great idea that one turned out to be.

Paul J. Scalise
Oxford University

> From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@huji.ac.il)
> Date: 2007/08/16
> The Yomiuri calls on the LDP and DPJ to consider forming a coalition
> government to avoid the difficulties in the legislative anticipated as
> a result of the July 29 HOC elections.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:20 PM

[SSJ: 4609] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Jean-Christophe Helary
Date: 2007/08/17

On Aug 17, 2007, at 12:51 PM, Ellis Krauss wrote:
> 3)Do you think there is absolutely no political risk to the DPJ in
> opposing the renewal of the anti-Terrorism Law and no "costs"
> internationally to Japan for withdrawing all its forces from the
> Indian Ocean?

There seems to have been a pattern of terrorism against countries that are participating to Afghan or Irak activities.

Based on that, it seems that the best "anti-terrorism"
measures would be to withdraw from any activity related to either theater.

Most of the anti-terrorism laws are anti-foreigners laws with some warfare coating to please the militarists. What is needed in Afghan and Irak is certainly not addressed by them.

There is a lot of diplomacy that is not taking place for example. With Pakistan (and that from the beginning of the story) for one.

What if from an "anti-terrorism" paradigm we tried to shift to an asian diplomacy paradigm ?

Jean-Christophe Helary

Approved by ssjmod at 05:20 PM

[SSJ: 4608] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/17

To Paul Midford: specific responses below. But let me ask Paul some more general, basic questions underlying his posts on this matter to ascertain where he is coming from:
1)Do you personally oppose the US, Japanese, and NATO UN-authorized operations in Afghanistan? And if so why?
2)If not, are you basing all of your arguments on Japanese poll data, when we know that these can change and public opinion be influenced by elite (and foreign) actions?
3)Do you think there is absolutely no political risk to the DPJ in opposing the renewal of the anti-Terrorism Law and no "costs" internationally to Japan for withdrawing all its forces from the Indian Ocean?

Best,
Ellis

ESK: Spain and Sweden is not Japan, the world's second largest economy, bucking for a seat on the Security Council and with possibly the world's second most powerful naval forces. Nor does either country have an important alliance with the U.S. directly. Spain is part of NATO which is fighting tooth and nail in Iraq and losing people. That's a Spain-NATO problem. Japan is Japan alone. Makes a big difference.
But it is not just distance and absence of concrete information that explains the relative acceptance of this deployment. Much more than the Iraq deployment, the MSDF deployment can be presented as part of Japan's contribution to international cooperation against transnational terror, thus gaining the crucial legitimacy in Japan of association with legitimate United Nations-linked activities.

PM: I have yet to see any evidence that the EU is getting involved in this issue in any significant way.

ESK: Maybe not yet, but NATO is heavily involved and it wouldn't surprise me to see EU putting some either subtle or public pressure on Japan too soon. We'll see.

PM: We should remember that Koizumi had
already slashed the MSDF deployment two years ago (MSDF provision of fuel and water to allied ships is way down over the past two years), and at least part of his reason for doing so was the winding down of US and allied operations in the Indian Ocean.

ESK: Since that time the situation in Afghanistan has worsened, not improved. As for being political rather than military, I cite the following from an online article on Japan in the Indian Ocean on ZNET by Richard Tanter [ http://www.zmag.org/content/showartic
le.cfm?ItemID=9990 ]
Firstly, in 2004 the Koizumi government committed Japan to rapid deployment of a theatre missile defence system in conjunction with the United States, the most potent part of which will be the sea-based system centred on Japan's four Aegis-class destroyers. All four Aegis-class ships -- the Kirishima, Kongo, Myoko and Chokai -- spent time on the Indian Ocean station, but all four are undergoing advanced Aegis training with the US Navy, in preparation for their new duties.
[6]
Secondly, the primary reason for dispatching the Kongo-class Aegis ships in the first place was not, as was stated by the government at the time, air defense for the supply vessels. The smaller but still highly competent Shirane- and Murakame-class destroyers were more than capable of handling any conceivable local area ocean air defense. The real reasons are not completely clear, but undoubtedly have to do with the prodigious area-wide surveillance and tracking capacities of the Aegis air defense system operated by the Kongo-class ships . These would have enabled the MSDF ships to cooperate with both US and UK navy and air units operating not only in the Indian Ocean, but possibly over Afghanistan itself. ....
More generally, the Indian Ocean deployment has been of enormous value to the MSDF itself, by providing a very large portion of the MSDF's ships and personnel with war zone experience. The MSDF thus gained practical experience of multilateral operations in theater, with all the trials of inter-operability, communications difficulties, differing rules of engagement, and differences in organisational culture.
"Inter-operability" -- the capacity to work together with military forces of other nations, is clearly a technical requirement for any effective multinational force -- whether under UN auspices or any other.

PM: They aresimply not doing much any more in the way of
monitoring ship traffic. In other words, this
deployment actually has little to do with what's going
on in Afghanistan.

ESK: Again, from the Tanter article:
Between 2001 and mid-2005, according to the Asahi,
forty seven MSDF ships have participated in thirteen
rotations on station. By October 2005 MSDF supply
ships had supplied 552 ships in the multinational
force, dispensing fuel worth 155 hundred million
yen.[2]...
But the Japanese mission is not limited to supplying
fuel. The Asahi articles make clear that one part of
the MSDF contingents duties has been interception of
vessels regarded as suspicious. The Asahi cites JDA
statements about 11,000 inspections, and "many crews"
arrested.

ESK: Seems like something to me

PM: In terms of impressing the Japanese public, distrust
of the US in Japan has risen so much as a result of
Iraq that I am not sure they can be very persuasive;
even in better times the US has had difficulty
directly influencing Japanese public opinion. If the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law is shot down what
can the Bush administration reasonably do other than
express disappointment? When Spain executed an
in-your-face withdrew three years ago from Iraq, the
then much stronger Bush administration wasn't able to
impose much cost on Madrid.

ESK: The so-called "coalition" in Iraq at the time was
merely window dressing for the American-Anglo
operations. Japan's role in the Indian Ocean (unlike
in Iraq) is much more substantial. Japan is much more
dependent on the US than Spain for security and
therefore the US has more leverage. I don't know
whether the Law will be shot down or not if DPJ
opposes. My point was that Japan and Japanese public
could possibly be vulnerable to a lot more pressure
from the US and EU on this matter, and that the DPJ
might pay a higher price than it thinks domestically
and internationally if it doesn't pass the law again
and completely withdraws from the Indian Ocean. which
I don't think was being considered in this discussion

PM: The DPJ's decision to target the MSDF deployment
is a long-term cost of Koizumi's decision to deploy
the SDF to Iraq. The MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean
looks like and can be easily confused with the just
extended ASDF mission in Iraq.

ESK: My point was that these are very, very different.
Might the Japanese public or part of it confuse them?
Possibly. But there are very good arguments to be made
that they are quite different and again, it's possible
that the US and EU may start making these publicly.

PM: Although not related to the non-combat MSDF
deployment per se, the broader souring of the
Japanese public toward an expanded overseas role for
the SDF can be seen in a regular Yomiuri poll on
public support for recognizing Japan's right to
collective self-defense.

ESK: "..an expanded overseas role for the SDF" and a
poll on "collective self-defense" are not at all
synonymous. Everyone knows "collective self-defense"
is a code word for defending the U.S. around the world.
SDF's overseas role could include operations under UN
mandate or authorization as you have written about.
The poll is measuring apples not oranges!

PM: The young LDP Diet member I mentioned above thinks
Koizumi's justifications for the SDF deployment to
Iraq, such as his "ridiculous" claim about safe areas
there, did a lot of damage and created sigificiant
public mistrust.

ESK: I agree with this.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:52 PM

[SSJ: 4607] Grand Coalition

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/16

An English version of the Yomiuri editorial calling for a grand coalition is also available:
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20070816TDY04004.htm

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 11:31 AM

[SSJ: 4606] LDP-DPJ Coalition?

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/16

The Yomiuri calls on the LDP and DPJ to consider forming a coalition government to avoid the difficulties in the legislative anticipated as a result of the July 29 HOC elections. The argument: a grand coalition would serve not only the public interest, now that Japan is facing major challenges, domestically and internationally, but also that of both parties.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20070815ig90.htm

Any bets about these parties' response?

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:30 AM

[SSJ: 4605] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/16

"The discussion on what Japan got in North Korea by cozying up to Bush with its Iraq policy makes the mistake of forgetting that when Koizumi first began cozying up to Bush, the main concern Japan had about the United States' North Korea policy was that it would be TOO TOUGH. Bush had labeled both Iraq and North Korea members of the "Axis of Evil" and had invaded Iraq. Many in Asia were afraid that Bush would go after North Korea next, not just with a tough negotiating policy but even with some kind of military action. Around this time, Koizumi was trying to reach out to North Korea by visiting the country in hopes of bringing about a break-through that would IMPROVE relations between the US and Japan on the one hand and North Korea on the other. So when we ask whether Japan got anything from the United States for backing them in Iraq, we should recognize that Japan was successful in RESTRAINING US policy in North Korea.
There was no military brinkmanship, the US tried diplomacy in the six-party talks, and eventually the Bush admin decided to make a deal."

There are abundant indications that many in Japan, including the public, have worried about restraining US military action against North Korea.
However, I have never seen any indication that Koizumi worried about this, although Len is right that Koizumi was trying to improve relations and that Tokyo initially opposed the shut down of Kedo, etc.
Nonetheless, at the same time Koizumi was making statements suggesting that Japan could not count on the US to defend Japan if Japan did not help out in Iraq, and in February 2003 JDA head Ishiba made his famous remark about possibly needing to preempt a North Korean attack. If Koizumi was worried about US preemptive action against the North, it is hard to understand why his cabinet was talking up the North Korean threat itself. Beyond the mindset of Japanese elites or the public, there is no evidence that the Bush administration ever seriously contemplated military action against North Korea (although Clinton apparently did in 1994).

"What changed in the interim was Japan's, and especially Abe's views on North Korea. It is only in the years since Japan decided to send troops to Iraq that Japan has adopted a tougher policy than the US (on abductees, at least). Those who say that "Koizumi got nothing from Bush" should recognize that what Koizumi wanted on North Korea policy and what Abe wanted changed in the interim and that it was probably asking a bit much to expect the US to steer between toughness and compromising exactly in line with Japanese rhythms on this issue."

This point is well taken, but in the context of my original discussion with Ellis it supports my contention that Japan did not get any pay off on North Korea justifying the SDF deployment to Iraq. More generally, it suggests that Japan should not expect to gain significant political influence in Washington by sending the SDF overseas.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 11:28 AM

[SSJ: 4604] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/16

Regarding Steve Reed's original post and Ellis Krauss' response:

Yomiuri and undoubtedly the Abe administration will play up the argument that Japan will no longer be a respected member of international society unless it continues the Indian Ocean deployment. Polling doesn't suggest that these arguments work very well with the public, status insecurity seems to be more of an elite preoccupation. Externally, it's pretty clear Japan's position in the "international community" will not be affected. Last time I checked various European states such as Spain and Sweden were still respected members, despite playing no military role in the War on Terrorism at present.

I have yet to see any evidence that the EU is getting involved in this issue in any significant way. The Bush administration appears to be lobbying on the MSDF Indian Ocean deployment primarily for political not military reasons. We should remember that Koizumi had already slashed the MSDF deployment two years ago (MSDF provision of fuel and water to allied ships is way down over the past two years), and at least part of his reason for doing so was the winding down of US and allied operations in the Indian Ocean. They are simply not doing much any more in the way of monitoring ship traffic. In other words, this deployment actually has little to do with what's going on in Afghanistan. I interviewed a young LDP member specializing in security who believes that Abe cannot explaining why the MSDF needs to be in the Indian Ocean.

In terms of impressing the Japanese public, distrust of the US in Japan has risen so much as a result of Iraq that I am not sure they can be very persuasive; even in better times the US has had difficulty directly influencing Japanese public opinion. If the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law is shot down what can the Bush administration reasonably do other than express disappointment? When Spain executed an in-your-face withdrew three years ago from Iraq, the then much stronger Bush administration wasn't able to impose much cost on Madrid.

The DPJ's decision to target the MSDF deployment is a long-term cost of Koizumi's decision to deploy the SDF to Iraq. The MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean looks like and can be easily confused with the just extended ASDF mission in Iraq. Ozawa is clearly trying to paint Afghanistan as Iraq, pointing to the lack of a clear UN mandate to attack Afghanistan before the start of hostilities. The fact that the UN gave an ex post facto mandate for Afghanistan enhances the comparison since the UN did the same for Iraq. If the SDF had not gone to Iraq it would be easier to separate the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean from the Iraq War. The real challenge for the DPJ will be to fashion an alternative bill that contributes to stability in Afghanistan in other ways (last Sunday's Nikkei discussed their preliminary work on such a bill).

Another potential monkey wrench for Abe could come if the JDM releases the names and dates of US ships refuelled by the MSDF. A number of specialists believe this information would show the MSDF fueling ships bound for Iraq, indicating Koizumi cabinet statements to the contrary were disingenous, and
thereby providing a real link to Iraq.

Although not related to the non-combat MSDF deployment per se, the broader souring of the Japanese public toward an expanded overseas role for the SDF can be seen in a regular Yomiuri poll on public support for recognizing Japan's right to collective self-defense.
Support for recognizing this right peaked at 35.2% in 2002, and then declined consistently, falling to 30.5% by 2005. The negative influence of the Iraq deployment appears to be the cause of this decline.
The young LDP Diet member I mentioned above thinks Koizumi's justifications for the SDF deployment to Iraq, such as his "ridiculous" claim about safe areas there, did a lot of damage and created sigificiant public mistrust.

Best,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 11:27 AM

[SSJ: 4603] Re: Under the Radar

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/15

> From: Steve Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp) First I want to revise my
> count of bullet holes in the feet. I forgot that one of the few
> candidates who won for the LDP, Kobayashi in Kanagawa, has several of
> his people arrested on election law violations. His election will
> probably be declared void.

EH: If and when his "people" are charged and found guilty. The "guilt by association" (renzasei) rule.
> Two recent events have not been widely reported and are therefore
> still "under the radar" but seem potentially important to me.
> First, Minister Koike tried to fire a bureaucrat in her ministry and
> was prevented from doing so.

EH: The issue has yet to be decided by Abe.

> Koike is also on the way to being fired, though not necessarily for
> that reason. I only know what appeared in the newspapers but there is
> probably an interesting story here somewhere.

EH: What I could gather from newspaper reports is that Koike is the to be retained in her post and Shiozaki Kanbouchoukan, who resents Koike precociousness, might be on his way out (at least if Mori's advice is heeded).

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 11:26 AM

August 15, 2007

[SSJ: 4602] Re: Under the Radar

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/08/15

First a clarification on my claim that Abe would lose a public debate on the US-Japan Alliance. I was not referring to the current anti-terrorism bill.
Ozawa said the operation is not sanctioned by the UN and US spokesman now use the word "UN" as often as they can in their public statements in Japan.
Maybe they will be able to convince the public on this one.

I certaintly did not mean to say that Ozawa could stop the operation in the Indian Ocean. In fact, Ellis'
argument concerning "the ability of the US and EU to subtly put pressure on Japan to continue to aid in the Indian Ocean/Afghanistan effort" is exactly what interests me. How are they going to do it? How do democratic governments, including Blair in Britain among the many others, get their publics and parties to go along with policies that neither support? It has already been fun to watch as Koike was amazed by how well she was treated on her recent trip to Washington.

What I did mean to say was that Abe would lose a real public debate on the US-Japan relationship if one happened. My model is Helmut Kohl. Revising the constitution is not a vote-winning issue. If anything it is a vote-loser but primarily it is a vote-borer.
Protecting Article 9, at least as framed by the socialists and communists, is equally boring to voters. This is not 1960. If the LDP is forced to explain Japanese policy toward the US so that the average voter can understand it, the average voter will not be pleased.
I do not know where such a debate would lead but I am pretty sure that Abe would not be happy with the outcome.

The basis for this claim is primarily talking to my students and watching TV (which is why I am placing no bets on this one). Ellis has shown how Kume changed TV news but Koizumi has changed it even more by getting people talking about politics on variety shows. TV Tackle and Oota Souri are the two most popular examples but you hear people debating the pensions problem all over the place these days. Member of the Diet regularly go on these programs and are regularly embarrassed by the questions people ask. Young ladies whose jobs depend upon their looks, not their brains, sometimes win arguments with senior politicians. This is also fun to watch.

John Campbell makes two good points on the Koike-Moriya problem. First, I did not notice the policeman angle. The second is about the LDP thinking of themselves as the adults that the children (voters) should trust. I think I can find a quote by Yoshida Shigeru during the 1955 Shipbuilding Scandal to the effect that voters should not concern themselves with scandals but leave such things up to the adults. That statement was followed by a massive drop in support for Yoshida and his replacement as leader of the Liberal Party.

After the Abe cabinet, the LDP is having more trouble portraying itself as the adult in the conversation with the voters. The LDP position on the pensions issues boils down to: "You know all that money you paid into the pension fund. Well, we lost a big chunk of it, we spent another large chunk on pork barrel projects that have since gone bankrupt, and our employees stuffed quite a lot of it in their own pockets. We apologize but everyone is really equally to blame. (This is a change from the original claim that it was all Kan Naoto's fault from his brief stint at Minister of Health and Welfare and then that it was all the union's fault. The party in power has trouble avoiding responsibility.) Nevertheless, we are the only ones who can fix the problem so please trust us."
They need a new spin doctor.

Even though the Koike-Moriya battle was below the radar when I wrote that missive, it had exploded all over the media by the time forum subscribers read it.
The media is playing it as another failure of the Abe
cabinet: he forms a cabinet of his buddies and cannot keep his buddies from fighting. I guess this should be counted as a third bullet hole in LDP feet. Of course, they can get back to zero simply by replacing Abe.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 02:12 PM

[SSJ: 4601] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/08/15

If the Indian Ocean operation is truly in support of a multinational operation and not just a US-led coalition of the can't-say-noers, would one way to get Japanese participation extended be to change the reality and perception so that it is not primarily
(exclusively?) Japan supplying fuel for US operations but Japan supplying fuel primarily (exclusively?) for non-US forces? Release the data on who gets how much.
And at what cost to whom. And show that the support is for a truly multinational operation and is not just bankrolling a US operation.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 11:23 AM

[SSJ: 4600] Re: Under the Radar

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/15

Steve Reed wrote:
> First, Minister Koike tried to fire a bureaucrat in her ministry and

> was prevented from doing so. This is one of the things that got
Tanaka
> Makiko in trouble.
> Koike is also on the way to being fired, though not necessarily for
> that reason. I only know what appeared in the newspapers but there
is
> probably an interesting story here somewhere. I wish someone would
> figure out what is going on and tell us all. In any case, it would
> appear that the LDP is not yet in control of the bureaucracy.

I have no special knowledge but the case is certainly something. Appointment of the jimujikan is a classic site for politician vs bureaucracy battles; if I remember correctly, some political scientists saw the fact that ministers have overridden ministerial views as an indication that politicians are in charge, while others saw the reaction to such incidents as being quite extraordinary as indicating the strength of ministry organization.

It is interesting that Moriya (the guy Koike was trying to fire) explained why he went directly to the Prime Minister (in what other country could that happen?) by saying that it wasn't his personal case, it was that violating established procedures threatens all of Kasumigaseki. One can imagine how Koizumi would have reacted to that. Abe left the minister he appointed less than six months ago hanging out on her limb--anybody's guess as to whether she was betrayed or just dumb in announcing her choice.

That choice itself is another similarity to Tanaka Makiko--Koike wanted an ex-cop rather than someone from the Defense Agency itself. That is, attacking the bureaucracy (in Koike's case, going after leaks; in Tanaka's case, slush funds etc) takes precedence over the agency's mission, foreign policy or defense policy.

The Japanese LDP and the American GOP used to claim they were the grownups who could run things . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 11:22 AM

[SSJ: 4598] Under the Radar

From: Steve Reed
Date: 2007/08/14

First I want to revise my count of bullet holes in the feet. I forgot that one of the few candidates who won for the LDP, Kobayashi in Kanagawa, has several of his people arrested on election law violations. His election will probably be declared void. LDP in these cases is to try to persuade the guilty party to resign but repeat the mantra, "This is a decision each politician must make for themselves." This is yet another way in which LDP politicians are free. My bullet hole count is now two to two.

Second, I watch TV Tackle last night and the DPJ participants did not look happy trying explain Ozawa's position on extending the anti-Terror Law. TV Tackle has become Hamada Kouichi's show so it is not representative but an Abe-Ozawa debate on the talk shows might yield a different result that a broadly based public debate. We may have a Schattsneider problem here: Abe can win in the Diet and perhaps on the talk shows but Ozawa needs a broader audience. In any case, there is more debate (as oppposed to mere shouting matches) now than I have ever seen.

Two recent events have not been widely reported and are therefore still "under the radar" but seem potentially important to me.

First, Minister Koike tried to fire a bureaucrat in her ministry and was prevented from doing so. This is one of the things that got Tanaka Makiko in trouble.
Koike is also on the way to being fired, though not necessarily for that reason. I only know what appeared in the newspapers but there is probably an interesting story here somewhere. I wish someone would figure out what is going on and tell us all. In any case, it would appear that the LDP is not yet in control of the bureaucracy.

Second, serious hard ball is being played in Gifu 1st district. Noda Seiko already faced a divided LDP in the city assembly when she voted against postal reform and was opposed by assassin Sato Yukari. The 2005 election in Gifu was pretty nasty with both sides accusing the other of dirty play. Noda won the SMD.
Sato came in 2nd but got a PR seat. Noda was then let back into the party. The LDP now has two candidates in Gifu 1st who are not friends, both wanting the nomination. This is not an uncommon situation but this time the two candidates both attract media attention and their fights attract even more. Things got more interesting when the police arrested a guy for threatening Sato's life if she dared run in the next election. This was about the time that the mayor of Nagasaki was assassinated and there a few other cases of threats around the country. Now someone has broken into Noda's office, stealing computers and surveillance tapes and burning the place down. Seems someone has been studying American political history and got to the chapter on Watergate. Besides being bad publicity for the LDP, this may mean that reform is finally having enough effect that someone's ox is being gored.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 11:14 AM

[SSJ: 4596] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Yoichiro Sato
Date: 2007/08/14

On the subject of "Japan factor" in major power policies toward DPRK, Linus Hagstrom and Marie Soderberg have published an edited book "North Korea
Policy: Japan and the Great Powers" (Routledge, 2006), to which I contributed a chapter. Linus and Marie also did a special edition on Pacific Affairs 79(3), Fall 2006, on the same subject.

Both Dr. Schoppa and Dr. Alexander make important points that Japan's position on DPRK has not been constant and that U.S.-Japan policy coordination has been subjected to many factors, Iraq being just one of many other important factors including ROK position on DPRK and US-ROK relations.

Yoichiro Sato
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Approved by ssjmod at 10:32 AM

[SSJ: 4595] Re: Another long two cents from Reed

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/14

I agree with much of what Steve Reed has suggested in his, as usual, good analysis of DPJ and LDP prospects.
But one caveat about US-Japan relations and especially the anti-terrorism bill renewal. I don't think we can underestimate the ability of the US and EU to subtly put pressure on Japan to continue to aid in the Indian Ocean/Afghanistan effort. This, after all, is NOT Iraq--this was a true multilateral effort fully sanctioned by the UN against a terrorist and Taliban enemy with horrible human rights record--and in which NATO forces are fully engaged and losing both people and ground. There are a lot of public relations moves that the US and EU and LDP can mount to impress the Japanese public with the importance of Japan not letting the international community down in the war on terror (the real one, not the one in Iraq) and of the negative consequences of doing so. The DPJ may win the battle on this law but I would not underestimate the possibility that it could pay a heavy price in both internal discord and also external perception that it might not be able to be trusted with international affairs and relationship with the US. After all, Bush, thank goodness, will not always be President and most Japanese do understand the importance of US-Japan relations and keeping Japan a respected member of the international community.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:31 AM

[SSJ: 4594] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Mary Alice Haddad
Date: 2007/08/13

Dear Paul,

Just to follow up on John's suggestion, some of the years of World Values Surveys code the Japanese data by prefecture. If you aggregate the individual level data to the prefecture, you might be able to get what you need. You could also control for many of the urban-rural factors as well.
The surveys are available online:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.

Best,
Mary Alice

Mary Alice Haddad, Ph.D.
Academy Scholar
Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (on leave) Assistant Professor of Government and East Asian Studies Wesleyan University mahaddad@wesleyan.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 10:30 AM

[SSJ: 4593] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Kenji Hayao
Date: 2007/08/13

Given the recent discussion on the future of the US-Japan alliance, I thought that SSJ readers might be interested in a recent op/ed piece by Richard Samuels on Japan's security policy: "The More Muscular Japan"
(Boston Globe, 8/7/2007).
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/08/07/the_more_muscular_japan/.
I believe that Samuels' book, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, is coming out soon (Amazon lists its publication date as August 2007).

Kenji Hayao

Approved by ssjmod at 10:29 AM

August 13, 2007

[SSJ: 4592] Re: Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/13

To Paul Scalise: certainly an interesting project. I confess I'm surprised there is enough meaningful variation on the dependent variable (votes in
committee) to make the analysis worthwhile. For independent variables, I would guess that there might be some way to make valid inferences about a few individual constituencies after a lot of work--i.e.
exemplary case studies--but getting anything systematic would be awfully hard.

An inadequate alternative would be to analyze national survey data to see what face-sheet variables are associated with the opinions you are interested in, and then code constituencies based on their population breakdown in terms of those face-sheet variables (via aggregate datasets). Whether anything other than the traits associated with urban-rural would amount to anything is doubtful, I imagine.

One other though: if there are any really large-N surveys with relevant questions, where you can get the individual-level data, analyzing them by individual constituencies might work. Even when the cell sizes are tiny, when you aggregate them into your own classifications you could get up to numbers that are big enough for decent inferences.

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

[SSJ: 4591] Voting Behavior: Ideas or Interests?

From: Paul J. Scalise
Date: 2007/08/13

In a time-series, I'm trying to analyze the voting behavior of Japanese politicians in Diet committee for both the Upper and Lower Houses compared to their UK and German counterparts. It's a topic-specific vote regarding one aspect of structural reform over the past 15 years (I won't go into the details on the topic), but I currently encountered an annoying snag and I'm hoping someone here can help me.

Using the methodology of Sheri Berman (*), I'm testing to see whether "ideas" or "interests" drive policy outputs on structural reform.

The theory is that I would need to test for 5 things:

1. If ideas matter, I would need to demonstrate that there are/were *real* differences between ideas that lead to *real* differences in policy outputs;

2. The relevant ideas *predated* the policy outputs in question (i.e., they were not a posteriori and ad hoc justifications for the vested interests);

3. The ideas could not be linked to some other observable variable;

4. The actors -- in this instance politicians -- carried these ideas over time, eventually institutionalizing them; and

5. The actors who bore these ideas made similar choices over time even as the political and economic environments changed, or conversely, that the actors with different ideas made different decisions even when placed in similar environments.

To use Berman's methodology, I collected data for the following background and foreground variables: (1) the macro political environment (e.g., public opinion polls, public sentiment polls, etc.), (2) the evolving party platforms (LDP, JSP, DPJ, JCP, Komeito, etc), (3) the relevant politicians' speeches, public declarations, and Diet pronouncements, (4) politicians' books, diaries, and personal interviews on structural reform,
(5) the *reported* cash contributions to the political parties by industrial sector, (6) politician turnover in the Diet, and of course (7) the politicians'
voting records by party.

All of this information (excluding the one-on-one qualitative interviews) were based on publicly available data, but took quite a while (over two years!) to collect and collate (especially the party cash contributions).

Here's the problem: in order for these tests to be systematic, I need to cover not only the macro, but also the micro issues. Differently put, I need to test not only for the *theoretical* party, corporate, and general consumer interests, but also the *theoretical* interests within their local constituencies. Berman suggests using local public sentiment polls and cash contributions to individual politicians in a time-series to cover those issues, but I'd like to
know:

(a) Are local/regional newspapers in Japan known to report on their own support levels of their incumbent Diet members?

(b) Has any researcher here actually collected and wrote about the reported cash contributions to individual Japanese politicians in a time-series?
Also, where does one need to look for that data and how reliable is it? (Note: I was using the "kanpo" for the contributions to the party headquarters in a time-series, but it took forever to crunch the numbers.)

Any and all advice would be greatly appreciated.

Apologies for this lengthy post,

Paul J. Scalise
Oxford University

* Berman, Sheri. 2001. "Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis." Comparative Politics 33(2):231-50.

* Berman, Sheri. 1998. The Social Democratic Movement:
Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:57 PM

[SSJ: 4590] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/08/13

Aurelia George Mulgan writes of agreeing
> Abe will not lead the LDP into the next election.
> He is too much of an electoral liability, and t...

Given that, and given the fact that the complaining within the LDP is just complaining at this stage, should we assume the LDP does not want to name a new leader now because the shine will have worn off by the next election? Better to wait until shortly before the election and ask voters to approve an unknown PM and Cabinet that has not had time to drive its approval ratings down?

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 01:08 PM

[SSJ: 4589] Abe's (and Ozawa's) future

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/13

Mori Yoshio had the peanut gallery of journalists on the Tahara program gasping on Sunday morning (though some of it was laughter) as he told Abe what to do with the cabinet reshuffle. The Japan Times thoughtfully publishes on the web this press holiday and this story is pretty good.

This seems pretty strong to me--is Mori again saying what he shouldn't, or is there some loosely coordinated campaign to drive Abe out, or what?

[NATIONAL NEWS]
Ex-PM Mori gives Abe tips on Cabinet reshuffle http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070813a5.html

Not that the DPJ can get together behind its leader--Maehara said on the same program that he favors extending the so-called anti- terrorism law.
Since the DPJ was the winning party, and is groping to figure out how to leverage the Diet, one would think shutting up for a while would be sensible. Maehara was so inept as DPJ head maybe we can look for him to jump on the sinking ship of the LDP now.

But I should leave this interparty stuff to those who understand it . . .

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 11:57 AM

[SSJ: 4588] post-HOC election changes by DPJ?

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/08/11

Dear Colleagues,

The following report may be of interest:

Yuri, Kageyama (Associated Press [dateline: Tokyo]), "Opposition promises change in Japan," Yahoo! News, 11 August 2007, URL:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070811/ap_on_re_as/japan_rising_opposition;_ylt=AgcQCBgO_pURYEznTIeHCYwUewgF

Among other sources, political analyst Eiken Itagaki is quoted in the above-cited report.

Vincent K Pollard
University of Hawai'i at Manoa
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
ASIAN, U.S.. HAWAI'I, WORLD POLITICS, FUTURES
______________________________________________________

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

[SSJ: 4587] Another long two cents from Reed

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/08/11

I have several thoughts on several of the topics being discussed on the Forum.

(1) On the HR override: I learned a lot about the legal aspects of this problem from the discussion but have a comment about the political aspects.
Abe was roundly criticized for the large number of forced votes he used to pass bills in the last Diet.
Abe presumably thinks that railroading bills through the Diet is leadership, another Kishi legacy perhaps.
The public seemed to think otherwise, rating Ozawa's leadership above Abe's. An HR override would raise this problem again big time.

(2) On LDP and DPJ policy: Everyone seems to have heard of Abe's criticism of Ozawa's agricultural policy but few seem to have heard of Ozawa's critcisum of LDP policy. The reason is clear: most people, including the Japanese voter, are forced to rely on the Japanese media.
Ozawa was asked on Sunday Project about Abe's criticism and his reply was, "Have you looked at their policy?" He said that the LDP had built ridiculous assumptions into their projections. I did not pay attention to the details but it was like assuming that every Japanese women will have two children in the next ten years. Thus my previous comment that Ozawa probably exaggerated but Abe probably lied. We won't really know until there is a debate.
The exciting prospect of the DPJ being another ruling party is that they will get the coverage needed to have their policies compared to the LDP's policies instead of some silly abstract ideal. I saw several talk shows leading up the 2005 election in which the commentators clearly came down on the side of the DPJ policy. At least twice I hear commentators suggest that the 2005 election would come down to the DPJ's policy versus Koizumi's showmanship. In the event, of course, no one heard about the DPJ's policies.
The point is not that DPJ policies are indeed better than LDP policies. I don't study policy and have no clue which is better. The point is, if there is a real policy debate, don't put any big money on the LDP.

(3) On policy toward the US: Here again I do not study US-Japanese relations and have no clue about the substance of the policies but I am willing to bet that, if there is a public debate on policy towards the US between Abe and Ozawa, Ozawa will win in the court of public opinion. If this were to happen, Abe could go really go down in history as the second coming of Kishi. More interestingly, he could go down in history as Japan's Helmut Kohl. Kohl started a debate aimed at putting Germany's past behind it that wound up with a consensus that Germans have a duty to remember.
Japan has a "democratic deficit" analgous to the European one. In Europe economic policy is largely determined by the EU and one country cannot change much merely in order to respond to their own voters.
In Japan, the alliance with the US has been above electoral politics. The LDP has spent tremendous energy trying to get the Japanese public to go along with US demands even when the public was very reluctant. There is a good dissertation here, "Japan's Democratic Deficit" or, better yet, "The Other Democratic Deficit: How Leaders Overcome their Parties and Publics Reluctance to Go Along with the Iraq War."
Under what circumstances should leaders ignore the public? I have no clue.
The debate could, of course, split the DPJ. This is exactly the issue on which the DPJ is divided internally and part of the reason the LDP brought it up was to split the opposition. It had worked in the past. I, however, do not think so. The DPJ is a more unified party than the LDP. I expect more defections from the LDP on this issue than from the DPJ.
By "more unified" I do not mean that they necessarily agree with each other. Since at least the 2000 election the DPJ has been talking to each other.
They were the first Japanese party to ever publish a manifesto and have every single candidate sign off on it. The LDP accomplished this trick only once and then only by (temporarily) kicking out those who disagreed and limiting the manifesto to a single issue: postal reform. LDP members of the Diet like to say that the poor DPJ members are not "free", meaning that they have to vote the party line. LDP members are free to vote against their party, or even run against their party. All they need do to maintain good standing in the LDP is to win. (There are some interesting straws in the wind indicating that the "if you win your are LDP" policy is under strain but so far there are no
exceptions.)

(4) Shooting oneself in the foot: The DPJ has already shot itself in the foot twice. Nishioka's suggestion that male Councillors should all wear ties was dumb.
The party forgot to fill out the proper forms so the two bills they already tabled will have to be resubmitted at the next session of the Diet. The LDP has shot itself in the foot only once, by my count.
Another LDP member of the Diet has been caught using the same receipt to claim reimbursement more than once.
I am willing to bet that voters will be more upset by the LDP's problem and that we will see more similar problems in the near future.
The reporting requirements under the law for public funding for political parties are pretty anemic but they have been working great anyway. The JCP has been particularly active in searching through the piles of paper looking for anomalies. Many of those anomalies have proven to be extremely good TV, Matusoka's massive expenditures on free utilities being only the best of the lot. It appears to be the case that many LDP politicians provide lavish entertainment for which they do not wish to claim reimbursement and then search around for receipts they can use. When there are not enough such receipts, they use some of them twice. I do not know but am willing to bet that this had become standard operating procedure in many kouenkai and so there will be more cases soon.
There was a time that, whenever an LDP scandal broke, the LDP could find at least one DPJ member who had done the same thing. Catching twenty LDP politicians and one DPJ politician was considered a tie by the mass media. "They all do it." Recently, there have been no such countercharges, and the LDP has greater resources for investigating the DPJ than vice versa. The DPJ appears to have been burned often enough that they have cleaned up their act. On several issues, the LDP has done the same. The LDP wanted to attack Ozawa for having his kouenkai own property and sent out a memo asking all of their members who did the same thing to sell their property. Of course, LDP members are free to follow their own consciences so one may wonder how many followed the party's advice but, in any case, Japanese politics is getting cleaner.
This is exactly how two-party politics is supposed to work.

On that positive note ...

Steven R. Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 11:39 AM

[SSJ: 4586] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/11

Following on from John's and my earlier posting about Japanese politics moving into uncharted territory:
John is right - there are precedents for LDP-DPJ coordination, which in the past were quite successful (from memory - key legislation in finance and defence).
However, at that time, the DPJ was not led by Ozawa and its position in the Upper House was not as strong as it is now. Much depends on how the DPJ chooses to play it: whether it refuses to cooperate in order to bring down the LDP government (sooner rather than later, capitalising on its UH victory) or it becomes a constructive player in order to influence legislation.
Knowing Ozawa, I would predict the former, particularly as he has been so firmly committed to anti-LDP positions (on the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, for instance).
That's why the government keeps calling on the DPJ 'not to oppose for opposition's sake'. It can sense how Ozawa will behave, given that obstructionism is more likely to deliver his political goal of becoming PM.

I would predict that the LDP government won't submit to the Diet legislation that it knows will be voted down by the Opposition. In short, the legalities of the situation will not be tested. It will try to go down the coordination road through prior adjustment between the LDP and DPJ, but, I suspect, not very successfully. Ozawa is enjoying his new-found power - being courted by the American ambassador, for example, and presenting an image of an incoming prime minister with a change of administration around the corner.

Following on from Ehud's posting: I agree, Abe will not lead the LDP into the next election. He is too much of an electoral liability, and there are moves afoot within the party to get rid of him.

Aurelia
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 11:39 AM

[SSJ: 4585] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/11

Chris Winkler wrote:
And whoever followed in Koizumi's big footsteps, would not only struggle to reach a similar level of popularity, but also be tasked with cleaning up the mess those nasty side effects Koizumi's initiatives reform have created (for instance by reaching out to those Koizumi kicked out of the party, or bridging the divide between disgruntled Koizumi Children and reinstated former anti-reform forces, etc.).

ESK: Let's be clear here, kicking the zouhan out of the LDP turned out to be greatly popular and are not the source of the LDP's current post-Koizumi problems.
This problem and the divide between Koizumi's Children and reinstated zohuhan was because Abe and the party let them back in! This indeed was the first Abe action that began to sour public opinion against him. Thus the two problems you mentioned were not created by Koizumi's actions, but Abe and the party post-Koizumi.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:38 AM

[SSJ: 4584] Question about the Local Allocation Tax System

From: Linda Choi Hasunuma
Date: 2007/08/11

Hello,
I am doing research on Japan's local allocation tax
(LAT) and would like to know of any or all previous efforts made to revise the LAT in the postwar era before Koizumi's Trinity Reform proposals.
Thank you in advance for your help.
Linda

--
Linda Choi Hasunuma, Ph.D Candidate, UCLA Dept. of Political Science http://www.polisci.ucla.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 11:37 AM

[SSJ: 4583] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2007/08/11

I may be charged with practicing political science without a license, but there is evidence that Bush did listen to Koizumi and changed directions adn policies as a result.

According to the personal accounts of people in the room, Mr. Koizumi offered interpretations of North Korea and Kim Jong Il behavior and objectives, plus advice of what to do about it, that informed the White House and changed US directions. There were other examples of this kind of participation, but I do not have my notes at hand.

I think that we academics have to remember that policy and strategy are not just about grand ideas that we put on the board in front of a class, but are composed of thousands of small details of creation and implementation that occur on a daily basis. Mr.
Koizumi had an entree into that process, participated, and apparently was effective.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:36 AM

[SSJ: 4582] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Leonard J. Schoppa
Date: 2007/08/10

The discussion on what Japan got in North Korea by cozying up to Bush with its Iraq policy makes the mistake of forgetting that when Koizumi first began cozying up to Bush, the main concern Japan had about the United States' North Korea policy was that it would be TOO TOUGH. Bush had labeled both Iraq and North Korea members of the "Axis of Evil" and had invaded Iraq. Many in Asia were afraid that Bush would go after North Korea next, not just with a tough negotiating policy but even with some kind of military action. Around this time, Koizumi was trying to reach out to North Korea by visiting the country in hopes of bringing about a break-through that would IMPROVE relations between the US and Japan on the one hand and North Korea on the other. So when we ask whether Japan got anything from the United States for backing them in Iraq, we should recognize that Japan was successful in RESTRAINING US policy in North Korea.
There was no military brinkmanship, the US tried diplomacy in the six-party talks, and eventually the Bush admin decided to make a deal.

What changed in the interim was Japan's, and especially Abe's views on North Korea. It is only in the years since Japan decided to send troops to Iraq that Japan has adopted a tougher policy than the US (on abductees, at least). Those who say that "Koizumi got nothing from Bush" should recognize that what Koizumi wanted on North Korea policy and what Abe wanted changed in the interim and that it was probably asking a bit much to expect the US to steer between toughness and compromising exactly in line with Japanese rhythms on this issue.

Len Schoppa
University of Virginia

Approved by ssjmod at 11:35 AM

August 10, 2007

[SSJ: 4581] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/10

Steve, what's the
> over-under on Abe's survival?

As indicated above and below, I am not Steve. But, if it's OK, I would like to venture a guess. Judging by recent reports about positions taken by several habatsu, other than Aso's, and a group of young and middle-level LDP Diet members calling themselves something like the League for Expediting Reform, it seems that the broadside against Abe is gaining strength by every passing day.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 06:52 PM

[SSJ: 4580] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/10

Having to deal with the DPJ as another ruling party (c.f. Amari via Aurelia) is not completely uncharted territory, I think. The situation after the 89 UH election, the Hosokawa cabinet, and particularly the shinjirarenai LDP-JSP coalition all provide precedents for procedures to coordinate policy among somewhat hostile participants who have something approaching veto power. The situation is now more extreme for sure, but it isn't a black and white difference.

Of course it would really be fun if Abe and Ozawa took on the coordinating tasks personally, but I trust a process will be worked out where good negotiators will take the lead--something along the lines of Ellis's old account of how the House Management Committee worked, maybe.

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 06:44 PM

[SSJ: 4579] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/10

Another perspective on the issue of how the LDP will manage its Diet relations with the DPJ comes from the Nikkei Shinbun on 2nd August. In an article analysing the possible impact of recent political developments on trade policy, the President of Keidanren, Mitarai Fujio, is quoted as saying: "External trade negotiations now need pre-negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties." This observation will clearly not only apply to external trade negotiations.
The circle of 'adjustment of interests and opinions', which is the norm for the Japanese policymaking process, has just expanded to include a DPJ now effectively wielding veto power.

On the same (trade) issue, METI Minister Amari is also quoted as saying: "We ask the opposition party not to oppose in order just to oppose...Any treaty and agreement, including EPAs, needs to be approved by both the Lower and Upper Houses. With regard to this issue, the DPJ IS NOW ANOTHER RULING PARTY - we need their understanding."

It seems Japanese politics has now entered unchartered territory.

Aurelia
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 06:02 PM

[SSJ: 4578] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/10

John Campbell wrote:
Koizumi: I asked a few days ago about the logic behind a statement attributed to some LDP insider that there is absolutely no chance Koizumi would come back as an LDP presidential candidate. Is it because he doesn't want to, too many LDP people dislike him, or some norm about no repeats?

I think it is a combination of both.
It probably was in late 2005 or early 2006 if I remember correctly, when some within the LDP and the conservative media apparently still had hopes Koizumi could be persuaded to serve two more years as prime minister. At that time, Gerald Curtis wrote an interesting Newsweek article on this issue. Curtis back then suggested it might be best just to believe Koizumi, because Koizumi has always been very straight
- forward with what he wanted to do. Obviously in retrospect, Curtis' assessment was correct. Koizumi sticked to his word, retired and has since kept a very low profile, even declining to take a position in the Machimura faction, which had been offered to him. I'm not sure, what would happen, if Ozawa managed to derail Koizumi's pet project (postal reform), but as things stand right now, I don't think Koizumi would want to return.
Furthermore, I'm not sure, whether many within the LDP still want Koizumi to return. After all, the negative side effects of Koizumi's policies have arguably begun to surface. If Koizumi returned, it certainly would help the party in the short-term, but there always would be another post-Koizumi era.
And whoever followed in Koizumi's big footsteps, would not only struggle to reach a similar level of popularity, but also be tasked with cleaning up the mess those nasty side effects Koizumi's initiatives reform have created (for instance by reaching out to those Koizumi kicked out of the party, or bridging the divide between disgruntled Koizumi Children and reinstated former anti-reform forces, etc.).
I'm pretty sure, self-declared future LDP leaders Asou, Tanigaki and Nakagawa (Shouichi) would not be too happy to inherit the LDP from a second Koizumi regime, seeing how Abe is already struggling with the leftovers of the first one (not to mention his Cabinet's missteps and the pension scandal).

John Campbell wrote:
All those complaints: why are so many LDP members of various sorts saying Abe should leave? Are they just venting, or it there some purpose to it?

I think, it is mostly venting. There are certainly a good deal of parliamentarians within the Heiseikenkyuukai, the Yamasaki faction and the Tanigaki faction who would like to see Abe go (eight Lower House parliamentarians from those three factions established a new "Anti-Abe" club earlier this week).
But even those opposed to Abe probably realize that there is neither a realistic alternative to Abe nor anybody whose name recognition comes close to Abe's.
After all, the three factions don't have a serious contender within their own ranks (unless one counts the Heiseikenkyuukai's final hope, Nukaga Fukushirou).
At least not until they finally manage to agree on one single candidate and win the support of one or two other factions (Koga, Koumura) for said candidate.

One would think, that potential candidates to succeed Abe should be the first ones complaining about his performance. Interestingly enough, Asou and Nakagawa
(Shouichi) have been supportive of Abe (if Japanese reports are correct, Asou might hope Abe will name him secretary general in the cabinet reshuffle and therefore put him in a better position to finally become LDP president in 2008 or whenever), and even Tanigaki, who has always been critical of Abe, has offered only muted criticism thus far.

Best regards,
Chris Winkler, M.A.
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:40 PM

[SSJ: 4577] Re: The HOC Election and the US and Japan as "Difficult Allies"

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/10

To Paul Midford:
Yes, I think there is more convergence now but still some differences. A couple of responses to your good
post:

1)As in my response to Henry Laurance: there is a great difference between intent and consequences. I agree Koizumi didn't get much from Bush for sending SDF to Iraq, but he also didn't get punished in some way for not sending SDF (risk avoidance rather than necessarily expecting gains)

2)There is also a difference between what Koizumi might have feared (US abandoning Japan's defense against N. Korea) and what was actually realistic--if Koizumi believed that he was obviously over-reacting.

3)Paul wrote: " Was the rhetorical support the US gave Japan on the abductee issue worth the political capital spent pushing the highly controversial SDF Iraq deployment through the Diet, not to mention the losses the LDP suffered in the 2004 HOC election Was the rhetorical support the US gave Japan on the abductee issue worth the political capital spent pushing the highly controversial SDF Iraq deployment through the Diet, not to mention the losses the LDP suffered in the 2004 HOC election?"

ESK: Couple of points here: first, the rhetorical support on the abductee issue is worth a LOT to the LDP's right wing base, especially with Abe pushing it so hard for quite some time now. Look at the risks Abe took in isolating Japan in the 6-party talks now just for the abductee issue. Is it rational? Hell, no?!
But then the LDP has painted itself into a corner on the abductee issue and blown it so far out of proportion to reality or its worth that it can't back down for domestic political reasons. Second, has the
2004 HOC election loss ever been completely explained by SDF in Iraq? Public opinion polls, as you know, eventually showed a majority supporting the dispatch.
And I thought the HOC election loss was mostly attributed to Koizumi's constantly having to water down his reform bills because of opposition from the zouhan in the party?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:39 PM

[SSJ: 4576] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Marshall Gittler
Date: 2007/08/10

Henry Laurence said:
In other words, on this point I'd go with the conclusion that boots in Iraq got Koizumi nothing from Bush. Him and Tony Blair both.

On this point, yes. But on other points, quite a lot.
Look at the different reaction in the US to China's exchange rate policy and Japan's massive FX intervention in '03-'04. Of course China has a larger (and growing) trade surplus with the US, but I remember that at the time, US forbearance of Japan's intervention was widely attributed to Koizumi's support of Bush. As a measure of just how grateful the US was for this support, it was noted at the time that the annual Presidential statement commemorating the attack on Pearl Harbor that Bush made in Dec 2003 neatly avoided mentioning just who it was that did the attacking.

Ultimately though it's no surprise if the Bush afministration doesn't let domestic Japanese politics hold up a process necessary for world peace and indeed for Japan's own safety.

Marshall Gittler

Approved by ssjmod at 04:38 PM

[SSJ: 4575] Re: US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/10

Henry Laurence:
"In other words, on this point I'd go with the conclusion that boots in Iraq got Koizumi nothing from Bush. Him and Tony Blair both."

ESK: I agree with your statement if taken literally as getting something "from Bush." However I would add some caveats: 1)consequences and intent are two different things--Koizumi gambled that he could influence Bush, but it may not have worked. 2)He did accomplish something domestically, which also might have been what he intended--once again he stretched the constitutional "taboo" about sending SDF abroad (this time to a combat zone although he denied it) and not under UN auspices or for PKO purposes but solely to help U.S., and set a precedent. Since Nakasone this is how LDP PM's have been getting around Article 9, by breaking one little taboo at a time 3)He also didn't lose anything as it turned out.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:37 PM

[SSJ: 4574] US and Japan as "difficult allies"

From: Henry Laurence
Date: 2007/08/10

Many thanks to Paul Midford and Ellis Krauss for a fascinating discussion: I have only a very minor observation to make.

Paul Midford wrote:
This year, Bush did ignore Tokyo's hardline on the abductees and pushed for a compromise with the North.
Although Ellis did not say this, I suppose we could use his logic to ask whether Bush punished Japan for withdrawing troops from Samawah last year by seeking a compromise with North Korea? Otherwise, I think we would have to conclude that Koizumi's boots on the ground in Iraq gained Japan no real influence with Bush, who ignored Tokyo's interests when it suited his.

I'm not an expert on foreign policy at all, but I've heard an alternative narrative about the US change of heart last year over compromise with North Korea that has nothing to do with Japan. Bush himself didn't want or push for the compromise (and nor did his neocon advisors, e.g. John Bolton, who publicly went ballistic after the agreement), but after 3 disasterous years in Iraq they were ready to grudgingly acquiesce to more compromise-minded members of the foreign policy establishment (eg in the State
Department) in order to get at least one foreign policy "success." On this view, neither the neocon hawks nor the State doves (for want of better terms) ever cared about Japan's stance on abductee issue. It nicely mirrored the neocons' "don't negotiate with terrorists" ideology, but they were never going to go out of their way to help out. The US doves, on the other hand, thought that stubbornness on the abductee issue was not in Japan's interest: they found it both irritating and hypocritical (especially considering Abe's open hostility to that other group of abduction
victims, the Comfort Women). They certainly weren't
going to let a deal with the North slip away just to satisfy Abe's need to talk tough

In other words, on this point I'd go with the conclusion that boots in Iraq got Koizumi nothing from Bush. Him and Tony Blair both.

All the best

Henry Laurence
Bowdoin College
Maine, USA

Frome September 2007-July 2008:

Visiting Research Associate
Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies
Oxford University, UK

Approved by ssjmod at 12:34 PM

[SSJ: 4573] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/10

Three questions:

1. Koizumi: I asked a few days ago about the logic behind a statement attributed to some LDP insider that there is absolutely no chance Koizumi would come back as an LDP presidential candidate. Is it because he doesn't want to, too many LDP people dislike him, or some norm about no repeats? No replies, as I
remember, but whatever the reason might be I
wonder if Ozawa's ploy of introducing a bill to suspend post office privatization might change the calculation somewhat.

2. All those complaints: why are so many LDP members of various sorts saying Abe should leave?
Are they just venting, or it there some purpose to it?

3. Steve noted the new power of the UH to initiate investigations and demand documents. Given what is going on in Washington these days, that makes sense (though I don't think what might be uncovered in Japan would be as entertaining or frightening). Any signs of that so far?

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 11:38 AM

[SSJ: 4572] Re: The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/08/10

Thanks to Paul Midford for reporting on that conversation with the senior LDP person. Very fun read. The only thing I would nitpick about is any surprise that the HC is so powerful. I always tell my students that, other than the choice of PM, the budget, and treaties, the two chambers are equal. This makes the HC one of the most powerful upper houses in the world. It just didn't matter while the LDP controlled both chambers.

(The U.S. Senate is first, of course, and the German Bundesrat is powerful whenever they can convince the consitutional court that they have jurisdiction over a matter, but I'd rate the Sangiin as between those two.
The Australian and Italian Senates matter a great deal as well. But most upper chambers, especially in parliamentary systems, are much weaker.)

I really don't see the override as pratically all that meaningful. If a decent share of Japanese voters and media get bent out of shape about "tyranny of the majority," it's not hard to imagine the LDP, especially after this election spanking, shy away from exercising "tyranny of the supermajority." To put it another way, if there were an issue for which the LDP's use of the override were deemed politically acceptable, the more likely outcome would be that the DPJ would find a way to support the bill and make the override unnecessary.

Bicameralism with divided control over the two houses is extremely rare in a parliamentary system. Even in 1989, when the LDP lost its majority, the HC caused some trouble, most famously in the PKO debate. But then, the LDP was still by far the largest party, so it just needed to make deals. The "Opposition" had more seats, but didn't really form a coherent political group. THIS is the first real experience of divided government in Japan, and I don't anticipate it going smoothly. My past work with James Druckman shows that governments that lack UH majorities tend to collapse sooner as well, although the coincidence of single-party control in the Lower House and "opposition" control in the Upper House is even more unusual.

We live in interesting times. Steve, what's the over-under on Abe's survival?

-mike

Associate Professor of Political Science Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(tel) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778

Approved by ssjmod at 10:54 AM

[SSJ: 4571] Re: The HOC Election and the US and Japan as "Difficult Allies"

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/09

Thanks to Ellis Krause for his latest response. I apologize if I misunderstood parts of his previous post. With his latest post our views are definitely converging, especially as regards the Democrats and the Ianfu resolution. On the wisdom or brilliance of Koizumi putting boots in Iraq, I still wonder....

What Ellis was saying:
I never said or have thought the US would "abandon"
the alliance or Japan if Koizumi had not sent SDF to Iraq. But Koizumi needed to keep Bush listening to Japan and its concerns about N. Korea and to have influence with the US in the 6 party talks etc.
Alienating Bush who was desperate to have other big countries other than the UK seem to do even symbolic gestures in Iraq, would not be a good idea at that sensitive juncture. Yes, of course he was pleasing Bush, but to distinguish between "Bush" and the U.S.
at that juncture is artificial--Bush was the President of the U.S. and it wouldn't have helped Japan to alienate him (especially when the current clear idiocy of the invasion of Iraq was not apparent to a majority of Americans yet).

Paul's puzzle:
So Ellis was talking about diplomatic abandonment, not abandonment in the context of a war. It's worth noting that many in Japan think Koizumi was talking about abandonment in war. Two days ago a young maverick LDP member told me he thought Koizumi did much to damage the alliance by suggesting that Japan could not count on the US to defend against North Korea unless Japan helped the US in Iraq. Long before the Iraq War he often heard constituents express skepticism about the commitment to defend Japan. Koizumi's statements deepened mistrust of the US.

Taking Ellis's much more plausible (to my mind) point about diplomatic abandonment, I still have to wonder, how did the US support Japan during the 6 party talks in 2003-2004? What would abandonment have looked like? Their interests were the same on the nuclear issue. I suppose the US could rhetorically have ignored the abductee issue, but I see no reason to think the US would have sought a serious compromise with the North at that time that would have damaged Japan's interests. And with Koizumi visiting Pyongyang twice, he seemed more open to a compromise with North Korea than did the US. Was the rhetorical support the US gave Japan on the abductee issue worth the political capital spent pushing the highly controversial SDF Iraq deployment through the Diet, not to mention the losses the LDP suffered in the
2004 HOC election?

This year, Bush did ignore Tokyo's hardline on the abductees and pushed for a compromise with the North.
Although Ellis did not say this, I suppose we could use his logic to ask whether Bush punished Japan for withdrawing troops from Samawah last year by seeking a compromise with North Korea? Otherwise, I think we would have to conclude that Koizumi's boots on the ground in Iraq gained Japan no real influence with Bush, who ignored Tokyo's interests when it suited his.

Best,

Paul

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science Dragvoll, Norwegian Univesity for Science and Technology (NTNU)
Office # 10504 NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Web: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/japan
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 10:53 AM

[SSJ: 4570] Re: UH election- remaining puzzles

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/09

> From: Yves Tiberghien (yvestibe@politics.ubc.ca)
> Date: 2007/08/08
"2. Like John, I am puzzled that so few people really take Article 59-2 of the constitution seriously (the
2/3 rule, although it is 2/3 of members PRESENT, ie requiring to have everyone show up). Komeito and LDP have 69% of the seats in the LH. They can override the UH in everything, including, for example, the nomination of Muto as next BOJ head or the anti-terrorism law. It is constitutional and would be employed in most other political systems. Is it a story about norms that prevent the use of legal provisions?"

I have not read the relevant legislation myself, but if the Japanese press it to be believed, this is not the case. The distribution of legal powers is different than the distribution of constitutional powers. In this case, the law gives the HOC an equal say with the HOR in these appointments. The only way for the HOR to override a HOC veto would be to first push through a change in the law and then push through their preferred nominee. Given how difficult the two-thirds majority override veto is to use in the first place this would seem an almost insurmountable task. Moreover, Komeito, which has traditionally derived a lot of its power from the upper house, might be expected to oppose this, preventing a two-thirds majority in the lower house.

This is perhaps about norms, but it is also about the problems of Diet management and scheduling; cooperation with Komeito is another issue.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 10:52 AM

August 09, 2007

[SSJ: 4569] The HOR two-thirds override of a HOC veto is effectively unusable

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/09

Yesterday, I met a senior LDP member in charge of rules and procedures in the HOR. According to this member, the HOR's constitutional right to overturn the HOC's veto (rejection) of ordinary legislation with a two-thirds majority is effectively useless, especially if the upper house sits on the bill for up to 60 days.
The reason is that it is generally impossible to keep the HOR in session long enough to schedule an override vote. He did not give me a clear explanation of why the HOR could not be extended two months for this purpose, but certainly this would be an unprecedently long extension that could cause real hardship and other problems. As a political scientist, my instinct is to be a skeptical and think that where there is a will there is a way, and that if the LDP gets desperate enough they will think of ways to keep the lower house in session long enough to schedule an override veto.

Nonetheless, in the wake of last week's HOC election the upper house is emerging as more powerful than its constitutional powers would have led almost anyone to expect. Although it is still clearly the weaker chamber, its non-overidable powers regarding appointments (e.g. governor of the Bank of Japan, etc.) also adds to its bargaining power in relation to the HOR.

Consequently, this senior lower house member suggested that the LDP would not necessarily be so reluctant to disolve the lower house sooner rather than later, since even if they loose their two-thirds majority there, they will only loose power that they cannot exercise anyway. On the other hand, if the coalition wins even a small majority in the lower house they can perhaps cow the DPJ into cooperating with them.
Before lower house disolution, with Ozawa and the DPJ smelling blood in the water, they have little incentive to cooperate with the LDP.

On the other hand, this LDP member thought the DPJ would have trouble using the 60-day delaying tactic.
He thought public opinion would punish the DPJ for using this power to block the extension of the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean to provide free fuel to the few American and allied ships still stationed there. Public opinion would turn against the DPJ if they did this only for power competition purposes.

Perception is everything in politics, but I think this is mostly wishful thinking. It would be a remarkable shift if public opinion, which has not really supported this mission, suddenly swung around and started blaming the DPJ for forcing its end. My take on public opinion toward Koizumi/Abe security policy initiatives suggests that Ozawa is making a good bet to target these security initiatives as the place to confront Abe and the LDP.

Best,

Paul

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, NTNU Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science Norwegian University for Science and Technology Dragvoll, Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim Norway
Web:
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 05:47 PM

[SSJ: 4568] Re: How did "rural" areas actually vote?

From: Robin Le Blanc
Date: 2007/08/09

Hi All,
I'm also very interested in exactly how rural votes broke down. In the complete absence of data, I offer this utterly unsupported comment.

Let's suppose that the LDP DID, in fact, continue to win support in small, agricultural cho and son (towns and villages), and let's suppose that the DPJ did better in the "rural" cities, where most voters are not depending on agriculture for their incomes. That could still mean that the DPJ was winning because it seemed pro-agriculture.

Why? Well, many voters in rural "cities" might feel that support of agriculture is tightly connected to their city's economic well being and, thus, indirectly to their own well being (regardless of whether that is true). AND in more urban areas, DPJ candidates are likely to be better organized - able to use the remnants of some union organization, for example, while, in the small villages the whole chi-en, ketsu-en thing would make it more difficult for new candidates to penetrate, regardless of the message they wanted to deliver.

I'd love to hear what others think about this.

Robin Le Blanc

Approved by ssjmod at 11:11 AM

August 08, 2007

[SSJ: 4567] Re: The 2007 HC Election

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/08

I am afraid the bet was on less than ten years. I forgot how many, though. At the time, I seconded Ellis, against Steve and John (Campbell). Back then,, Hatoyama and some others at DPJ came out in favor of revising the Constitution, including the wording of Article 9, just as Koizumi had done. What seemed to be the emerging cross-party consensus was that the SDF would be recognized as a military. The disagreement centered on how exactly to reword Article 9.

At any rate, it seems we lost - at least for the time being.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 06:39 PM

[SSJ: 4566] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/08

> From: Meg McKean (mamckean@duke.edu)
> Date: 2007/08/08
> overrides require a 2/3 vote of the HR, and the LDP may have real
trouble
> producing that.

Indeed, and Mr. Machimura, the new head of the Mori faction, has admitted that prospect.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 06:11 PM

[SSJ: 4565] Re: How did "rural" areas actually vote?

From: Aurelia George-Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/08

George has made some really good points, which are worth exploring further. It would be an interesting project to get recent farm household population data from the Somucho for county (gun) towns and villages within so-called 'rural' prefectures and see how these various municipalities cast their votes for particular candidates. This would be the only way to get a definitive perspective on how towns and villages with higher numbers of farm households voted. Voting data can be obtained from prefectural election management committees (senkyo kanri iinkai) - available on the internet - (I'm not sure these are up for the recent UH election).

I used this kind of data to check on the composition of electoral support for my book on former MAFF Minister Matsuoka Toshikatsu published last December.

As another point of interest: it seems the MAFF is 'reading' the election as a farmer rebuff to the LDP; and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in charge of the FTA negotiations, is optimistic that the DPJ will come to power in the next election, thereby delivering an easier road to an agreement (given the DPJ's publicised support for FTAs
- don't ask me to explain the contradictions in their agricultural policies - they are inexplicable!)

Aurelia George Mulgan
University of New South Wales
ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 04:14 PM

[SSJ: 4564] Re: UH election- remaining puzzles

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/08

Since it's the topic of my research, I thought I might point this out here:
According to a new survey jointly conducted by the Asahi Shimbun and professor Kabashima Ikuo from Toudai, it seems that there is no two-thirds majority for constitutional reform in the Upper House anymore.
Apparently only 53% of the new Upper House's members are in favor of constitutional reform (compared to 71% in 2004). This certainly can be attributed to the election loss and the general feeling that the Abe administration should have pushed topics which the electorate apparently thought are of greater importance. However, on top of that, it would be very positive, if this survey's results became a sign
saying: "Don't take constitutional reform for granted just yet". The steady increase of public support for constitutional reform (while more than 60% of the Japanese public oppose a revision of Article 9) has given rise to the following myth: Over the last couple of years, several scholars have argued the sole stumbling block for constitutional reform was the public referendum. This view apparently was and is based on a rather simplistic understanding of the discussion. The fact, that only SPDJ, JCP and Nippon Shintou have openly opposed constitutional reform, does not mean everybody in favor of constitutional reform automatically agrees on the content of a new constitution. Hence, even before the Asahi published this survey, there always (should) have been serious doubts, whether LDP, DPJ and Koumeitou would have been able to find common ground on the issue of a constitutional reform draft resolution.
While it would be foolish to see the results of the survey as a sign pointing to the end of this most recent quest for constitutional reform (which began in the early 1990s), the current constitution might as well outlast Abe, the same way it outlasted his beloved grandfather five decades ago.

Best regards
Chris Winkler, M.A.
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:36 PM

[SSJ: 4563] Re: The 2007 HC Election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/08

> From: Steven R. Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
> Date: 2007/08/07
> First, is it too early to declare victory in my bet that the
> constitution will not be revised?

Steve: since your bet was with me, I think I should chime in here and say that, given the DPJ victory in the upper House, your side of the bet looks pretty secure. I am not thinking of ways to spend the Y100 we bet on that. Who knew the LDP would follow Koizumi with such an incompetent bumbler? But since the bet was for passage of the revision of the Constitution within 10 years as I recall, I think we should let that play out before I pay up (although I've started saving for that eventuality already! :-D).

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:58 PM

[SSJ: 4562] Re: The HOC Election and the US and Japan as"DifficultAllies"

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/08

To Paul Midford:

Thanks for your response. But I think we are talking past each other here. Let me clarify what I was saying since I think you responded on some points to things I was not saying:

Paul's reply:
Koizumi certainly pleased Bush, and he and his subordinates did articulate fears about being abandoned in the face of a North Korean threat if Japan did not support the US in Iraq. .....In any case, this fear was and is unrealistic. Violating a treaty commitment to a major ally like Japan would have shredded America's reputation as a reliable ally (any damage that might conceivably be done by abandoning the govt. in Baghdad would pale by comparison) and would run against the unipole's desire to control all security outcomes, especially regarding a powerful country such as Japan. More importantly, now that the US has decided that North Korea threatens US security, US dependence upon Japan as an ally for dealing with Pyongyang has increased. There is simply no rational abandonment scenario here....

What I was saying:
I never said or have thought the US would "abandon"
the alliance or Japan if Koizumi had not sent SDF to Iraq. But Koizumi needed to keep Bush listening to Japan and its concerns about N. Korea and to have influence with the US in the 6 party talks etc.
Alienating Bush who was desperate to have other big countries other than the UK seem to do even symbolic gestures in Iraq, would not be a good idea at that sensitive juncture. Yes, of course he was pleasing Bush, but to distinguish between "Bush" and the U.S.
at that juncture is artificial--Bush was the President of the U.S. and it wouldn't have helped Japan to alienate him (especially when the current clear idiocy of the invasion of Iraq was not apparent to a majority of Americans yet).

Paul's reply:
This "awful legacy" of the Gulf War has been more keenly felt among Japanese elites than in Washington or US public opinion. American public opinion toward Japan was already quite favorable before 9-11. US elite opinion had already improved greatly thanks to cooperation regarding the revised Defense Guidelines, peacekeeping etc. Already in October 2000 the Armitage report was looking forward to Japan emerging as the "Britain of Asia." US elites were even more impressed by the dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean in November 2001 and the ASDF to Pakistan. So as far as the US was concerned, this Gulf War legacy had already been overcome by the end of 2001.

Ellis's point: It doesn't matter if US public opinion had largely forgiven or forgotten the 1991 Gulf War if, as you say, it was still felt more among Japanese elites. And whether it was or not, Koizumi was eager to not repeat that mistake even if it was not a big shadow still over the relationship. Do I think in the larger perspective Japanese foreign policy has been rational--no, I do not. That it did not support the US and allies in a wary in 1991 that was widely supported and for a clear cause (punish naked aggression), but did in a widely unpopular war in which the U.S. had few supporters and for a trumped up cause, does not speak well for Japanese foreign policy in general. But did Koizumi get what he wanted out of sending SDF to Iraq and not suffer negative consequences with the public by doing it?
Definitely. is destroyers there!

Ellis' Response: Why should Japan "put boots on the ground" in Afghanistan at all when it is making a real contribution ferrying fuel and ammunition and helping to protect American warships in the Indian ocean? On the other hand, the "boots on the ground"
in Iraq made no substantial contribution to the war there (indeed, detracted from it b/c other troops had to protect the SDF)--purely a symbolic gesture which was its only point. So Japan has in fact made Afghanistan a priority in terms of real support for the U.S. What it did in Iraq was purely for political purposes, didn't cost Koizumi anything as it turned out, and made W happy so Japan could still try to exert influence on his administration.

Paul's reply:
One more thought about Iraq and Japan's image in the
US: Koizumi arguably gave Japan an image in
Washington that was "too good." .... As I argued in my EWC
monograph on public opinion a few months ago Iraq was not a stepping stone but rather the high-water mark of Japanese support for a US military operation for
years to come.
Ellis responds: We are in complete agreement on this.
Beltway policymakers were naive to think that sending SDF to Iraq meant Japan was going to become "the Britain of Asia." Another example of the complete neglect of historical reasoning and rational decisionmaking in this administration.

Had Japan and its LDP leadership maintained better ties to the Democrats, it is conceivable that they could have persuaded the House leadership to not hold these hearings in the first place. At the very least, creating a distant and mistrustful relationship did not help Japan's influence with the new Democratic
majority in Congress.

Ellis replies: I agree that Koizumi's cozy ties to
Bush probably didn't help Japan with the Democrats but frankly, the Democrats will always champion human rights issues more than the Republicans and Honda's resolution on ianfu might have had exactly the same response once the LDP Diet Members' ad appeared in the NYT. Again, we won't know either way with these'what if' scenarios we can never answer. And, as you said too, if Democrats take power in 2008 won't matter anyway.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:56 PM

[SSJ: 4561] UH election- remaining puzzles

From: Yves Tiberghien
Date: 2007/08/08

Thanks to Rob for kick-starting the UH discussion with great election data and to everyone. A couple issues and puzzles may still deserve further discussion, if anyone is ready for more..

1. Nobu Hiwatari made a great observation:
"All this boils down to the continued softening of party supporters as well as policy convergence and ideological overlap." Indeed, what several on the list have described in terms of the DPJ's astonishing ability to out-LDP the LDP where we expected it least (rural areas) makes for a puzzling emerging party spectrum. (cf Michael Thies' point on the irony of the DPJ welcoming the LDP's most anti-reform elements and supporters; Paul Midford's point on the DPJ setting up a first as the first party out-competing the LDP over pork in rural areas; and Nobu's point on the DPJ putting old Takeshita-Tanaka wine into its bottle).

Putting this into a comparative perspective, I would tend to argue that the current UH result can only be seen as yet one more transitional outcome. The DPJ's current attempt to have a Tanaka-Takeshita approach to rural/postal issues, a socialist approach to US relations (against the renewal of the anti-terrorism law), a more Komeito-than Komeito approach to daily life issues, and a reformist / small government streak in its core financial/economic reform outlook cannot be stable. It is an opportunistic spectrum aiming at catching all the discontents of both Koizumi and Abe without the realistic ability to govern. Likewise, as noted by Aurelia the agricultural policy is just unrealistic and impossible to implement without major WTO and US disputes.

In this sense, I would see the current result as unsustainable in a LH election if at least 6 months can pass.

The current degree of overlap and multiple-issue embrace between the LDP and the DPJ seems to me without equivalent in other advanced democracies.

That leads me to see only 3 possible scenarios:

A. If the LDP keeps Abe and Abe keeps showing a lack of tactical ability, we could conceivably suddenly see a new LDP in the nominal name of DPJ and pass from one to the other. The trigger might be a defection from Komeito. Ozawa has always cultivated close links with Komeito since 1989. But the change might be minimal, with key tradeoffs between tradition and reform remaining WITHIN the large umbrella party, rather than between parties, thus robbing voters from the ability to arbitrate.

B. If a bit of time passes (close to 2 years), the DPJ could soon prove unstable, especially if Ozawa passes away. It could split. If similar discontent continues within the LDP in reaction to both Koizumi and Abe's incompetence, the LDP could also fragment.
Then, only when the pieces reassemble could we see something interesting in terms of a unified party spectrum and a stable 2 party system. Any thought on this?

C. Or the LDP could move fast, exploit the Ozawa weakness and DPJ incoherence, skillfully use the 2/3 clause in Diet on important bills, while letting the public see the DPJ appear as obstructive, and quickly reassert itself.

2. Like John, I am puzzled that so few people really take Article 59-2 of the constitution seriously (the
2/3 rule, although it is 2/3 of members PRESENT, ie requiring to have everyone show up). Komeito and LDP have 69% of the seats in the LH. They can override the UH in everything, including, for example, the nomination of Muto as next BOJ head or the anti-terrorism law. It is constitutional and would be employed in most other political systems. Is it a story about norms that prevent the use of legal provisions?

In any case, Abe could do us a great service by unearthing this article and allowing us to watch it in action. Why doesn't he make a public case that the constitution has given him the power to do this and that he has no choice but to use it in the face of childish and obstructive actions by the DPJ?

3. Again from a comparative perspective, I am always puzzled that so many Japan analysts debate about a possible LH dissolution as a way for Abe to regain command. Why would anyone on earth do this? In most other systems, the dominant view would be that the LH must go to its term and that Art 59-2 is there to avoid gridlock.

PS: SHAMELESS PLUG:
I would also like to make a shameless plug for my new book in Cornell's Comparative Political Economy series. A large part of the book focuses on structural and corporate reforms in the Hashimoto to Koizumi periods. Another chapter focuses on the politics behind the Nissan-Renault deal and the Nissan restructuring process.

All details below

With all good wishes,

Yves T.

--------
*** Author of New Book: ENTREPRENEURIAL STATES:
REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, AND KOREA.
Forthcoming Summer 2007.
A volume in the series: Cornell Studies in Political Economy edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London
http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4725

http://www.amazon.com/Entrepreneurial-States-Reforming-Corporate-Gover
nance/dp/0801445930/ref=sr_1_1/002-0569643-7364838?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid
=1182453013&sr=8-1

Book Description
In Entrepreneurial States, an innovative examination of the comparative politics of reform in stakeholder systems, Yves Tiberghien analyzes the modern partnership between the state and global capital in attaining structural domestic change. The emergence of a powerful global equity market has altered incentives for the state and presented political leaders with a "golden bargain"--the infusion of abundant and cheap capital into domestic stock markets in exchange for reform of corporate governance and other regulatory changes. Drawing on extensive archival research and interviews with policy and corporate elites in Europe and East Asia, Tiberghien asks why states such as Korea and France have embraced this opportunity and engaged in far-reaching reforms to make their companies more attractive to foreign capital, whereas Japan and Germany have moved forward much more grudgingly.
Interest groups and electoral institutions have their impacts, but by tracing the unfolding dynamic of reform under different constraints, Tiberghien shows that the role of political entrepreneurs is critical.
Such policy elites act as mediators between global forces and national constraints. As risk takers and bargain-builders, Tiberghien finds, they use corporate reform to reshape their political parties and to stake out new policy ground. The degree of political autonomy available to them and the domestic organization of bureaucratic responsibility determine their ability to succeed.

Yves Tiberghien, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
University of British Columbia / Department of Political Science
Email: yvestibe@politics.ubc.ca
Personal Web site: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/tiberg/
GMO Politics Website: www.gmopolitics.com

Cell phone in France: 06-27-76-57-51

Main Mailing Address for 2007:
Faculty Associate
Liu Institute for Global Issues - Office 211
6476 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Tel: 604-827-5679
Fax: 604-822-6966

Long-term Address and Phone:
Buchanan C 416, 1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1 CANADA
Tel: 604-822-4358
Fax: 604-822-5540

Approved by ssjmod at 11:04 AM

[SSJ: 4560] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Meg McKean
Date: 2007/08/08

> From: Fred Uleman (fuleman@gmail.com)
> Date: 2007/08/06
>
> As a number of people -- including dismayed LDP politicians -- have
> pointed out on national television, the HoR can only override the HoC
> if the HoC rejects a bill. If the HoC bottles it up in endless
> discussion and never brings it to a vote, there is apparently nothing
> the HoR can do.
>
> This makes the threat of an override rather toothless.

Actually, I understand from Articles 59 through 61 of the Constitution that discussion can only be endlessly effective in bottling things up if there are less than 60 days remaining in a session for regular bills, 30 days for budgets and treaties. If inconclusive discussion goes on for more than 60 days on a regular bill or 30 days for a budget or a treaty (without the session itself ending), then endlessness is constitutionally interpreted as rejection, and rejection can then be overridden. However, overrides require a 2/3 vote of the HR, and the LDP may have real trouble producing that.

What the opposition should do in this situation if it influences (or, now, controls) the HC is to try to prevent the initial considering of important bills until there are less than 60/30 days left in the session. Dithering thus comes in two phases: first, avoid considering anything; then, run out of time before the session ends so that the HC does not have enough time in which not to act. That kills a bill entirely for the session.

Meg McKean

Approved by ssjmod at 11:02 AM

[SSJ: 4559] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/08/08

Fred Uleman wrote:
> As a number of people -- including dismayed LDP politicians -- have
> pointed out on national television, the HoR can only override the HoC
> if the HoC rejects a bill. If the HoC bottles it up in endless
> discussion and never brings it to a vote, there is apparently nothing
> the HoR can do. This makes the threat of an override rather toothless.

This is not what the Constitution says; it specifically says that failure to take action within 30-60 days (depending on the kind of bill) equals a rejection.

> Article 59
>
> A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise
> provided for by the Constitution. 2) A bill, which is passed by the
> House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors
> makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives,
> becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of
> Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members
> present. 3) The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude
> the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of
> a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law. 4) Failure by
> the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days
> after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time
> in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives
> to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of
> Councillors.
>
>
> Article 60
>
> The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.
> 2) Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors
> makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives,
> and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of
> both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the
> House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the
> period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by
> the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of
> Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

The only fly in the ointment is if the Diet goes into recess before the bill 60 days has elapsed in the case of an ordinary bill or 30 days in case of a budget bill. There is also the matter of whether a day means any day or only days in which the Diet is in session.

There has never before been a situation in which the LDP controlled two-thirds of the LH while the oppostion controlled the UH. However, when the LDP controlled the LH by a less than two-thirds majority and the opposition the UH during 1990s, the LDP negotiated budgets with the Opposition. It didn't just railroad things through since the public would regard that as undemocratic.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 11:01 AM

[SSJ: 4558] How did "rural" areas actually vote?

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/08/07

> From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@gmail.com)
> Date: 2007/08/06
> It's interesting though: whilst many farmers clearly voted for DPJ
> candidates in rural constituencies, they also voted their ex-Zenchu
> executive LDP candidate into the No. 2 slot in the PR constituency
> (Yamada Toshio).

Most of the support for the rural=DPJ hypothesis seems to be looking at prefecturally aggregated data.
"Rural" prefectures like Ehime voted for the DPJ, hence rural areas support the DPJ, as the argument
goes. Is this argument entirely valid? Here in GIfu,
the DPJ candidate won the belt of southern cities that are really part of the Nagoya/Toyota metro area, and the LDP's candidate won handily in the smaller towns/villages across the rest of the prefecture. In other words, real "rural" voters, the kind with rice fields, voted for the LDP just like they always have.

My first reaction is to wonder if that result (i.e.
DPJ wins suburbs, LDP wins countryside) contradicts this whole rural-DPJ/urban-LDP line that everyone seems to be taken for granted. My second reaction was to wonder if the GIfu results are generalizable.
For those who didn't know, Gifu's "LDP" candidate was actually kicked out of the party after opposing postal reform to the bitter end, and no one could mistake him for the Koizumi/Abe reformist LDP.

For the sake of argument, and without supporting evidence beyond the GIfu case, let me offer an alternative hypothesis. Could the balance of power have shifted WITHIN prefectures from rural areas (which still support the LDP) to urban (urban in the sense of 100,000 person cities, not 25 million metro
areas) areas (which support the DPJ). The DPJ may
have won all those single-seat constituencies because it mobilized "urban" voters in "rural" areas.

Does anyone know where I could find city/town/village aggregated vote totals for the election? I'd be curious to check on this.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:00 AM

[SSJ: 4557] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/08/07

> From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@gmail.com)
> Date: 2007/08/06
>
> In response to John's query about Ozawa's 'disappearance' for two
days
> after the election, I have read that this was due to 'exhaustion'
> following the gruelling election campaign. Clearly, this level of
> 'exhaustion' may be linked to his heart condition, so some element
of
> 'cover-up' can be suspected.

Then again, we could believe the Yomiuri Weekly's (or is that Weekly Yomiuri?) report that he was holed up
with officials from Koumeito all night. :) Maybe
I'll have to go look at the issue and see what it says.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 10:52 AM

[SSJ: 4555] The 2007 HC Election

From: Steven R. Reed
Date: 2007/08/07

First apologies to all. I have not participated in the discussion and I have not even followed all of the posts very carefully. My only excuses are that I gave up on trying to get anyone else to predict before the election and I never participate in the postmortems until I have had a chance to look at the data. Sorry.

First, I think this election was perfectly normal.
Thresholds were indeed crossed but it is merely a continuation of trends long in place. The only exceptions are the Koizumi miracle elections of HC2001 and HR2005. The LDP wins only when the LDP leader runs against the LDP. Ray Christensen cites an LDP employee saying that he would be happy when Koizumi was gone and things got back to normal. They are but normal includes losing elections. Comparing HC2007 to HC2001 makes it look like a tremendous change but compared to
HC2004 it is just another normal loss for the LDP. It was not Koizumi who was popular. It was running against the LDP.

Second, the Abe cabinet has lowered the bar for the DPJ in many ways. If all you have to be is more competent than the Abe cabinet, many local PTA chapters would qualify. Commentators keep arguing that the DPJ has to live up to some higher standard than the LDP. I think many (perhaps even most) voters are ready to vote for "not the LDP" unless the LDP shows it can govern. The LDP's best chance is if Ozawa and the DPJ shoot themselves in the foot yet again but the LDP has to stop shooting itself in the foot as well.
The party with the fewest bullet holes in their respective feet will probably win the next election. I am betting on the DPJ.

Comments on agricultural policy are relevant here. I know little about the policy or the proposal themselves but a couple of TV interviews led me to believe that, if there were a real debate over agricultural policy, we would probably find that Ozawa stretched the truth pretty far but the LDP lied like hell. Just a guess on agricultural policy but overall I would not bet that the LDP will win all the debates with the DPJ over policy. I would flip a coin.

One of the most important results of this election is that the DPJ will now have access to the data. How many LDP bodies are buried in there? I imagine that the LDP has been systematically hiding facts from the public for years. Katayama, the HC secretary-general who lost this time, argued during the campaign that the DPJ was to blame for the pensions scandal because they made all of that data public and upset the people.
I expect to see more such incompetence scandals over the next year or so and more upset people.

Probably the single most important result of this election will be a policy debate, both sides having access to both data and the media. Access will not be quite equal but it will be closer than it ever has been. We seem set for a public debate on relations with the US! I will bet against Abe on this one but am not sure who to be on. That's the nice thing about public debates: you can never predict how they wil work out.

Commentators are talking about DPJ defections to the LDP. The LDP will indeed try to split the Democrats and may even get a few. Nevertheless, when politicians have a choice between a party that just lost badly and another that just won big, they generally choose the latter, policy be damned. I expect many potential LDP candidates to seek the DPJ nomination in the next general election. Some incumbents may even defect. Why should postal rebels cooperate with their own assassins when the LDP is unpopular and has way too many incumbents to nominate already? The LDP is virtually guaranteed to lose votes and seats in the next election, barring only another Koizumi-like miracle. If the party nominated Watanabe Yoshimi and he promised to change Japan by changing the LDP, would anyone buy it?

Finally, two comments on predictions and betting.

First, is it too early to declare victory in my bet that the constitution will not be revised?

Second, has everyone seen the wonderful article by Masuyama in SSJJ? I had just told a journalist that Abe would resign no matter what the chattering classes were saying when Masuyama's article arrived using a statistical model that predicted Abe would not resign.
Needless to say, Masuyama won and I lost. Betting against the chattering classes works pretty well but betting on data analysis works much better.

Yoroshiku,

Steven R. Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 10:45 AM

[SSJ: 4554] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/06

John Campbell is asking the right question:

"Another dog not barking--though again, I haven't been listening that closely--is the lack of discussion of the lower house overriding the upper by 2/3 vote.
Since Abe generally takes Bush as his role model in all things, including a lack of regard for opposition party opinions in the legislature, I'm somewhat surprised that he didn't vow to ram through anything he wants using his LH super-majority."

I have seen some discussion of this in the Japanese press. However, we need to keep in mind the DPJ's "nuclear option." They can sit on a bill for up to 60 days in the upper house, thereby depriving the Lower House of an opportunity to revote a two-thirds majority since the Diet will go out of session before they can. Of course, Abe could extend the Diet session. One week to two week extensions are common, but two month extensions are, to my understanding, unheard of. Unheard of does not of course mean illegal or impossible, but presumably extending a Diet session for up to two months would not be easy.
I hope someone on this forum can offer some perspective on how easy or difficult this would be.
At the very least, this would slow the legislative agenda to a snail's pace, with only the most important bills getting through.

To illustrate how tough this makes things for Abe, unless he extends this week's Diet session from 5 days to over two months the DPJ will hold the power to force a withdrawal of the MSDF from the Indian Ocean on November 1st, since the regular Fall Diet session will open within 60 days of November 1st.
Whether the DPJ decides to use its "nuclear option"
is another matter. One DPJ member I talked to worries about a public backlash in the Indian Ocean dispatch case if the DPJ does this (although not in the case of Iraq related legislation).

Japanese newspapers reported over the weekend something I had been ignorant of: the HOC's legal powers are much greater than its constitutional powers, at least in terms of appointments. For example, the law governing the Bank of Japan gives the HOC equal power with the HOR in appointing its chairman. The HOR cannot override the HOC decision in this case, nor can it for most other agency appointments. The DPJ has already said it will does not favor Fukui's reappointment as BOJ governor, and under the law as it stands now, that seals his fate.
Conceivably, the LDP could ram through a whole series of laws depriving the HOC of power over these appointments, but the DPJ could sit on these for two months and do the same with other legislation, gumming up everything, not to mention making the LDP look too majoritarian and dictatorial.

It seems the HOC has much more leverage than we (or at least I) thought. I hope others with superior insights on this balance of power will post these.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 10:44 AM

[SSJ: 4553] Re: The HOC Election and the US and Japan as"DifficultAllies"

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/06

To Ellis Krause:
I really appreciate your response. Actually, many of the points you raised overlap with what I was trying to say. Here I will try to clarify these as well as our points of disagreement.

Paul's original point:
1)The biggest short-coming of Koizumi's diplomacy was that he lacked an America policy. All he had was a Bush policy, which is related, but is not the same thing. This is why he made the blunder of sending the SDF to Iraq instead of Afghanistan. The Iraq deployment won him more credit from Bush but over time did not win him credit from the US.

Ellis's response:
On the contrary, it won him a great deal of credit both with Bush and the U.S. And the point was to win credit with Bush to keep him on Japan's side in dealing with N. Korea.

Paul's reply:
Koizumi certainly pleased Bush, and he and his subordinates did articulate fears about being abandoned in the face of a North Korean threat if Japan did not support the US in Iraq. I don't know how real this fear was, but talking it up is arguably one reason why the Japanese public has come to so distrust the US lately. In any case, this fear was and is unrealistic. Violating a treaty commitment to a major ally like Japan would have shredded America's reputation as a reliable ally (any damage that might conceivably be done by abandoning the govt. in Baghdad would pale by comparison) and would run against the unipole's desire to control all security outcomes, especially regarding a powerful country such as Japan. More importantly, now that the US has decided that North Korea threatens US security, US dependence upon Japan as an ally for dealing with Pyongyang has increased. There is simply no rational abandonment scenario here. If Japanese elites really don't trust the US to act in its own interest they should start looking for another ally or another strategy.

Ellis:
The whole Iraq SDF dispatch was for both that purpose and to overcome the awful legacy (for Japan) of their failure to support the allies in the Gulf War in 1991.
He was brilliantly successful in this too and totally changed the view of Japan in DC and the US (look at some of the recent public opinion polls of Americans'
views of Japan).

Elis:
And he did also send SDF to Afghanistan--the maritime SDF to this day is carting fuel, supplies and munitions to US Naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and there have been SDF Aegis destroyers there!

Paul's reply:
Again, after doing this the Gulf War legacy should have been overcome. If Ellis and others (including
Koizumi) think otherwise, then the key issue was where Japan should have put boots on the ground: in Iraq or Afghanistan? Bush preferred Iraq, but even his administration would have had to credit a Japanese decision to send troops to Afghanistan.
Broader public opinion in the US would have welcomed this decision as much or probably more, and Japan would have looked like a friend of the US rather than Koizumi looking more like a friend of Bush. In Japan it would have advanced the agenda of expanding the SDF's overseas role instead of setting it back.
Perhaps Ellis can come up with a more convincing alternative counter-factual scenario where an Afghan "boots-on-the ground" dispatch does not benefit Japan as much as "boots" in Iraq. If so, I will read it with great interest.

Ellis:
[Indeed, this is the bill that's coming up in the Diet soon that the DPJ is opposing! ]. He not only did win credit from the US elites and public and he did send SDF to aid the U.S. in Afghanistan.

Paul's reply:
One more thought about Iraq and Japan's image in the
US: Koizumi arguably gave Japan an image in Washington that was "too good." Many American analysts started writing that the Iraq dispatch was a stepping stone to Japan dispatching the SDF overseas to use force in support of the US. The pre-9-11 prediction of Japan becoming the "Britain of Asia"
seemed to be coming true. As I argued in my EWC monograph on public opinion a few months ago Iraq was not a stepping stone but rather the high-water mark of Japanese support for a US military operation for years to come. I believe last week's upper house election vindicates this conclusion, as does the looming fight over the Indian Ocean dispatch in the Diet. Both events must come as jarring and unexpected events for many American analysts and policy-makers who had been misled by the "too good image" Koizumi created.

Paul's original post:
.....This contributed to making the US a "difficult ally" by draining away trust and goodwill toward Japan in the Democratic Party, and this environment encouraged the "Ianfu" resolution just passed by Congress.

Ellis's reponse:
The Honda resolution on ianfu had absolutely nothing to do with Iraq, Japanese favoring Republicans (in fact in 2004 according to public opinion polls Kerry was favored by the public over Bush, one of the first Democratic candidates in a while to be so favored),

Paul's reply:
My point was not that "Japanese" favored Bush, Ellis rightly points out that Kerry was favored in Japanese opinion polls. Rather, my point was that LDP leaders including Koizumi made statements suggesting they wanted Bush to win on top of catering to Bush's desires regarding Iraq. The problem I see today is between the LDP and the US Democratic Party, not between the US Democrats and "Japan." If Democrats come to power in both the US and Japan by 2009, this problem will vanish. Japanese and US Democratic administrations will likely embrace each other enthusiastically, although I hope not too enthusiastically, or else we will end up with a repeat of the same Yoto/ruling party syndrome.

Ellis's response continued:
...or Koizumi sending SDF to Iraq and being close to Bush. Indeed, while Democrats were more supportive than Republicans on this issue (which they usually are about human rights issues) similar resolutions had been submitted six times previously, and the last one in 2006 was introduced by two Republicans. The Honda resolution passage this time was completely about the REAL failure of Koizumi's foreign policy--his stubborn insistence on going to Yasukuni--and Abe's background as a leader of a Diet group denying the force used in the ianfu recruitment and treatment , stupid public statements by Abe on this issue, and an ad defending this view in the NY TIMES by Japanese Diet members which many people think is what really pushed the resolution over the top. In other words, this resolution was about the growing consciousness and alienation in the U.S. on Japan's denial of its historical responsibility, and nothing to do with Iraq, Afghanistan, or Koizumi's security policy.

Paul's reply:
I agree entirely that much of the credit for the passing of the HR Ianfu resolution goes to Abe's stupid public statement in early March and the similarly foolish WASHINGTON POST ad by rightwing Japanese Diet members. What I trying to say was that Koizumi and the LDP, by identifying too closely with Bush and the Republicans INDIRECTLY contributed to this outcome by creating mistrust and a lack of good will among Democrats toward the LDP dominant government. As Ellis rightly points out, Ianfu resolutions sponsored before 2007 had gone no where.
Why? Because the Republican leadership in Congress had quashed them from the outset. Even before Abe's foolish statement in early March, Democrat Mike Honda had used the Democrats' new power to actually hold hearings in mid February on this issue, hearings that got much press attention in Japan and which, I believe, provoked Abe's early March remark. Had Japan and its LDP leadership maintained better ties to the Democrats, it is conceivable that they could have persuaded the House leadership to not hold these hearings in the first place. At the very least, creating a distant and mistrustful relationship did not help Japan's influence with the new Democratic
majority in Congress.

Best,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 10:43 AM

[SSJ: 4552] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/08/06

As a number of people -- including dismayed LDP politicians -- have pointed out on national television, the HoR can only override the HoC if the HoC rejects a bill. If the HoC bottles it up in endless discussion and never brings it to a vote, there is apparently nothing the HoR can do.

This makes the threat of an override rather toothless.

-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 10:41 AM

August 06, 2007

[SSJ: 4551] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/08/06

In response to John's query about Ozawa's 'disappearance' for two days after the election, I have read that this was due to 'exhaustion' following the gruelling election campaign. Clearly, this level of 'exhaustion' may be linked to his heart condition, so some element of 'cover-up' can be suspected.

I may have read in previous postings (or in the press
- I can't remember) that Ozawa is strong on politics but weak on policy. If the DPJ's agricultural policy is anything to go by, this is a pretty accurate assessment. 'Scattering' (baramaki) 1 trillion yen in direct income subsidies to farmers (big and small) would undermine the government's modest structural reform targets for agriculture in order to facilitate, amongst other things, equally modest market opening agreements (under the WTO and FTAs). As for the DPJ's 'pie in the sky' 100 percent food self-sufficiency goal, it is not only impossible (given Japan's agricultural land constraints) but laughable in an age of globalisation. About the only economically responsible element of the DPJ's agricultural policy was funding the 1 trillion yen for farmers' income subsidies from cuts in public works.

It's clear that the DPJ's agricultural incomes policy was a blatant vote-buying gesture and the hoped-for means to make inroads into the LDP's farm vote. This is not the first time the DPJ has tried this strategy, but this IS the first time it has worked. However, if ever in government, the DPJ would find itself subject to the same kind of policy pressures that the current coalition faces. These policy pressures are coming from the MAFF (on the need to structurally reform agriculture in order to give it a viable future) and also from MOFA, METI and big business (on FTA agreements, particularly with respect to those that enhance Japan's economic security, the competitiveness of its manufacturing exports in North America and Europe, and its regional integration strategies in the Asia Pacific).

It's interesting though: whilst many farmers clearly voted for DPJ candidates in rural constituencies, they also voted their ex-Zenchu executive LDP candidate into the No. 2 slot in the PR constituency (Yamada Toshio). Normally it would have been an ex-MAFF candidate, so there was something of a break with tradition. The Mainichi said JA (Nokyo) distanced itself from the government and the MAFF in the election, but I've yet to check on which candidates it formally 'recommended'.

I'm also wondering what people are thinking of the new
'mantra': "LDP in urban areas, DPJ in rural areas".
The next LH election will reveal whether the DPJ's gains in rural constituencies can be consolidated. It remains to be seen, considering the greater salience of localism/pork barrel considerations in LH single-member districts, the advantages that incumbency bestows in pork barrelling, and the fact that farmers will be mindful that they are voting in the government, rather than merely casting a 'cost-free' protest vote.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA
Canberra

Approved by ssjmod at 05:26 PM

[SSJ: 4550] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/06

To John Campbell:

The DPJ was actually rather straight forward about Ozawa's condition. The DPJ's second-in-command, Kan Naoto confirmed already on election day that Ozawa had been told by his doctors to take some rest. In addition to the stress of campaigning, he apparently also suffered from some flu - like symptoms. Hence he only appeared in public 2-3 days after election day.
Hope that helps.

Chris Winkler
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:57 PM

[SSJ: 4549] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/08/04

I have little to add to the fine discussion of the election here, but having received two friendly jibes I will say something:

Paul: I should not have implied that many LDP candidates in the past explicitly attacked the prime minister. What was common in years of scandal, I think, was for non-incumbent conservative candidates, including those with official party nominations, to deplore the evil ways of politics-as-usual and vow to clean things up. I can't remember if this was originally my observation or Steve Reed's.

George: My fear that Ozawa would somehow snatch defeat from the jaws of victory did not come true.
However, I thought it was kind of odd that he disappeared from view for what, two days? I have not been following the papers or the wide shows much but I haven't noticed anyone commenting on that. Is there some cover-up about his medical condition?

Another dog not barking--though again, I haven't been listening that closely--is the lack of discussion of the lower house overriding the upper by 2/3 vote.
Since Abe generally takes Bush as his role model in all things, including a lack of regard for opposition party opinions in the legislature, I'm somewhat surprised that he didn't vow to ram through anything he wants using his LH super-majority.

After the 2006 election Bush did say he would listen more to the opposition, as Abe too said last week.
Bush didn't mean it; if Abe did, it might well be because he worries he could not hold the LDP
+Koumeitou sufficiently together. Policy differences
aside, it might be that a latent sense of the "tyranny of the majority" as illegitimate would give some LDP members pause. On the other hand, it might be that many would just be looking for any chance to get rid of Abe.

Anyway, tough times for politicians coming up, if they need a receipt for "even one yen" of their spending.
Offhand I would commend the DPJ's strategy of introducing this sort of hard-to-oppose bill, and then refusing to pass high-profile bills like authorization of Afghanistan support. I imagine that pushing for a general election is the right strategy and would be popular as well.

Finally--why exactly is it unthinkable, as some insider was quoted, that Koizumi would come back?
Because he doesn't want to? Because too many LDP members dislike or fear him? Because of some prohibition on coming back? I would have thought the last reason earlier, but it didn't seem to inhibit Hashimoto.

Approved by ssjmod at 04:00 PM

[SSJ: 4547] Re: The HOC Election and the US and Japan as "DifficultAllies"

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/03

To Paul Midford:
Although I share many of Paul's sentiments about the Bush Administration and the U.S. as a "difficult ally"
(I'd say from the perspective of its allies, the US recently has become the worst of allies!), I have to disagree with some of his interpretations of Japan and US-Japan relations

1)The biggest short-coming of Koizumi's diplomacy was that he lacked an America policy. All he had was a Bush policy, which is related, but is not the same thing. This is why he made the blunder of sending the SDF to Iraq instead of Afghanistan. The Iraq deployment won him more credit from Bush but over time did not win him credit from the US.

On the contrary, it won him a great deal of credit both with Bush and the U.S. And the point was to win credit with Bush to keep him on Japan's side in dealing with N. Korea. The whole Iraq SDF dispatch was for both that purpose and to overcome the awful legacy (for Japan) of their failure to support the allies in the Gulf War in 1991. He was brilliantly successful in this too and totally changed the view of Japan in DC and the US (look at some of the recent public opinion polls of Americans' views of Japan). And he did also send SDF to Afghanistan--the maritime SDF to this day is carting fuel, supplies and munitions to US Naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and there have been SDF Aegis destroyers there! [Indeed, this is the bill that's coming up in the Diet soon that the DPJ is opposing! ]. He not only did win credit from the US elites and public and he did send SDF to aid the U.S.
in Afghanistan.

.....This contributed to making the US a "difficult ally" by draining away trust and goodwill toward Japan in the Democratic Party, and this environment encouraged the "Ianfu" resolution just passed by Congress.

The Honda resolution on ianfu had absolutely nothing to do with Iraq, Japanese favoring Republicans (in fact in 2004 according to public opinion polls Kerry was favored by the public over Bush, one of the first Democratic candidates in a while to be so favored), or Koizumi sending SDF to Iraq and being close to Bush.
Indeed, while Democrats were more supportive than Republicans on this issue (which they usually are about human rights issues) similar resolutions had been submitted six times previously, and the last one in 2006 was introduced by two Republicans. The Honda resolution passage this time was completely about the REAL failure of Koizumi's foreign policy--his stubborn insistence on going to Yasukuni--and Abe's background as a leader of a Diet group denying the force used in the ianfu recruitment and treatment , stupid public statements by Abe on this issue, and an ad defending this view in the NY TIMES by Japanese Diet members which many people think is what really pushed the resolution over the top. In other words, this resolution was about the growing consciousness and alienation in the U.S. on Japan's denial of its historical responsibility, and nothing to do with Iraq, Afghanistan, or Koizumi's security policy.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:17 PM

August 03, 2007

[SSJ: 4546] The HOC Election and the US and Japan as "DifficultAllies"

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/03

HOC Elections and the US and Japan as "difficult allies"

Nobuhiro Hiwatari asks:

"...I am curious to know how folks grasp the impact of changes in the party control of government or legislative chambers (in both countries) on an alliance."

Professor Hiwatari and Ellis also wonder whether Japan is becoming a "difficult ally." First, it is worth noting that the switch in control of legislative chambers also has something to do with the US becoming a "difficult ally," as seen in the just passed House resolution calling for an unequivocal apology to the
so-called "comfort women." That both allies are now
becoming "difficult" is a natural reaction to what I would call "yotoism" or "ruling party-ism." On both sides of the Pacific the illusion set in that the ruling parties were here to stay for decades, if not forever. This is not necessarily such a new phenomenon on the Japanese side, but it is on the American side.

The biggest short-coming of Koizumi's diplomacy was that he lacked an America policy. All he had was a Bush policy, which is related, but is not the same thing. This is why he made the blunder of sending the SDF to Iraq instead of Afghanistan. The Iraq deployment won him more credit from Bush but over time did not win him credit from the US. Sending the GSDF to Afghanistan would have appealed more broadly to American elites and the public, would not have created the image of Koizumi being an active supporter of the Bush administration, and would have been much more legitimate and popular with the Japanese public. The legitimacy of SDF overseas deployments might have expanded instead of taking a hit. Koizumi and other senior LDP leaders made matters worse by publicly saying they hoped Bush won in 2004. This clearly runs against prevailing norms in relations among democracies. Not smart.

This contributed to making the US a "difficult ally"
by draining away trust and goodwill toward Japan in the Democratic Party, and this environment encouraged the "Ianfu" resolution just passed by Congress. Also contributing to this is the reputed unwillingness of political secretaries at the Japanese Embassy in Washington to meet with Democrats, especially before last November's election, but apparently even to some extent since. Behind all of this a myth has recently arisen in Japan that sees Republicans are better for Japan than Democrats. Personally, I think a balanced analysis would suggest both parties have a rather mixed record toward Japan, but in any case this myth risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Bush administration, by getting too close to Koizumi also suffered from the same problem.
Ambassador Schiffer has been in Japan for sometime now, but until this week he had apparently never tried to meet the leader of the largest opposition party.
Scandalous. No wonder Ozawa turned him down, and no wonder the Indian Ocean deployment has emerged as a prime target.

Of course, among democracies foreign policy must be focused on the party in power. Nonetheless, until now it has been the norm, and smart practice, to also cultivate ties with opposition parties, especially the leading opposition party. Even if one thinks Bill Clinton went too far during the 1993 G-7 Tokyo summit when he met with summit host Miyazawa's LDP break-away opponents like Ozawa, diplomats, including the Ambassador, definitely should be doing this.

Talking to a Lower House member of the DPJ today, there seems to be a clear consensus within the party to vote down the Indian Ocean MSDF extension as before.
However, there is no consensus yet about whether to go all the way to try preempting a lower house revote by sitting on the bill for two months or until the Diet goes out of session (I have still not heard any convincing discussion of whether the Lower House could actually stay in session 60 days; if so next week's session might need to be extended till October). This member, who personally supports the extension, thought resorting to this might create a public backlash, and would create tension within the DPJ, although he does not expect a serious party split to develop as a result. On the other hand, he said the DPJ would be united in going all the way with this delaying tactic to kill another reauthorization of the ASDF mission in Iraq, and that this would be popular. In other words, he drew a very clear distinction between the war in Iraq and the war on terror, including the Indian Ocean
deployment.

Cheers,

Paul

P.S. For those interested, I have published on Koizumi's lack of an America policy in English in "A War in the Gulf and a Bush in the White House: deja vu for Japan?" in Yone Sugita, ed., , Evaluation of the Bush Administration (Musashino: Smallworld Libraries, 2004), accessible at ; and in Japanese in "Busshyu ni "No-" to ieru Nihon," in Sugita Yoneyuki, ed., Busshyu wo saiten suru: Nasei to gaikou no seisaku hyouka (Tokyo: Akishobo, April 2004), pp. 175-206.

Approved by ssjmod at 10:46 AM

[SSJ: 4545] HOC Elections and DPJ

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/03

Regarding the DPJ heterogeneity and prospects to hang on together and give the LDP a good fight in next HR elections, whenever they are held, recall the
following:

A. The DPJ did not fall apart after the dismal defeat in September 2005 HR elections.

When the LDP was founded in 1955, not a few, including some of its bigwigs, had expected it to breath its last before the year was over. Well, of course, things have changed since then, but not the prospects of winning being a powerful adhesive.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 10:45 AM

August 02, 2007

[SSJ: 4544] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Nobuhiro HIWATARI
Date: 2007/08/02

Some fairly obvious comments inspired by Ellis' post-

(1) It seems support for both major parties and non-partisans (or independents) have been stable but soft (except for the run up to the elections when voters start expressing their voting preferences) with the largest voter group being the (again!) soft non-partisans. Ostensible continuity need not distract us from recent changes. Apparently, the narrowing of the policy positions of the two major parties combined with the policy heterogeneity of each party are making it easier for voters to frequently switch party allegiances or move in and out of the non-partisan residual group. And the election was another step in the ongoing process. On the surface it seems to have done little to harden partisanship or non-partisanship, pending detailed analysis of panel data.

(2) If such is the case, it is clear what this election was not: It was not, in my view, a choice between neo-liberal reforms and social democratic (or third way) alternatives, as most political commentators and the media had anticipated. Instead, it was a broader process of policy convergence, in which the Democrats won by filling in the distributive policy opening created by the Koizumi-Abe reforms. In fact, Abe tried quite hard to frame a policy debate by raising the issues of growth, administrative reform, the fiscal cost of DJP policies, and even the consumption tax hike. Instead of backfiring, the tax hike issue was drowned by voter concern over the pension and money scandals and was ignored by Ozawa, who refused to budge from his "living first" appeal.
Abe's challenging words, "this election is about whether I or Ozawa is suitable as PM" is now haunting him but not responded by Ozawa, which has boomeranged in a less conspicuous way. Had Ozawa accepted the challenge I think Abe had no chance of avoiding resignation two days ago. Defenders of Abe (including
Aso) argue Abe's policies are sound and need to be pursued (implying the election was not about policy
alternatives) but may have to modified for local constituency interests (read, distribution). The dispensing of compensation after an election defeat, especially a Upper House election defeat, is not new.
In fact, I found that a decline in LDP's Upper House seats to be a better predictor of deficit spending than the Lower House after controlling for economic conditions. It is not clear how the LDP government plans to cater to local interests at a time when the economy is strong and unemployment down, or whether the government will last that long, but some sort of local spending program might be in the works.

(3) One way to see how far party competition has changed in the last couple of elections is to compare the sound bites of the DJP and the two traditional opposition parties; the Communists and the Social Democrats, in the recent election. Am I the only one who finds deja vu in "stop poverty, Protect Article 9,"
"JPC: the reliable opposition," repeated by Communist candidates, or the SDP leader's utterance "no Constitution change, Abe go"?
Compare that with Ozawa's cherry picked slogans: "A reliable pension system, a fixed child allowance, and income compensation to (every) individual farmer(s)."

(4) All this boils down to the continued softening of party supporters as well as policy convergence and ideological overlap. If this smacks of old LDP factional competition bursting into the national scene by two large factions, all I can say is historical analogies can be deceiving as well as insightful.

(5) Will this make Japan a difficult ally? Everyone is aware that the next political showdown is over the extension of the Anti-Terror Special Measures that authorizes SDF activities in the Indian Ocean. Ozawa has already confirmed that the DPJ will oppose the extension and has refused to meet with Ambassador Schieffer to discuss the matter, probably forcing the government to pass it by a revote in the Lower House.
This trial will show whether there is a practical resolution to a divided legislature, how united the LDP remains under Abe, and whether dissolution of the Lower House is the only alternative. Partisan battles over foreign policy seem to be in vogue now on both sides of the Pacific, injecting a lot of uncertainty.
But I am curious to know how folks grasp the impact of changes in the party control of government or legislative chambers (in both countries) on an alliance.
For, an alliance is founded on day-to-day activities and future planning and multi-faceted coordination by the foreign and military services, and political leaders reign at the top of the iceberg. No doubt all sorts of bilateral differences over issues and domestic political changes will shape the way an alliance develops. But would the changes be simple and
unidirectional?

Nobuhiro Hiwatari

Approved by ssjmod at 06:29 PM

[SSJ: 4543] Rengo and Ozawa's Farm Policies

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/08/02

It would be interesting to watch how the policy priorities of Rengo unions, who fielded several of their own as DPJ candidates and supported other DPJ candidates in the HOC elections, mesh with Ozawa's agriculture policies.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 10:57 AM

[SSJ: 4542] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/08/02

Thanks to Robert Pekkanen for starting, and to all for continuing, this interesting discussion on the implications of the HOC elections. A few more random thoughts to add stimulated by recent posts:

1)One more possibility I have not seen raised about DPJ prospects: if many of the LDP supporters, especially in rural districts, who voted DPJ in this election did so for the first time, it may have broken old voting habits of party loyalty. This may make it easier for them to do so in the future--they may not become DPJ supporters, but rather find it easier to move over into the "independent" floating vote camp.

2)On policy and factions: if this is developing, it won't be the first time. Pre-LDP merger, the smaller predecessors to the LDP, and for a time even afterwards, had very different types of less organized, exclusive factions where issues and policies (and leadership power struggles) were important in creating the divisions between them.

3)On implications for security policy, for those interested, Chris Hughes and I have an article in the Summer 2007 issue of Survival entitled "Japan's New Security Agenda" discussing our views of what US-Japan relations would be like in the future. We predicted Japan would become a more difficult ally because Koizumi and Abe were moving it closer to the U.S. on security issues. And this was even before this election with the DPJ taking control of the HOC. This election as Paul Midford interestingly discusses, is going to make even the attempt to move further in that direction, and relations with the U.S. even more complex and difficult.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:57 AM

[SSJ: 4541] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/08/01

The discussion on SSJ Forum has been very helpful.
Peter Ennis and I gave our take on the election in the "Foreign Affairs" newsletter. Here it is:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070801faupdate86480/richard-katz-peter-ennis/what-next-for-japan.html

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 10:56 AM

[SSJ: 4540] Re: 2007 HOC Election/rural policy

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2007/08/01

This is a fascinating discussion. Nobuhiro Hiwatari raises the issue of rural and agricultural policy - i.e. what policy would be forward-looking (as opposed to merely politically expedient). Obviously opening up agricultural markets and not throwing money at farmers is a good thing in some ways. However, if such policies are pursued, aren't they likely to result in the continued decline and depopulation of Japanese rural areas? Isn't that also a problem? Are there are policymakers, think tanks etc that are coming up with genuinely constructive ways to deal with the issue of rural decline? (By that I don't necessarily mean ways that spare rural areas pain, but ways that offer a way forward that will ultimately be good both for rural areas and the country as a whole.)

Peter Cave
University of Manchester

Approved by ssjmod at 10:55 AM

August 01, 2007

[SSJ: 4538] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/08/01

Two quick comments regarding Paul's recent post:

The rivalry between the current Machimura faction and the Heiseikenkyuukai dates back to the 1970s and the infamous clashes between faction leaders Fukuda and Tanaka. Several authors have argued one reason for Koizumi's obsession with the so-called "resistance forces" (=Heiseikenkyuukai and Kouchikai) and postal privatization was the memory of his mentor (Fukuda) being defeated by Tanaka, Takeshita, Gotouda and Oohira back then.

Policy and factions has always been a difficult topic.
However, as far as constitutional reform is concerned, the Heiseikenkyuu in fact has a long tradition of either ignoring the issue or adamantly defending the constitution. Takeshita, Obuchi and Hashimoto basically belonged to the former group, while Gotouda Masaharu and Nonaka Hiromu were/are outspoken defenders of the current constitution. So it does not surprise me that members of the Heiseikenkyuukai spoke in favor of the current constitution during the election campaign.

Regards,
Chris Winkler
PhD candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 06:04 PM

[SSJ: 4537] Forum question

From: Cathy Lorraine Wood
Date: 2007/08/01

I am seeking any information regarding offshore outsourcing ("guest workers") of part-time airline cabin attendant positions. This includes social movements to protect the rights of guest workers contracted to work at airlines but whose rights might be circumvented through offshore contract agreements.
I've contacted the few scholars who look specifically at flight attendant issues, but, to date, no scholar has addressed airlines in Japan at any great length.
Recommendation for both English and Japanese references are greatly appreciated.

Thank you,
Cathy Wood
University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Approved by ssjmod at 05:51 PM

[SSJ: 4536] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/01

The 2005 HOR election demonstrated the ability of a highly skilled politician to change the channel away from pensions and Iraq, and focus public opinion toward what he wanted: postal reform as a way of breaking the old LDP. This year's election showed the ability of the public to change the channel away from what an ordinary politician wanted: constitutional reform and a greater military role overseas to pensions, money politics, and growing economic inequality. Koizumi represented the high-water mark of a politician's ability to influence public opinion, Abe is average in his ability to influence the public, although mediocre might be a better description.

The results of this election at least suggest that the public is not interested in focusing on constitutional reform and Japan's international security role anytime soon, if not actually opposed. Constitutional reform finished fifth among election issues in Yomiuri's exit polling; they did not give a breakdown on how those citing this issue felt about constitutional reform, but since only the Socialists and JCP made this a big issue, one can surmise that there may have been as many opponents as supporters among this group. Even before the pension scandal opinion polls showed the public was not happy with Abe's attempt to make the upper house election about constitutional reform. The election results also raise a big road block that could limit the prospects for constitutional revision through July 2013: A Yomiuri poll of candidates found that only 29% of DJP HOC candidates supported constitutional reform versus 91% of LDP candidates.
Komeito delivered a similar message to Abe after the
election: stop focusing on constitutional reform and focus on economic issues instead.

Although they were defeated, it is interesting that two Tsushima (old Hashimoto) faction candidates in Koichi and Shimane openly expressed their opposition to constitutional reform, Kageyama in Shimane describing himself as a dove. This may represent a new trend in the evolution of factions: factions taking consistent policy positions. The Tsushima faction has been an opponent of the Mori faction's support for a larger overseas military role since at least Fall 2001. The fact these two candidates took this position may, however, also/instead reflect public negativity toward constitutional reform and a larger military role.

Interestingly, the DJP appears to be targeting the MSDF deployment in the Indian Ocean in support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan as the issue over which to confront Abe and try to force a dissolution of the HOR. This would seem to be a smart strategy in view of polls that have showed 55-60% wanting a withdrawal as soon as possible versus about 30-35% who want the mission continued.

This will test the ability of the HOC to matter by blocking legislation, even in the face of a two-thirds majority in the HOR. In order to keep the MSDF in the Indian Ocean past November 1st Abe may have to extend next week's Special Diet session from 5 days to over two months: Not impossible, but certainly difficult.
We are heading into unchartered waters here.

Overall, the election results cast great doubt on the flurry of analyses by western and some Japanese scholars that see Japan moving toward playing a significantly larger international military role. Abe might still be able to reinterpret the constitution to end the ban on the "exercise of collective self-defense," although he will have a hard time getting this past Komeito and LDP opponents. In any case, such a paper change has almost no prospect of translating into military reality (except possibly for missile defense) through the remainder of this decade at least.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 05:50 PM

[SSJ: 4535] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/01

This has been a fascinating discussion. I will make a point in this post about whether "Japanese voters"
really fear the LDP losing power, and will address the implications of this election for Japan's foreign policy in a subsequent post.

HOC Election Results: Do Voters fear the LDP losing Power?

Japanese commentators have often suggested that voters worry less about turning the HOC over to the opposition, therefore are more likely to vote retrospectively in upper house elections but then vote to preserve LDP rule in the lower house. To my mind this is essentially an urban legend, so to speak, one that quickly disintegrates upon closer scrutiny. It's a comforting myth for those in power, and probably stems from what Steve Reed calls the LDP's equilibrium myth that LDP rule is the equilibrium of Japanese politics overlooks the role of malapportionment, district size, a fractured opposition, and coincidence
in election outcomes.

It essentially personifies the electorate as a unitary rational actor that distributes votes to punish the LDP here but preserves LDP power there. Of course, since the public is not a unified rational actor there is a massive collective action problem here: who decides which voters vote to preserve LDP power in the HOR, and which vote for the opposition so they don't get totally wiped out? The mirror image question applies in an HOC election when voters decide to punish the LDP.

This argument also overlooks the reality that Japanese "voters" as a whole have not given the LDP a majority of the popular vote in a lower house election since 1963. The most we can say in favor of this hypothesis is that only a certain swing segment of the electorate sometimes votes to punish the LDP but otherwise fears the loss of LDP rule. If the 2003 HOR election had only been held in urban districts the DPJ would have won a majority so clearly urban voters are not afraid of the LDP losing power.

If there is a segment of the electorate afraid of the LDP losing power it must be among rural voters, and in the end what we are left with little more than a restatement of the fact that the LDP has traditionally had a lock on rural voters. Two times, in 1989 and 2007, these voters defected in significant numbers and punished the LDP. Both times they had reason to be unhappy with LDP policies. You can call two times a pattern, but I would call it a coincidence. What is probably not a coincidence is that both losses followed large HOR victories: after such large victories the LDP paid less attention to satisfying voters and paid a price for this. In these sense the HOC losses gave the LDP an early warning of what would happen in a HOR election if they did not change direction. In terms of the LDP's lock on rural voters, one might add that 2007 is the first election in which we have seen another party try to seriously compete over pork and subsidies.

On the other hand, Ethan also rightly points out that it is easier to target pork in smaller SMD districts than in the larger prefectural districts of the HOC.
With tighter connections to constituents, it is harder for HOR SMD incumbents to be defeated, especially in rural districts where pork matters most. I might add that we see the same pattern in the US, where Senate seats are generally more competitive than Congressional seats. These structural differences do suggest why opposition parties made quicker and more spectacular gains in these two HOC elections as compared to several HOR elections.

If we had less malapportionment and if the opposition vote became less fragmented (which is happening) the majority voting non-LDP would stand a better chance of translating their votes into a majority of seats in the HOR. In sum, suggesting that "Japanese voters"
are afraid of the LDP losing power confuses a collective outcome expressed in Diet seats with individual preferences, an outcome that is not reflected in voting patterns.

Best,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 05:49 PM

[SSJ: 4534] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Daniel Smith
Date: 2007/08/01

In response to Joyce Gelb's question:

I don't know the official numbers of women voters for Minshuto (DPJ) at election time, but according to a poll taken by Asahi Shinbun a week before the election, 43% of men supported the Minshuto, compared to 22% for the Jiminto (LDP). A much lower 22% of women supported the Minshuto, compared to 19% for the Jiminto, so it doesn't appear that women voters were decisive players. Of course this is from a week before the elction when voters had not completely settled on their choices.
On another gender-related note, this election saw the candidacy of the first openly-lesbian candidate, former Tae Kwon Do Olympic aspirant Otsuji Kanako.
Although she failed to receive enough votes to win in the PR list for the Minshuto, it was nonetheless noteworthy. Because the PR list candidates can get votes from anywhere in the country, most candidates focus on their home constituencies or wherever else they might be popular, thus Otsuji focused on Tokyo's gay neighborhood Nichome, Osaka (where she had had local office), and Kagoshima (where her family name is well-known). Her candidacy is also evidence of Ozawa's efforts to attract diverse (and famous) candidates like Otsuji, Yokomine Yoshiro (father of professional golfer Yokomine Sakura), and J-League soccer star Tomochika Toshiro.

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200706190088.html

http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200707190152.html

I hope that helps a little,

Daniel M. Smith
graduate student, UCSD

Approved by ssjmod at 04:55 PM

[SSJ: 4533] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/08/01

A quick response to Joe Sasanuma:

"There was an interesting piece in the Tuesday's edition of the Sankei Shinbun that predicted what would have happened in the Lower House elections based on the results from the just- completed HOC election.
It concluded that the LDP-CGP would hang on to a bare majority. Although the study is obviously only experimental, the result was very interesting because the DPJ didn't just win in this past HOC election, they won big, even in traditionally LDP strongholds (e.g. by 50,000 votes in Okayama, 33,000 in Tottori, 21,000 in Saga)."

Yesterday, Asahi and Yomiuri each ran the same scenario with some different assumptions and came up with very different results. Both projected the DPJ and other yato parties winning a majority, in one case up to a two thirds majority, depending upon whether Komeito voters supported LDP candidates or not. A two-thirds DPJ majority in the lower house seems to be a bit of a stretch, but a majority does not. A similar analysis based on the 2004 upper house election also showed the DPJ winning a majority or near majority in the lower house.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 03:12 PM

[SSJ: 4532] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Joe Sasanuma
Date: 2007/08/01

What a fascinating discussion!

Sam Jameson asked:

Was the July 29 result the beginning of the destruction of the LDP as the perennial ruling party of Japan and its replacement by the Democratic Party of Japan as the new perennial ruling party of Japan?

Or was it the beginning of a true two-party system in which changes of government occur from time to time?

Or was it just an extreme example of a Mr. Hyde rampage in the upper house before voters go back to their polite, obedient, unquestioning acceptance of LDP dominance in the lower house?

There was an interesting piece in the Tuesday's edition of the Sankei Shinbun that predicted what would have happened in the Lower House elections based on the results from the just- completed HOC election.
It concluded that the LDP-CGP would hang on to a bare majority.
Although the study is obviously only experimental, the result was very interesting because the DPJ didn't just win in this past HOC election, they won big, even in traditionally LDP strongholds (e.g. by 50,000 votes in Okayama, 33,000 in Tottori, 21,000 in Saga).
Robert Pekkanen made the point that:

The HOC is easier for the DPJ to run in than the HOR because it needs to field fewer candidates. The brilliant Ethan Scheiner argued that the Japanese opposition's failure stems from their inability to recruit quality candidates, which in turn has its roots in Japan's fiscal centralization combined with clientelism. Fewer districts alleviates this problem.

The Sankei study suggests that the problem for the DPJ in the HOR isn't just fielding quality candidates, but also the system itself.

I had one question I wanted to ask everyone: Did the LDP lose this election, or did the DPJ win it? That is, was the success of the DPJ because of LDP's failures (pension issue, minister gaffes), or because Ozawa's strategy of focusing on the SMDs paid off.
Poll in Asahi Shinbun suggested that LDP supporters abandoned the party in doves (25%). If this was because Ozawa was successful in targeting and wooing them, it seems to suggest a strategy that DPJ can enjoy in the future to win elections, without the need to rely on mistakes by the LDP.

Joe Sasanuma

Approved by ssjmod at 10:32 AM

[SSJ: 4531] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: David Arase
Date: 2007/08/01

I don't normally post in listserves but I'm enjoying this discussion and would like to bring up some random thoughts. One is, I read that (yesterday in theYomuri or Asahi online) , based on a poll of election winners and continuing UH members, an awful high percentage want to change the proportional system to single seat districts. There didn't seem to be a partisan distinction among those polled (the article didn't mention one at least). If this is true, it would seem to indicate the DJP is feeling strong enough to compete with the LDP head to head. Smaller parties would really be hurt. Maybe someone on the ground can check this.

Another thing is that, given the LDP's commitment to liberalization, will it be able to stop the alienation in the countryside? If not, it would be great for the DPJ from a structural point of view because urban voters have not been so captive to the LDP, and maybe the same will be true in the countryside.

I never thought a two-party system was a realistic possibility, but now some doubt is beginning to creep in.

David Arase

Approved by ssjmod at 10:31 AM

[SSJ: 4530] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Joyce Gelb
Date: 2007/07/31

prior to the Sunday election, the Japan Times predicted that women would play a pivotal swing role probably voting for the SDP. I wonder if anyone has data related to gender,which has not been mentioned thus far in the discussions. Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 10:30 AM

[SSJ: 4529] question on the HOC election

From: Brooks Spector
Date: 2007/07/31

The most recent issue of 'The Economist' article on an aging Japan (July 28) seems to tie in the fate of the LDP in the election with older persons' growing anger over the scandal of the lost pension records. Given the fact that the scandal became public so close to the election, can election data or observers'
perspectives support the idea that the voting results were -- at least in part -- a function of older persons and retirees punishing the LDP for the bureaucracy's ineptitude through the relatively safe medium of a change in party shares in the HOC?

Also, let me publicly thank SSJ Forum readers for their recommendations on books and their sharing of ideas and articles and other sources for my presentations on the contemporary Japanese foreign policy concerns.
/s/ Brooks Spector

Approved by ssjmod at 10:29 AM

[SSJ: 4528] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Nobuhiro HIWATARI
Date: 2007/07/31

For what its worth, pieces of information that might contribute to the discussion (actually its not worth this long a posting, I admit)-

(1) DJP's landslide is attributed in media reports to the pension scandal, the money in politics issue, ministerial misbehavior, and rural voter realignment (based on the inequality issue). As acknowledged by many on this list, the last cause should have the most long lasting consequence for both policy and party system.

(2) The available exit polls suggest that on average one fifth to one third of the self-declared LDP supporters voted for the JDP, regardless of district characteristics. The DJP supporters voted overwhelmingly for their own party. The independents were split with less than a quarter voting for the LDP and approximately a half for the independents. The support rate for the LDP has been relatively stable, as well as that of the DJP. Of course, there was an influx of support from the independents to both parties (but mainly the DJP) as the election approached.

(3) I think the DJP's success in the (rural) one-member district can be attributed to Ozawa's strategy, which has consisted of recruiting and fielding competitive candidates (mostly local assembly
politicians) and responding to the insecurities and disaffection of rural voters. The causes of insecurities are many but the heart of it is the slow, agonizing, and mishandled decline of the agricultural sector combined with bleak prospects of government assistance and protection in times of fiscal austerity.
Ozawa and his candidates not only listened to such local concerns and addressed them by proposing on top of their policy list an across the board agricultural income support system, which was rightly criticized by the LDP as "throwing money to the problem". Note, however, that agricultural policy was not high in the LDP's campaign pledges and the policy proposed there (which is the Agricultural Ministry's policy) is to support full-time large farmers to make them more competitive, facing international pressure whenever negotiating bilateral free trade agreements and facing the WTO round developments (or, the lack thereof).
Already, there are similar reports in the media (the source being the Agriculture Ministry, I assume) fearing that the government might be compelled to change its agricultural policy, which would inevitably damage ongoing free trade negotiations with agricultural exporters (read, Australia).
Interestingly, less than 24 hours after Abe's defeat, all three leaders of the top business associations have come out if favor of his staying in power, all supporting his reform policies and lamenting a lack of policy debates during the election (a thinly veiled stab at the DJP's distributive policies).

(4) The election results should have profound effects on the organization of both parties. The major casualties of LDP's rout were the 9 incumbents of the Tsushima faction (the former Tanaka-Takeshita-Hashimoto faction). I don't have to remind readers that the HOC has been the faction's stronghold since it was created by Tanaka, it was the main force that thwarted Ozawa's attempt to take over the faction in 1992-93, and it was the center of interest group politics devoid of policy debates, electing ex-bureaucrats supported by national interest groups (including of course, the postmasters and agricultural coops). This time, the local postmasters'
organizations were unavailable to the LDP and the coops endorsed their own candidate (on the LDP list) instead of an ex-Agricultural bureaucrat. The election was another (default) step in Koizumi's pledge to destroy the old LDP. Ozawa might be relishing sweet revenge by hammering the final nail in the old Tanaka faction's grip on the HOC by following its pork barrel strategy. The new distributive policy of the DJP plans to give cash directly to farmers (regardless of whether they are part-time or inefficient) bypassing the cumbersome bureaucracy and public corporations and without resorting to building roads and bridges. On the other hand, it has been recognized for some time now that the ability of national interest groups, the medical association etc, to deliver votes have been declining, thereby becoming a less reliable source for the LDP. We might be witnessing the birth pains of a new urban LDP, the other side of the coin being the transformation of the DJP as a new rural force. Like the Koizumi "children" of 2005 (and actually 2001), the majority of the DJP is now the Ozawa children. At least, it seems to me, Ozawa has successfully put the old Tanaka-Takeshita wine into the new DJP bottle (...cliches never work, do they?).

(5) On the other hand, I have found little evidence that the LDP has lost support among urban voters. Of course, the LDP was routed in the battle over independent voters. For some time, however, the LDP lawmakers have become less rural based. Currently the degree of rural-ness of the median LDP lawmaker's district is about national average. The lines may have crossed in the last HOR and this HOC election. Also, neither party has cultivated safe seats (in both
Houses) while both parties have virtually eliminated districts with no candidates. Currently, both parties have become competitive in electoral districts across the board (and in both Houses).
Such is what makes the party system so fluid in Japan, until the two major parties can reach some sort of equilibrium (if they ever do, fingers crossed!) and that is why both parties have become heavily dependent on PR firms, in spite of the ludicrously (in my view) tight campaign regulations. Well, we are only behind Mrs. Thatcher by, say, a quarter of a decade in political PR. In any case, I am not predicting a reversion of the rural/urban bases of the LDP and the DJP but am speculating that such is the nature of the current crossroads.

Nobuhiro Hiwatari
Institute of Social Sciences, Univ. of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 10:28 AM

July 31, 2007

[SSJ: 4527] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/07/31

I join Joyce Gelp in thanking Bob Pekkanen for his insightful analysis.

CGP stands for Clean Government Party = Koumeitou.

The next lower house (LH) elections could turn out to be "critical." They might indicate whether the Koizumi victory in 2005 in the LH was a blip in what had appeared to be a trend toward the emergence of a two-party system - the 1994 electoral reform being a major factor. That trend in LH elections had been notable in the single seat districts. I am not sure how strong an impact that trend in LH elections has had on Sunday's upper house elections. But an impact couldn't be ruled out in view of the support of lower house voters mobilization networks given to candidates running in the single seat contests. The LDP, which used to win all these the contests, won only 6 this time. The DPJ won almost all the remaining 23 seats. Moreover, in the contests over two seats, in the overwhelming majority the LDP and DPJ won one seat each. But, as some observers argue, the large number of former LDP voters who voted for the DPJ intended to punish the LDP, not to remove it from power. At least some of them may feel that LDP's defeat has gone to far and decide to vote for the LDP in the next LH elections.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:52 PM

[SSJ: 4526] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain
Date: 2007/07/31

Regarding Mike Thies's point about the DPJ's credibility vis-a-vis the agricultural sector, the question seems to be whether farmers are motivated primarily by economic concerns.

According to a Japanese religion scholar I talked to a few years ago, farmers will always be conservative, because they have a deep emotional affinity to land, which makes them pro-Shinto, which makes them pro-Emperor / nationalist, which makes them support the LDP. I don't know if this is really / still true, but it suggests that the agricultural sector may increasingly oscillate between prioritizing its economic (DPJ) and social (LDP) affinities.

Of course, this would also imply that Abe should have done well, which wasn't the case. Any religion specialists willing to weigh in?

For what it's worth, some radical right parties in Europe have been moderately successful in coopting union support by selling their anti-immigration agenda as an economic, as well as a cultural, issue (along the lines of "immigrants are undercutting union salaries"). The DPJ is on the other side of the ideological spectrum, but it's increasingly the case that traditional vote-party linkages are weakening around the world.

Kenneth

Approved by ssjmod at 04:03 PM

[SSJ: 4525] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Li-Hsuan Cheng
Date: 2007/07/31

In this case, a better analogy would be the attitude toward agricultural subsidy in the U.S. There is also no clear difference in the agricultural policy between the two major parties, either. Labor politics is much more ideologically divided in most democracies and thus not a appropriate analogy.

Approved by ssjmod at 04:02 PM

[SSJ: 4524] Re: questions about the future of Japan politics;CGP = Clean Government Party

From: Sam Jameson
Date: 2007/07/31

At 10:08 07/07/31 +0900, you wrote:
>From: Joyce Gelb (joycegelb@msn.com)
>Date: 2007/07/31
>
>thanks to Bob Pekkanen for an insightful analysis of the election
>results . WHat does this electoral volatility, coming as it does after
>the LDP's "greatest success" in 2005 , suggest for the future.

Since 1989, in general, voters have been far more severe on the LDP in upper house elections than they have been in the lower house elections. (The LDP losses in the historic election of 1993 after Ozawa split the party came entirely from defections by incumbents. Voters re-elected all of the LDP incumbents who remained in the party after the split, and even added one seat to the LDP holdings.)

Even before the voters' "Dr. Jekyll-My. Hyde schizophrenia" (Jekyll in the lower house, Hyde in the upper house) tendency became visible, the LDP did not enjoy large majorities in the upper house.
Indeed, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972-74) was so concerned with maintaining the LDP majority in the upper house that he rounded up corporations to "sponsor" LDP candidates -- both in terms of financing the campaigns of the individual candidate and in terms of rounding up votes for the candidate from among its own employees.

Another long-standing "given" in Japanese politics is the voters' sense of balance. Any time a party won a big victory in the past, it suffered a reduction in its holdings in the next election.

Right now, all forecasts for the next lower house election call for a reduction in the holdings of more than two-thirds of the seats by the LDP and the Komeito simply because of a feeling that "balance"
will be restored.

When voters have gone into their rampaging "Mr. Hyde"
mode in upper house elections, they have done so with the "soothing assurance" that the LDP will still hang on to the government in the lower house.

The landslide proportions of the 7/29 Democratic victory that sent the LDP reeling back to its crippled position of 1989, however, raises the question of whether the LDP is still capable of a recovery after 18 ears of struggle in the upper house.
It still holds by far the largest number of local assembly members throughout the nation but its old strength among interest groups has been diminished.

In addition, Ozawa since 1993 has been trying to persuade the interest groups that still remain to desert the LDP and come over to his side. His visits to local Chambers of Commerce during his travels in the countryside in the last year could be interpreted in this light.

Or was it the beginning of a true two-party system in which changes of government occur from time to time?

Or was it just an extreme example of a Mr. Hyde rampage in the upper house before voters go back to their polite, obedient, unquestioning acceptance of LDP dominance in the lower house?

These are my questions of the moment.

>Perhaps, the answer to that query cannot be known until the next Lower
>House election. What is the CGP, for informational purposes - is this
>New Komeito? I dont recognize the acronym. Joyce Gelb

Clean Government Party

Sam Jameson

Approved by ssjmod at 04:00 PM

[SSJ: 4523] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/07/31

I'm enjoying this discussion. Thanks to all who have fired the first shots.

One thing that I keep reading is that Ozawa, in targeting the SMDs, promised farmers that the DPJ would restore some of the subsidies that the LDP had cut (or threatened to cut - I'm not sure which).
That's smart electioneering in the short run, but is it really conceivable that the DPJ can out-rural the LDP? I've thought for a long time that the two current big parties make little ideological sense - both are pretty heterogeneous.
Koizumi did his best to homogenize the LDP by booting out anti-form types, but how much sense does it make for the DPJ to woo the LDP's most anti-reform voters?
Different issue, but it almost seems as crazy as if the British Tories wooing the hard left unions that Blairism abandoned.
Does this smell funny to anyone else? Or am I misunderstanding what Ozawa's rural strategy was about?

======================================
Michael F. Thies
Dep't of Political Science, UCLA
Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472
(ph) 310-825-1976 (fax) 310-825-0778
thies@polisci.ucla.edu
http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~thies

Approved by ssjmod at 02:33 PM

[SSJ: 4522] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Chris Winkler
Date: 2007/07/31

While Abe has repeatedly emphasized his determination to carry on with his "reforms", he will probably have a harder time selling his "ideology-first" approach to both, his party and Komeito after this disastrous election.

Before the election few parliamentarians were bold enough to speak out what everybody knows or should
know: Voters in the prefectures care far more about financial support (be it farm subsidies or public-works spending) than ideological issues, like constitutional reform. NHK's exit polls on Sunday showed that only 6% or 7% of voters thought constitutional reform was an important issue in the election, same counts for educational reform.

Granted, this election was overshadowed by the pension record scandal and the inability of cabinet members to correctly declare their office expenditures or watch their mouths. Nevertheless, the aforementioned figures are in line with those from previous elections.
Regardless of all the criticism the (rather
unideological) conservative mainstream-centered politics of the LDP under the 1955 regime had to endure over the last couple of years, Japanese voters apparently are not yet willing to completely forget these "good old days" and the benefits this system had brought with it.

Komeito leadership today already called for Abe to focus more on the people's life rather than constitutional reform. It will be interesting to see, whether more (senior) members of the LDP start calling for a similar approach, once the DPJ begins shooting down important drafts in the Upper House. Should this happen, Abe certainly will find it more difficult to continue his current policy. The cabinet re-shuffle in late August will probably give us a first indication of where the LDP is headed. If Abe sticks to his policy of appointing (almost) exclusively inexperienced yes-sayers and hawks to important positions, his situation is unlikely to improve.

Now, what does this mean for constitutional reform?
Provided Ozawa succeeds in keeping the DPJ together, they should be able to remain the largest party in the Upper House for the next six years, even if they lose some seats in the 2010 election. This is not going to make it any easier for Abe to realize his ambitious pet project, constitutional reform within the next five years, as he had originally planned. To make things worse for Abe, after Sunday's election Komeito probably will be even more determined to emphasize its independent position on the issue. Since the differences between Komeito's stance and the LDP's
2005 drafts are even more significant than the differences between LDP and DPJ, I get the feeling, the current constitution will still be in place, by the time I submit my dissertation on the topic in 2009.

Chris Winkler

Approved by ssjmod at 01:32 PM

[SSJ: 4521] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Li-Hsuan Cheng
Date: 2007/07/31

Two polls done by Asahi Shunbum before the election show that both of Kenneth's suggestions are correct.
According to the survey done on July 21, 22, 50% of the respondents believed that Ozawa has stronger leadership, while only 31% believedthat Abe has stronger leadership. Given Ozawa's image of power broker, this survey shows the unpopularity of Abe. On the other hand, another poll done before the election also shows 64% of rural voter have deep concern about regional inequality (kakusa) and local economic condition.
Li-Hsuan Cheng

Approved by ssjmod at 01:31 PM

[SSJ: 4520] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/07/31

Reply to Kenneth McElwain's question:

I'd vote for both. Profile of party leaders matters more than ever now b/c of change to Single Seat constitutuencies, PR portion and vote for party rather than individual, influence of television (that began prior to electoral reform), etc. However, this doesn't mean consistently strong or successful PMs--just the opposite. Means exactly BECAUSE image of party leader matters more than ever that they will either be very successful if skillful politicians and especially media managers, or really fail dramatically (Abe, Mori) if they can't manage media image well and aren't skillful.

I don't think it's necessarily the complete abandonment of traditional constituencies that explains the HOC defeat compared to Koizumi's HOR 2005 success. Rather, it was the floating vote, the independents, especially in cities but not exclusively, that Koizumi managed for the first time to really corral for the LDP in large numbers in 2005 (another indication of why party leader image matters more now).
This time, as was probably inevitable with Abe's poor leadership, scandals, etc., they deserted LDP and went back to well, being independent, and voting for DPJ. I think LDP did pick up more votes than usual in rural areas, but in part that may be due to rural independents and in part to fact that Ozawa and DPJ made more of an effort in rural areas this time and appealed to rural dissatisfaction. Not sure. Anyone have the polls which show who voted for DPJ in urban and rural areas?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 12:55 PM

[SSJ: 4519] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain
Date: 2007/07/31

One thing I've been wondering is whether the LDP's losses signal that Koizumi-style populism was a flash in the pan, or that the profile or party leaders matter more now than ever before.

On the one hand, the LDP's losses in rural areas suggest that the party shouldn't have been so quick to abandon their traditional constituencies (agriculture; construction). On the other, Abe's rapidly declining popularity seems to have cast a pall on the LDP's electoral viability.

I don't mean to stake this as an either-or argument, but the two interpretations suggest different long-term prospects for Japan. If the LDP's losses were Abe's fault, then the party needs to find somebody popular to replace him (or at least somebody not unpopular, like Fukuda). If they stem from poor redistributive policies, then they could keep Abe in power, ramp up agricultural subsidies, and still be competitive in the next Lower House election.

Kenneth

Approved by ssjmod at 12:18 PM

[SSJ: 4518] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Purnendra Jain
Date: 2007/07/31

CGP is Clean Government party- literal translation of Komeito.
I wrote a quick piece for Asia Times. Link below. Comments are welcome.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IG31Dh03.html

There is another piece by Hisane Masaki in today's Asia Times. If interested visit http://www.atimes.com/

Purnendra Jain
Professor, Asian Studies
University of Adelaide

Approved by ssjmod at 11:43 AM

[SSJ: 4517] Re: 2007 HOC Election

From: Joyce Gelb
Date: 2007/07/31

thanks to Bob Pekkanen for an insightful analysis of the election results . WHat does this electoral volatility, coming as it does after the LDP's "greatest success" in 2005 , suggest for the future.
Perhaps, the answer to that query cannot be known until the next Lower House election. What is the CGP , for informational purposes - is this New Komeito? I dont recognize the acronym. Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 10:23 AM

July 30, 2007

[SSJ: 4516] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/07/30

Hello again from Gifu,

From what I saw of the TV pundit reaction last night, they seem to be playing up the "LDP went too far with chiho kirisute," and the DPJ victories in rural (single member district) prefectures seem to back
that up. This morning, though, I was reading the
GIfu city-by-city results and they made me wonder.
The DPJ candidate won the belt of southern cities that are really part of the Nagoya/Toyota metro area, and the LDP's candidate won handily in the smaller towns across the rest of the prefecture. My first reaction is to wonder if that result (i.e. DPJ wins suburbs, LDP wins countryside) contradicts the pundits'
interpretation. My second reaction was to wonder if the GIfu results are generalizable. For those who didn't know, Gifu's "LDP" candidate was actually kicked out of the party after opposing postal reform to the bitter end, and no one could mistake him for
the Koizumi/Abe reformist LDP. Has anyone else seen
comparable city-by-city results in other prefectures?
I'd be interested to hear about them.

Well, John, Ozawa seems to have gotten though the election without messing up too badly, eh?

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:59 AM

[SSJ: 4515] 2007 HOC Election

From: Robert Pekkanen
Date: 2007/07/30

Quick thoughts on the morning after.

Coming on the heels of the LDP's greatest ever electoral victory (HOR, 2005), this 2007 HOC election is their greatest ever defeat. In 1989, the LDP lost its majority, but remained the largest party and was able to still manage the HOC. Speculation in the run-up the election, when the LDP and CGP were clearly not going to win the combined 64 seats needed to maintain their majority (51 for LDP and 13 for CGP), centered on whether the LDP might do well enough (mid-40s if CGP held 13) to retain their majority by enticing in a few independents. Likely candidates included People's New Party members who disagreed with party leader Tanaka's dovish politics and were themselves ex-LDP MPs booted out by Koizumi over postal privatization. In the end, such plans were pipe dreams.

Results:
Election results LDP DPJ CGP JCP SDP PNP NPJ Unaffiliated
Elected this time 37 60 9 3 2 2 1 7
Not up for election 46 49 11 4 3 2 0 6
New Totals 83 109 20 7 5 4 1 13
Old Strength 110 81 23 9 6 4 0 7
Change -27 +28 -3 -2 -1 0 1 +6
.
LDP won 23 seats in districts, 14 in list, 37 total--down 27 seats.
DPJ won 40 district seats, 20 list, 60 total-up 28 seats.
CGP won 2 distrct seats, 7 list, 9 total-- JCP won 3 list.
SDP won 2 list.
People's New Party won 1 district, 1 list, 2 total.
New Party Japan won 1 list.
Unaffiliateds won 7 seats.

List results:
party Votes Party votes Candidate votes% # elected
DJP 23,111,474 18,498,788 4,356,587 39.45 20
LDP 16,462,625 10,359,884 5,896,616 28.10 14
CGP 7,716,985 3,453,775 4,183,001 13.17 7
JCP 4,386,714 3,861,329 468,991 7.48 3
SDP 2,627,183 1,948,539 647,238 4.48 2
New Party Japan 1,760,013 1,121,147 618,682 3.00 1
People's New Party 1,262,360 662,051 577,752 2.15 1

There are 96 list seats and 146 district seats. Up for grab this time, 48 list seats and 73 district seats. Districts were 29 1 seat, 12 2 seats (24), 5 3 seats (15), and 1 5 seat (5).

The LDP benefited mostly from the 2 seat districts.
These are uncompetitive, giving in each case 1 LDP and
1 DPJ victor-except in Gifu in which an unaffiliated supported by the LDP and CGP won, as did a DPJ candidate.

So, the LDP got:
14 list seats
6 SSD seats
11 Seats from the 12 2 seat districts
5 seats - 1 from each of the 5 3 seat districts
1 seat in Tokyo (of 5)

Without the 2 seat districts, it would have been much worse for the LDP. Tokyo's never been a great district for the LDP, but they showed weakness in the
3 seat districts and the 1 seat districts.

In Tokyo, the LDP had two good candidates. One was Marukawa, who came in 4th. She was an inexperienced candidate who had failed to register to vote in the last couple of elections, after returning from a posting in New York. A young former TV announcer with good looks, she won. The LDP incumbent Hosaka, lost.
An experienced pol, he used the traditional LDP group-based politics and narrowly lost-coming in 6th by 32,500 or so votes (earning 651,484). Interesting contrast to Marukawa, inexperienced and criticized as inept, but telegenic. The implications for those interested in candidate quality are fascinating.

A number of factors combined to produce this curious alchemy of disastrous defeat coming 2 years after triumph. Some are ephemeral, some systemic.

1) HOC FEWER SEATS: The HOC is easier for the DPJ
to run in than the HOR because it needs to field fewer candidates. The brilliant Ethan Scheiner argued that the Japanese opposition's failure stems from their inability to recruit quality candidates, which in turn has its roots in Japan's fiscal centralization combined with clientelism. Fewer districts alleviates this problem. Also, the districts are bigger than HOR districts, making them harder (or more expensive) to target with pork.
2) HOC LESS IMPORTANT: The HOC is the less
important body. Voters know this and worry less about turning the HOC over to the opposition. So, many voters might have chosen in this election to send the LDP a message, even though they remain LDP supporters.
Polls suggest the LDP garnered only 60% of the votes from self-identified LDP supporters. Will they come back? Did the DPJ make inroads into the LDP's base, or did the base just send a message?
3) PENSION ISSUE DOMINATES ELECTION: PM Abe's pet
issues were patriotism and patriotic education. Voters couldn't have cared less. The issue that dominated this election was the loss of 50 million pension records. Voters were incensed. The records had been lost under a series of administrations, not just Abe's.
However, Abe was in the PM's residence when it hit the papers. Making matters much worse, Abe initially mishandled the issue, dismissing it and then minimizing it before belatedly realizing this issue was going to be tremendously annoying and important to voters. The 2005 election issue was postal privatization, a not inherently interesting topic that captivated voters due to Koizumi's mastery of framing issues and playing the (especially non-traditional-e.g.
"soft news" shows and weekly magazines) media.
4) HE'S NO KOIZUMI: Koizumi campaigned very
little for the LDP. He was on the trail initially, but pulled very early-reportedly after his appearances reminded voters a little too keenly how much they preferred Koizumi to Abe. One can imagine how Koizumi would have handled the pension records issue, turning it into a stick to beat the bureaucrats and increase his own popularity (and win the election). Abe also faced criticism over his judgment, when 3 Cabinet members resigned (including one suicide) after various scandals. The farm minister who replaced the suicide almost immediately became embroiled in exactly the same time of financial scandals as his predecessors.
LDP MPs questioned Abe's repeated failure to vet his Cabinet.

The results open many issues for discussion in Tokyo.
Among these:

1) PM RESIGNATION: PM Abe insists he won't resign.
His line is that HOC elections are not about who should be the governing party. I haven't heard him explain what they are about if this is the case. PM Hashimoto resigned after the LDP got 44 seats in 1998 and Uno Soskue resigned after the party got 39 seats in 1989. In the 29 SSDs, the LDP won 6 and DPJ 23.
HOR SSD incumbents must now consider whether Abe can lead them to victory in the next HOR election. There is no obvious successor.
2) DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: Unlike the 1989 elections,
which left the LDP 109 seats to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, then largest opposition) 68, this time the LDP is for the first time ever not the largest party. The DPJ is the largest party with, coincidentally, 109 seats. I also note that several of the unaffiliateds (and the PNP) ran with DPJ support.
It's possible the DPJ can cobble together a majority coalition by enticing in PNP and SDP and a few unaffiliateds. I haven't heard anything about their intentions about playing it this way or going it alone.
3) DPJ: How will the DPJ handle its new power?
Will it be obstructionist? Can it convince the voters it's responsible and position itself for victory or at least a good showing in an HOR election?
4) CGP: What's gone almost unnoticed is that this
is also CGP's worst ever (I think) performance in a HOC election. They have already said they plan to continue their coalition with the LDP. CGP is important not only for their limited numbers (which were essential to the LDP in the HOC), but for their electoral support in hotly contested SSD in HOC and HOR. CGP voters tend to be quite disciplined and their votes can swing many SSDs. In the 2003 election, analysts estimated that had the CGP voters in SSDs all marked their ballots for DPJ instead of LDP, there would have been a swing of 50 seats-enough to have won the DPJ control of the HOR. Will the CGP start to distance itself from the LDP?

Robert Pekkanen
Assistant Professor
The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington Box 353650 Seattle, WA 98195-3650
Tel: 206-685-1527
Fax: 206-685-0668
pekkanen@u.washington.edu
http://faculty.washington.edu/pekkanen

Approved by ssjmod at 11:32 AM

[SSJ: 4514] Re: Female Candidates in the HR?

From: Joyce Gelb
Date: 2007/07/28

As I recall, the guidelines for increasing female candidates in the DPJ are largely advisory, not mandatory, so not an actual quota system . There was a section in the American Political Sicence Review a couple of years ago which discussed this in detail but i dont have it at hand. The JCP has good policies to encourage female candidates, including such things as child care support although i am not sure how this actually affects outomes in terms of candidacies.
Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 11:31 AM

July 27, 2007

[SSJ: 4513] Re: corporate social responsibility

From: Verena Blechinger-Talcott
Date: 2007/07/27

Dear Daniel, Dear SSJ-Forum Members,

In recent years, there has been quite a number of publications on CSR in Japan. So far, most of the Japanese literature on CSR is in the field of management studies or business ethics, but there are also some social scientists who work on CSR. One of the authors whose work I would like to recommend is Professor Tanimoto Kanji from Hitotsubashi University.
His work has covered relations between firms and NGOs, socially responsible investment, and issues of social entrepreneurship.

The Japan Standards Association has also published a number of useful publications on CSR ("CSR no kihon
chishiki") which provide a brief, but concise introduction into the issue and the Japanese discourse about it (www.jsa.or.jp).

In English, Kyoko Fukukawa (Bradford University, UK, School of Management) has published about Japanese concepts of CSR. She is just working on a major empirical study covering, among others, concepts of CSR in Japanese firms.

I hope this helps.

Sincerely,

Verena Blechinger-Talcott

Approved by ssjmod at 06:32 PM

[SSJ: 4512] corporate social responsibility

From: Daniel Aldrich
Date: 2007/07/26

Dear Colleagues,

A friend of mine is working on issues of corporate social responsibility (known as CSR) and was wondering if there have been any recent publications from Japan on this issue. Feel free to email directly with your thoughts (daniel.aldrich@gmail.com).

Sincerely,

Daniel

--
Daniel P. Aldrich, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar, Law Faculty, University of Tokyo Assistant Professor, Political Science, Purdue University http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/
Tel: 81-3-5841-3170

Approved by ssjmod at 06:31 PM

July 26, 2007

[SSJ: 4511] Re: Female Candidates in the HR?

From: Mala Htun
Date: 2007/07/26

You are right that there are no gender quotas in Japanese parties. However, the DPJ does have a quota like policy regarding the PR lists, the details of which I can't exactly recall (according to Ms Komiyama, the party's shadow minister for gender equality whom I spoke with in fall 2006). Unfortunately my notes on this are in transit between Tokyo and NYC so I can't look up the specifics now.
Best,
Mala
(Mala Htun, htun@mindspring.com)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:43 PM

[SSJ: 4510] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/07/26

I had dinner last night with a senior political reporter, and he claimed that it is extremely rare for an LDP candidate to publicly criticize an LDP PM during a political campaign. On the other hand, John has watched more Japanese elections than either I or this "senior" reporter have, so maybe he can provide us with one or two interesting examples from past elections (Katoh Koichi recently criticized Abe's foreign policy, but this was indirect, low-key, and not connected to a campaign). I certainly agree with John that the old multi-seat constituency system gave anti-mainstream LDP candidates an incentive to play opposition candidate and run against the mainstream LDP leadership, but this seems to have generally been done quietly, rather than in the pages of the national press.

This senior reporter, who know Abe pretty well, also believes that contrary to Abe's public insistence that he will not resign no matter the results on Sunday, he is prepared to step down if the LDP does not make it to 40 seats. Incidentally, I wonder if Abe is doing himself or his party any good by coming out with this statement before most of the ballots have even been
cast?

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 12:42 PM

[SSJ: 4509] Female Candidates in the HR?

From: Ethan Scheiner
Date: 2007/07/26

I have an empirical question about parties, but it is
*not* related to the Upper House election. Sorry.

I do not know of any "major" party in Japan (LDP, DPJ, SDPJ, JCP, Komeito) that has "quotas" with regard to female candidates for races for the House of
Representatives: That is, as far as I know, none of the parties require PR lists to be ordered man-woman-man-woman-etc., and I don't know of any party that requires a certain number of female candidates or any other issues like that related to female candidates.

Is there any female-quota-type policy among any of the major parties that I'm missing?

Thanks,

Ethan

Approved by ssjmod at 10:43 AM

July 25, 2007

[SSJ: 4508] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/07/24

Peter Cave writes:
> Similarly, I also wonder what exactly is meant by the LDP having
> better organization in rural areas, assuming that it is still true
> that the truly rural campaign strategies (personal relations etc)
> don't really work in rural cities. More effective koenkai in the
> cities? This seems to beg the question, why does the DPJ have less
> effective koenkai in such places?

EH: If I remember Curtis' pathbreaking study (Election Campaigning, Japanese Style; Daigishi no Tanjou), he made a distinction among three different geographical/demographic localities and related them to the degree of prevalence of kouenkai: villages, towns and (small) cities, and metropolitan areas. In villages, koenkai were scarce because there was no need for them; the local social structure was reflected in voting. In metropolitan areas, they were scarce because social networks were harder to create and maintain (other than such groups as labor unions).
They were most prevalent in towns and small cities because they were needed and the social fabric was such that they could be created and maintained.

Now rural areas have changed, including the tightness of the "natural" social networks. So koenkai are both needed and practical not only in towns and cities, but also in what were called rural areas. Two p's worth from someone who has not been working on this.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:10 PM

July 24, 2007

[SSJ: 4507] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2007/07/24

This is an interesting debate about the struggle between the LDP and DPJ in rural areas. I am wondering, however, if we might benefit from somewhat sharper clarification of the terms. I am a bit unclear about what is being considered as a 'rural area' and how the electorate in such areas can be broken down; also, what proportion of constituencies are in such 'rural areas'. Maybe my perceptions of Japan's political geography are inaccurate (quite likely), but is it not true that even in many areas of Japan that are usually thought of as 'rural', most of the voters actually live in urban or at least semi-urban areas (country towns and cities)? Moreover, as George Ehrhart reminded us, almost all 'farmers' are part-time farmers who get a relatively small proportion of their income (?) from agriculture. So, I am wondering how these voters in country towns and cities are thinking when it comes to voting, and what sways their decision.
Is it the promise of money for farming specifically?
Is it the promise of money to help revive rural areas or keep them going more generally?
Is it 'conservative values' of some kind? Or is it the sense of 'on', local solidarity, and so on? A combination of all of the above? Or other things?

Similarly, I also wonder what exactly is meant by the LDP having better organization in rural areas, assuming that it is still true that the truly rural campaign strategies (personal relations etc) don't really work in rural cities. More effective koenkai in the cities? This seems to beg the question, why does the DPJ have less effective koenkai in such places?

Maybe someone is working or has recently published on this and would like to publicise their efforts.

Peter Cave

Approved by ssjmod at 07:09 PM

[SSJ: 4506] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/07/24

Interesting posts from all. There is nothing new against LDP candidates running against the leadership, particularly in times of scandal, and particularly by non-incumbents. In a very schematic way that might be
logical in the old electoral system but not now.
However, American Congressmen do it all the time.

_________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Michigan
Visiting Professor
Dept. of Health Policy and Management
Keio University Medical School
Apt #1005, 23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 06:49 PM

[SSJ: 4505] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/07/24

Many thanks to George, Ethan, Aurelia and others for their insightful posts about rural voters. Regarding George's dispatch from the front-lines, a few comments and questions come to mind.

First, a few questions for George:

If the LDP is so strong in Gifu, why are they only running one candidate instead of two in a two seat district? This would seem to be a riskless bet. The LDP could suffer from over-nomination in a three-seat district, but not in a two-seat district.

Rural post-masters general are reported to be out stumping for anti-postal privatization candidates throughout rural districts. Is this happening in Gifu?
If so, are they supporting the LDP rebel or the DPJ candidate?

Do you know how the DPJ did in the local elections in Gifu earlier in the year? Prefectural and city council reps. are said to be the key to local organization, and the DPJ is slowly but steadily catching up in this area, although perhaps not in Gifu?

Regarding comments, George wrote:
"The previous posts talked about the DPJ's rural strategy and LDP's urban strategy, but frankly, out here in the sticks there isn't much of a difference.
...Folks in the local construction industry aren't buying the DPJ pork line--they say Koizumi was an aberration, they know which side of their bread is buttered and it isn't the DPJs."

We would expect rural LDP and DPJ candidates to sound more like each other than like urban LDP or DPJ candidates in terms of policy issues. What makes them most distinguishable are their party labels. George's finding that rural construction companies still trust the LDP label more than the DPJ label in terms of pork is important, although it ironically might be a self-denying prophesy. The better the LDP does in rural areas this time the more it will validate the Koizumi-Abe strategy of taking rural voters for granted and concentrating on the urban voters. A Yomiuri poll from last week showed the LDP gaining somewhat in rural areas, and is now slightly ahead of the DPJ there, although the DPJ remains unexpectedly
strong.

Ethan makes an important point about lower house SMD's being more suitable in scale for targeted pork barrel politics, but the LDP would have to suffer a painful rural losses to risk a return to significant pork-barrel politics (would they also de-privatize the post offices?). Even then, the LDP would find it hard to return to this strategy because of budget tightness and the critical scrutiny they are now receiving from the media and urban voters over this. Ideologically, going back to a rural pork-barrel strategy would repudiate Koizumi's legacy and increase the danger to already vulnerable "Koizumi children" in urban areas.
This would a combustible combination that could produce large scale urban HR defections from the LDP,
perhaps led by Koizumi himself.

"In his speeches, the LDP candidate talks about "protecting (small business/ food safety/ the little guy)" and the DPJ candidate talks about "helping (rural areas/ the little guy). Six of one, half dozen of the other. The constitution isn't an issue, and the pension issue provides the only major difference (and criticism/defense of Abe, I guess)."

Not everywhere. Asahi reports that in Koichi the local LDP candidate, Tamura Kohei, is openly running against Abe and Nakagawa, criticizing Abe for promoting meaningless slogans like "Utsukushii kuni Nihon" and constitutional reform and failing to bring pork-barrel projects (typhoon preparedness funding, a new international airport) with him when he visited the district to help Tamura. Not surprisingly, Tamura is a member off the Tsushima (old Tanaka Hashimoto faction), but his strategy of combining Tanaka style pork-barrel politics with Koizumi's tactic of publicly running against the LDP (or in this case its
leadership) seems novel. This case reemphasizes the looming ideological and policy battle the LDP may face internally, a situation made worse by the new majoritarian SMD system and the increasing centralization of LDP leadership. These changes make it harder for the LDP to try to be an eight-sided beauty catch-all party. In short, this is not your
father's LDP.

I am looking forward to seeing how this discussion and the election unfold.

Cheers,

Paul

Approved by ssjmod at 06:48 PM

[SSJ: 4504] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/07/24

I generally agree with George Ehrhardt that in rural areas, there probably isn't much to distinguish between LDP candidates and DPJ candidates in general terms - except maybe in two areas: public works (where the DPJ has a long history of advocating retrenchment of wasteful spending on useless projects) and on the new subsidy system (direct income support) for farmers.
Small-size farmers are very sceptical about whether this new system will continue to assist them in the way price subsidies did in the past because it is more difficult for them to qualify for support. For this reason small-size farmers are more inclined to support the DPJ, which promises a more liberal administration of the new system. The DPJ is deliberately trying to make inroads into LDP support amongst farmers by offering continued support for small-size farmers. On the other hand, it has tried this tactic before without much positive effect. In the past, farmers have simply not voted rather than opting for the DPJ.
Maybe the new subsidy system will be a spur to a real switch in their voting preferences.

Aurelia George Mulgan
University of New South Wales
ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 01:27 PM

July 23, 2007

[SSJ: 4502] Re: Query on prison time for white-collar crooks

From: Patricia G. Steinhoff
Date: 2007/07/23

I don't have data on insider trading convictions and I don't study white collar crime, but I can offer a few other factors that might affect the kind of sentence one receives in criminal cases.

1. Anyone who refuses to cooperate with the police and prosecutors these days gets harsher treatment. So one would expect that someone who confessed and was contrite would get off lightly, while someone who refused to talk, or refused to accept the prosecution's statement of the crime (which is the equivalent of a guilty plea) and demanded a full trial would get a stiffer sentence in the end.

2. There is also strong pressure from the public for "genbatsuka" these days, which translates into pressure on the courts to produce stiffer sentences.
So something that warranted a particular penalty a decade ago would probably routinely get a somewhat harsher penalty today, all other things being equal.

3. When the first trial produces a light sentence or even a finding of not guilty, in the Japanese criminal justice system the prosecution can appeal and try again at the appeals court. This is fundamentally different from the Anglo-American system in which appeals are only on technical legal points with no presentation of new or amplified evidence, and to retry someone who was found not guilty would be prohibited as double jeopardy. In short, the prosecution gets a second shot if they didn't get what they wanted the first time around. They use this routinely whenever they think they've lost face through a not guilty judgment, or a lighter penalty than they asked for. So one question would be whether the longer sentences came about in the first trial or on an appeal.

4. A related question would be where the defendant was during all this time. If the defendant was kept in unconvicted detention (as opposed to being let out on bail with a guarantor), then in a sense the prosecution gets the person a jail sentence in solitary confinement even before the case is decided, just by stringing out the proceedings for a longer time. In many cases of non-cooperation, they can also ask the judge to hold the person incommunicado on the grounds that they might tamper with evidence if they could talk to anybody. That means that in effect that person is not only being held in solitary confinement, but is held in complete isolation except for the lawyer, whose visits cannot be completely blocked. If despite this the defendant insists on his innocence and gets a light sentence in the first trial, then the prosecution can in effect add another year or more to that sentence by appealing it. Quite often, the time spent in unconvicted detention in these situations is longer than the law would allow as a penalty for the crime.

Pat Steinhoff

Approved by ssjmod at 06:18 PM

[SSJ: 4501] Re: Query on prison time for white-collar crooks

From: Ekaterina Korobtseva
Date: 2007/07/23

Dear Richard,
I think this book might have some helpful references:
*Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the United States* by Mark D. West
(2007) University Of Chicago Press

Sincerely yours,
Ekaterina

--
Dr. Ekaterina Korobtseva
Okinaga Junior Research Fellow
Wadham College
University of Oxford

Am currently on fieldwork in Tokyo:
Office: 03 3219 3366

Approved by ssjmod at 01:44 PM

[SSJ: 4500] Re: Query on prison time for white-collar crooks

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/07/23

Richard:
I believe one of the academic experts NHK had on the news the other day after Murakami's sentencing mentioned that because Murakami wasn't at all contrite but fought the accusation all along the line, the court "had no choice" but to sentence him to prison time. You might want to look into the sentencing of white collar defendents who did not confess or weren't contrite vs. those who were to see if this is standard practice?

Best,

Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 01:43 PM

[SSJ: 4499] Query on prison time for white-collar crooks

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/07/21

Murakami has just been sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison, just as Horie was sent to jail. My understanding is that jail time is highly unusual for white-collar crime. Usually the sentence is suspended after the defendant pleads guilty and puts on a show of remorse. For example,Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, whose far-flung Seibu empire made him the richest man in the world back in 1990, pled guilty in 2005 to years of insider trading and falsifying financial reports-acts that cost stockholders and creditors billions of dollars. Yet, the well-connected Tsutsumi was allowed to walk away with a 30-month suspended sentence.

I was wondering if anyone had data on convictions and jail sentences for insider trading. Also, any data on convictions and jail time for the banksers and bureaucrats guilty of fraud in connection with the nonperforming loan crisis.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 09:55 AM

[SSJ: 4498] Re: Rural Voters (dispatches from the front line)

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/07/20

I've been following the campaigning here in rural Gifu, between a DPJ candidate and a quasi-LDP candidate (the LDP kicked him out over postal reform and he lost his HR seat, so now he's running for the HC with the full backing of the local LDP). There's a communist too, but no one cares about him.

The previous posts talked about the DPJ's rural strategy and LDP's urban strategy, but frankly, out here in the sticks there isn't much of a difference.
In his speeches, the LDP candidate talks about "protecting (small business/ food safety/ the little guy)" and the DPJ candidate talks about "helping (rural areas/ the little guy). Six of one, half dozen of the other. The constitution isn't an issue, and the pension issue provides the only major difference (and criticism/defense of Abe, I guess). Folks in the local construction industry aren't buying the DPJ pork line--they say Koizumi was an aberration, they know which side of their bread is buttered and it isn't the DPJs. Obviously, this is only one district, but both the DPJ and LDP are big enough tents that rural candidate everywhere are free to use this kind of a line, so I'd bet that the situation is similar in other rural areas.

My sense is that Ethan is right to wonder whether the DPJ can set up local organizations. This time, GIfu elects two reps, so the election isn't competitive, but if it were (as the HR will be), the election will come down to organizational strength, not policy manifestos (at least that's how local politicos see it).

Richard,

Most of the people around here are the rural non-farmers that you wondered about. I don't know how this issue is perceived in urban areas, but around here it isn't just rice prices/incomes. Perhaps most importantly, the series of Chinese safety scandals has made food imports tremendously salient here--just in time for the election-- which makes Japanese agriculture worth supporting. The local LDP candidate, at least, is quite explicit about how promoting Japanese agriculture means promoting safe food for all Japanese people. At the risk of getting warm and fuzzy, my impression is also that the term "supporting farmers" touches off a host of associated meanings, including something like "chiho ni yasashii." There aren't as many rice fields as there were 20-30 years ago, but people still fondly remember when they were there, and like the idea that farming goes on where
they live. My $.02 anyway.

George Ehrhardt

Approved by ssjmod at 09:51 AM

July 20, 2007

[SSJ: 4495] Re: Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP? Public OpinionandSecurity

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2007/07/19

I wonder if I might use the forum to make contact with people interested in Japan who might be building up a collection of one of the more attractive traditional sources of infiormation, namely the book and the academic journal. I have acquired a miscellaneous collection of both over the years, 95% of which represent not so much materal used in some realised academic project as academic aspirations which realism now tells me, in my mid-80s, are unlikely to be fulfilled. It's hard to characterise the collection except as sociological jackdawish and extending pretty much over the post-war period, though I should point out that two reasonably valuable collections that people might expect to get from me -- relating to Tokugawa education and the postwar land reform -- have long since gone to libraries.

Anyway, the books are there, they take up too much space, and they will be a nuisance to my family. I can send a list to anyone interested.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 09:52 AM

July 19, 2007

[SSJ: 4494] Re: Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP?

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/07/19

Rural vote fans will enjoy this article:

LDP facing crisis in conservative Ehime
MIYA TANAKA
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20070719f1.html

I noticed and downloaded it this morning during the coffee break of the class on Japanese politics I am teaching in Korea right now; I had the students read it word for word and it provided a good text for my lecture--which was already in part about the problems "reform" caused for the LDP. Also the dog that didn't bark here--no mention of constitutional or educational reform, nothing utsukushii about it.

Re Rick's remarks, the DPJ shows up here as new and reformist; the LDP as neither that nor effectively old-school.

Since Ozawa has been the architect of most of Japan's political fiascos of the last 15 years or so, including the nearly unique move of kicking the largest party out of a ruling coalition (which then ceased being so), I keep thinking that somehow he will screw this chance up too.

Approved by ssjmod at 06:54 PM

[SSJ: 4493] Re: Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/07/18

What are the ramifications of the DPJ's rural gambit for the politics of economic reform?

Traditionally, the DPJ was an urban-based party and the city votes were the most interested in reforms.
However, in this election, Ichiro Ozawa decided that the outcome would be determined in 29 rural single-member districts. Hence, the DPJ has been going after those districts with leaflets promising that the government would spend as much as \1 trillion ($8.2
billion) to ensure that farmers receive \15,000 per 60 kilograms of rice, even if the market price dropped to as low as one-third of that amount. Ozawa has similarly made an alliance with postal rebel leader and public works booster Shizuka Kamei.

So, here we have the spectacle of a traditional urban party trying to go for the rural vote while holding onto its urban core base. Whether it can do so, or will alienate its urban base by these tactics remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the LDP has been a mirror image: trying to increase its urban vote while holding onto to its rural core. In this case, the LDP cut public works--which appealed to urban voters but hurt rural areas including part-time farmers who worked in construction--while simultaneously practicing all kinds of farm protectionism (in regard to trade policy and FTAs, land ownership rules, taxes, etc.)

Under Koizumi, the LDP had success on this front in the 2005 Lower House landslide. According to calculations by Ethan Scheiner, for the firsst time, the LDP won as many seats in the 100 most urban of the 300 single-seat districts as in the 100 most rural and 100 medium. It remains to be seen whether or not this was a fluke.

Both the LDP and DPJ approaches appear a bit strange to me. While the farm bloc is not as powerful as it used to be, the fact is that the farmers are not only a declining force in the population as a whole, but even as a percentage of the rural areas. A generation ago, when the average Tokyoite thought of farmers, he pictured grandpa and grandma. Today, farmers are down to only 5% of the workforce, full-time farm households are only 1% of all households, and 61% of core farmers are over age 65. 10% of farmland lies idle because there is no one left to farm it. Nonetheless, regulations restrict sales to non-farmers--even though farmers could reap big capital gains by selling. The price for all this protectionism is high food prices.
So, the farmers have political clout way out of proportion to their voting power. Why, in going after the rural vote, do the parties emphasize the farmers as opposed to the non-farm majority in these areas---particularly after the switch to single-seat districts in the LH? Perhaps it's like the ethanol lobby in Iowa; it hurts the beef ranchers and others, but the corn farmers have the clout.

The question is: if the DPJ wins and attributes its victory to the rural gambit, would this not dilute its commitment to reforms that benefit its urban base?
Perhaps the prominence of the pension scandal will diffuse this tendency, but it's still worrisome to me.

Since we're on the subject of the elections, a couple other questions arise.

The conventional wisdom is that, even if the LDP loses badly, Abe will be able to hang onto power since there is no clear, strong successor. Taro Aso is weak in the party. But my gut tells me that, if the LDP is shellacked, party elders will not want Abe as their standard-bearer in an upcoming LH election in which they are bound to lose many seats anyway (since the
2005 results were such an outlier). He may try to hang on for a while, as did Mori, but eventually he'll be made to see the light. As for the lack of a clear successor, there is always the Kaifu caretaker route.

The second question is the ability of the DPJ, if it wins big, to force an early LH election. Although the Constitution (Articles 59-61) allows the LH to pass budgets (by majority vote) and all other laws (by two-thirds vote) even if they are rejected by the UH, the tradition up to now is that the LDP has negotiated with the UH on budgets when the UH was conrolled by the oppostion. It would be viewed as unseemly by the voters for the LH to railroad budgets through. Will that tradition hold? If so, will Ozawa obstruct budgets and other matters in order to try to force an early LH election? If he tries, can he in fact force an early election that is bound to lower the ruling coalition's dominance?

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 02:56 PM

[SSJ: 4492] Re: Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP?

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/07/18

Reading Paul's comments, I wondered what Ethan's response would be. Thank you both.

Ethan writes:
> it is harder for the LDP to target subsidies in a way that's
> meaningful for elections like the one coming up.

All eyes would probably be on the 29 districts, in which the contest is, in fact, FPP.

Best.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 02:55 PM

July 18, 2007

[SSJ: 4491] Re: Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP?

From: Chris Winkle
Date: 2007/07/18

A very interesting and inspiring post by Mr. Midford, so I felt obliged to add two comments:

Apart from the LDP versus DPJ confrontation, this election could have a major impact on the internal power structure of the LDP. If the LDP loses the election, then this will not only result in headaches at the Prime Minister's office, but also spell trouble for the Tsushima faction. It has already lost 30 members over the past five years (in late 2002 101 parliamentarians were members of what used to be the Hashimoto faction, whereas 2006 the Tsushima faction has only 74 members, according to IMIDAS figures).

In this context, one place to watch is Okayama, where the LDP's secretary general in the Upper House, Katayama Toranosuke is up for re - election.

Under normal circumstances, DPJ candidate Himei Yumiko probably would not stand a chance against Katayama, seeing that Okayama is one of the LDP's "Hoshu no Oukoku" bastions. However, 2005's post privatization purge has created a very interesting situation in this electoral district. After all, Hiranuma Takeo (whose Lower House district is Okayama 3) has yet to re-join his old party. And while he has publically declared support for Katayama, the Asahi Shimbun reports, there are apparently questions, whether Hiranuma's supporters will as a block indeed vote for Katayama.
In the unlikely case of Katayama's defeat, the Tsushima faction would be damaged even further, because it would lose one of its two point men in the Upper House. This in turn could prove to be positive for a Machimura faction trying to continue its dominance over the party.

It also should be very interesting to see how well the DPJ will fare in Hokkaido. Traditionally Hokkaido has been a DPJ stronghold and this time they have teamed up with a curious, albeit influential political figure there, Suzuki Muneo (whom many will remember as the one Diet member serving the longest jail sentence in postwar history). Anything short of the election of Tahara Kaori (Suzuki's candidate) and DPJ candidate Ogawa Katsuya would be a disappointment for both sides.
A victory probably would result in continued close cooperation between Suzuki and the DPJ in the future, whereas a defeat would certainly cause tensions. This in turn would be yet another setback for the dream of a (reasonably) unified opposition.

Chris Winkler, M.A.
PhD Candidate Munich University
Visiting Research Fellow Keio University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:01 PM

[SSJ: 4489] Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP?

From: Ethan Scheiner
Date: 2007/07/17

Very nice post by Paul.

A couple of other quick thoughts: It's actually not unusual for the DPJ to be leading the LDP in PR voting in the rural areas. What is unusual is leading in candidate voting.

But one thing that I mention in my book, but usually gets overrun by the larger argument, is that HC districts are much larger than HR ones. As a result, it is harder for the LDP to target subsidies in a way that's meaningful for elections like the one coming up.
Also, unlike the HR, which requires candidates in nearly all 300 single member districts in order to do well, the fact that the DPJ needs only one or two candidates in just the 47 prefectural districts makes it much easier for the opposition to do well.

Where I would see this election being particularly significant (from the perspective of party alignment
issues) would be if the DPJ were to do sufficiently well that it could create momentum in recruiting candidates and support organizations. However, most likely (if the LDP is smart) the next HR election would be sufficiently far away from now that all momentum would be lost already by then.

Best wishes,
Ethan (Scheiner)

Approved by ssjmod at 09:39 AM

July 17, 2007

[SSJ: 4488] Are Rural Voters Dumping the LDP? Public Opinion and Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/07/17

If history is any guide, I am not the only subscriber to SSJ Forum who is closely watching the unfolding Upper House campaign. One of the more interesting developments is a Yomiuri Shimbun poll from last week showing that the DPJ is now running ahead in much of the LDP's traditional bastion: rural areas. In many ways this is not surprising. The LDP under Koizumi and Abe (Koizumi especially) has taken rural voters for granted. Cut-backs in public works spending, postal privatization, and less-discussed rural municipal mergers have all hit rural voters hard. At the same time the DPJ has started actively courting rural voters. Ozawa has made increasing agricultural subsidies one of the DPJ's main election planks whereas the LDP appears to be ignoring the issue, again apparently assuming that rural voters will support them any way. Other press reports indicate that rural postmasters are out busily campaigning against any politician who supported postal privatization. Although a number of LDP upper house members revolted and opposed postal privatization, on balance this helps the DPJ.

We could already see this pattern emerging in the 2005 lower house election. The wave of Koizumi children was primarily an urban phenomenon. The DPJ generally held its rural seats and even made some gains in some rural areas (Hokkaido, Niigata, and Okayama). Gifu is a place to watch this election, given that the 2005 election badly divided the local LDP chapter there and those divisions appear to have persisted.

A skeptic might compare the current situation to the
1989 Upper House election, when JA and rural voters often supported Socialist candidates as a way to punish the LDP for supporting agricultural liberalization over the previous several years. Of course, in the 1990 lower house election these voters went back to supporting the LDP. However, this time the situation appears different for several reasons.
First, the DPJ is ideologically much closer to average voters in rural areas than was Shakaito. It can field candidates who are hardly more leftist than their LDP opponents. Second, postal privatization if not municipal mergers have cut deeper than the liberalization of fruits and beef in the 1980s. If the LDP suffers significant losses in rural areas the LDP might well try to increase public works spending there again, although this would run afoul of budget tightening goals. It would also suggest a return to Hashimoto faction policies, something the current leadership of the LDP might find difficult to accept.

The second observation I would make is that Abe has completely failed to make this election about constitutional revision. The public has clearly had other priorities and has forced Abe to abandon his plans to make this election about constitutional reform. Even before the current lost pension scandal an opinion poll showed almost 50% of respondents answering that discussing constitutional reform in the upper house election would be "inappropriate," versus something like 20% who thought it would be appropriate.
Although the discussion about revising the constitutional interpretation on "collective defense"
and extending the ASDF mission in Iraq have not attracted much attention in the current campaign, these issues certainly have not helped Abe or the LDP, and may well be contributing to the adverse wind they face.

I am looking forward to hearing how others are viewing at the current campaign.

Cheers,

Approved by ssjmod at 08:36 PM

June 28, 2007

[SSJ: 4481] Japanese young people's politics

From: Tom Blackwood
Date: 2007/06/27

Dear SSJ Forum,

A student of mine would like to learn about Japanese young people's interest (or lack thereof) in politics, and would appreciate some leads on where to find data on things like voting behavior, party affiliation, important political issues, and political behavior.
The age group she is most interested in is Japanese university students (18-22). I am sure that there must be some good resources out there, and I would greatly appreciate any suggestions. Unfortunately, my student does not read Japanese. Please feel free to reply directly to me: kuroki@apu.ac.jp

Thanks in advance,

Tom Blackwood

Associate Professor, Asia Pacific Studies

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Approved by ssjmod at 10:21 AM

June 12, 2007

[SSJ: 4470] Question about statistics on demonstrations

From: Carl Cassegard
Date: 2007/06/11

Dear everyone,

I wonder if you could help me with the following
question: is there any official or non-official statistics or list of political demonstrations in Japan? Above all I'm interested in what demonstrations have been held in the Kansai area since the late 90s until today..

I will try the Prefectural Police in Osaka when I visit them this summer (but my guess is that they might not be very forthcoming with this kind of statistics). I will also look through the "sayoku-kei"
journals I know of for information.

If you have the slightest idea about where to look or where to ask, I would be tremendously grateful!

Best regards,

Carl Cassegard
Dept. of Oriental and African Languages
Goteborg University
Sweden

Tel: +31 - 785 42 11
E-mail: carl.cassegard@japan.gu.se

Approved by ssjmod at 09:59 AM

June 11, 2007

[SSJ: 4468] Locating Police Records in Kobe

From: David Slater
Date: 2007/06/11

Hello Everyone,
I got a request from a friend of mine for some information. I wonder if anyone knows how I might go about locating this sort of thing? Is it possible? Has anyone ever done this sort of locating?

Thanks very much,
David Slater
Sophia University

Can your friend help track down a file on my father kept by Japanese police (Kempetai) before and during WWII?

Rahmo Sassoon arrived in Kobe in 1936 and lived there through the war. He was a leader and spokesman for the Sephardic Jewish community resident there, and had repeated official interactions with the authorities. I have no idea if Japan has anything similar to FOIA or if this is a difficult request. I'm looking to find and pay someone to locate and copy any available information.

--
David H. Slater, Ph.D.
Faculty of Liberal Arts
Sophia University, Tokyo

The Sophia server rejects emails at times. Should your mail to me get returned, please resend to:
dhslater@gmail.com. Sorry for the inconvenience.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:12 AM

[SSJ: 4467] Re: jidoo fuyo teate programme on NHK

From: Michio Nitta
Date: 2007/06/08

I would like to provide additional information about Peter's posting.

1. The jidoo fuyo teate cut is applied to households which have received a jidoo fuyo teate for the past five years or have been eligible for the jidoo fuyo teate for seven years (e.g. a parent who has been divorced for seven years).
2. The law was enforced in April 2003, so the first case of teate cut will appear next April (see No.1).
3. This law exempts households which have children under 3 years old, not 8.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:11 AM

June 07, 2007

[SSJ: 4463] jidoo fuyo teate programme on NHK

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2007/06/06

This morning, NHK's 'Seikatsu Hot Morning' had another hour-long feature on 'kakusa shakai'. Today's theme was the cut in jidoo fuyo teate that is due to come into effect next April (I think). Specifically, it will be cut by 50% for parents who have received it for five years, though children below 8 will be exempt.
(Please don't rely on this posting for complete factual accuracy - I am recalling from memory.) The programme took as a case study a single mother of 37 with 4 children, currently receiving about 52,000 yen per month in jidoo fuyo teate in total, and also working all the hours she can. I wasn't able to watch to the end, but it was gripping and affecting stuff.
The programme explained that the average income of working single mothers with kids, excepting the teate, was about 164,000 yen per month, and also that a higher proportion of single mothers in Japan work than in any other developed country (over 80 percent, even higher than Sweden with 70 percent plus, it was pointed out). (Implication - they are not welfare
scroungers.) There didn't seem any doubt whose side Seikatsu Hot Morning was on, even though they mostly let the facts and case study speak for themselves.

I thought I'd bring this to your attention partly for its intrinsic interest (if it is available for viewing online, some might like to look at it), and partly as an example of how the mainstream media is covering these issues.
One interesting point - for an explanation of the rationale behind the policy, they went to a bureaucrat from Koosei-Roodoo-Shoo. What you would expect in Japan, I guess, but it would never happen in Britain, where civil servants are never asked to defend or explain policies to the media. It's always the politicians. I think I can guarantee that in an equivalent British programme, it would have been a government minister who was being questioned. (And, there would probably have been an opposition minister speaking too.) Now I know that Seikatsu Hot Morning probably wants to keep its presentation as unpolitical as possible, but if one accepts the view that politicians are fundamentally responsible for policies in a democracy, I think they are the ones who should be questioned. It was also interesting that one presenter at one point referred to the 'kuni' making this cut. In Britain, I think it would have been 'the government'. It was a great presentation of the situation, but for me, it was much too depoliticised.
The agents of the policy were invisible.

Peter Cave
M.A., M.Phil., D.Phil. (Oxon)
Assistant Professor
Department of Japanese Studies
School of Modern Languages and Cultures
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
Tel: (+852) 2859-2000
Fax: (+852) 2548-0487
Email: petercav@hkucc.hku.hk
Homepage: www.hku.hk/japanese/peter.html

Approved by ssjmod at 09:50 AM

May 15, 2007

[SSJ: 4445] Re: request for recommendations of anydiscussions(inenglish) of p.m. abe's new foreign policyinitiatives/directions

From: Gavan McCormack
Date: 2007/05/14

Let me hasten to jump on the bandwagon of self-promotion by mentioning my own forthcoming book, due any day now (June 2007) from Verso: Client State:
Japan in the American Embrace.
It is a study of the Japanese state under Koizumi and Abe.

Gavan McCormack
ANU, Canberra, Australia.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

May 14, 2007

[SSJ: 4441] Re: request for recommendations of any discussions (inenglish) of p.m. abe's new foreign policy initiatives/directions

From: Purnendra Jain
Date: 2007/05/14

A good staritng point, in my view, is
How Able Is Abe?
Richard Katz and Peter Ennis
>From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007

Purnendra Jain
Professor, Centre for Asian Studies
University of Adelaide
Australia

Approved by ssjmod at 09:27 PM

[SSJ: 4440] Re: request for recommendations of any discussions(inenglish) of p.m. abe's new foreign policy initiatives/directions

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/05/11

Please check the following by Glosserman and Glazer in PACNET, May1st:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aStdkTzkwF3o&refer=japan

Regards,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 09:25 PM

[SSJ: 4438] Re: request for recommendations of any discussions(inenglish) of p.m. abe's new foreign policy initiatives/directions

From: Christopher Hughes
Date: 2007/05/11

In response to Brooks Spector's enquiry about Abe's emerging foreign policy, and as a self-plug, I would recommend an article by myself (Christopher W. Hughes) and Ellis Krauss, due to be published in the next edition of Survival, vol 49, no. 2, Summer 2007.
The article looks at the transition from Koizumi to Abe, and how structural change in the nature of leadership in Japan is encouraging a more proactive but also potentially volatile Japanese alliance partner for the US.

Chris

Approved by ssjmod at 09:23 PM

May 11, 2007

[SSJ: 4437] request for recommendations of any discussions (inenglish) of p.m. abe's new foreign policy initiatives/directions

From: Brooks Spector
Date: 2007/05/11

i am a retired american diplomat, now living in south africa, who has been asked to help lead a short graduate (m.a.) colloquium on contemporary japanese foreign policy. having served in japan previously, i feel reasonably comfortable dealing with historical issues and up through the early parts of the koizumi prime ministership. my challenge now is to offer analysis of prime minister abe's likely directions and initiatives.

accordingly, i would appreciate forum reader recommendations (even forwarded documents) of very early analyses or explorations of p.m.
abe's foreign policy directions. materials could be sent directly to me at pas1@mweb.co.za if individuals feel the items are not of sufficient general interest for the listserv.

many thanks, /s/j. brooks spector

Approved by ssjmod at 09:45 PM

May 10, 2007

[SSJ: 4435] Re: J Const disc. mailing list

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/05/09

Dear All,

Given the lack of suggestions, I have gone ahead and created a mailing list to discuss the pros and cons of revising or not revising the Japanese Constitution.
Please drop me a note (to fuleman at gmail.com) if you would like to be subscribed.

Thank you.

--
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 11:09 AM

May 08, 2007

[SSJ: 4434] J Const disc. mailing list

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/05/08

Does anyone know of a good English-langauge mailing list devoted to discussing the Japanese Constitution (including whether or not to change what how)? Or am I going to have to set it up myself and invite you?

--
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 04:54 PM

April 19, 2007

[SSJ: 4424] Re: Seeking information on politicians' visitstoYasukuni

From: Sven Saaler
Date: 2007/04/19

Seems like the head of the "Minna de Yasukuni jinja ni sanpai suru kokkai giin no kai", Mr. Kawara Riki, is not particularly keen on publicity in this respect; his homepage doesnt mention his being the chairman...
http://homepage3.nifty.com/kawara/

I am sure the Shrine itself will be happy providing the information, they are usually very cooperative...
(unless you ask the wrong questions...). For sure, a list of parliamentarians that visited the Shrine is not being treated as a secret matter.

There are several lists of sanpai-sha in the internet, but I don't know whether they are trustworthy (some claim to be compiled on newspaper coverage). The names that appear in the lists sound reasonable though, i.e.
the names coming up are those one would expect.

Sven Saaler
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 04:08 PM

[SSJ: 4423] Re: Seeking information on politicians' visits toYasukuni

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/04/19

Also to Mr Katagiri,

There is a group of Dietmembers called "minna de yasukuni jinja ni sanpai shiyou" or words to that effect. If you can find out who the nominal head of this group is, he (and I assume it is a he) would probably be more than glad to provide the information.

--
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 02:16 PM

[SSJ: 4421] Re: Seeking information on politicians' visits toYasukuni

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/04/19

In response to Mr. Katagiri, didn't these visits usually get into the newspapers? If so, keyword searching on e.g. the Asahi database (online or on
disks) or some other newspaper article collection should do it.

Probably that is too obvious. If the visits often didn't make the papers, it might be tough. On the other hand, if not reported, then maybe a visit was truly private and did not matter politically?

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
In Japan through Summer, 2007
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
5-23-2 Hiroo, Shibuya-ku
Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 02:13 PM

[SSJ: 4419] Seeking information on politicians' visits to Yasukuni

From: Nori Katagiri
Date: 2007/04/18

Dear Shaken members,

I am emailing to ask for some help with my research. I am looking for information about visits to the Yasukuni Shrine made by Japanese politicians.
Specifically, I need the names of the Nakasone cabinet members who visited the shrine in 1986 and those of the Kaifu cabinet members who did so on 8/15/1989 (PM Kaifu himself did not). All I could find after a few hours of online research both in Japanese and English and visiting my university's library was an online database of politicians's visits between 2000 and 2004.
If any of you know information about sources, please email me privately (katagiri@sas.upenn.edu), unless you wish to share it with other members of the list.
Thank you in advance.

Respectfully,
Noriyuki (Nori) Katagiri, Mr.
Ph.D. Candidate, Dept. of Political Science University of Pennsylvania

Approved by ssjmod at 02:10 PM

March 13, 2007

[SSJ: 4403] Foreign Affairs essay--How Able is Abe?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/03/12

Abe's handling of the "comfort women" issue is just one example of the way he has handled, and mishandled, various issues. In the current issue of "Foreign Affairs," Peter Ennis and I have a profile of Abe: his personality and capabilities, the role of nationalism in his thinking, his stances on issues ranging from foreign policy to economic reform, and a comparison between Abe and Junichiro Koizumi.

The following URL from "Foreign Affairs" provides the first 500 words of the piece.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86206/richard-katz-peter-ennis/how-able-is-abe.html

Richard Katz
Editor
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

March 02, 2007

[SSJ: 4395] anti-Yoshida pro-reamarment coup mulled, with U.S. support, new documents

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/03/01

For a brief summary of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency papers declassified in response to the initiative of the Associated Press, see Joseph Coleman (with Randy Herschaft), "Papers tie U.S. to 1950s Japan Coup Plot," Yahoo! News, 28 February 2007, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070228/ap_on_re_as/japan_assassination_plot;_ylt=Arjm31HrawbVDioULPUkZ0hvaA8F

Vincent K Pollard
University of Hawai'i at Manoa
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard
U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i ' i S y s t e m

Approved by ssjmod at 11:34 AM

February 19, 2007

[SSJ: 4388] Whaling on thin ice?

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/02/19

See Geoffrey Lean, "Whales saved by fire on Japanese vessel; Hundreds will be spared after the fleet's only factory ship is crippled in Antarctic," _The Independent_ (UK), online edition, 18 February 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article2281372.ece

Vincent K Pollard
University of Hawai'i at Manoa
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard
U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i ' i S y s t e m

Approved by ssjmod at 05:34 PM

February 13, 2007

[SSJ: 4383] Question about NHK VAWW-NET case

From: Jonathan Lewis
Date: 2007/02/13

Dear SSJ-Forum,

I have a question about the ongoing case regarding the editing of a documentary on the December 2000 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery.

Nobuo Ikeda, a commentator whose blog is, I believe, quite popular, wrote about the case in his entry of 30 Jan 2007[1]. He finds the whole affair to have been a series of mistakes, which I summarize below. It's the first of these mistakes that I'd like to ask about.

Mistake # 1. The documentary was proposed by NHK producer Eriko Ikeda (no relation to Nobuo), who is a promoter (hokkinin) of the VAWW-NET and was on the committee organizing the Tribunal. In order to conceal E. Ikeda's role, the producer listed in the documentary credits was Akira (?) Nagai who worked under E. Ikeda.

In other words, writes N. Ikeda, the de facto producer of the documentary was one of the Tribunal organizers, which from the start meant that the documentary would not be neutral. The first mistake therefore was not killing the documentary at the proposal stage.

(For a short profile of Eriko Ikeda see http://www.kyoto-seika.ac.jp/multimedia/2001/no14.html; this profile in fact says that E. Ikeda produced (seisaku) the relevant documentary)

Mistake #2. Leaking information about the content of the documentary to right-wingers.

Mistake #3. Changing the documentary under pressure from the LDP. NHK should have ditched the whole program rather than broadcast an absurdly doctored version of it.

I've read a couple of Japan Focus articles about this controversy, by Tessa Morris-Suzuki[2] and Norma Field[3], but neither of them mentions Eriko Ikeda. Has Nobuo Ikeda got his facts right about Eriko Ikeda's role in VAWW-NET, the Tribunal and the documentary?

Jonathan Lewis
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo

[1] http://blog.goo.ne.jp/ikedanobuo/e/43a70d9ee119c0abefd9399845013e51

[2] http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/2305

[3] http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2352

Approved by ssjmod at 11:42 AM

February 05, 2007

[SSJ: 4378] Japan - Hawaiian Islands - plebiscite suggestion rejected (1897)

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/02/02

Dear Colleagues,

The summary below precedes a question for diplomatic historians and international law specialists.

Japan was one of twenty governments that maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Hawaiian Monarchy when it was overthrown by a cabal of mostly-Caucasian plantation owners in Honolulu (with support from Naval Marines) on 17 January 1893.

After William McKinley became U.S. President in 1897, Japan protested (once) against U.S. efforts to annex the rebel republic that followed the 1893 Overthrow. U.S. Secretary of State John Sherman rebuffed Japanese Minister's protest.

(SOURCE: Sarah Wambaugh, _A Monograph on Plebiscites: With a Collection of Official Documents_, Publications of the Carnedgie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920), [Consult the index for the single footnoted reference to the Hawaiian Islands].)

During 1893-1898, apparently Japan was the only government to protest U.S. plans to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

(SOURCE: Matthew Craven, "Continuity of the Hawaiinan Kingdom, Being a portion of a Legal Brief provided for the acting Council of Regency, " July 12, 2002, p. 29, http://www.hawaiiankingdom.org/pdf/Continuity_Hawn_Kingdom.pdf )

QUESTION: How much has Japan's 1897 opposition to U.S. annexation of Hawai'i attracted the attention of Japanese legal scholars and diplomaic historians writing in Japanese or English during the past 110 years?

Vincent K Pollard

Editor
Hawai'i Politics WWW Virtual Library
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/Hawaii.html

Approved by ssjmod at 11:26 AM

January 26, 2007

[SSJ: 4377] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/26

Hi Harumi,

Ellis Krause and I have just finished an extensive debate on this topic, so one suggestion is that you look over that debate. You might also check out my monograph on this topic (under publications and Policy Studies at http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/)

My relatively short answer here is that yes, the SDF will go overseas again. It does so quite frequently now, mostly for disaster relief.

Regarding the influence of the Iraq deployment, one of the major reasons for why the Iraq achieved some retrospective popularity, as you suggest, is because there were no casualties, and, as one survey question put it, the GSDF "did not get involved in war." But this does not mean that the same public opposition to sending the SDF to a something like a war zone will not reappear with equal ferocity the next time. After all, Abe cannot say "because no GSDF members were killed (or killed others) in Iraq I promise you that none will be killed (or get involved in fighting) in country X." The Iraq deployment does not create much of a precedent either. It was a humanitarian reconstruction mission in close proximity to combat, and rather similar to the Cambodia deployment.

Cheers,

Paul Midford

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director of Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Web: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/japan
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell Phone: +47-452-15-394
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 11:48 AM

[SSJ: 4376] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/26

To Ellis Krause:

One thing on which I think we would both agree is that in terms of strong leaders who are adept at escaping from the constraints of public opinion, Koizumi is a model. He ranks as one of the most, if not the most, politically adept post-war prime minister. Nonetheless, I still find him to have been significantly constrained: he was able to deploy the GSDF to Iraq but he had to substantially scale back the nature of the deployment. Lesser leaders have been and will be even more constrained. Abe shows almost as much willingness as Koizumi to chart his own course and ignore public opinion, but he also appears much more likely to suffer grave consequences for this. I did not follow the revised "patriotic" education bill last Fall very closely, but I believe the bill was actually well supported by public opinion. On the other hand, it is clear that Abe's emphasis on constitutional revision and a larger role in international security is unpopular and is also regarded as a distraction from what the public regards as more pressing issues.

I also agree that Koizumi was able to offer the GSDF dispatch to Iraq as an important political gift to Bush, although I still believe it was in fact essentially a "humanitarian reconstruction assistance" (jindou fukkou shien) mission, as described by the Japanese government. Purifying water and rebuilding schools and hospitals is basically all the GSDF "boots on the ground" accomplished. The military value for the US of this deployment was essentially zero (possibly even negative if you consider the Dutch and Australian troops tied down defending the SDF), but the political symbolism for the Bush administration was significant.

Koizumi would have had more room to build a precedent for expanded SDF operations overseas if he has sent the SDF to Afghanistan instead. There was dramatically less opposition to the Afghan War in Japan. The overwhelmingly unpopular nature of the Iraq War made it difficult to go beyond the limits of a "humanitarian reconstruction" mission like Cambodia. Incidentally, I think the Indian Ocean deployment has been a more important, if still quite limited, precedent for expanded SDF overseas operations than the Iraq deployment.

Best Regards,

Paul Midford

Approved by ssjmod at 11:37 AM

January 24, 2007

[SSJ: 4375] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul J. Scalise
Date: 2007/01/24

To Ellis Krauss:

One small point regarding Koizumi's Yasukuni shrine visits, the data are VERY clear: the public was overwhelmingly in support of Koizumi's visits when the subject was first broached.

According to the Mainichi Shimbun, 92% of those polled approved of the official visits in May 2001. Subsequent polls in June and August of the same year then averaged 67% approval rating for the visits (still very high). The polling data I have for 2004, 2005 and 2006 show the approval fell to the 45-55% range, and bobbed up and down thereafter inconclusively, in my opinion --- 66% (November 2005) to 36% (July 2006) to 50% (August 2006). I would be happy to pass the Excel spreadsheet along to anyone interested in having a more detailed look.

Paul J. Scalise

Approved by ssjmod at 01:37 PM

[SSJ: 4374] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Harumi Befu
Date: 2007/01/24

Will Japan dispatch its troops abroad again? The fact that the Iraq dispatch ended with no injury and no death and therefore that the government did not incur wrath of the people is likely to encourage the already hawkish Abe government to do it again.

Harumi Befu

Approved by ssjmod at 01:29 PM

[SSJ: 4373] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/01/24

To Paul Midford:

Thanks, as usual, to your thoughtful reply.

Just let me add one thing to your message. Again, we are not disagreeing at all about what the public thinks or feels. We are disagreeing about whether public opinion really constrains popular and creative leaders (like Koizumi) who can do things that are not supported by public opinion and get away with them (as Koizumi did). Your suggestion about a poll of Koizumi's justifications is irrelevant to this difference. I think the polls would probably show you were correct about how the public feels. But then again, the public was split about sending SDF to Iraq at all in the beginning and it did not enjoy great public support; the public was split about PM's going to Yasukuni. Yet in both cases Koizumi did those things. Abe partially backed off from the latter because he needed to buttress his public support, but it hasn't kept him from doing other things (nationalist education?) that do not have great public support either. And again, it doesn't matter which aspects of Koizumi's justification for Iraq the public bought and didn't buy--he managed to do it anyway and the very fact that he used all those justifications was merely an attempt to make the policy palatable to everyone if not supportive: if the public wanted to see it as solely for "economic reconstruction" so be it; he still accomplished his real policy goals which were to satisfy the Bush administration in the context of the N. Korea threat and to overcome the first Gulf War debacle. The fact that he got so much of the public to see it as economic reconstruction is merely a testimony to his shrewdness and doesn't I think prove a thing about public opinion constraining his actions. But we will just have to agree to continue disagreeing!

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 12:26 PM

[SSJ: 4372] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/24

To Ellis Krause:

Thanks again for your extensive and thoughtful comments!

> ESK: Again, as you admit, p.o. being against such things, as
> sending the SDF to Iraq in the first place, hasn't prevented
> Japanese leaders from doing things anyway. So if that's true, then
> I don't think that's quite "proof" that the Japanese leadership
> won't do it again despite p.o. at the time.

I have said that the Iraq dispatch has made similar dispatches no easier and probably more difficult. I am not saying that I have "proof" that another dispatch like this one would be "impossible." However, Abe or his successor would run significant electoral risks, or risk a revolt of backbenchers and Komei (somewhat similar to what happened in Fall 1990). I believe these pressures did cause Koizumi to significantly water down the Iraq dispatch. As I wrote before, we know the LDP paid a real price in July 2004.

> ESK: Every statement I saw Koizumi make on NHK he always used TWO
> justifications: contributions to international society and
> fulfilling obligations under US alliance. The latter of course is
> totally bogus as you implied , since under the US-Japan Security
> Treaty Japan does not have any clear obligation to defend the U.S.
> much less join with it in overseas adventures. It's not legal
> justification we are talking about I thought but public opinion.
> He tried to use both justifications to get both the right and his
> critics who didn't buy the dispatch, behind it. As you pointed out
> and I agree, public opinion wasn't initially moved, but he went
> ahead anyway. Thus, once again, public opinion, while setting
> limits doesn't necessarily constrain smart leaders from acting,
> then getting p.o. behind them eventually.

What I find is that Koizumi used the alliance as a justification at the beginning of the dispatch, and then dropped it later. Other government officials emphasized the humanitarian reconstruction mission, and media coverage overwhelmingly focused on this. But I think we will probably have to agree to disagree on what the dominant message was.

> I don't personally think the Japanese public ever bought it as a
> "humanitarian reconstruction mission" by the way--think the public
> bought it the way it was intended: "pacify Bush and the Americans
> with this little thing--don't worry we won't let anyone get
> hurt--so we don't repeat the mistake we made in the first Gulf War,
> and we;keep Bush on our side against N. Korea in the 6 party talks."

A very plausible hypothesis, but I think the polling data is reasonably convincing in showing that this is not the way the public bought it. When supporters of the GSDF dispatch are asked why they supported it, the US alliance tends to come in last. The value of the the GSDF's reconstruction work usually comes in first by a big margin. Although we probably share some skepticism about what the GSDF actually accomplished in Samawah, Japanese really value the SDF's humanitarian reconstruction role at home and now abroad, and polls show they see it as the SDF's most important mission overall. If you drop the term "humanitarian reconstruction" and add in terms like support for the "US," as Asahi did in its Iraq ASDF poll question in June 2006, suddenly majority support turns into majority opposition.

One way to settle this would be to do a poll in which we put Koizumi's original hawkish justifications for the SDF dispatch to Japanese respondents and see what happens. I predict it would bomb. I gather you think it would reveal some significant support. It would be nice if we could figure out a way to do such a poll...

Best Regards,

Paul Midford

Approved by ssjmod at 11:36 AM

January 23, 2007

[SSJ: 4371] Re: Public sector employment

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2007/01/23

Public sector employment, by which I assume you mean government, can be found in the Historical Statistics at the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and comm.

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/27.htm

This site give employees at central and local governemnt since the 1950s. If you want prewar, it is available on the CD, or ask and I will email.

Arthur Alexander
arthur.alexander@att.net

Approved by ssjmod at 01:11 PM

[SSJ: 4369] Public sector employment

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2007/01/20

I was wondering if anyone could point me to authoritative source on public-sector employment in Japan. I'd like to see center and local (separately or combined), and a time series would be gravy. If it's all that can be found, the public sector employment as a share of total employment would be fine.

And please consider yourselves to be authoritative sources.

Thanks much!
-mike

Approved by ssjmod at 12:01 PM

[SSJ: 4366] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/01/18

To Paul Midford:

Thanks for your interesting responses to my responses to yours. I am beginning to realize that we don't disagree on the facts, but rather their implications and the interpretations of your data. Some examples below.

Best,
Ellis

> ....Because of Iraq, the public is much less supportive of
> overseas humanitarian dispatches overall (see the data and
> reference in my last post). The fact that a solid majority of
> Japanese oppose the continued presence of the ASDF in Iraq is also
> telling.

ESK: Again, as you admit, p.o. being against such things, as sending the SDF to Iraq in the first place, hasn't prevented Japanese leaders from doing things anyway. So if that's true, then I don't think that's quite "proof" that the Japanese leadership won't do it again despite p.o. at the time.

> ...The SDF has also gone overseas on numerous other occasions to
> provide disaster relief without a UN mandate, the post 2004
> Tsunami relief mission being just one notable and recent example.
> In terms of significant precedents in support of the US military,
> the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean is more significant.
>
> The Iraq mission was officially justified as a response to a UN
> request. ... Your co-author elsewhere, Chris Hughes, has written
> about Japan's use of UN mandates to justify its deployments in
> Iraq and elsewhere (see Chis's Adelphi paper), and to avoid
> rationales related to the alliance.

ESK: All your examples are of direct and clear humanitarian or, as in Indian Ocean, clear UN mandate except Iraq. That was its significance--that even in the face of a very indirect and unclear "mandate" from international society and fierce opposition from some of the U.S.'s other main allies and major countries, Japan went ahead anyway. I consider that more of a break with precedent than sending SDF peacekeepers under UN auspices abroad, humanitarian assistance or the Indian Ocean with clear UN support. And I believe Chris has written about Japan's use of UN mandates, but also has posed that as one route, rather than collective defense, that Japanese leaders could take. In Iraq, Koizumi tried to do both to muddy the waters about which rationale was being used.

> Although the Koizumi and others in his cabinet have made comments
> about the importance of dispatching the SDF for the sake of the
> alliance, this was not the legal basis they used to justify the
> deployments, and these comments did not appear to move public
> opinion at all (in some cases they backfired). In practice, the
> mission was sold to the Japanese public as a humanitarian
> reconstruction mission.

ESK: Every statement I saw Koizumi make on NHK he always used TWO justifications: contributions to international society and fulfilling obligations under US alliance. The latter of course is totally bogus as you implied , since under the US-Japan Security Treaty Japan does not have any clear obligation to defend the U.S. much less join with it in overseas adventures. It's not legal justification we are talking about I thought but public opinion. He tried to use both justifications to get both the right and his critics who didn't buy the dispatch, behind it. As you pointed out and I agree, public opinion wasn't initially moved, but he went ahead anyway. Thus, once again, public opinion, while setting limits doesn't necessarily constrain smart leaders from acting, then getting p.o. behind them eventually. I don't personally think the Japanese public ever bought it as a "humanitarian reconstruction mission" by the way--think the public bought it the way it was intended: "pacify Bush and the Americans with this little thing--don't worry we won't let anyone get hurt--so we don't repeat the mistake we made in the first Gulf War, and we;keep Bush on our side against N. Korea in the 6 party talks."

Two quick points regarding Ellis' comments to Ehud:

> From a US point of view,I don't think the SDF, even today, begins
> to compare in significance with US military access to bases in
> Japan.

ESK: I think you are missing all the moves to make SDF, especially maritime and air, interoperable with US forces in the Pacific. U.S. bases in Japan outside Okinawa are not that significant in the grand scheme of things except for protection of Japan. Okinawa is for force projection in times of crisis in Pacific, but then again, the Japanese are pressuring the US to reduce them and they've promised they will. The new interoperability and joint planning is as much or more important now I think.

> The logistical significance the US provides Japan [sic: think you
> meant the other way round?] in the Indian Ocean is minimal....

ESK: Not what I heard--their fuel and ammunition carrying is quite significant I think?

> and of course the GSDF in Iraq only provided humanitarian
> reconstruction assistance to Samawah. Koizumi did indeed signal to
> China and Korea that how Japan interpretes its history is none of
> their business, but surpsingly, Abe has moved back from this
> position to some extent.

ESK: I don't believe Abe has moved back from that position at all! All he's done to smooth things over with China is move to a "Don't ask and I won't tell" policy." It is also questionable how long that can be maintained given the Japanese media but that's another issue. And he did it I think primarily because this was his chief domestic weakness upon taking office--in one fell swoop he removed the issue of his ability to handle China because of his inexperience. Smart move. Trade and investment with China has continued apace under Koizumi despite all the historical memory rhetoric so there was no reason for Abe to "reassure" China in practical terms. Besides, if he was really so intent on "reassuring China" he wouldn't have pushed a patriotic education bill or be still pushing constitutional revision!

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:40 AM

[SSJ: 4365] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/18

As a post-script to my message from yesterday, I want to express my deep gratitude to Ellis for his comments and for engaging on this issue with me. I have plans to follow my monograph with a full-length book looking at longer term trends in Japanese public opinion toward security, and his comments are helping me to clarify and develop my argument.

One comment regarding John Campbell's look at why Japanese leaders are so enthralled with American leaders and precedents: can we say that this tendency might be beginning to erode now that Abe has become premier? Besides indications that Abe is less enthusiastic about Anglo-Saxon style economic reforms than Koizumi, Defense Minister (no longer JDA Director) Kyuma has gone public with his opposition to Koizumi's support for the Iraq War. This view has been strong in the Hashimoto faction throughout, but this is the first time I am aware of a minister publicly expressing this.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:12 AM

January 17, 2007

Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Sanford Jacoby
Date: 2007/01/17

At the end of your Richard Katz's post, he said something to the effect that Japan was better off in the 1950s when stockholding was relatively widespread, and I took that as an implicit comparison to the United States, where stockholding by households is more prevalent than in Japan. So my sincere apologies to Richard Katz for inferring something that was not intended.

His figures are close to mine: In the Fed's Table 6, the median quintile holds stock from all sources worth $11,600. (The Fed data are for families; the Census looks at households) Whether that is a lot of money or not depends on what one compares it to. If it is compared to income, I am of the opinion that it represents rather meager savings. (In fact, the U.S. savings rate is close to zero currently and has been falling steadily since the 1980s.) Assume that the median family has median income of $43,000 and is of median working age (45). Assume that it has been saving since age 25, with half going into a passbook account and half into stock (in a 401k). It would accumulate $11,600 --assuming no capital gains or dividend reinvestments--by saving $580 per year. That works out to a savings rate of around 2.7%, which is biased way upward by not including capital gains and dividends. The question is not, why does the median have so much stock, but, why does it have so little? Why is the savings rate so low, especially with all the dire warnings about Social Security's solvency? And the answer is: the median household is heavily indebted. Its hoard of equity is dwarfed by its hoard of debt. Some economic journalists (e.g., Michael Mandel of Business Week) have claimed that high risk is inevitable and that U.S. households today have a greater appetite for risk simply because they hold a little bit of stock. But the data just discussed suggest that, if f the U.S. economy is relatively risky, it's not the result of decisions by the median household.

As for Japan, the relevance, I think is clear: In Japan, the financial community and government economists constantly hold the United States up as an exemplar--a country whose citizens have benefited from financialization and relatively high rates of family shareholding (as compared to Japan). Nihonjin, they say, put too much money into low-risk savings accounts; they put too much emphasis on having low-risk (of termination) jobs. They need to loosen up, take on more risk, buy more stock.

But if Japan were overnight to become exactly like the United States, its median household would be in the same difficult position as in the States: a little bit of stock, a lot of debt, and no good way to diversify its risk. So the question about financialization is, as Suzuki said in another post: cui bono? If higher risk in fact leads to higher returns, that surplus could be redistributed to those of lesser means, and we would have Pareto optimality. But the real world is nothing like that.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:34 PM

[SSJ: 4362] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2007/01/17

More on inequality and mobility from Arthur Alexander arthur.alexander@att.net

I tend to agree with Rick Katz that the policy focus should be on the individual not the job, or the firm, or the industry, or perhaps even the region (the last point is arguable).

The reason I say this is that the Japanese economy is becoming more variable. The fortunes of industries and companies are more heterogenous since around 1990 than at any time in the past 50 years and possibly longer. Regions, too, are faring quite differently. Just in the prefectures around Tokyo, for example, land prices have varied substantially betwen them in the past six years.

The proclivities of politicians have been to protect jobs by subsidies, protection, regulation, and any other means they could think of. Such an approach will become more costly and inhibit the positive changes that could make things better for everyone.

A common mistake among many people in the US and I think also in japan is that a job that is lost is lost for ever. That is, once one is out of work, there is no more future for that person. It turns out that the Japanese labor market is much more flexible than most people believe and that considerable churning occurs at most times.

On inequality, a recent paper looks at individual taxpayer returns: Moriguchi, C. and Saez , E. (2005): The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1885-2002: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics, University of California, Berkeley.

The income accounted for by the top 5 per cent of taxpayers rose sharply after 1980, swelling by 5 percentage points to almost a quarter of all income. This ascent more or less paralleled the rise in the Gini coefficient. The story in Japan, though, is not of the super rich at the very top of the income pyramid, but rather of those just below the top; the gains in income shares appear only in the 95-99 percentiles. That is, the very top tiers of Japanese taxpayers did not increase their piece of the economic pie. This result stands in contrast to incomes of top earners in the United States. The American growth in inequality came in the ranks above the top 1 per cent; for example, the top 0.01 per cent of American taxpayers claimed 0.5 per cent of personal income in 1980 compared to 3 per cent in 2000, whereas the same group in Japan remained at 0.5 percent over the same period.

The main story told by Moriguchi and Saez is not the shifts after 1980, but rather the very large decline of inequality from 1935 to 1945. The top 1 per cent accounted for one-fifth of all personal income in 1938, but fell abruptly and precipitously to under 8 per cent within 10 years. The authors attribute this dramatic fall mainly to the collapse of capital income caused by wartime taxation, destruction, and hyperinflation. Labor income concentration also declined, probably because of wartime wage controls, but much less dramatically. The top share remained low in the postwar years because of the breakup of zaibatsu holdings and the introduction of progressive income and inheritance taxes.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:53 PM

[SSJ: 4361] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/17

Fujikazu Suzuki of the RENGO Research Institute for Advancement of Living Standards wrote in response to me:

> I cannot get the way to protect workers without protecting their
> jobs ? Could you go into details of your argument?

[snip]

> So, I think, it is also important for us to find the way to
> stabilize the employment within the internal labour market of the
> firm.

As economies grow and develop, some industries grow; some shrink. Some firms grow; some shrink. New firms arise; others die. To make a worker's job at a particular firm his main social safety net creates tremendous political pressure to make sure that this firm survives and does not shrink--no matter how inefficient the firm. That's one reason Japan protected the zombies. That's one reason Japanese workers are being told these days: lose either your wage or your job, and they give in.

So, let's take a Rengo affiliate like the autoworkers. Given the tremendous rise of worker productivity and slowdown of car sales in Japan, how could Japan "stabilize the employment within the internal labour market of the [auto] firm[s]?" Only by selling overseas the vast majority of Japanese brand cars. Half the cars made in Japan in 2005 were exported, while many more were sold via transplants. What did that do to the stability of the internal labor market of General Motors or Ford and their affiliates? Had the US followed the policy you suggested, many Rengo members would have lost their jobs and US consumers would be driving cars with a lot more defects, and at higher prices.

So, workers cannot be guaranteed to have the same job at the same firm for all of their life. And, as you know, lifetime employment never applied to the entire labor force in Japan. What we can do is to provide a social safety net as workers transition from one firm to another, either within the same industry or in a different industry.

Countries where new firms arise and old firms die end up growing faster and providing new jobs. Labor practices that made sense in Japan when there was rapid economic growth and a growing population no longer make sense in period where many firms suffer declining sales and the working age population is shrinking.

Again, I am not claiming that the US is doing the right thing vis a vis safety nets and worker protection. There is a way to combine labor mobility with worker rights and a strong safety net, but the US had not done so in recent decades. However, as I said in a different context, the mistakes made by the US should not be used as a pretext for keeping outmoded, counterproductive practices in Japan.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 12:47 PM

[SSJ: 4360] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/17

In response to Sanford Jacoby:

Let me make this a limited response, partly because this is a forum devoted to Japan, not the US, and partly because you seem to be arguing against someone with different views than the ones you mistakenly attribute to me.

> Richard Katz implies that the United States has a kind of
> "people's capitalism" and that Japan should too.

Never said that; never implied it. What I did say was that Americans have a higher share of their financial assets in stocks than Japanese do; that stocks in the US have a higher return over the long haul than bank accounts; and that real shareholder power over management (which does not exist either in Japan or in the US) would be beneficial to the household owners of stocks as well as to the functioning of corporations and the economy in both Japan and the US.

As for the importance of stockholding in the American middle class. Here's the data according to the Federal Reserve report "Recent changes in US family finances." Among people in the 40-59% income quintile, 51% had direct or indirect (e.g. retirement plan) holdings of stock in 2004. Among those owning stocks, the median level of stock holdings was $15,000 in 2004. That was equal to about one-third of the quintile's median annual income of $43,000, and about 43% of their total financial assets That's a pretty hefty amount, relative to income and total financial assets. Among those in the 60-79% income quintile, 70% had direct or indirect holdings of stock. Among those owning stocks, the median level of holdings was $26,000 in 2004, which equaled about 38% of the quintile's median annual income of $68,000 and about 41% of their total financial assets. Again, it's a hefty amount. (For some reason, the figures in the printed Fed report and those in the Excel spreadsheet the Fed provides with the report are somewhat different; I've taken the ones from the Excel spreadsheet..)

But it's still too low. If people's wages and salaries had risen commensurately with their productivity over the last few decades, then they'd be able to afford to save more and thus invest more.

Suggesting that there are things Japan can learn from the US experience does not mean that I think the US economy is run in the best way possible. No more than suggesting that American manufacturers can learn from Toyota implies an endorsement of everything else that goes on in Japan.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist

Approved by ssjmod at 12:02 PM

[SSJ: 4359] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Fujikazu Suzuki
Date: 2007/01/17

In the last paragrah of [SSJ: 4351] (2007/01/16), Richard Katz wrote:

> BTW, thanks to Ron Dore for his additional info on inequality. I do
> disagree with him on one point. I think the right policy is to
> protect the worker, not the job.

I cannot get the way to protect workers without protecting their jobs ? Could you go into details of your argument? Of course, it is ridiculous to create wasteful jobs to protect them. However, it was not the main stream of many arrangements to protect employment within the corporation or corporate groups in the 1970s and 1980s. The "flexible rigidity"(to burrow the expression of Prof. Dore) of its employment system worked for the prosperity of the firm as well as for the workers. We should not ignore the importance of the workings of external labour market to give the workers to develop their vocational capability. But, at the same time, we need some mechanism to assure the stability of workers' vocational lives. So, I think, it is also important for us to find the way to stabilize the employment within the internal labour market of the firm.

> The problem is that it's hard to do labor reform without simultaneously
> doing corporate reform--and vice versa--not to mention the problem
> of budget cuts that hurt the safety net.

True! I agree with you. But, the true problem is for who's interests these reforms are done. And, I think, it is the most important role of the social science to clarify the difference of interests behind various policy options, not to preach one of them.

---------------------------------------------------
Fujikazu Suzuki suzuki.fujikazu@nifty.com
Deputy Director General
RENGO Research Institute for Advancement of Living Standards
(RENGO RIALS)
1-3-2 Iidabashi, Chiyoda-ku, 102-0072 Tokyo
JAPAN
Tel. +81-3-5210-0851 Fax. +81-3-5210-0852

Approved by ssjmod at 11:36 AM

[SSJ: 4358] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/17

Ellis wrote: "To Paul Midford: I'm afraid you misinterpreted my remarks about Iraq and Koizumi. I didn't say that Koizumi had succeeded in convincing the public about Iraq, any more than he did about his visits to Yasukuni (public was quite split, as you rightly pointed out, on Iraq deployment and also on his visits to Yasukuni). My point was that Japanese leaders since Nakasone have often gone against prevailing opinion to break "small taboos" on security then let the public get used to the new outer limits, thus pushing the envelope out further next time of what is acceptable and what not. This is exactly what Koizumi did with Iraq."

Ellis, I do understand your point here, and agree that it worked in the past. Whether we call it manipulation of public opinion, or rational reassurance (i.e. demonstrating that civilian control works, that the military will not again spin out of control, and that Tokyo can use the SDF in a judious and constructive way), this worked with the Cambodia dispatch of 1992. Public opinion was divided before the Cambodia but came to accept the mission of humanitarian reconstruction as a result of this deployment. At most, we can say that Koizumi repeated this precedent in Iraq with minimal tweaking, and without suffering significant adverse consequences. At worst, we can say that the public will be more reluctant to back the dispatch of the GSDF for humanitarian reconstruction to Syria (or post invasion country x) next year. Because of Iraq, the public is much less supportive of overseas humanitarian dispatches overall (see the data and reference in my last post). The fact that a solid majority of Japanese oppose the continued presence of the ASDF in Iraq is also telling.

Ellis: "So now the taboo of only sending SDF abroad under UN auspices has been broken for the first time, and because of that, Abe now takes the public stand that there has to be a case by case consideration of when "collective defense" with the U.S. is constitutional or not. I think that he couldn't have done that without the Iraq precedent."

The first overseas dispatch of the SDF outside of a UN framework was in 1994, when the SDF was sent to eastern Zaire to provide assistance to refuggees in the wake of the Rwandan genocide. The SDF has also gone overseas on numerous other occasions to provide disaster relief without a UN mandate, the post 2004 Tsunami relief mission being just one notable and recent example. In terms of significant precedents in support of the US military, the MSDF deployment to the Indian Ocean is more significant.

The Iraq mission was officially justified as a response to a UN request. In Spring 2003 the UN Security Council officially authorized the coalition authorities' presence in Iraq and a year later established a "multinational force" after which Koizumi immediately announced that the SDF contingent would join this force. Your co-author elsewhere, Chris Hughes, has written about Japan's use of UN mandates to justify its deployments in Iraq and elsewhere (see Chis's Adelphi paper), and to avoid rationales related to the alliance. Although the Koizumi and others in his cabinet have made comments about the importance of dispatching the SDF for the sake of the alliance, this was not the legal basis they used to justify the deployments, and these comments did not appear to move public opinion at all (in some cases they backfired). In practice, the mission was sold to the Japanese public as a humanitarian reconstruction mission.

Abe has not yet changed the constitutional interpretation barring the right to "collective defense," and my analysis of public opinion may suggest one reason for this. On the other hand, Abe has clearly signaled that he would like to, and if he "wins" this summer's upper house election he probably will reinterprete the constitution.

"Also, by the way, the very evidence you present that a majority of the public didn't support the sending of the SDF to Iraq, proves I think exactly the opposite of your main argument that public opinion totally constrains leaders! As I said in my original post, its sets limits, but doesn't totally constrain leaders."

I agree that public opinion does not totally constrain leaders. Koizumi, because of his great political skills, was far less constrained than other leaders, although still significantly constrained. Koizumi had his way by dispatching the GSDF to Iraq, and public opinion made its influence felt through Komei and elements of the LDP, which converted this mission from one designed to support the US to a humanitarian reconstruction mission ala Cambodia. I see this as an example of a leader modifying a proposal to place it close to the indifference point of public opinion: watering down the proposal enough so that a large and stable opposing opinion majority does not form. The key question is which changed more: Koizumi's proposal in 2003 or public opinion since? I would say the former. Despite watering down the dispatch, exit polls from the 2004 showed the number two reason for the LDP defeat in the upper house election that year was the Iraq deployment. In other words, the dispatch was a bit too far from the indifference point of public opinion.

Regardless of Iraq, Abe seems to think that he can rally public opinion around the issue of making Japan a "normal nation" and constitutional reform. If he wins the upper house election on this platform then my argument will certainly be proven wrong. In the meantime, Abe acts as though public opinion constraints are minimal and his capacity to lead is great.

Two quick points regarding Ellis' comments to Ehud: From a US point of view,I don't think the SDF, even today, begins to compare in significance with US military access to bases in Japan. The logistical significance the US provides Japan in the Indian Ocean is minimal, and of course the GSDF in Iraq only provided humanitarian reconstruction assistance to Samawah. Koizumi did indeed signal to China and Korea that how Japan interpretes its history is none of their business, but surpsingly, Abe has moved back from this position to some extent. Historical reassurance of Asian neighbors might not be dead after all. Also, despite the Yasukuni visits, I believe Koizumi issued more apologies than any other post-war prime minister, not that anyone was paying attention.

Paul Midford

Approved by ssjmod at 11:28 AM

[SSJ: 4357] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/01/17

> I just heard on the BBC that some politician in England is calling
> for curbs on executive compensation. The same power shift occurred
> in the UK; actually in some ways the British Labor Party has moved
> further to the right than even the American Democratic Party but
> calls like this may have more currency there due to a socialist
> heritage or something (though I have no idea if the idea has any
> chance of success).

Israel has gone the same route: socialist heritage (more ideology than practice), top managers' atrocious salaries, politicians' calls for curbing top managers' salaries and all. Nothing has been done, and it is likely that nothing will be done, as far as legal measures are concerned.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:20 AM

[SSJ: 4356] Re: July Upper House elections and Abe's fate

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/01/16

In reply to Rick Katz: it seems to me that there is a good chance of the LDP & CGP losing next summer. Elections tend to be referenda on incumbent performance, maybe more in Japan than elsewhere even under the old Lower House electoral system that dampened election-to- election swings. Since the mid 1970s, though most of its votes came from the rather structured more rural districts, the LDP needed the urban floating vote to win a good majority. When floating voters had negative feelings about the LDP they voted for the opposition or, in large numbers, didn't vote at all. The reason for negative feelings was scandals more often than not. So when somebody asked me the other day about the election, I said "one medium sized scandal in the spring should do it." Bigger than these little piddling ones that keep happening, but it wouldn't have to be as big as Recruit etc.

I don't understand why LDP and CGP leaders seem so adamant about not having a double election this time. They did it twice and it worked great. The advantages may not be as great with the new electoral system but they should still be there, I would think. The PM dissolves the house and gets a general election on his own say-so; seems to me Abe should again emulate his hero George W Bush and double down, go for a big bang rather than just whimper into obscurity.

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Visiting Professor
Institute of Social Science
Tokyo University
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
5-23-2 Hiroo, Shibuya-ku
Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 11:14 AM

January 16, 2007

[SSJ: 4355] Re: July Upper House elections and Abe's fate

From: Aurelia George Mulgan
Date: 2007/01/16

In response to Richard Katz's clarion call, the following data might be useful:-

The Tokyo Shinbun of 14 January reported a Kyodo News poll showing that the rate of public support for Prime Minister Abe's cabinet was 45.0% down from 48.6% recorded in a previous survey conducted 5-6 December 2006. The non-support rate for the Abe cabinet was 38.9%, up 3.6 points. Right after its inauguration the Abe cabinet's support rate peaked at 65.0%. Since then, its support rate has been declining and its non-support rate increasing.

The latest Kyodo New poll also showed the breakdown of public support for political parties: LDP at 41.9% (44.6% in the last survey), DPJ at 15.4% (20.3% in the last survey), and Komeito at 4.4% (3.5% in the last survey), the JCP at 3.9% (3.0% in the last survey), the SDP at 1.9% (1.4% in the last survey), the People's New Party at 0.3% (0.6% in the last survey), and "none" at 30.3% (25.0% in the last survey). No respondents picked the New Party Nippon.

Food for thought.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA
Australia

Approved by ssjmod at 05:05 PM

[SSJ: 4353] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/01/16

Thanks to all who responded to my post, with agreement and with disagreement. Let me briefly try to respond to several of these here:

To John Campbell: Yes, I think you are better off talking about "Why are the Japanese Leaders the Only Ones who Think The U.S. is Still a Model?" or something like that,. "Love" implies something very different I think and I'm not sure it's the appropriate word for the emulation and the self-interested followership that has and is occurring. Certainly, Abe's push for a National Security Council like the U.S. is an example of the continuing desire to emulate the U.S. Often forgotten in using the US as a model is the very different institutions of a parliamentary system like Japan's and a Presidential one like the U.S.

To Paul Midford: I'm afraid you misinterpreted my remarks about Iraq and Koizumi. I didn't say that Koizumi had succeeded in convincing the public about Iraq, any more than he did about his visits to Yasukuni (public was quite split, as you rightly pointed out, on Iraq deployment and also on his visits to Yasukuni). My point was that Japanese leaders since Nakasone have often gone against prevailing opinion to break "small taboos" on security then let the public get used to the new outer limits, thus pushing the envelope out further next time of what is acceptable and what not. This is exactly what Koizumi did with Iraq. It didn't have a majority support of the public when he sent the SDF in, as you pointed out. But he did it anyway and ultimately a small majority did support the deployment because the Koizumi government made darn sure that there were no "incidents" or casualties (that we know of) that would have produced a reaction. So now the taboo of only sending SDF abroad under UN auspices has been broken for the first time, and because of that, Abe now takes the public stand that there has to be a case by case consideration of when "collective defense" with the U.S. is constitutional or not. I think that he couldn't have done that without the Iraq precedent. This is exactly what I meant about breaking small taboos to establish new boundaries. Also, by the way, the very evidence you present that a majority of the public didn't support the sending of the SDF to Iraq, proves I think exactly the opposite of your main argument that public opinion totally constrains leaders! As I said in my original post, its sets limits, but doesn't totally constrain leaders.

To Ehud Harari: I think the question of whether the "Yoshida Doctrine" is dead or dying depends on what aspect of it you see as the core of it. I agree that Yoshida's eventual goal was for Japan to become a "normal nation" (Ken Pyle has an excellent chapter of this in his book The Japanese Question, Power and Purpose in a New Era about Yoshida expecting that eventually collective defense would be possible for Japan). But as you point out, that may have been Yoshida's longer term "vision" but my understanding of his "Doctrine" is that it has always been taken to be:
1)Get the U.S. to defend Japan by giving them bases
2)so that Japan did not have to totally rearm and could maintain it's "peace constitution" or get involved with any US adventures overseas not in Japan's interests
3)and could concentrate on economic growth,
4)thereby avoiding polarizing public opinion on security even further and also antagonizing Japan's neighbors because of Pacific War memories.

In other words, The Yoshida Doctrine was a brilliant way out of the "Alliance Dilemma" of keepng the US from abandoning Japan without Japan becoming entangled in US military policy abroad that Japan didn't see as in its interests. And it was interim means by which Japan ultimately might then be able to take its place as a political power again (by becoming an economic power) and only then perhaps become a "normal nation" in other respects.

In my opinion almost every one of these dimensions is either dead, or on its last legs.
1)Japan continues to provide the US with bases, but the core of the alliance now is the SDF and its interlocking and supporting active roles to the U.S. military, not the bases themselves any more
2)Japan has kept the "defensive" aspects of Article 9 but most everything else about the way Article 9 used to be interpreted in Yoshida's day and until the 1990s has now gone by the board. And Japan is about as rearmed as it can be within those defensive "limits."
3)Economic growth is not the national goal any more as it was until the late 1980s--becoming a "normal nation" (i.e. Yoshida's ultimate vision) in security and the alliance now is. 4)Koizumu's Yasukuni visits and essentially telling China and Japan that how Japan interprets the war is none of their business is the end of Yoshida's concerns about not antagonizing Japan's neighbors on the historicial memories issue.

So yes, Yoshida's ultimate hope/vision is coming to pass, but if that is the case, then indeed the Doctrine that was supposed to be the interim strategy for Japan is dead or dying. The Doctrine was the means to the ultimate vision of Japan as a "normal nation" and rearmed world power (although with defensive limits) which, once accomplished, means that the Doctrine isn't necessary and viable any more.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:38 PM

[SSJ: 4352] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/01/16

Ron Dore paraphrasing Paul Krugman on the explosion of CEO salaries:

> it's a change in social norms: the self-restraint ethic has been
> eroded: greed has become respectable.

This is a cultural argument, albeit culture change over time rather than cross-sectional variation in national cultures. If we ask why the cultural change occurred, a good possibility (from a political scientist's point of view) is that the power of corporate elites strengthened and opposed or "countervailing" power from labor unions and government weakened.

I just heard on the BBC that some politician in England is calling for curbs on executive compensation. The same power shift occurred in the UK; actually in some ways the British Labor Party has moved further to the right than even the American Democratic Party but calls like this may have more currency there due to a socialist heritage or something (though I have no idea if the idea has any chance of success).

Needless to say, it has been happening in Japan too, but more recently and from (in this regard) a starting point further to the left.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:51 PM

[SSJ: 4351] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/16

Fujikazu Suzuki is right. I stand corrected on the ratio of CEO:worker pay in the US twenty years ago. In my haste, I had relied on a secondary source that cited "Executive Excess," without going through my usual procedure of re-checking the primary source. Looking at the original 2006 edition of Excecutive Excess, it clearly says:

> Since we first started tracking the CEO-worker pay gap in 1990, it
> has grown from 107-to-1 to 411-to-1 in 2005. Today's gap is nearly
> 10 times as large as the 1980 ratio of 42-to-1, calculated by
> Business Week

It adds that, in the 1960s, CEO-worker ratios averaged around 35:1.

Business Week of April 22, 2002 (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_16/b3779125.htm?chan=search) says:

> 1980, CEO compensation was 42 times that of the average worker. In
> 2000, it was 531 times [this is among the top 365 companies--rk].

On April 18, 2001, BW said re: Japan (http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/apr2001/ca20010419_812.htm?chan=search)

> Typically, they earn only about 10 times more than a manufacturing
> employee, according to a 2000 Towers Perrin survey that looked at
> industrial companies with about $500 million in annual sales.

Japan's ratio, btw, was the lowest among the 25 advanced and developing countries in the BW table.

The 2005 edition of Executive Excess also has a number of stats showing that, in the US, CEO pay has a very loose (and sometimes inverse) relationship to company performance or shareholder return. For example:

> If you had invested in the stock of each of the single highest paid
> CEOs since 1990, you actually would have lost money. In fact, you
> would have done nearly six times better by investing in the S&P 500
> index.

Business Week over the years has also issued a number of articles on what it calls the "fuzzy" link between CEO compensation and company performance in the US.

BTW, thanks to Ron Dore for his additional info on inequality. I do disagree with him on one point. I think the right policy is to protect the worker, not the job. If Nippon Steel or Nissan or NEC has to keep workers on its payroll regardless of declining sales, it's either going to cut wages, or start building flower shops and amusements parts to create make-work, or both. This hurts growth and living standards in Japan. There should be a good safety net as workers leave one job for another. I'm not claming the US had done a good job on this. But in Japan, the job is the primary safety net--hence the incentives to keep the zombie borrowers alive. It also hurts the incentive to hire regular workers at good pay and benefits in the first place. The problem is that it's hard to do labor reform without simultaneously doing corporate reform--and vice versa--not to mention the problem of budget cuts that hurt the safety net.

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 12:44 PM

[SSJ: 4350] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Sanford Jacoby
Date: 2007/01/16

From: Sanford Jacoby, UCLA

Richard Katz implies that the United States has a kind of "people's capitalism" and that Japan should too. If the median household has a lot of its assets in corporate stock, then it should be as risk-loving as the folks on Wall Street. And since, in theory, a democratic political system ought to reflect the median voter's interests, then the policies that support shareholder primacy are, presumably democratic. But wait. When it comes to corporate governance and financial regulation, the interests of the median household are vastly different from those of the upper middle class.

Katz cites figures on equity as a percentage of financial assets for the median household bracket in the US. Looks quite high, at around 40 percent. Maybe we do have shareholder capitalism after all. But wait a minute. The median household actually doesn't own very much equity in absolute terms. In 2004, after the stock market stopped gyrating, the value of the median household's share equity -- direct and pension-held -- was a meager $7,500. The major asset held by the median household is its home, which in 2004 caused all non-stock assets, financial and nonfinancial, to have a value of $148,000. Lest one think that real estate gives the median household a cushion to encourage risky share investing, remember that there is a mortgage to fund this house as well as secondary mortgages to pay for big-ticket consumption goods such as a college, orthodontics, and other bills. Thus the median household in 2004 had total debt of $74,000. In other words, its debt/equity ratio was 9.9. The median household also has considerable assets tied up in firm-specific skills, although these are difficult, if not impossible to measure. But the implication is that the median household is undiversified. Its primary assets are a house and a job. It is exposed to high levels of default risk. It will act in a risk-averse manner in financial and labor markets. That doesn't sound like the sort of policies the Republican Party has been proposing in recent years.

But wait. Those GOP pols know which side their bread is buttered on. Let's have a look at the top 1% of American households. (See the Money magazine on the coffee table?) Their stock holdings are worth $3.3 million. They have homes and other assets --bonds, cash, partnerships -- worth $12 million. Lucky for them, their homes are not their primary non-stock asset and they do not require secondary mortgages to finance their children's dentistry. Hence their debt is only $566,000 and their debt equity ratio is 0.17. In other words, the debt/equity ratio of the median household is 58 times greater than that of the wealthiest 1 percent. For the top 1%, the combination of a relatively small amount of debt and a diversified portfolio translates into a willingness to take all manner of risk on the stock market. Bring on those hedge funds. (By the way, the top 1% owns 37% of all household stock holdings; the top 10 % owns almost 80%. Guess whose preferences drive financial policy and corporate governance? Not the median household's.)

And, as a final note, it is important to remember that the equity held by households is only a portion of total equity ownership (about half). Other big owners include institutional and foreign investors, whose diversification drives them to seek very different (risk-accomodating) financial rules than the median household. So much for people's capitalism. Coming soon to a country near you.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:36 PM

[SSJ: 4349] July Upper House elections and Abe's fate

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/16

Calling all political scientists!

In July, the Upper House will hold elections. The LDP seems vulnerable.

Right now, out of the 242-seat chamber, the LDP-Komeito coalition has a 14-seat majority (111 seats for the LDP and 24 for the Komeito) for a total of 135.

Half the seats are up for re-election. But these are the seats that were elected in the Koizumi landslide of 2001. In that year, the LDP won 64 seats (and another 2 people joined the LDP caucus after the election) and the Komeito won 13. In 2004, despite Koizumi's presence, the LDP won only 49 seats--15 less than in 2001 and one less than the Minshuto total of 50.

So, the LDP is expected to lose some seats. If it loses just a few, no one can blame Abe. In fact, at some point, the politicians and pundits will come up with a magic number. Above that, Abe can claim that the LDP did better with him than without him. That will help his clout. Below that number, and Abe's critics can say he has no coattails and that will embolden them to continue the resistance to reform that they are already raging. Should the LDP actually gain seats, Abe will be a hero.

But what are the odds of the LDP-Komeito coalition actually losing its majority? If this happens, I presume that Abe will almost certainly have to resign, as Hashimoto had to do in 1998. Recall that the LDP lost its majority in 1989, when it introduced the consumption tax. Hashimoto expected to regain it in 1998, but failed when the LDP won only 44 seats. That election followed another hike in the consumption tax in 1997 and an ensuing recession. Koizumi regained control for an LDP-led coalition in 2001.

Assuming the Komeito wins the same 11 seats that it did in 2004, the LDP has to win 52. That's 3 more than Koizumi won in 2004. If it wins less, it will need to pick up a few independents to retain control.

Abe's popularity has dropped from 70% to 50% as of December and January polls may show a further drop. I suspect he's got time to turn it around, but he's going to have to be a lot more assertive than he has been so far. The good news for Abe is that the 50% Nikkei figure is no lower than Koizumi's popularity during most of 2005-2006. But Abe's re-admission of the postal rebels, the concessions to the highway lobby, and the scandals du jour are not helping. Nor, I presume, is the fact that everyone knows Abe will start agreeing to some hike in the consumption tax once these elections are over. And, quite frankly, the 52-year-old Abe may simply not have been ready for prime time.

So, I'd like to hear some informed speculation about both the "magic number" and the odds of the LDP-led coalition actually losing in the UH? And, if the latter does occur, what (or who) comes next?

I also presume the mere fact that an LDP is not assured already has an impact on Abe's clout today.

(I'd like to thank Len Schoppa for helping me with some of these numbers. I'd also like to blame Len for any mistakes in my analysis or speculation, but I doubt I can get away with that.)

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 12:27 PM

[SSJ: 4348] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Fujikazu Suzuki
Date: 2007/01/15

Fred Uleman wrote:
(Date: 2007/01/01)

> Apologies for not having the source data, but to quote Richard
> Florida's 2004 _The Flight of the Creative Class_ (p 186): "Thirty
> years ago, the average real annual compensation of the top one
> hundred chief executives was $1.3 milllion, or thirty-nine times
> the pay of the average worker. In 2001, that figure hit $37.5
> million -- over one thousand times what an average worker took
> home."

I have not read Richard Florida's "The Flight of the Creative Class", but Fred Uleman's quotation from this book is almost the same as Paul Krugman's famous article in NYT Magazine on October 20, 2002. However, the cited year is a bit different. Krugman wrote as follows:

Over the past 30 years most people have seen only modest salary increases: the average annual salary in America, expressed in 1998 dollars (that is, adjusted for inflation), rose from $32,522 in 1970 to $35,864 in 1999. That's about a 10 percent increase over 29 years -- progress, but not much. Over the same period, however, according to Fortune magazine, the average real annual compensation of the top 100 C.E.O.'s went from $1.3 million -- 39 times the pay of an average worker -- to $37.5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordinary workers. ("For Richer", By PAUL KRUGMAN, NYT Magazine October 20, 2002)

I searched the free Fortune web site but could not find the article in the Fortune magazine of which Krugman, and perhaps also Richard Florida, used as the data source. Are there anyone who can use the university library kindly clarify the fact regarding the above citation?

---------------------------------------------------
Fujikazu Suzuki
Deputy Director General
Research Institute for Advancement of Living Standards
(RIALS)
1-3-2 Iidabashi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0072,
Japan
Tel +81-(0)3-5210-0851 Fax. +81-(0)3-5210-0852
e-mail: suzuki.fujikazu@nifty.com

Approved by ssjmod at 12:10 PM

[SSJ: 4346] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2007/01/15

I don't know Richard Florida's source for the CEO remuneration figures quoted by Fred Uleman, but they are the same -- 39 times in 1970 and over a thousand now -- that are used by Paul Krugman in an interesting piece in the New York Times Review 20 Oct 2002 and he cites them as calculated by Fortune for the top 100 CEOs rather than all CEOs or CEOs of a specific segment of firms. The Krugman piece is particularly interesting because he goes over various economists' explanations for the rise, concludes that they are all inadequate and says -- this is an economist talking -- it's a change in social norms: the self-restraint ethic has been eroded: greed has become respectable. He doesn't mention one important mechanism -- the remuneration consultants who compile statistics of last year's executive pay distribution which compensation committees use to put their ceos at least in second quartile thereof, thus ensuring constant upward ratcheting.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 11:54 AM

[SSJ: 4345] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policytoward Security

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2007/01/15

To Ellis,

> I also think Koizumi and Abe are different; indeed
> I think Koizumi, who in my opinion will undoubtedly
> go down as the second most important PM in postwar
> history (the other being Yoshida ) especially for
> his domestic political reforms in changing the LDP,
> effectively undermined the Yoshida Doctrine and Abe
> is intent on continuing that, in spades. I think
> Abe is very much like his grandfather, Kishi, who
> handled the U.S. by tough negotiations on the
> US-Japan Security Treaty, 1957-1960, to get what he
> wanted from the U.S. In other words, he will try to
> influence the U.S. in directions favorable to
> Japan's interests from within the tent (as he
> thinks for e.g., Britain does) instead of standing
> outside the tent and merely saying "Sorry, peace
> constitution and public opinion prevents us from...."
> as most Japanese postwar PMs have done. But, as
> Chris Hughes and I have written in a forthcoming
> article, if the Yoshida Doctrine is moribund, where
> is the Koizumi or Abe Doctrine to replace it? What
> general guidelines do future PMs have to follow?

I am looking forward to reading the forthcoming article.

In the meantime, I beg to disagree on one point, which Ellis and Chris share with several others. In my humble opinion, the Yoshida Doctrine is not moribund. According to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition), "moribund" means (1) "being in the state of dying: approaching death," and (2) being in a state of inactivity or obsolescence." Well, the Yoshida Doctrine is very much alive. What Koizumi and Abe are doing is taking it one step farther, probably toward its ultimate stage. Yoshida envisaged a process where Japan would give first priority to economics and keep a low security profile to allay neighbors' apprehensions and dull domestic resistance, while sukoshizutu, or if you prefer, nashikuzushi, increase Japan's military strength to the point where Japan, having regained its economic strength and won the trust of the international community, would change from a US security dependent to a US security partner. He didn't set a time limit on this process.

May be the issue here is semantic: what is known as the Yoshida Doctrine is only one part of what might be called the "Yoshida Vision."

I agree with all the other parts of your post and with John's.

Best.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:46 AM

January 15, 2007

[SSJ: 4344] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Fred Uleman
Date: 2007/01/15

Apologies for not having the source data, but to quote Richard Florida's 2004 _The Flight of the Creative Class_ (p 186): "Thirty years ago, the average real annual compensation of the top one hundred chief executives was $1.3 milllion, or thirty-nine times the pay of the average worker. In 2001, that figure hit $37.5 million -- over one thousand times what an average worker took home."

FWIW
--
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 05:57 PM

[SSJ: 4343] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Fujikazu Suzuki
Date: 2007/01/15

Richard Katz wrote:
(Date: 2007/01/12)

> According to a report called "Executive Excess," twenty years ago the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay in America was approximately 10:1, not too different from the 8:1 ratio that Prof. Dore cites for Japan in 1960. The ratio in 2006 is now a stunning 282:1.

I have never heard that the American CEO pay became so close to the average wages of the workers.

According to the "Executive Excess 2006", the latest report of the Annual CEO Compensation Survey by The IPS & UFE, the above figures on the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay in America cited by Mr. Katz are not correct. The report says:

In 2005, average total compensation for CEOs of 350 leading U.S. corporations was $11.6 million, down slightly from $11.8 million in 2004.107 The ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay was 411-to-1 in 2005. While this is still smaller than the 2000 peak of 525-to-1, it is nearly 10 times as large as the 1980 ratio of 42-to-1.(The Institute for Policy Studies and Unite for a Fair Economy,"Executive Excess 2006":p.30, http://www.faireconomy.org/reports/2006/ExecutiveExcess2006.pdf)

"The ratio in 2006" is unpublished, and "282:1" is nearly the ratio of "281:1" in 2002, when this ratio saw its bottom during the last decade.

Although I could not get the ratio of twenty years ago, that is in 1985, the ratio shown in "CEO Pay Chart" in the web site of the United for a Fair Economy for 1960, 1970 and 1980 was 41, 79, 42, respectively. (http://faireconomy.org/research/CEO_Pay_charts.html) So, I think it is unlikely that it became "approximately 10:1" in the mid 1980s.

Approved by ssjmod at 02:37 PM

[SSJ: 4341] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2007/01/15

Dear Colleagues,

Citing the work suggested below is prompted by Ellis Krauss's apt commment. In part, Professor Krauss states that while "....leaders have always been somewhat constrained by public opinion, they always used it....."

In Justin Lewis's _Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along with It_ (Columbia University Press, 2001), his examples are drawn from U.S. media politics. However, the kind of questions Professor Lewis asks about the skillful if not beneficial use of public opinion by television news anchors and the Clinton Administration are worth considering for possible use outside the U.S.

Colleagues teaching political science classes might also consider using a 32-minute video by a similar title. It covers some of the ground covered by Lewis's book: "Constructing Public Opinion: How Politicians and the Media Misrepresent the Public" (Northampton, Massachusetts: Media Education Foundation, 2001).

Part or all of Lewis Justin's video may be used with undergraduates, including in introductory classes....with the caveat that one or two statements on foreign policy-related polling data will (correctly) appear dated. However, that problem easily is obviated by any of the following methods: 1) Orally reminding students that the video was produced before 9-11; 2) Stating as much in in-class viewing/discussion guide; or 3) skipping the section.

Vincent K Pollard
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/Asia.html
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/critical.html
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/chculture.html
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 01:04 PM

[SSJ: 4340] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/01/15

Ellis and I can chat privately, but in response to this comment

> So only thing I might disagree with now that I see
> "Leaders" in your title is the word "Love"--not "love"
> but a highly instrumental, self-interested, strategy,
> albeit a different one than the Yoshida Doctrine.
> Being a leader, to quote from the Beatles, you cannot
> afford to sing "Love is all you need!" :-)

I would note that my title is "Why do Japanese Leaders Love George Bush when Nobody Else Does? Imitating America in Government Organization, Asia Relations, and Economic Policy." In foreign policy it may be mainly instrumental strategy (though I think there are plenty of irrational, as well as stupid, elements here too). However, that is only 1/3 of the talk, and with regard to the other two topics that explanation doesn't hold. It isn't really "love," that was facetious--not affective but cognitive and evaluative. Japanese leaders, for whatever reason, are likely to assume that American ways are somehow "right" or "correct," which isn't so likely in other countries.

Thanks to all for comments--this is really just a talk for students, but I am delighted to get all this help in thinking about it.

__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Visiting Professor
Institute of Social Science
Tokyo University
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
5-23-2 Hiroo, Shibuya-ku
Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:36 PM

[SSJ: 4337] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/01/13

Hi John:

Sorry I missed "Leaders" in your title. Since the discussion was about public opinion I just thought your title was in response to that.

Agree completely with the rest of your analysis. Although leaders have always been somewhat constrained by public opinion, they always used it and Article 9 to make sure that Japan didn't get entangled in U.S. foreign policy adventures they didn't think were in Japan's interests. Shall we say it was a "useful constraint" or a "constraint they were quite delighted to have?" Also agree that this was the core of the Yoshida Doctrine in many ways followed by almost all postwar PMs (again, Nakasone a partial exception but only partial).

I also think Koizumi and Abe are different; indeed I think Koizumi, who in my opinion will undoubtedly go down as the second most important PM in postwar history (the other being Yoshida ) especially for his domestic political reforms in changing the LDP, effectively undermined the Yoshida Doctrine and Abe is intent on continuing that, in spades. I think Abe is very much like his grandfather, Kishi, who handled the U.S. by tough negotiations on the US-Japan Security Treaty, 1957-1960, to get what he wanted from the U.S. In other words, he will try to influence the U.S. in directions favorable to Japan's interests from within the tent (as he thinks for e.g., Britain does) instead of standing outside the tent and merely saying "Sorry, peace constitution and public opinion prevents us from...." as most Japanese postwar PMs have done. But, as Chris Hughes and I have written in a forthcoming article, if the Yoshida Doctrine is moribund, where is the Koizumi or Abe Doctrine to replace it? What general guidelines do future PMs have to follow?

So only thing I might disagree with now that I see "Leaders" in your title is the word "Love"--not "love" but a highly instrumental, self-interested, strategy, albeit a different one than the Yoshida Doctrine. Being a leader, to quote from the Beatles, you cannot afford to sing "Love is all you need!" :-)

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:59 AM

[SSJ: 4336] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2007/01/12

On Jan 12, 2007, at 1:41 AM, SSJ-Forum Moderator wrote:

> From: Ellis Krauss
>
> First, to John, I'd be a bit more circumspect if I
> were you about that talk entitled, ""Why do Japanese
> Leaders Love George Bush when Nobody Else Does?" The
> Japanese do NOT love George Bush.

Ellis,

I didn't hear the talk in question, but I've made similar arguments myself. The point isn't that the Japanese people like Bush, it's that the "Japanese Leaders" like Bush. Public polls may have said one thing, but I believe Koizumi was the only world leader other than the Israeli PM to come out and say he hoped Bush beat Kerry in the election. We could discuss the reasons if you'd like, but without hearing the talk, I suspect John is right.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:48 AM

[SSJ: 4335] Re: Abe's success so far?--addendum

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/12

In my last posting, I mistakenly left out two pieces of data before hitting the "send" button.

Firstly, in response to Sanford Jacoby:

Among those in the 40-59% income quintile in the US, direct and indirect holdings of stocks accounted for 41% of financial assets in 2004, down from 46% in 2001 due to the market crash. Among those in the 60-79% income quintile, direct and indirect holdings of stocks accounted for 37% of financial assets in 2004, down from 52% in 2001. I presume that, when the 2007 survey comes out, it will show a bounceback in the proportion of stocks since prices have since recovered. So for the middle class and especially upper middle class, stocks are very important.

I think if Japan could get back to where it was in the 1950s, where the majority of stocks were owned by households, it would help, not only on the demand front, but--if accompanied by other measures--also help on the corporate governance front.

Secondly, in response to Ronald Dore:

According to a report called "Executive Excess," twenty years ago the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay in America was approximately 10:1, not too different from the 8:1 ratio that Prof. Dore cites for Japan in 1960. The ratio in 2006 is now a stunning 282:1.

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

[SSJ: 4334] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2007/01/12

Thanks to Richard Katz for the OECD analysis. But one has to be careful of "dualism" because the regular/non-regular worker dichotomy and the increase of non-regulars from 19% to 30% is not the only explanation of rising inequality. (And the OECD needs to be more careful in sorting out regular vs irregular from full-time vs. part-time. A lot of irregular workers are 150% full-time: they have to be to make ends meet.) The inequality is also in part the dualism that people used to denounce in the 1970s, the dualism of large and small firms, out-sourcing and sub-contracting firms. OECD I suppose is quoting the Chingin chosa for the spread of full-time wages when it says that there was no increase in inequality for full-time workers between 1994 and 2003. But if you take the hojin-tokei figures, the average wage plus benefits for the 16% of corporation employees in the smallest firms was 44% of that for the 10% working for the biggest firms in 1994, but that had fallen to 33% by 2003. (An absolute fall from 3.0m.yen to 2.4m., compared with a slight rise in the big firms from 6.9 to 7.4m) That surely can't all be due to a substitution of regular, by irregular workers.

One reason for this is the shameful way in which Rengo, reflecting the big enterprise unions' total loss of any sense of class solidarity, allowed Nikkeiren to strangle Shunto and Keidanren subsequently to kill it off, (greatly helped by the deflation of course). The average wage increase established by the big firms used to be trumpeted throughout the land and had a big effect on wage-setting in the small firms, forcing them all, more or less equally, to make the same percentage wage increase which they passed on to consumers.That helped to keep differentials stable rather than increasing -- as well as helping to maintain the level of modest inflation that all healthy economies need.

Anyway, I trust that Japanese policy-makers are tackling the irregular worker problem at least by improving their social insurance situation, and are not going to listen to the OECD economists when they say -- true to OECD form --

"One important key to reversing the rise in inequality and poverty is to reduce labour market dualism. This requires a comprehensive approach including reducing employment protection for regular workers and thereby weakening the incentives of firms to hire non-regular workers."

I.e. LEVEL DOWN, DON'T LEVEL UP.

But one thing they say which the government should indeed take to heart is:

"Social spending as a share of GDP has been expanding in the context of population ageing, although it remains below the OECD average and the proportion received by low-income households is small."

Also when they point out that the proportion of children of single mothers in poverty is extraordinarily high in Japan, and that the change in the seikatsu hogo system designed to push single mothers into work took place in face of the fact that the child-poverty rate was higher for working mothers than for non-working mothers.

A propos the US "shareholder primacy" question at issue between Richard Katz and Sandy Jacoby, it is a nice illustration of the gap between formal institutions and actual behaviour. In the conflict of interest between agents and principals when the agents are managers and the principals are minority shareholders there is no way the shareholders will ever win if the agents are greedy and unscrupulous -- information assymetry and all that. As Galbraith pointed out in the 1960s there was then an ethic of honesty and trust among US managers which among other things kept their remuneration relatively modest and prevented too much cheating. No more. Now you can get your shareholders to give you several hundred million above board and still rip them off. The important thing about nihonteki-keiei was that "employee sovereignty" -- the collectivity of your fellow-employees being the "principal" -- helped to maintain an ethic of honesty and trust because if you cheated you were ripping off the people you worked with every day. That's why most of the fushouji were about people doing illegal things for the sake of the firm, not for their own benefit at the expense of the firm.

The novel about how the big firms screw the little ones, by the way, was it Shiroyama Saburo Yusha wa katarazu? Splendidly graphic.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 11:35 AM

January 12, 2007

[SSJ: 4331] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/01/12

Gee, Ellis. You missed the word "leaders" in my title. Part of my point is that it is the leadership (specifically Koizumi and Abe) that loved George Bush so much, not the population--that's why I said the Midford paper with nice tables on popular attitudes was helpful.

And you are right that the government has always been constrained by the public's opposition to military expansion, but my interpretation is that in the old days--up to the first Gulf war--the main story was the Prime Minister of the day defending his own preferences by telling Washington that "I'd love to help you out but the public just won't go along with it." If I remember, it was the inventor of this ploy, Yoshida Shigeru, who warned that if Washington forced a bigger military there would be a Socialist takeover (or was it a Communist revolution?) and Japan would completely disarm.

I would say that even Nakasone was only a partial exception to this generalization and there weren't any others until Hashimoto--and in his case rather briefly. The real change was Koizumi and Abe. I think those two guys really preferred a substantially bigger and more active military. (Obviously Ozawa too, back in the day). Actually, for Koizumi this was secondary to his domestic dreams, I'd say, while for Abe security along with patriotism seems to be primary.

Approved by ssjmod at 04:30 PM

[SSJ: 4329] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2007/01/11

A brief comment both the John Campbell's post and about the Midford paper:

First, to John, I'd be a bit more circumspect if I were you about that talk entitled, ""Why do Japanese Leaders Love George Bush when Nobody Else Does?" The Japanese do NOT love George Bush. Indeed, he was one of the few Republican presidential candidates in my memory according to polls not to be favored in a presidential election over a Democrat: more Japanese wanted to see Kerry win in 2004 than Bush. What is true is that they are one of the few publics who still like the U.S. and feel an affinity for it (still over 70%, fairly consistently for last 20 years, although there was a dip around 1995-6 as a result of the Okinawa rape and a decade of trade friction) and whose liking for the U.S. has actually gone up in the last ten years. However, they trust the U.S. less now as a result of Iraq. According to a poll in the Yomiuri Shimbun, December 17, 2004:
Trust U.S.? Yes 38%
No 53% In 2003: 45%

I agree with Paul Midford's paper that public opinion has changed, and also that it can set limits on what policymakers can do. But wasn't that always the case? And hasn't the LDP's strategy for the past 25 years been not to challenge public opinion directly (as Kishi did directly in passing the 1960 Security Treaty) but rather to break small previous limits, have a small negative reaction from the public, then allow the public to get used to it and have the new policy become the new outer limit and so forth? Isn't that what Koizumi did with SDF to Iraq, which hardly had majority support when he sent them in, but wound up with over 60% support and has now established that SDF can be sent abroad under the excuse that it is was to fulfill obligations under the US-Japan alliance and Treaty (no such obligation exists or ever has in that Treaty, however) rather than as previously only under UN auspices as in PKOs?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:39 PM

[SSJ: 4327] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/10

Sanford Jacoby says:

> I think few would quibble with the notion that
> shareholder primacy is constituted in its most
> advanced form in the United States.

I would more than quibble. I think shareholder primacy in the US is as much an ideology an the notion of company-for-employees in Japan. The whole issue of the widespread corporate scandals in the US is a case of corporate executives and Board members ripping off shareholders (from their own employees to teacher pension funds), in collaboration with accounting firms, big commerical banks (Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase had to pay billions to investors that it misled about Enron) to investment banks (which famously put "lipstick on pigs"). The current US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, was CEO of Goldman Sachs when it was fined $120 million for misleading investors. Now, he is trying to roll back the Sarbanes-Oxley law (SOX) as well as the ability of shareholders to sue crooked execs.

How about the Board of Directors, with fiduciary duty to protect shareholders? Well, with the CEO and Chairman of the Board now usually the same person, too many boards are often composed of rather compliant types, thereby seeming to justify the skepticism about outside directors by Canon and Keidanren chief Fujio Mitarai. Keidranren is also trying to limit shareholder suits and other necessary reforms.

It gets worse in the US. We now have the options backdating scandal, in which executives falsely date stock option grants to earlier dates when the stock price was lower. This gives them more profits when they exercise the options--at the expense of other shareholdes. Nearly 200 companies have disclosed federal or internal inquiries into their stock option practices.Why would directors allow this? According to a study conducted by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, during the past decade, as many as 1,400 outside directors at 460 companies may have received options that had their grant dates manipulated to show a lower purchase price. The study found that, while SOX reduced the amount of stock option backdating, it did not eliminate it. In one case, a CEO had had committed this fraud was allowed to retire with $175 million in his severance package.

CEOs and Wall Street complain about the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), but it's far less than the compensation of a typical S&P 500 CEO. And the single scandal of Enron wiped out more shareholder value than all the cost of SOX compliance combined.

The current head of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Chris Cox, came to fame as a Congressman in the 1990s when he sponsored a succesful bill tolimit shareholders' ability to sue company executives.

Sanford Jacoby says:

> But doesn't the median household in the US own a
> lot of stock these days, thanks to 401s and all
> that? Not really. Equity -- directly owned or in
> pensions --presently constitutes only 4.8 % of the
> median household's wealth.

I think Sanford is looking at total assets, incuding a person's primary house or his business (e.g. a hairdresser's shop or pharmacy). And a median household has more of its assets in its primary home than in stocks. According to a recent Fed report, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf, as of 2004 (latest available) financial assets constituted only 15% of the total assets of people in the 40-59% income quintile (averaging $43,000 a year in income), but 48% of those in the 60-79% quintile (averaging $68,000 in income). Of of those financial assets, 16% of the people in the 40-59% income quintile had direct ownership of stocks, 13% owned mutual funds, 53% had retirement accounts (of which a great deal is stock ownership), and another 30% had life insurance policies (and the life insurers are typically big stock investors). Among those in the 60-79% income range, 28% held stocks, 19% held mutual funds, and 70% had retirement funds.

So, while no one would say that weath distribution, let alone stock distribution, is equalized in the US, a fairly large portion of the American public depends on the stock market to help it fund things ranging from sending kids to college to retirement.

One of the big problems is that 34% of families had stock in only one company, typically their employer, who often contractually locked them in to that firm's stock. This is why thousands of Enron employees had their retirement nest eggs wiped out. After Studebaker went bankrupt in the early 1960s, Congress mandated that penion funds could have no more than 10% of their assets in only one firms. Congress has refused to make the same ruling about 401Ks.

Despite all the American tatemae, American firms are not run for the shareholders.

I think in America and Japan, companies are bureaucracies which seek to aggrandize themselves. In America, we have had in the past decade an increase in executive power at the expense of the company and its shareholders. In Japan, we have mindless empire-building and diversification by firms hoarding cash. In America, we have deals that aim at making executives rich, often at the expense of the firm itself.

I have never advocated that Japan adopt the American system,, particularly as it now stands. Hell, I don't even think America should adopt the American system. But America's myriad flaws should not be used as a pretext to block needed reforms in Japan.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 03:25 PM

January 10, 2007

[SSJ: 4325] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policytoward Security

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2007/01/10

Hi John,

Thanks for your feedback and kind words. If you circulate your talk at some point please let me know. I would love to take a look.

Incidentally the NBR US-Japan Forum seems to have changed a lot since I was last on it in 2004-5. I don't see any discussion about security. On the other hand, it looks less addictive now.

Best,

Approved by ssjmod at 05:20 PM

[SSJ: 4323] Re: New Monograph on Japanese Public Opinion and Policy toward Security

From: John Campbell
Date: 2007/01/10

I wanted to say something about the substance of Paul Midford's paper, but first, let me confirm Wilhelm Vosse's helpful post that the link is

http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications/midford.pdf

It comes in on Safari as a pdf which can be saved as such, even for us poor Macites. It would save time if EWC could have this information on its website.

I think Paul has made a very good argument and then backed it up with data. The shift in opinion from pacifism to "defensive realism" that distinguishes among purposes of the military makes sense, and so does his argument that such opinion has been an important constraint on what hawkish leaders can get away with. A direct linkage of public opinion to foreign or security policy is hard to demonstrate, as I remember learning in graduate school, but there is at least a strong inferential case here. There are good over-time data on Japanese public opinion re US actions: positive on Afghanistan, turning very sour after Iraq.

Incidentally, these are handy for a talk I am preparing called "Why do Japanese Leaders Love George Bush when Nobody Else Does? Imitating America in Government Organization, Asia Relations, and Economic Policy." It is the current Japanese leaders who are so enamored of Washington, not the Japanese people. Indeed I'll swipe one of Paul's tables.

Approved by ssjmod at 02:43 PM

[SSJ: 4322] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/10

In reply to Ronald Dore:

> I didn't know that Japan had now overtaken Turkey
> and Mexico to have the second highest poverty rate in
> the OECD's statistics, but I am not surprised.

This is reported in Nikkei of July 20 at http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNKS/Search/Nni20060720D20JF880.htm

> The proportion of the population living in relative
> poverty, defined as less than one-half of the
> median household disposable income, came to 13.5
> percent in 2000, the second highest among OECD
> members following 13.7 percent in the United States,
> the OECD said in a survey on the Japanese economy.

There is more information is in the OECD's Economic Survey of Japan published in July 2006. It says, among other things:

> Changes affecting those at the lower end of the
> income distribution are of particular concern.
> While the top income quintile's share of disposable
> income increased between 1985 and 2000, the share
> of the bottom quintile declined. Consequently, the
> ratio between the top and bottom quintiles rose
> from 4.4 in the mid-1980s to 5.6 in 2000, well
> above the OECD average of 4.5.

> The proportion of the population living in absolute
> poverty increased by 5 percentage points between
> the mid-1980s and 2000 in Japan, the only OECD
> country to record an increase.

> The average income of those in relative poverty is
> low compared to other OECD countries.
> Consequently, the amount of income transfers needed
> to raise all those in poverty up to the 50%
> threshold in Japan - the poverty gap - is the third
> largest in the OECD area.

Note that it is covering the time period of 1985-2000, before the onset of the "Americanization" of Japanese finance that Prof. Dore decries. It is, among other things, a product of the "lost decade."

As for rising income inequality, it attributes this mostly to the growing labor dualism, i.e. the rise of irregular workers:

> This suggests that rising inequality of labour
> earnings, which account for about 80% of households'
> market income, was the key factor. Indeed, the
> earnings of those in the bottom income quartile
> have fallen as a share of total earnings since the
> mid-1980s. .However, growing market income
> inequality cannot be explained by the variation in
> wages paid to FULL-TIME WORKERS, as Japan was one
> of only three OECD countries to record a decline in
> wage inequality between 1994 and 2003. .
>
> Instead, the growing proportion of non-regular
> workers is a key explanation of increased
> inequality in market income in Japan. On an hourly
> basis, parttime workers - who account for about
> two-thirds of non-regular workers - were paid only
> 40% as much as full-time workers in 2003.
> Consequently, the increase in the share of
> non-regular workers from 19% of employees in 1994
> to 29% in 2004 has significantly raised the overall
> level of inequality in Japan. Another study found
> that wage differential between regular and
> non-regular workers has risen since the early 1990s
> (Higuchi and the Policy Research Institute, MOF,
> 2003). Moreover, the level of inequality among
> non-regular workers is relatively high - with a
> Gini coefficient of 48 in 2002 compared to 28 for
> regular workers - and has been increasing.
> Part-time workers earn on average only 40% as much
> per hour as full-time workers, a gap which appears
> too large to be explained by productivity
> differences. In addition to the equity implications
> of greater labour market dualism, non-regular
> workers receive less on the- job training, thus
> limiting their human capital and Japan's growth
> potential.
>
> The lower wages paid to non-regular workers makes
> them attractive to firms, particularly since the
> economic malaise that began in the early 1990s. In
> addition, many are not included in enterprise-based
> social insurance schemes. Indeed, only about
> one-half of non-regular workers are covered by the
> Employees' Pension Scheme and health insurance and
> about two-thirds by employment insurance The number
> not covered include those who do evade participation
> in these insurance systems even though they are
> legally obliged to join. This results in an
> additional 13% saving in non-wage costs for firms.
> In a government survey that asked management why
> they hire non-regular workers, around half of firms
> cited reducing wage costs while nearly a quarter
> mentioned cutting non-wage costs.

> They [part-timers] are concentrated in smaller
> firms, where they are generally paid on an hourly
> or daily basis.

Prof. Dore further writes:

> In 1960 corporate directors in the LARGE FIRMS
> [emphasis added--rk] I quoted in my last mail were
> paying themselves in salaries and bonuses something
> like 8 times the average wage...Between 1976 and
> 1999 it fluctuated only between 2.4 and 2.7. In
> 2005 it had nearly doubled to 4.7.

I think you get very skewed results on all kinds of issues if you only look at the big firms. The 5,000 or so big firms in the MOF Corporate survey employ only about 10% of Japan's workforce. Half of workers in firms with more than 1,000 employees are unionized, compared to only 1% at firms with less than 100 workers. Just at US autoworkers or steelworkers used to get high wages way back when the firms they worked for had monopoly power in the US, the same is true of full-time regular workers at Japan's big firms. But you can't project the labor situation of this thin slice of the labor force to the entire Japanese workforce.

Nor can you project the tatemae of managers at these big firms to the way the whole economy works. Once these big firms got into trouble--or even beforehand--they hired part-timers who worked alongside the full-timers, wore different uniforms and hardly enjoyed the same wages or conditions.

The lifetime employment system for core workers at the big firms certainly did affect how firms operated, and it did seem to benefit both firms and workers when growth was good and before the population started aging. But once firms got into trouble, the situation changed. To some degree the small-and-medium sector served as a shock absorber. I remember a book of short stories about life in the SME's who serve as subcontractors for the big manufacturers. It wasn't pretty. (Can't remember the name of the book right now, but I think the stories were done in the 1980s.)

Prof. Dore concludes:

> The more you can do to bang on about the wage issue
> in the Oriental Economist, Richard, the better.

I look forward to your subscription check.

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 01:11 PM

[SSJ: 4321] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Sanford Jacoby
Date: 2007/01/10

I think few would quibble with the notion that shareholder primacy is constituted in its most advanced form in the United States. Therefore, if the United States represents a desideratum for Japan or, for others, the wrong direction in which Japan is headed, it makes sense to understand the consequences of shareholder primacy in the United States.
We do know that income inequality in the United States has risen since the late 1970s. Usually this is chalked up to global trade (China) or to changes in the returns to education to do with technology. But recent research (Atkinson) shows that a substantial portion of the rise in aggregate inequality can be traced to shares held by the top income earners (top 10, 5, 1, .5 percent). That rise has been meteoric in the US since the 1980s but is only now just starting to increase in Japan.
It's unlikely that the top tier's rising share has anything to do with skill shifts or China. A more likely candidate is changes in corporate governance whose beneficiaries are those with a stake in the economy's financialization. The time correlation is good: inequality rises in the US at about the same time as does financialization. Correlation is not causation, but there is corroborating evidence showing a direct relationship between financialization (defined as CEO comp, comp of top corporate officers, Wall Street bonuses etc.), growth in top income shares, and growth in aggregate inequality.
Hence further financialization of Japan's economy -- a shift in corporate rents from labor and retained earnings to shareholders and top executives -- will surely raise overall inequality in Japan, beyond that produced by the rise in contingent employment. Whether this shift improves long-term productivity is another matter. It's a crapshoot to predict the factors driving long-term productivity in advanced economies. The US has adapted to financialization by relying more heavily on equity financing. But whether this would be a "good thing" for Japan to emulate is unclear. Japan has done very well by investing a big chunk of its retained earnings in corporate R&D, where it leads the world. In particular types of industries -- especially the almost-unique case of Silicon Valley -- equity financing may be superior for growth.
But it's dicey to generalize from one sector to an entire economy. Ask Ford Motor.
Equity financing means more risk and the presumption then is that this leads to higher returns. The question is, however, who bears the risk and who collects the returns? As least in the United States, the risk is presently being shifted from corporations and investors to relatively undiversified employee households (Hacker). And the evidence suggests that the returns are being creamed off by the top income earners. The data on income stagnation alongside rising productivity--see Krugman--support this picture.
But doesn't the median household in the US own a lot of stock these days, thanks to 401s and all that? Not really. Equity -- directly owned or in pensions --presently constitutes only 4.8 % of the median household's wealth.
So Japan's ongoing financialization surely will raise inequality and risk, but whether the returns contribute to long-term growth that benefits all households is an open question.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:55 PM

[SSJ: 4317] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2007/01/09

I much enjoyed reading Richard Katz's spirited rejoinder, and am delighted to know that he too sees the current source of economic anorexia -- what is preventing the spendid performance of the export manufacturers from leading to a real recovery --is the brake on consumption caused by the reduction in wages and the impoverishment of households. I didn't know that Japan had now overtaken Turkey and Mexico to have the second highest poverty rate in the OECD's statistics, but I am not surprised.

But why then is it that the really influential economists are not shouting loud and clear that the Keidanren is wrong in urging its members to continue to hold back wages? Why are they not calling on Rengo to remind its unions that the strike weapon could still be made to work; that the unions in the most opulent firms that can easily afford a few days' strike, have a "patriotic" duty to take the lead? Why are the economists of the foreign financial community -- who now greatly influence the agenda of the Japanese economist community -- all concerned, not with wages and demand management, but with whether or not Abe will continue the Koizumi/Takenaka reform agenda -- see Robert Feldman in this week's Ekonomisuto whose only complaint against the Abe government is to warn it of the accusation of double-talk because it is contemplating restrictions on foreign take-overs. The increasing concentration of the smartest brains and the most articulate and effective voices, as well as the highest incomes, in the finance industry -- something James Tobin was warning the world about in his AEA presidential lecture back in the 1980s -- is part of the increasing dominance of finance over the economy shown in the national income statistics I quoted last time. It serves to make the interests of the financial community, however short-sighted they may be, the dominant voice in policy discussions.

Richard Katz writes;

> The notion that firms were traditionally run for
> their employees--or so-called "employee sovereignty"
> in Japan--is almost as much an ideology as the
> notion of the Soviet Union as a "workers' state."

The notion that firms should be run for their employees is indeed an ideology. The notion that that was, in fact, an ideology which dominated the concerns of the managers who made the allocation decisions for their firms in the 1970s and 1980s, depends on one's reading of historical fact, and -- apart from the vast literature on nihonteki keiei and the philosophizing of businessmen -- the figures seem to support it. One of the strongest pieces of evidence that managers identified their own interests as being identical to those of (what they considered their fellow-) employees rather than with shareholders lies in the pay statistics. In 1960 corporate directors in the large firms I quoted in my last mail were paying themselves in salaries and bonuses something like 8 times the average wage. Thereafter, as nihonntekikeiei became consolidated with shunto as one of its key institutions, that ratio steadily decreased until at the time of the oil-shock recession it was down from 8 to about 2 and a half times. Thereafter, between 1976 and 1999 it fluctuated only between 2.4 and 2.7. In 2005 it had nearly doubled to 4.7.

Having lived through Mrs. Thatcher's years in England I am well acquainted with the ideology of the "share-holding democracy" that appeals so much to Richard Katz. High returns to equity and low wages are a recipe for a highly skewed income distribution whether the bulk of the equity is held directly by households or by pension funds, and a fortiori if the choicest and most high-yielding quarter of the equity is held by foreigners as in Japan at the moment. What kept household consumption at a low level of GDP was the exceedingly high level of corporate and public investment, not government consumption -- and that, plus the high expenditure on R&D and the inventiveness of the people it supported, was a major stimulant of productivity growth (not just fierce competition and shareholder power, Richard) as long as the wage share was high enough to provide the necessary demand. Maekawa reportish moralising about the wickedness of keeping the household consumption share of GDP so low, mistakes the purpose of that report which was chiefly to assure Americans that Japan was doing its bit to restrain the relentless surge of exports that was upsetting Congress so much. (Remember that stuff ab out yutori and jikan-tanshuku at the same time?)

If we talk about, not GDP as a whole but the value added of the big corporations which set the pace for both the financial and employment institutions, what has changed is not so much the share of capital as the composition of payments to capital. In 1980, when, by my calculations, capital was getting a 23% share, interest payments were six times dividends. In 2005, when the capital share was down to 19%, interest payments were a half of dividend payments The other big change is the enormous increase in rent -- presumably mostly leasing -- from under 20 to over 40% of payments to capital. In the 80s, that capital flow of interest was recycled to households via savings accounts. OK, real interest rates on deposits were lower than they might have been -- not only from what the experts oddly call "financial repression" but also because of the inefficiency and undeservedly high salaries of the banks. But they were only occasionally, as in the mid-1970s, negative and they were widely distributed. That is certainly not the case with either the dividend payments or the leasing payments that have replaced them.

The other interesting thing about the value added figures is the declining share of taxes. In the first half of the 1980s corporations were contributing to the public purse in all forms of taxation -- car taxes, stamp duties, juminzei, profits tax etc. -- 13% of their value added. Forget the disaster year of 2001 when they paid less than 7%. Throughout the recovery since then they still have not paid more than 10% despite the dire state of public finances. And they still claim that they can't compete unless corporation tax is reduced!

Anyway, history is one thing. The present situation is another. The more you can do to bang on about the wage issue in the Oriental Economist, Richard, the better.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 11:25 AM

January 09, 2007

[SSJ: 4311] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2007/01/05

Ronald Dore wrote:

> It's not firms that are dependent on capital
> markets: it's the minds of managers. They are now
> obsessed with their share price and slavishly
> deferential to "the market reaction"... Shacho who are
> lesser mortals have to do their regular o-mairi to
> Wall Street and the City and at least pretend to
> listen to what they are told.

I think "pretend" is the key word here. All the ostentatious homage to share price and shareholder value is mostly tatamae. That's why I mentioned that foreign investors, who now own a quarter of shares, can't even get management to pay dividends comparable to those in the US or Europe (i.e. dividends as a share of profits).

Prof. Dore writes:

> Richard Katz thinks that they are still not
> rewarding shareholders in the way they deserve. An
> increase in dividends of 174% between 2001 and 2005
> - while cutting per capita wages by 6%...Getting up
> to American levels of return on equity is the
> summum bonum.

I'm afraid you're unfamiliar with my views. In my writings, I have always been very critical of the slashing of real wages in the current recovery, which occurred in large part due in large part to the surge in lower-paid part-time and temporary workers. In fact, despite lower unemployment, which is supposed to help workers get higher wages, real wages per worker fell again in 2006. The result, among other things, is poor consumer spending; people being forced to spend all their savings to survive (25% of households now report no savings left compared to 8% a decade ago); and rising poverty (Japan is now second only to the US in its poverty rate). Keidanren is demanding wage restraint again in 2007. The fact that Keidanren chief Mitarai is in Abe's Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy doesn't bode well for household disposable income (in regard to either wages or taxes or governmental benefits).

But this has nothing to do with the rise of shareholder power. The notion that firms were traditionally run for their employees--or so-called "employee sovereignty" in Japan--is almost as much an ideology as the notion of the Soviet Union as a "workers' state."

The share of wages in GDP has been dropping in Japan for decades. However, as long as growth was high enough, living standards still rose quite substantially. Once growth rates fell, this really pinched. Anti-reformers blame the rise of inequality and poverty on Koizumi's alleged (but non-existent) market fundamentalism. In fact, income inequality began rising in Japan at least two decades ago.

So why do I talk about shareholder power? Let me explain.

The purpose of an economy, in my view, is to raise the living standards of the population.

One necessary, but not sufficient, condition for this is rising productivity. You can't consume what you don't produce. That's especially important now that Japan has more retirees but fewer workers to support them. Productivity growth is now the only source of long-term per capita GDP growth. Japan's productivity is not rising fast enough to meet its needs. Japan needs a productivity revolution, and despite years of reform, that has yet to emerge.

Firms are forced to become most efficient when they are subject to competition (at home and abroad) and when shareholders have real power.

The second necessary but not sufficient ingredient is how that GDP is distributed. That has to do with politics, balance of power, etc. In Japan, labor has always been weak. In addition, households have long been gypped out of their proper return as owners of capital. Back in the 1950s, households owned the majority of shares. But in the 1960s, to help fend off foreign buyouts, government and business promoted cross-shareholding. Today, households own only a fifth of shares. Throughout the postwar era up until around 1990, regulated interest rates on deposits kept nominal rates below the rate of inflation-in other words, a negative rate of interest. This transferred God-know-how-many hundreds of billions of dollars from households to firms. The Zero Interest Rate Policy has further cut savers' income. The banking crisis was solved, not through overt government capital injections, but through a covert transfer of income from workers and savers to banks and their company borrowers. The notion that it is the rise of shareholder that is hurting household income is untrue. Traditional Japanese methods and power balances did it long before any US hedge funds arrived on Japanese soil.

This recovery has been more dependent on business investment and a growing trade surplus than any going back to at least 1955 (when the modern stats begin) and perhaps further. Consumer spending has lagged because household income has been squeezed. That is not a sustainable growth path. But it's also not new. It's been a problem since the mid-1970s. I've called this "economic anorexia."

As far back as the 1986 Maekawa Commission report, at least some reformers have recognized that Japan had to move to consumer-led growth, and that cannot be done without households getting a higher share of national income. The Maekawa proposals were rejected and Japan got the "bubble" instead.

The point is that Japan needs both better efficiency and better distribution of income to support solid growth and rising living standards, not to mention the burden of the aging. Shareholder power and rising wages are not necessarily antagonistic. Under the proper conditions (including helping households, pension funds, etc. own more of the shares) they are partners. Supporting one (shareholder power) doesn't have to mean rejecting the other (rising real wages).

On the contrary, one of the reasons Japan has had such problems in growing is the low household share of income as well as inefficiency. A higher household share of GDP is not only justice, but economic necessity. That was one of the big themes of my 1998 book, "Japan: the System That Soured."

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 11:39 AM

January 05, 2007

[SSJ: 4309] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2006/12/27

Richard Katz says he'd like to see some numbers.. They are easily available in the hojinkigyo tokei. Apparently one can't distribute tables through the forum, but I can send anyone who's interested the relevant time series from 1980 for non-financial firms with capital of over one billion yen -- 3800 in that category in 1990, 5600 in 2005. The famous shift from bank finance to capital markets is, indeed, stuff and nonsense. There was a shift to bond finance in the heady days after the Plaza agreement, from something like 16% of debt in 1980 to 36% in 1989 but since that peak borrowing year of 1989 there has been only a marginal shift in the composition of debt as firms have reduced it in total, using all their spare cash to improve their debt/equity ratio instead of investing or raising household consumption as the economy needs by paying better wages. Bank borrowing, short and long-term has been reduced by 47%, outstanding bonds by only 42%. As for new equity, the firms which have graduated to the billion yen category must have increased their capital, but the average firm in the category now has only 3% more in capital and capital reserves than the firms there 17 years ago.

It's not firms that are dependent on capital markets: it's the minds of managers. They are now obsessed with their share price and slavishly deferential to "the market reaction", and the analysts, in a way that their much more indebted predecessors would have scorned. You have to be a Toyota to give two fingers to the rating agencies. Shacho who are lesser mortals have to do their regular o-mairi to Wall Street and the City and at least pretend to listen to what they are told.

Richard Katz thinks that they are still not rewarding shareholders in the way they deserve. An increase in dividends of 174% between 2001 and 2005 -- while cutting per capita wages by 6%: the figures for the same set of large firms -- presumably only shows that they are trying hard but could do better, even if they are also rewarding their shareholders with share buy-backs which apparently more or less equal dividends in amount. Never mind if squeezing wages even more contracts household consumption even more and makes the recovery even more sluggish and problematic. Getting up to American levels of return on equity is the summum bonum.

The chief consequence of all those "reforms" Messrs Katz and Alexander so sweetly approve of is to increase the dominance of financial interests in the Japanese business world. Look at the national income statistics. The exporting manufacturers who have pulled the economy out of its mess are not the chief beneficiaries of this new reformed world. In 1980, financial firms earned (at least, took) 10% of total corporate profits. In the early years of this century they have been taking 25%. In 1999, the year that all our hearts were bleeding for those banks with their dicey loan books, they took 30%.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 11:42 AM

December 27, 2006

[SSJ: 4308] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Paul J. Scalise
Date: 2006/12/27

Rick Katz writes:

"Real shareholder power is, with a few exceptions, mostly a joke. Until firms have to tap the capital markets for funds and until there is a real market for corporate control, shareholder power will remain weak. I'm certainly open to being corrected if I'm wrong here, but that's my sense of things."

I would like to comment on the Alexander-Katz exchange. Rick Katz asks whether shareholders are replacing stakeholders as the dominant managerial force in the ownership of Japanese companies? Based on my own research for my doctoral dissertation, I would argue no. What is mostly happening is statistical noise over concrete substance.

True, with respect to the ownership structure of Japanese corporations, there has been a material shift over the past ten years. Mark-to-market accounting, pressure to reduce cross-shareholdings to maintain financial solvency, and banks reducing their equity holdings to within their Tier 1 capital ratios by September 2004 all contributed to this statistical shift. Individual and foreign shareholders are slowly replacing banks, brokers, and other institutions as the dominant shareholders in Japanese corporations.

It's also true, for example, that major institutional investors are starting to become more active during the General Shareholders Meetings (AGM), albeit from a very low base of activity. According to annual surveys conducted by the Commercial Law Center since 1996, a gradual but steady increase of listed companies that responded to the survey saw their shareholders cast negative votes at their meetings. The latest data I saw indicated that 23% of all listed firms had negative votes cast at shareholders' meetings today versus 11% in 1996.

But do these statistical shifts here and there represent a much larger, path breaking change in Japanese corporate behavior? Let's face it: the answer is no, not really.

These ownership shifts, as stated above, have more to do with superficial accounting changes than any real "Saul-on-the-road-to-Damascus" revelations about investor relations or shareholder attitudes.

And while the Commercial Law Center's survey ratio shows a doubling since 1996, it's generally flawed because the number of shareholders voting against a given a proposal could be either very small, or, for that matter, negative for good reason, while still making it look like institutional investors are being far more active en masse.

The case of electricity is useful to demonstrate why. Most Japanese EPCOs, starting in 2002, for example, included a "state of corporate governance" (koporeto gabanansu-no jokyo) in their annual reports suggesting that they really started to care about their investors. The president of TEPCO even reportedly stated in a new year's message to senior management that the company's new benchmark of excellence was neither the load curve nor the financial ratio, but the share price. Many financial analysts and reporters then started to convey these misleading notions in print.

But a thorough review of the AGMs for TEPCO and KEPCO over the past ten years suggests the opposite; a small fraction of shareholders are placing new proposals on the agenda, yes, but little substance has changed thanks to deregulation.

In the case of KEPCO, a small group of 287 shareholders who collectively own 132,200 shares (0.01%) continue to put a series of aggressive proposals on the voting ballot each year. As is the case every year, these shareholders are activists who oppose the company's use of nuclear power, and who have purchased their shares for the sole purpose of placing these items on the AGM agenda. In 2000, for example, these proposals included removing two directors (chairman Yoshihisa Akiyama, and its president, Hiroshi Ishikawa) for the nuclear power scandals and accidents, increasing the dividends 20 percent to \70 per share by divesting income allocation from further nuclear power generation, and amending the articles to include provisions on running open shareholder meetings. In fact, these activists went so far as to propose "the company's articles be amended to have the directors' retirement bonuses paid in the form of spent nuclear fuel materials, and to have the cash that would otherwise go to those retirement bonuses placed in a fund for disposing of nuclear waste!" Needless to say, some of these proposals are totally absurd, while others would have been viewed as sensible in a more Anglo-American shareholders' context. Yet, these and another seven proposals, as they are every year, were voted down at the AGM. No real change takes place.

TEPCO management faced similar AGM tensions after a similar nuclear power scandal in 2003. In this instance, management halved executives' bonuses to take responsibility for falsifying nuclear plant safety reports for over a decade. But while most Japanese fund managers openly viewed TEPCO's self-imposed punishment as sufficient, most foreigners held an entirely different view, demanding that ALL management bonuses be cancelled for the year. Naturally, once again, the foreigners lost and TEPCO won.

When I interviewed Marc Goldstein, regional director of Shareholder Services, Inc. (Tokyo), he explained that most of the "shareholder activism" purported to exist since the changes in Japan's Commercial Code is largely meaningless from an Anglo-American perspective. Institutional investors continue to cave into the wishes of top-management; foreigners and their "foreign ways" remain a trivial sideshow in both AGMs and corporate governance; and hostile takeovers and other M&A activities continue to be virtually non-existent in Japan, though the occasional high-profile case does pop up from time to time.

Paul J. Scalise
Oxford

Approved by ssjmod at 01:49 PM

[SSJ: 4306] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/12/27

This note responds to Rick Katz's queries on the actual changes in shareholder activism and corporate finance.

From 1950 to 1990, shareholders in Japan filed fewer than 20 derivative suits against directors. (A derivative suit is an action brought by a shareholder, not on its own behalf, but on behalf of the corporation, on grounds that the corporation is not pursuing its duties owed to the company and its shareholders.) By 1999, there were 286 such suits before the courts, 95 filed in 1999 alone. However, the main impact is not on the number of suits filed, but on the changes in behavior induced by the suits. In a fully functional system, the expectation of suits would reduce the questionable behavior to the point that few actual suits were filed. Anecdotally, I have heard and read numerous comments from managers that they cannot do what they used to do because they would be sued. For example, one of the motivations to incorporate poison pills defenses against takeovers into law is that companies now cannot turn down takeover bids that pay high premiums over current share prices without fear of shareholder suits.

On corporate finance, according to the Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations, just prior to financial system liberalization, in the late 1970s, large manufacturing companies relied on bank loans to finance 35-40% of their total assets, bonds were around 3-5%, and retained earnings and paid in capital (funds raised through selling shares) accounted for around 10% each. By 2006, bank loans had fallen to 13%, bonds had gone as high as 11%, but then fell to 5%, and retained earnings and paid in capital each were around 25%. Retained earnings and paid in capital march along pretty much in tandem.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:27 AM

December 26, 2006

[SSJ: 4305] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2006/12/26

In reply to Arthur Alexander:

I absolutely agree with Arthur that many of the reforms which took place in the Koizumi era were actually initiated prior to his arrival, have now taken on a life of their own, and cannot be rolled back. I think the changes in accounting and in the foreign presence in finance, retail and other sectors are particularly important. Some of the accountants are the real unsung heroes of the NPL reduction process, e.g. the Resona case. Creation of the FSA turned out to be a real milestone, especially once Takenaka took control over it.

However, I question Arthur's verdict that:

> Reform was driven by the shift of corporate funding
> from banks to capital markets.

I'd like to see some numbers to back this up commonly expressed view. My sense is that the shift has actually been from banks to self-financing. In aggregate, the corporate sector is a net saver. Firms have greatly reduced their debt. New investment is still way below cash flow. The corporate sector has, to a significant degree, made itself immune from financial discipline, from either banks or capital markets. For example, what percentage of corporate investment is funded by tapping the bond and stock markets? It would have be a lot for capital markets to have real power to discipline firms.

> As business ties to banks weakened, shareholder
> monitoring became more important. Oversight and
> monitoring were strengthened by lowering the fees
> required to initiate shareholder suits, introducing
> and expanding the authority of statutory auditors,
> and reducing the shareholding threshold to demand
> inspection of records.

Again, how much of this commonly expressed view is yet really true? Shareholder suits certainly increased once fees were lowered (showing that the alleged non-litigiousness of Japanese has more to do with institutions, rules and costs rather than culture). The household share of stockholding has not risen. The foreign share has risen to somehing close to 25% (if memory serves). Even so, investors have had a very tough time in getting firms to pay dividends at a level comparable to those paid in the US and Europe, despite making ardent requests along this line. I think the trend is slowly moving in the direction you're suggesting, but the movement so far is far less than many commentators suggest. Real shareholder power is, with a few exceptions, mostly a joke. Until firms have to tap the capital markets for funds and until there is a real market for corporate control, shareholder power will remain weak. I'm certainly open to being corrected if I'm wrong here, but that's my sense of things.

But let me stress that, aside from these two points, I'm in general agreement with Arthur's description that the reform process is a lot bigger than Koizumi. The real irony is that some of the most impactful reforms --including the ones that Koizumi used to give himself more power vis a vis the Ministries-- were initiated under Hashimoto, who became the symbol of "the resistance." However, let's not forget that Hashimoto said that, had he known Japan was going to go through its banking crisis, he never would have intitiated the "Big Bang" financial reforms when he did. The increased role of foreigners is, in part, the law of unintended consequences at work.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economst Report.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:09 PM

December 25, 2006

[SSJ: 4303] Film review "From Flags of Our Fathers to Letters from Iwo Jima"

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/12/24

Dear Colleagues,

For those who are interested in a discussion of complementary and competing historiographies of a WWII battle, see Aaron Gerow, "From Flags of Our Fathers to Letters From Iwo Jima: Clint Eastwood's Balancing of Japanese and American Perspectives," _Japan Focus_, 18 December 2006, URL: http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2290

Vincent K Pollard
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Futures studies Asian Studies Honors
Hawai'i 2050 Sustainability Project
University of Hawai'i at Manoa

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/Asia.html
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/Hawaii.html
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/critical.html
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/chculture.html
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 11:30 AM

[SSJ: 4302] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/12/23

I agree almost totally with Rick Katz on his evaluation of Koizumi's economic policies.

But, I would add an important addition to his analysis.

Although PM Koizumi did not initiate significant economic reforms, nevertheless, many important changes that had been developing over the previous decade continued to unfold under his watch. Significantly, he did not oppose these developments..

Perhaps the greatest changes have been in finance. Reform was driven by the shift of corporate funding from banks to capital markets. Other factors played major roles: banks' nonperforming loans and dangerously low capital highlighted the need for greater flexibility in developing new revenue-producing financial products; relatively unfettered foreign financial institutions aggressively competed with Japanese banks at home and abroad; Japanese companies' desire for more sophisticated financial services pushed the cause of more permissive regulation; scandals among Finance Ministry officials cast doubt on the ministry's ability to regulate the industry; pressure from the United States to open pension markets and trust banking reinforced domestic demands for higher returns; and the apparent failure of the old system to monitor banks and other financial intermediaries -demonstrated by the outright failure of several financial companies and the suspected insolvency of many others- legitimated proposals for a new oversight regime.

Reform of accounting standards also was driven by the growing role of capital markets, with American government and foreign investment bank support. The Finance Ministry wrote new regulations that required consolidated reporting, mark-to-market accounting for financial instruments, recognition of off-balance sheet liabilities, and reporting line-of-business accounts. The FSA introduced mark-to- market accounting for real estate and other assets in 2002. Anti- reform LDP politicians, especially former financial regulator Hideyuki Aizawa who wanted to roll back the tougher standards, opposed these moves. Tellingly, Mr. Aizawa was defeated in his re- election bid in November 2003.

Pressure to change corporate governance flowed from greater reliance on capital markets. The commercial code was amended several times after 1993 to ease limitations on corporate share repurchases, allow stock options, simplify merger procedures, allow stock swaps in mergers, eliminate the ban on holding companies, facilitate the ability to spin off companies, remove prohibitions on treasury stock, and authorize companies to adopt an American style board of directors.

Corporate monitoring, a traditional banking task under bank-centered finance, was in disarray. Banks, fearful of causing the collapse of their customers, were unwilling to identify weak firms. In addition, tighter financial regulations restricted banks' ability to bail out troubled borrowers, thereby reducing the value of main bank relationships to businesses. As business ties to banks weakened, shareholder monitoring became more important. Oversight and monitoring were strengthened by lowering the fees required to initiate shareholder suits, introducing and expanding the authority of statutory auditors, and reducing the shareholding threshold to demand inspection of records.

Significantly, the push for reforming corporate governance regulations came from the leading business groups working with political leaders, and supported by METI. This alliance dethroned the slow-motion process controlled by the Ministry of Justice, which customarily required decades to introduce change in company law.

Reducing the capital requirements for incorporation in 2003 to virtually zero eased entry; despite a weak economy, startups increased by 17% between 2002 and 2004, according to Justice Ministry figures.

Therefore, Koizumi's years can be described as a period of continuing reform even though he was not the prime mover of much of it. A comparison with the Meiji Restoration is instructive. The view that we now have, looking backward across almost 150 years, of dramatic rebirth was not immediately apparent to those on the scene. Yet, 1880 was hugely different from 1860. Crawcour's description of these changes are worth noting: "In the context of Japanese history, the changes following the Restoration appear to have been almost instantaneous and the restrictive apparatus of the old order to have been removed, as it were, at a stroke. But in fact these changes took at least ten turbulent years. The Restoration signaled far-reaching changes but had little immediate impact on the economy other than to exacerbate the existing uncertainties and disruption. Nor did it solve any of the existing problems that had beset the bakufu in its last years."

I would say almost the same thing now: Japan's economy in 2006 is vastly different from 1986, parly abetted by Mr. Koizumi. However, the ongoing process of reform has independent roots, but the speed will be faster or slower according to contemporary poitical conditions.=

Approved by ssjmod at 11:26 AM

December 20, 2006

[SSJ: 4297] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2006/12/20

Peter Cave wrote in response to my posting:

> One mischievous interpretation of Richard Katz's
> interesting post might be:
> 'Koizumi didn't really do much for the Japanese
> economy. However, he made it look as if he did, thus
> succeeding in staying in charge for five years.

The most important substantive thing in the economic field that Koizumi, and especially Takenaka, accomplished was reducing nonperforming loans. Without their presence, even given the burgeoning recovery in 2002-03, the banks would not have written off as much as they did and firms would not have reduced debt as much as they did. I think the 2003 Resona case where honset accounting was imposed, and then the criminal case against the UFJ, were the turning points. And it Koizumi a while to come around, first to appointing Takenaka and then giving him the support that he needed. That may be "one thing," but it was indispensable to recovery. Without solving the banking crisis, the recovery would have been stillborn. I should add that solving the NPL problem was accomplished in large part through a massive, covert transfer of income from workers and savers to banks and borrowers, plus .

As for public works, it is both an economic and political move.

Beyond that, I don't see any significiant economic accomplishments by Koizumi.Solving the NPL problem was necessary to recovery, but not sufficient. 40% of GDP growth since 2002 has come from business investment, more than in any recovery since postwar reconstruction, fed in part by ultra-low interest rates. Another third came from exports, fed in part by the lowest price-adjusted yet rate since 1985. Consumption still lags because consumer income still lags. That's not a sustainable path. Note the recent sharp markdown of 2004-06 growth to 1.5% instead of 2.2%.

>And allowing the LDP to stay in power too

I think Japan would be better off withour one-party dominance. Competition is as essential to political health as to economic health. Of course, having the Minshuto as opponents helped.

> Ergo, Koizumi was basically a Bad Thing, as he kept
> the LDP show on the road longer than would otherwise
> have happened.'

I don't think that. Koizumi has several positive accomplishments, but mostly in the political realm:

1) Establishing the intellectual hegemony of the notion of "no growth without reform," a dictum that Abe is trying to abandon.

2) Centralizing policymaking power in the Office of the PM rather than the bureaucracy and LDP barons

3) Running elections on policy issues

4) Moving Japan another incremental step toward participating in collective security (though doing it via Iraq wasn't so great)

Peter notes his own view is that Koizumi:

> has created significant expectations for more
> effective policy leadership among the public -
> which I guess is a Good Thing.

I agree.

> I suspect these expectations will come back to bash
> the LDP before too long.

I guess that's what Abe is experiencing now. Whether or not Kozumi fulfilled the expecations that he created, many people thought he did. I've love hear you expand on the this view.

P.S. I'll double-check on the copyright issue.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 12:18 PM

December 19, 2006

[SSJ: 4296] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2006/12/19

One mischievous interpretation of Richard Katz's interesting post might be:
'Koizumi didn't really do much for the Japanese economy. However, he made it look as if he did, thus succeeding in staying in charge for five years. (And allowing the LDP to stay in power too - and allowing Abe to take over and enact his noxious education law reform, thanks to the huge LDP majority in an election which was supposedly all about postal privatization, ha ha ha.) Abe looks like he won't be as successful, which may mean that the LDP finally gets its payback from the public, albeit six years later than it might have. Ergo, Koizumi was basically a Bad Thing, as he kept the LDP show on the road longer than would otherwise have happened.'

Though I am no fan of Koizumi, I think this (which is of course my provocative post and not Richard Katz's subtle view!) might be a bit harsh, since whatever his other faults, he does seem to have helped to get the economy out of the worst of its hole, and he has created significant expectations for more effective policy leadership among the public - which I guess is a Good Thing. I suspect these expectations will come back to bash the LDP before too long.

By the way, when I wrote an op-ed for the FT last year, they told me I could reproduce the lot, as copyright remained with me.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:55 PM

[SSJ: 4295] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2006/12/19

On Tuesday, Nov. 21, the London FT printed an oped by me saying that Abe needs an economic agenda. Due to copyright rules, I cannot quote the entire oped, but the opening on their free website includes:

Shinzo Abe, the new Japanese prime minister, has reversed the slogan of his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. "No growth without reform" has morphed into "no reform without growth". Fearing that this could mean "lacklustre growth, without reform", many previously enthusiastic foreign investors are holding back for now.

Mr Abe will not reverse the reforms but the momentum gathered recently could be lost. His passions are foreign policy and making the education curriculum more "patriotic". Some of his appointees, such as Yasuhisa Shiozaki, chief cabinet secretary, have great economic expertise. But if Mr Abe is not personally engaged they will lack sufficient clout. Many of Mr Abe's aides have reduced reform to the sole issue of cutting the budget deficit and then excessively relying on inflation to meet their targets. Too many government and business leaders believe they have already pushed through enough change and are content to let past reforms take their course.

Subscribers can get the rest at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1365e544-78c6-11db-8743-0000779e2340.html

I think the recent big markdown in GDP growth figures puts a big crimp in Abe's alleged "growth strategy." Abe has a goal of growth, but no strategy to achieve it--perhaps except for urging the BOJ to create more inflation for higher nominal growth and hence more tax revenue. But if real growth, and hence tax revenue, is lower, then Abe is going to have a tougher time closing the budget cap while avoiding big tax hikes on consumers that bring disaster at the polls.

Actual growth from early 2004 through July-September 2006 has been marked down from 2.2% to 1.5%--a huge 40% drop. Secondly, the Cabinet Office just downgraded medium-term potential growth from 1.7% to 1.4%. All of this suggests that previous claims that Japan had done enough reform to raise productivity growth have been proven false. Moreover, despite huge growth in corporate profits, consumer income still lags, putting a big crimp in spending. This is one of Japan's decades-long structural defects on the demand side. It was addressed as far back as the 1986 Maekawa Commission report.

Yes, Japan has done a lot of reform. But it needs to do a lot more. This is no time to tread water. Reform needs a critical mass and a longer gestation period before it will bear fruit in permanently higher growth--just as was the case in the US. And Japan's structural flaws are worse than those in the US.

The pragmatic and collegial streak that served Shinzo Abe so well in foreign affairs (i.e., his surprise trips to Beijing and Seoul to mend fences) has backfired on him in domestic politics. The immediate cause of Abe's plunge in the polls--Asahi reports that Abe's approval rating has abruptly plunged from 63% in late September to only 47% by early December--is the reinstatement of the postal rebels. Even among LDP supporters a majority (54%) opposed bringing back the "rebels," according to a Nikkei poll.

However, the rebel issue per se is only part of Abe's problem.

First impressions are lasting. And the first impression Abe has made on domestic issues is that he places expediency above principle. This is in direct contrast to Koizumi who turned politics into a morality play of "good guys" (reformers) versus "bad guys" (the resistance). Consequently, the public was willing to overlook Koizumi's compromises on substance. Abe, by contrast, is losing the benefit of the doubt.

Take the issue of road and gasoline taxes. Koizumi tried, and failed, to change the law so that some of these taxes could be used in the general account. Koizumi also tried to break up assorted state-affiliated highway corporations. The result was a bit of a hash (e.g. every kilometer of road in the original construction plans was kept in by the end of the day)..

Now, fast forward to Abe. When he again raised the issue of diverting revenue from the road taxes to the general budget, he fuzzied up the issue, but ended up essentially agreeing to put the resolution off until 2008 -after this summer's elections. He is being pilloried in the press for the compromise. Voters are looking at the symbolism, not the details.

Truth be told, Abe's compromises are no worse than Koizumi's myriad concessions. Except for a couple issues, Koizumi was a lot more sizzle than steak. But that's the effect of first impressions. It's one thing to be expedient; it's quite another to look expedient.

Abe has an even bigger problem. Abe's domestic priorities are not those of the public. People are more concerned about their stagnant wages, high youth unemployment, rising taxes, and the fragile state of social security than in making education more "patriotic." A Nikkei poll found that 55% of the public thought the bill should not necessarily pass this session, including 53% of LDP supporters.

Once again, Abe's image contrasts poorly with his predecessor's. Koizumi's mantras were, "No growth without reform," as well as "Reform the LDP to reform Japan." He seemed to be addressing the voters' main domestic concern: the poor state of the economy and how its malaise was related to political corruption. Aside from reducing nonperforming loans -a vital achievement- Koizumi's economic record is hardly impressive. In fact, most of his reforms -from cutting public works to postal privatization- were largely political moves in economic garb. But that's not how it looked.

It's not just the public that's watching Abe. The forces of resistance are testing how far they can push him. For example, Abe claims that one of his top priorities is more Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Asian countries. He believes this will help counterbalance China's regional influence as well as promote reform within Japan. One of the main obstacles has been the farm lobby. Yet, the man that Abe made Agriculture Minister, Toshikatsu Matsuoka, is opposed to negotiating any abolition of trade barriers in farming. Indeed, at the November 2 meeting of Abe's Cabinet-level Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), Matsuoka defeated those who wanted to put those farm barriers on the negotiating agenda (see profile of Matsuoka below).

Abe has time to correct his early missteps. But July's Upper House elections are just over the horizon.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 11:31 AM

December 18, 2006

[SSJ: 4294] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2006/12/15

Michael Smitka

> ...Robert Feldman of Morgan Stanley has a
> piece that covers some issues; Robby is an optimist,
> and focuses on the attempt to shift petroleum product
> taxes, currently earmarked for road construction,
> into the central budget. He believes Abe is enjoying
> considerable success, against heavy opposition.
>
> http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20061208-Fri.html
>
> I will add an area upon which he does not touch:
> financial reform. Here he has not to date intervened
> and the newspaper (Nikkei) interpretation is that
> vested interests are again running the game...

A newspaper report I read one or two days after Feldman's piece appeared in Morgan Stanley's Global Economic Forum was less impressed with Abe's achievement regarding the gas tax bill. The argument was that the original bill was diluted by the construction interests to such an extent that, in fact, most of the funds would continue to go into road construction, implying that the roads in questions would include those leading to nowhere; and only the leftovers would be spent on other things.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:14 AM

December 15, 2006

[SSJ: 4293] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Robert W. Aspinall
Date: 2006/12/14

Thank you to Sarah for opening up an interesting discussion.

Abe's Domestic Policy: Education Reform

It may be possible that Abe is trying to set himself up as leader that puts education at the heart of his domestic reform programme. In this he follows Nakasone and Obuchi (although Obuchi died before he could do much). He certainly devotes a lot of attention to it in his emails and podcasts (yes, Abe is carrying his charisma deficit into the latest media formats).

It may be a coincidence that Abe's term in office has been accompanied by the dominance of education issues in the Japanese media. News about bullying, the falsification of high school records and revision to the Fundamental Law of Education have dominated the front pages since October. However, Abe's actions and words in response to educational problems show that he gives these issues a high priority. It is certainly coincidental that Abe's arrival in office has come at the same time as the ten-yearly moral panic over ijime induced suicides. However by sending his own advisor to a scene of one of the suicides in Fukuoka, Abe intervened in a direct way dissimilar to the actions of previous prime ministers.

Abe's creation of the 'Education Rebuilding Council' is another sign of the importance he places on educational issues. The rhetoric that accompanied the setting up of this council would be familiar to anyone who has followed ideologically conservative discourse on education since the occupation - i.e. educational problems are mainly the result of a lack of morals among children, a breakdown of the family, and a lack of emphasis on traditional Japanese values throughout society.

Why is this more than just rhetoric and symbolism this time? The answer partly lies in a clause in the new Fundamental Law of Education that states clearly that education must be carried out according to laws enacted by the Diet. This removes the ambiguity in the old FLE that suggested power over education policy should be shared between the centre and the localities. It is possible that this could lead to greater powers for the central government.

Similarly, the suggestion made by Abe's education council that police should be involved in prosecuting school bullies sounds like a reasonable proposal on the surface. However it could open the way for more intervention by law enforcement officials and other agents of the state in internal school affairs.

Taking all of the above into consideration would it be an over-reaction to worry that education reform under Abe's stewardship represents a potentially significant threat to the autonomy of schools, teachers and local education officials?

Robert Aspinall
Shiga University
Faculty of Economics, Hikone

Approved by ssjmod at 03:31 PM

[SSJ: 4292] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Tomohito Shinoda
Date: 2006/12/14

I had a chance to listen to Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki's talk this week. He claimed that Abe successfully made a cabinet decision to change the 1954 law which created the gasoline tax totally allocated to the construction of roads.

Abe originally planed to allocate all the tax revenue of 3 trillion yen to the general budget. But a political compromise was to allocate only the residual to the general budget after the budget for "needed" road construction is allocated. We do not know how much would be left.

Abe's strategy, so far, seems to avoid conflict within the LDP until the July upper house election. But Japanese voters, who expected the continuation of Koizumi style top-down leadership, are very disappointed.

According to my friend at Asahi Shimbun who conducts opinion polls, the cabinet approval rate among female at their 20s-40s dropped substantially. We may see a big loss of LDP in the July election.

P.S. My book, Koizumi Diplomacy, is finally coming in February from University of Washington Press.

Best Wishes,

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Tomohito Shinoda, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
International University of Japan
777 Kokusai-cho, Minami Uonuma, Niigata 949-7277 JAPAN
Tel. 81-25-779-1112 Fax. 81-25-779-4442
Email. tshinoda@iuj.ac.jp
Home Page. http://www.iuj.ac.jp/faculty/tshinoda
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Approved by ssjmod at 03:21 PM

[SSJ: 4291] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Michael Smitka
Date: 2006/12/14

As to economic policy, I can't provide a detailed list. But Robert Feldman of Morgan Stanley has a piece that covers some issues; Robby is an optimist, and focuses on the attempt to shift petroleum product taxes, currently earmarked for road construction, into the central budget. He believes Abe is enjoying considerable success, against heavy opposition.

http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2006/20061208-Fri.html

I will add an area upon which he does not touch: financial reform. Here he has not to date intervened and the newspaper (Nikkei) interpretation is that vested interests are again running the game. Eight government financial institutions (most important, the small business ones) were to be consolidated, turned into one larger bank and gradually shrunk and privatized; two others were to be turned into regular banks and publicly listed and completely sold off almost immediately. Now none of that is happening. The consolidation will be partial (according to the initial signals) with the old Export-Import Bank left out of the pot (which actually makes sense to me). More important, the relevant ministries will run the show, as they will not remain the creature of special legislation giving them an anomalous legal status: they will not be turned into regular banks. So they won't be regulated by FSA, they won't be subject to corporate income tax (unlike the newly privatized post office and narita airport financial institutions), their business and funding plans will be subject to approval by the relevant ministry as will personnel appointments (primarily MOF -- maybe METI will keep some role). The article made a point of noting that they are to maintain their policy focus (subsidized lending to zombie firms, as outsiders would put it) and also still be able to compete with private banks (to the detriment of the latter, who don't have special rules).

On the good side, the cleanup of regional banks and local financial institutions continues, with the restructuring plan of Ashikaga Bank now mapped out. Now that the three megabanks are in OK shape the FSA (with a modest-sized staff) can turn its attention to smaller fry, which in the aggregate are not at all small. Since real estate prices in outlying areas continue to decline, and of course rural banks are, well, rural, numbers remain in ill health or are dead but not yet buried.

Remember that even the large banks are profitable only because (i) some of their borrowers are now in good enough health that loan loss reserves can be reduced, which shows up as a profit, and (ii) stock holdings are up, with the rising tide of the market floating the big banks off the reef they were on. In the interim (iii) loss carryforwards mean they pay no corporate income tax for some years to come. However, according to friends at the biggest of the big, which the salary structure has been reformed, personnel cuts and branch closures have yet to come. So bank profits from lending operations are minimal and falling. (Locally, in Chiba, the outlying Resona branches are to be or have already been closed -- I'll ride past one in a few minutes to confirm.) In other words, Japan remains vastly overbanked. Until that changes, a downturn in the economy would again threaten weak banks in a systematic way. The "reforms" of the government banks is not good news in that regard, as it keeps a body of large, subsidized players in business.

In sum, Abe does not have a person who at least in public is fulfilling the role played by Takenaka (now back at Keio?). He is focusing on one fight, but either has no interest in other issues (bank problems are no longer in the headlines) or feels politically he can't follow through on various of the contentious reforms that were mapped out under Koizumi but not legislated. So a cup half full?

=======================
Michael Smitka, Professor of Economics
Visiting Researcher and Fulbright Scholar
Faculty of Law and Economics
Chiba University
1-33 Yayoi, Inage-ku
Chiba-shi Japan 263-8522

cell: 080-5440-3702
skype: jidoshasangyo [free from US]
=======================

Approved by ssjmod at 03:12 PM

[SSJ: 4290] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/12/14

Well, I hate to agree with my old sensei at Stanford, but I don't think Abe's going to China and Korea first was any such thing as indicating the US is "no longer that important." On the contrary, the US is MORE important than ever as a military ally of Japan and Abe is very dedicated to deepening that alliance. Rather, what it indicated was that Abe recognized and seized the opportunity to mend fences with those two countries after Koizumi had riled them on the Yasukuni issue. This was something that also temporarily shored up his domestic popularity after he took office. This was also in the interests of the U.S. as Washington was getting concerned about Japan's friction with its neighbors.
Best,
Elli

Approved by ssjmod at 03:04 PM

[SSJ: 4288] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Sarah Hyde
Date: 2006/12/13

Thanks to everyone for picking up on my suggestion yesterday.
To pick up on Paul's comment about Constitutional Reform, I met with Edano Yukio in the summer who is in charge of the process in the DPJ. He gave me the emphatic impression that the DPJ will prevent any form of reform happening. I suppose I had been beguiled by Koizumi's huge victory last year and thought this would give them power to push things through but Edano, is convinced that the DPJ and the SDPJ hold the 'trump cards' and without their agreement, nothing will change. In fact he said that Fukushima Mizuho has the real power with Constitutional Reform and without convincing her, nothing will happen. Indeed, Edano himself is very against any change to Article Nine.
Sorry for slightly changing the subject!
Sarah
-----------------------------------------------
Dr Sarah Hyde
Lecturer in the Politics and IR of Japan and East Asia
Dept of Politics and IR
University of Kent
Canterbury
CT2 7NX
(01227) 827233

Approved by ssjmod at 02:44 PM

[SSJ: 4287] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2006/12/13

Regarding Lee Woolgar's point about Abe's introduction of Innovation 25 and the significance of going beyond 5 year science and technology plans, I wonder whether this reflects a perception of growing competition from China. Early this year China introduced with much fanfare an ambitious 15 year Science and Technology plan (it also covers innovation) that calls for China to reach global frontiers in several key technological areas, with the leading role given to the private sector. Already the third largest spender on S&T if measured on a PPP basis, if the plan is realized China should easily outstrip Japan and perhaps match the US in S&T spending by 2020. Of course, there is much more to science, technology, and innovation than big budgets. Nonetheless, the perception of an S&T challenge from China might be prompting Japan to respond in kind with longer term plans. I would be curious if anyone has seen any discussion of this topic in the press or elsewhere.

Cheers,

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, Japan Program
Department of Political Science & Sociology
Dragvoll, NTNU Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan

Approved by ssjmod at 02:36 PM

December 13, 2006

[SSJ: 4286] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/11/13

Replying to Hugo Dobson: I do listen to Bob Angel's pod cast every week--I should note he is my kouhai and an old friend--and I always find it interesting. It is annoying that he gets so much more out of reading the Japanese press than I do sitting here in Tokyo. It is amusing that he seems to have a much more favorable view of the goings on in the Japanese government these days compared to the old days when he worked for them (when he and Ed Lincoln ran the late Japan Economic Institute).

Bob's take on Abe's fall from grace, if I remember, was pretty much along the line the press takes--he is losing his "reformer" image by giving in to who Bob calls the "factionalists" (vs. the "populists"). Personally I find the idea of Abe appealing directly to public opinion the way Koizumi did so well pretty hard to imagine. The little puppets of him one sees on wide shows look much more animated than he does live.

Approved by ssjmod at 06:20 PM

[SSJ: 4285] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Lee Woolgar
Date: 2006/12/13

The Innovation 25 policy introduced in Mr Abe's first parliamentary speech has been the major point of interest so far. While the detail is still a little unclear, the introduction of a longer term strategy beyond the normal 5yr science and technology basic plans could be representative of the importance placed on science and technology over the longer term.

Incidentally, recently a database of science and technology policies in the EU 25 and other nations (Japan and the US) has been developed to allow policy makers and researchers to quickly grasp the range of instruments in various countries. The link is here:

http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/

that for Japan:

http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/index.cfm?fuseaction=ri.content&topicID=373&countryCode=JP&parentID=4

Please bear in mind that it's still going through development and amendment but any comments from members of the SSJ forum would be warmly welcomed. I'd be grateful, however, if any comments could be directed directly to me at this address rather than through the forum.

Regards,

Lee Woolgar Ph.D.

Research Centre for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST)
University of Tokyo
Komaba4-6-1, Meguro-ku, Tokyo

Second Theory Oriented Research Group
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan
woolgar@nistep.go.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 06:13 PM

[SSJ: 4284] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2006/12/13

Didn't I read that Abe basically rolled over and gave in to the LDP's road lobby a few weeks ago? I don't know if anyone has any comments on that, or if it might have made any difference to public perceptions of him.

Peter Cave
HKU

Approved by ssjmod at 06:01 PM

[SSJ: 4283] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Hugo Dobson
Date: 2006/12/13

Rather similar to what his grandfather did. Kishi's first overseas visit was not the US but was a tour of Asia including Taiwan, India and Pakistan.

I don't know if anybody else listens to it but Robert Angel's current weekly podcast "Japan Considered" deals with some of the reasons for the sudden drop in Abe's approval ratings: http://www.japanconsidered.org

Cheers
Hugo

Dr Hugo Dobson
Senior Lecturer in Japan's International Relations,
National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of East Asian Studies,
University of Sheffield,
Sheffield S10 2TN
UK
Tel: 0114 2228437
Fax: 0114 2228432

Approved by ssjmod at 05:54 PM

[SSJ: 4282] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Harumi Befu
Date: 2006/12/13

One observation I would make is that contrary to the successive prime ministers who have visited Washington to pay respect to US president (called Washington moode) as soon as they assumed the office, Abe skipped that formality and went to Korea and China. This has to symbolize Abe's thoughts and policies not only vis-a-vis Asian but also vis-a-vis US. He made an important statement--that US is no longer that important.

Harumi Befu, Emeritus Professor
Department of Anthropological Sciences
Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-2145
U. S. A.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:25 PM

[SSJ: 4281] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/12/13

Thanks to Sarah Hyde for trying to get this discussion started. I'll put my 2 yen in with the following:

Yes, Abe moved surprisingly quickly by his smart visits to China (which was quite eager to mend fences with Japan) and Korea to nip in the bud his major potential weakness and the one negative legacy of Koizumi--the Yasukuni issue and relations with Japan's neighbors.

Ironically, I think the very positive dimension of Koizumi's legacy--postal reform and the centralization of the LDP is beginning to become the issue that undermines his appeal. Specifically, letting the former "rebels' on the postal issue back into the party has very much diluted any continuation of "reform" from Koizumi's legacy and also inserted a potentially very conflictual issue into the party, especially dividing some seniors from more reform-minded juniors, especially those who won their seats by challenging the "rebels." Abe doesn't seem to have a domestic reform agenda except for symbolic nationalist changes like the Educational reform bill which is divisive too. Big question #1: can he recapture an image of continuing Koizumi's domestic reformist legacy?

Big question #2 for Abe: how long can he ride the "abductee" issue--the issue which catapaulted him to power in many ways--to maintain popularity? Subsidiary question: how long will the right-wing allow him to get away with a "don't ask, don't tell" policy on Yasukuni?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 11:31 AM

[SSJ: 4280] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2006/12/13

Thanks to Sarah Hyde for suggesting we discuss Abe's success after 3 months. He has significantly improved relations with China and Korea in the short-run. The question is how did he do this? Did he promise to not visit Yasukuni as PM? If so, can we expect him to keep his promise while in office? I have seen some speculation that if he is still PM after next July's House of Counselors election, that he might go then. Of course, that would produce a tremdous backlash from China and Korea. My hunch is that he will not visit again while in office, and will pursue a nationalist agenda more quietly, perhaps via the revised education law's emphasis on "patriotic" education, and perhaps by continuing to encourage a reassessment of the Class A War Criminals.

It is interesting that Abe's popularity has declined rapidly since October. He started off with high approval ratings in September (63%), perhaps thanks to Koizumi's after glow. The North Korean nuclear test boosted his popularity. But in November and December his approval ratings, according to Asahi, have fallen to 53% and 47% respectively. Abe's lackluster speaking skills appear to be one factor.

Another reason is probably the reinstatement of 11 "postal rebels." 67% of voters opposed this move in both Asahi and Yomiuri polls. I believe this supports the argument I made last year that Koizumi's success in the September 2005 election was due primarily to his promise to "smash" the LDP. It was his purge of rural party conservatives that many voters found particularly appealing, rather than postal privatization per se.

Personally, I don't see Constitutional reform progressing very far at the moment. If Abe survives next July's upper house election, and especially if the LDP were to gain a few seats, he might get serious about pushing constitutional reform. Until then, I don't expect to see much happen on this front.

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, Japan Program
Department of Political Science & Sociology
Dragvoll, NTNU Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 11:22 AM

[SSJ: 4279] Re: Abe's success so far?

From: Sam Jameson
Date: 2006/12/12

For starters:

The Asahi Shimbun today (Dec. 12) reported that a poll it conducted Dec. 9 and 10 showed support for Abe had fallen to 47% from 63% (the third highest* rating any Japanese postwar prime minister had won) the day after he took office in September.

From November to December, the decline was 6% -- caused mainly by two factors: 1) Abe's move to restore the party membership of 11 postal privatization rebels who had been thrown out by Koizumi last year was seen by many voters as marking a return to the "old Liberal Democratic Party," the poll found. 2) The Asahi also reported that many Japanese (65% in its poll) felt their livelihood (kurashi) would not improve under Abe while a notable number (25%) said it would worsen.

Before he was elected, 59% of the voters polled by the Asahi in early September said they felt "friendly" toward Abe - but only 29% said he possessed "strong leadership." Whereas Koizumi won high ratings by promising to "destroy the LDP" if it didn't approve his reforms, 70% of the voters predicted that the ruling party would not change under Abe.

In a November poll by the Asahi, Abe's rating dropped from 63% in October to 53%. Complaints about ambiguity in explaining his political beliefs by 55% of those polled was the biggest reason, the newspaper reported. In addition, most voters wanted the government to shore up pension and health insurance systems facing a rapidly aging society and held little interest in Abe's priorities to reform education and rewrite the American-imposed Occupation Era "Peace Constitution," the newspaer reported.

The only foreign policy move by Abe that affected his support ratings was his visit to Beijing and Seoul Oct. 8 and 9, marking the end of Chinese and Korean refusals to meet Koizumi. That event kept Abe's support level at 63% in October, the Asahi said.

Abe's "don't ask, don't tell" stance on visits to Yasukuni shrine not only made the visits to Beijing and Seoul possible but also virtually wiped out Yasukuni as a topic for the mass media in Japan.

Neither North Korea's nuclear explosion Oct. 9 nor Abe's strong insistence on pursuing a full disclosure of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens figured in any of the Asahi polls.

Sam Jameson

* The highest rating ever achieved by a postwar Japanese premier was Junichiro Koizumi's 78% in April 2001 and the second highest was Morihiro Hosokawa's 74% in January 1994. (according to the Asahi)

Approved by ssjmod at 11:14 AM

December 12, 2006

[SSJ: 4278] Abe's success so far?

From: Sarah Hyde
Date: 2006/12/12

Dear colleagues

We are approaching, nearly, the third month anniversary of Abe as PM. He does seem to have managed to balance two quite contrasting sets of policies. He is managing to appease the Chinese and South Koreans with his timely visit back in October, yet simultaneously, there is a growing discourse around the Constitution etc. I thought it would be fun to get a discussion going on him - when discussions get going here they are great fun but we have not seen one for a while.

Best wishes

Sarah

Dr Sarah Hyde
Lecturer in the Politics of Japan
University of Kent
Canterbury
CT2 7NX
01227 827233

Approved by ssjmod at 06:47 PM

December 06, 2006

[SSJ: 4272] Re: translation / publication in Japanese

From: Sharon Domier
Date: 2006/12/06

Sorry,
My message wasn't clear:
http://www.pace.or.jp/indexe.html

click on the red dot in front of the title (not the title itself). The full text is available online as pdf files.

Sharon

Approved by ssjmod at 12:35 PM

[SSJ: 4271] Re: translation / publication in Japanese

From: Sharon Domier
Date: 2006/12/05

There is an online publication called _Practical Guide to Publishing in Japan_. I assign it to my students interested in translation so they can understand copyright information and how the publishing industry works in Japan. It includes information on selling your publications in Japan and how to find an agent.

I haven't had an English book translated into Japanese, but as a Japanese studies librarian the information included seems quite reasonable.

Best wishes,
Sharon Domier
UMass Amherst

Approved by ssjmod at 11:08 AM

December 05, 2006

[SSJ: 4270] Re: translation / publication in Japanese

From: Carl Freire
Date: 2006/12/04

Hi Daniel,

At 11:38 AM +0900 12/4/06, SSJ-Forum Moderator wrote:
>I wonder if anyone has experience in having their English language
>books translated into Japanese? If so, could you please email me with
>a description of the process?

I don't have any answers for you, but as I think you can see from the answers you've already gotten on the NBR list, you're going to have to be a little more specific in your question.

I get the feeling that what you really want to know are brass tacks kinds of questions like "who can I approach about getting my diss/book published" "how do I find a translator" "what arrangement should I have with the translator I already found" "what can I expect in interacting with the publisher" and so on.

However, unless you are a little more specific about what you want to know, you're probably going to get a lot more anecdotal responses that answer only some of your questions (interesting and insructuive though some of those anecdotes have been).

Cheers,
Carl

******
Carl Freire
Tokyo, Japan
carl_p_freire -*at*- ybb-dot-ne-dot-jp
cfreire-*at*-world-dot-oberlin-dot-edu

Approved by ssjmod at 02:34 PM

December 04, 2006

[SSJ: 4267] translation / publication in Japanese

From: Daniel Aldrich
Date: 2006/12/02

Dear Colleagues,

I wonder if anyone has experience in having their English language books translated into Japanese? If so, could you please email me with a description of the process?

Thanks very much,

Daniel

--
Daniel P. Aldrich, Ph.D.
USJRP Advanced Research Fellow, Harvard University
Assistant Professor, Political Science, Tulane University
http://www.tulane.edu/~aldrich/
Tel: 617.495.2626

Approved by ssjmod at 11:38 AM

November 10, 2006

[SSJ: 4258] 1st Japan-born person elected to U.S. Congress on Tuesday

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/11/08

See "Akaka, Hirono win Congress seats," _Honolulu Advertiser_, 6 November 2006, Internet edition,
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/Nov/07/br/br02p.html
paragraph 3.

Vincent K. Pollard, Ph.D.

Dept. of Social Social Sciences
Kapi'olani Community College

Asian Studies Program
Undergraduate Honors Program
Hawai'i Research Center for Futures Studies
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I SYSTEM
_____________________________________

WEB: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
"Asia, U.S., Hawai'i, world politics, futures"
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 01:32 PM

November 06, 2006

[SSJ: 4255] Politics on the Ground: Songs and Flags in the Schools and Court

From: David Slater
Date: 2006/11/04

In the rush to cover the non-race for Prime Minister and then North Korea's nuclear test, we might have overlooked a significant dynamic of "politics on the ground," so to speak. On September 21st, the Tokyo District Court ruled that the 2003 Tokyo Board of Education order that forced (under penalty) teachers to sing the *Kimigayo* and stand for the *Hinomaru* at graduation ceremonies was unconstitutional. The 400 plaintiffs were awarded 30,000 yen each (far less than many of them lost in fines, according to one teacher from Tokyo). The teachers argued that there was no place for these symbols of pre-war militarism in post-war education, and sued for the right to protest this infringement on thought and expression, and for the autonomy of school practice in general.

Despite the fact that the teachers' unions have been hobbled by the Tokyo Board of Education (TBOE) and are much less able to protect the rights of teachers or students than they once were, many teachers have refused to follow these unconstitutional dicta. Hundreds have been suspended and/or fined; at least 10 have been fired and at least as many have been forced out, according to teachers.

Given the current political atmosphere, the ruling came as a surprise to both sides. Still, some say that it could not have come at a better time. It had been reported that Abe had drafted a set of educational reforms to recreate Japan as a "beautiful country" by making the Japanese curriculum more "patriotic" and teachers more subservient through a crackdown on the ritual practice of educational ceremony. (Parts of this draft have been leaked in various places and versions since.) The new Ministry of Education, Ibuki Bunmei, has very little experience in education, but seems to know enough about schools to make restoring patriotic order a priority. So it appears that Tokyo Mayor Ishihara, the driving force behind the unconstitutional 2003 orders, has some new allies.

Even as the lawyers for the plaintiff teachers were announcing victory, many rank-and-file teachers were far less than optimistic about the possibility of this ruling standing up to appeal. Indeed, the story of the past 15 years has been one of the TBOE outmaneuvering the teachers' unions at almost every turn. Some say that even if the presiding judge's ruling is overturned, it pushes the bounds of the debate; others say it appears to have made educational reform that much more of an attractive target.

And in fact, in the weeks since the ruling, a lot of attention has been paid to schooling in the popular press. Teachers worry that the administration will address a recent spate of issues -including bullying, failure to teach courses required for graduation, and, more generally, academic standards and tracking- not in their own right but within the hazy context of restoring "traditional values" (whatever these are). Many fear that with all of the reform that is needed (and almost all teachers recognize the need for reform of some kind), the revisions to the post-war education law will basically be aimed at making patriotic students and obedient teachers, leaving the real problems within the educational system untouched.

At a drinking party last week, one teacher lamented, "What is really amazing is that we are in a position today [after so many years of struggle] where we have to fight just for the right to speak up, and this is supposed to be educational. What a 'beautiful country' we will make." Another corrected him: "No, in fact, we are not fighting for the right to speak. It is worse than that. We have to fight for the right just to keep our mouths closed" (that is, the right NOT to sing).

I guess we will see what happens.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/20060922TDY04005.htm

Here, Ishihara explains that forcing teachers to sing and stand is one way of "restoring order at schools":

http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/385066

Here Ishihara is blaming the "grade-grabber" teachers for schools' failure to teacher courses required for graduation:

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20061104TDY02010.htm

And the Justice Minister's declaration of the ruling as "unbelievable" (but of course, this was just his "personal view" and therefore not his view as the Justice Minister?):

http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060922/kyodo/d8k9npdo1.html

Here, the new Education Ministry conflates at least three sorts of discipline (intellectual, pedagogical and national/patriotic) in its justification for policy reform:

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20061003f1.html

A general overview of Abe's direction on education:

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20061027f1.html

--
David H. Slater, Ph.D.
Faculty of Liberal Arts
Sophia University, Tokyo

The Sophia server rejects emails at times. Should your mail to me get returned, please resend to: dhslater@gmail.com. Sorry for the inconvenienc

Approved by ssjmod at 10:46 AM

October 16, 2006

[SSJ: 4243] Escape from Japan

From: Sachie Mizohata
Date: 2006/10/16

Interesting article in the New York Times. http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/fashion/15miho.html

According to this article,
"Many [Japanese women] escape to New York, staying from three months to three years. "In New York they feel they don't get any pressure, that New York gives them freedom," said the Japanese-born owner of the Sunrise Mart, a Japanese market in Little Tokyo."

I am one of the early Japanese "ryugaku-nanmin" refugees who also went to New York to seek better opportunities. (And, I realized there, by Japanese standards, we don't bow and smile enough.)

In Race for the Exits, Leonard J. Schoppa argues that Japan's social system based on gender-biased policies has drawn on the human resources of women and many frustrated women have employed exit strategies.

I suspect that "fugitive" individuals (single, married, divorced women, freeters, the retired, and ex-fonctionnaires) continue to find ways to escape from archaic Japan.

On the other hand, to my surprise, many women choose to be archaic. These women know marriage gives them power. Since many husbands spend all their time on business duties, women's power is reinforced because of men's absence at home. The wives enjoy their status as the boss managing their families, while they happily call their husbands "shujin" (my Master!?).

Or, is Japan changing?

Sachie Mizohata

Approved by ssjmod at 05:59 PM

October 13, 2006

[SSJ: 4241] Re: high posture

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/10/11

Thanks to all who answered my question including some off line. I must say that "koshi ga hikui" is new to me and quite expressive. Of course "my a** is dragging" is pretty expressive too (though different apparently).

> I guess the word is Tei-shisei and Ko-shisei. Ikeda was known for his
> "Tei-shisei," which was quite the opposite of his actual personality.
>
> Kiichi Fujiwara
> University of Tokyo

A significant point--"posture" is not primarily a matter of personality but of strategy. So far Abe seems to be pursuing a high-posture structure but is not sounding as arrogant as his ojiisan in personal terms. Early yet.

__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:53 PM

[SSJ: 4240] Re: high posture

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2006/10/11

> From: Robin Le Blanc
> Date: 2006/10/11
>
> Hi John,
>
> I have heard politicians who are accomodating described as "koshi ga
> hikui."

I've heard the same.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 12:46 PM

October 11, 2006

[SSJ: 4238] Re: high posture

From: Kiichi Fujiwara
Date: 2006/10/11

John,

I guess the word is Tei-shisei and Ko-shisei. Ikeda was known for his "Tei-shisei," which was quite the opposite of his actual personality.

Kiichi Fujiwara
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 10:56 AM

[SSJ: 4237] Re: high posture

From: Robin Le Blanc
Date: 2006/10/11

Hi John,

I have heard politicians who are accomodating described as "koshi ga hikui."

Robin

Approved by ssjmod at 10:42 AM

October 10, 2006

[SSJ: 4235] Re: high posture

From: Shunichi Takekawa
Date: 2006/10/10

>From Jiminto: Seikento no 38-nen by Kitaoka Shinichi (1995, Yomiuri Shimbunsha)

"Ikeda no sokkintachi wa, Kishi no KOUSHISEI ga hanpatsu o maneitakoto o kyokun toshite, 'kanyo to nintai' o utai, 'teishisei' o enshutsushita." (p. 102)

------------------------------------------------------
Shunichi Takekawa
PhD Candidate in Political Science
Junior Specialist, Center for Japanese Studies
University of Hawaii at Manoa
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
http://www.politicalscience.hawaii.edu
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stakekaw/
http://www.hawaii.edu/cjs/

Approved by ssjmod at 01:21 PM

[SSJ: 4234] Re: high posture

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/10/10

Hi John:

The term I believe is koushisei. Its role in Kishi's unpopularity and Japanese prime ministerial politics is discussed in a brief footnote (31) on p. 52 and also another reference on p. 253 of George Packard's Protest in Tokyo.

Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
oShort bio/photo: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss.php
o"Expert sheet" : http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-es.php
oRecent research: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-rs.php
oCurriculum Vitae: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-cv.php
oAbout IR/PS: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/about/about.php
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 12:38 PM

[SSJ: 4232] high posture

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/10/07

Can somebody help me out with a simple translation? In all the talk of the Kishi influence on Abe, I haven't noticed anyone pointing out that Kishi was famous for his "high posture," meaning high-handed dealing with the opposition parties, pushing confrontational issues, and proclaiming what political scientists these days call "majoritarianism" that whoever has the majority has the right to do whatever. Around 1960 a strong contrast was drawn with Ikeda's "low posture"--at least in terms of style, respect for the opposition, consultation, avoiding confrontational issues, etc.

My problem is I can't remember the Japanese term, and I want to refer to it in a talk. My polemical point is that this is of course Bush, but there is some polisci to it as well. Comments welcome.

Incidentally, is there an on-line dictionary that would have answered this question? Breen isn't set up for it.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:32 AM

October 02, 2006

[SSJ: 4229] organic agriculture statistics

From: Kingsbury, Aaron J
Date: 2006/09/30

I am looking for official JAS certified organic agriculture production figures in Japan by prefecture and commodity. Ideally, these figures would be for each prefecture since the standards were passed. Any ideas?

I could not find this data on the MAFF website.

Thank you,

Aaron Kingsbury

Approved by ssjmod at 11:35 AM

September 25, 2006

[SSJ: 4223] Re: Three puzzles behind Abe's election

From: Chao-Chi Lin
Date: 2006/09/23

Hi Yves,

I did not get a chance to read recent news and the party presidential election outcome carefully yet. Thanks for pointing out that voting decisions at the central and local level are so close. It is very interesting. However, I think, "convergence", if any, could be the other way around. The level of support Abe received from prefectures is not much different from that Koizumi respectively received in 2001 and 2003. In 2003, Koizumi received 68 percent of prefecture votes. It is not too surprising that Abe received 65.7 percent (if we assume that Koizumi's supporters are more likely to support Abe). Comparing three election outcomes, we can find that what has changed more is at the national level, i.e. Diet member votes. In 2001, Koizumi received around 50 percent of Diet member votes. In 2003, Koizumi received more Diet member votes, up to 54 percent. This time, Abe received more than 60 percent.

If there is any convergence, that is because popular opinion matters more now. Allowing rank and file members to vote implicitly invite the public to play a certain role. Of course, primaries do not necessarily reflect public opinion because the composition of party members may not reflect the structure of general voters. (Literature on US presidential primaries has a lot of debates.) In the past, as shown in the presidential elections of 1978 and 1982, party membership was nominal. Mass party members joined the party in order to support particular Diet members and the affiliated factions. They tended to vote collectively as blocks. But in 2001, we observed the change. Rank and file members, at least a great majority of them, cast their votes in the line with views by the general public (~away from the view of Diet members). In 2001, some Diet members were forced to change their decisions and support Koizumi at the last minute because Koizumi won a landslide victory at the local level. However, in 2003, many Diet members (despite consistent conflict with Koizumi) decided to support Koizumi because they thought Koizumi would help them to win elections. As independent voters have outnumbered any group of party supporters, the LDP needs to find a way to attract their votes. During Koizumi's term, LDP politicians were getting more sensitive to the impact of leadership selection on their own reelection and also the party's electoral fortune. That is, to win elections, with an eye toward attracting voters, the choice of party leader will take popular opinion into account. Since many polls already showed that the public prefers Abe, it is not very surprising that Abe got more support from Diet members this time.

Moreover, the composition of LDP diet members changed. Last year, a number of people got elected because of Koizumi. They did not have their own (strong) jiban and strong factional affiliation. They even did not get strong support from local chapters. It is very unlikely that they were able to effectively mobilize local chapters to vote for particular candidates. Of course, factions still exist. Before the election, factions or cross-faction groups already expressed their intention to support Abe. However, they are no longer only game in town.

As for the third puzzle, yes, I agree that leaders have some ways to mobilize and shape popular opinion. Popular opinion is fickle. Arguing that the party leader's popularity has become increasingly important alone may not take us too far. I am very interested in knowing any comments on the volatility and malleability of public opinion.

Cheers,
Chao-Chi

Approved by ssjmod at 11:32 AM

[SSJ: 4222] Re: Three puzzles behind Abe's election

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2006/09/22

Yves Tiberghien presents three very intriguing puzzles: the close fit between the distributions of the Dietmember's vote and the party branches', Koizumi's motivations in stepping down now, and the malleability of Japanese public opinion.

I haven't a clue regarding all three.

The change in public attitudes (reflected in the opinion polls cited) regarding Koizumi's Yasukuni visit possibly was effected by a belief that
(1) Koizumi's explanations immediately after the visit were sincere, and/or
(2) China's reaction was disproportional related to the change in attitude toward China).

Regarding Koizumi's motivations and plans, I should refrain from commenting, having just lost 100 yen to Ellis Krauss. Several months ago I said that Koizumi might, under certain circumstances, split the LDP and form a new party with his followers in the LDP and members of other parties. Ellis not only agreed with me that that was a wild scenario but also dragged me into a bet saying that what I said would never happen. Turns out he was right.

But I cannot resist taking a crack at this puzzle by adding to the four explanations proposed for consideration a fifth, may be another wild one: he wants to become a (young) elder statesman acting as an international do- gooder and trouble shooter. He would follow in the footsteps of Carter, Bush Sr. and Clinton. But unlike these three, who have no formal, state-related position, he prefers to stay in the Diet and perform his international roles either as a private citizen or as an envoy of the prime minister Close to Tiberghien's Deng Xiaoping hypothesis). He seems to have developed a passion for foreign travel. He could start with promoting the proposal he made during his visit to Israel in July, the day the recent war in Lebanon started. The proposal calls for a joint development of the Jordan Valley by Japan, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. His Israel visit was overshadowed by the war, but it was a major part of a statement he made in a press conference on July 17th following the G-8 Summit and the Q&A session that followed his statement.

Sorry, no bets this time.

Respectfully,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:22 AM

[SSJ: 4221] Re: Three puzzles behind Abe's election

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2006/09/22

A propos Yves' fascinating speculations. On the voting I'd vote for coincidence rather than design. Aso with the declared backing of one 11-man faction got 69 and Tanigaki with the backing of a 15-man faction got 66 of the MP votes, but in the local votes it was Aso 66 and T 36. Ever the optimist, I conclude that there is slightly more enlightenment among MPs than among their supporters in the country.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 11:17 AM

September 22, 2006

[SSJ: 4219] Three puzzles behind Abe's election

From: Yves Tiberghien
Date: 2006/09/22

Hello everyone,

Following on the exchange earlier this summer and the excellent posts by Kenneth McElwain and Chao-Chi Lin on the rules behind the LDP's leadership selection, I am puzzled by the outcome of Abe's election.

Abe received 267 votes out of 403 among Diet members, or 66.2% He received 197 votes out of 300 prefectoral votes, or 65.7% The net outcome is 464 out of 703, or 66.0%.

Given that the 2 votes were (supposedly) independent, how can they possibly converge to this degree, to the point of being almost equal? It really smacks of voting engineering in the prefectoral chapters.

This situation presents a vivid contrast to the situation in 2001, when there was a large divergence between the prefectoral votes and the voting intentions of Diet members. Of course, the sequential nature of that election forced the hand of Diet members and led to Kamei's defection to the Koizumi camp.

Does anyone have a clue?

And if essentially party leaders (along faction lines or other horizontal grouping methods) carefully allocated the vote both at the Diet level and prefectural level, isn't that surprising in contrast to more chaotic situations in recent years? Or did Koizumi orchestrate it all?

Further, what consequence will this have for the legitimacy and durability of Abe's rule?

I also would like to submit a second puzzle to the
list: the Koizumi puzzle. In very few democracies does a leader who managed to concentrate so much power and to score such a stunning election landslide accept to walk out so rapidly afterwards and in a show of disdain for power. There is little question that Koizumi could have gotten the lDP to extend his term by 1 or 2 years. He just chose not to do it.
Here are some hypotheses that come to my mind:
1. The Mencius hypothesis: Koizumi quotes Mencius repeatedly in his last Lion Heart letter published yesterday. Mencius also recommended to top leaders to leave office at the pinnacle of their glory, so as to be able to come back in the future, or at least to extend their influence to other realms. Is Koizumi strategically withdrawing in a brilliant show of Mencius-like wisdom and disinterest with a calculation that he will be called back to power a few years later when things don't run as smoothly?
2. The Blair hypothesis: was he pushed out by a party that finally exhausted him and outflanked him?
3. The Deng Xiaoping hypothesis: Koizumi essentially built Abe from total oblivion into the obvious party leader today in a mere 4 years. Abe owes his position to Koizumi. Koizumi finds himself in a pretty influential position. How could anyone ignore what Koizumi will say in the coming years about his protege?
4. Is he just genuinely tired and disinterested..?

And, when it comes to puzzles, a third recent event has puzzled me regarding the nature of Japanese democracy. It relates to the apparently stunning malleability of public opinion on key issues. Most interestingly, the opinion on the Yasukuni issue completely reversed within a mere 2 weeks. The Nikkei published polls showing that 53% of the public opposed the PM's visit to Yaskuni and 28% supported it on July 21-23. Apparently, a private poll made by the Kantei showed support as low as 20% and alarmed Koizumi himself. Of course, this was in the wake of the leaked memo by Emperor Showa. The Nikkei data then shows that by Aug 16-18, opinion had reversed:
48% FOR, 36% AGAINST. The analysis emphasized the huge impact of the actual leadership by the PM. In other words, at this moment of history, political leadership has the ability to shape and influence opinion in profound ways. On the China issue, the tit for tat cycle of mutual accusations has led to a collapse of positive views toward China in Japan. And of course, the tit for tat cycle was initiated by political decisions from the top.

What explains the extreme volatility and malleability of public opinion at this current moment? How far can it go?

In fact, this is exactly what Kato Koichi was warning both Koizumi and Abe on August 20, before his house was burnt down.

Cheers,

Yves

--------
Yves Tiberghien, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
University of British Columbia,
Department of Political Science
Buchanan C 455, 1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1
CANADA
Tel: 604-822-4358
Fax: 604-822-5540
Email: yvestibe@politics.ubc.ca
Secondary email: yvestibe@stanfordalumni.org

Personal Web site: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/tiberg/
GMO Politics Website: www.gmopolitics.com

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

September 20, 2006

[SSJ: 4213] Re: Kristoff column

From: Joyce Gelb
Date: 2006/09/20

Sorry - I meant Abe not Aso. here is a quote from today's LA Times : Abe and supporters are less pleased with many Western values imported into Japan.

Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 11:51 AM

[SSJ: 4212] Re: Kristoff column

From: Joyce Gelb
Date: 2006/09/20

mr Dore wrote: of the American acculturation of Japan's intellectual and policy elites. which acculturation is that ? - perhaps he has not seen Aso's recent pronunciation reported in the press that Japan has imported too many Western values.

Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 11:45 AM

[SSJ: 4211] Re: Kristoff column

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2006/09/20

A very interesting discussion about the nuclear option. I had always assumed that it becomes likely for Japan to take it when:
1. the NPT regime falls into complete disarray. A couple more failed revision conferences like the last one, continued struggle between US and IAEA to call the shots, nuclear powers' helplessness in face of N Korean, Itranian and who-next's defiance makes that likely sooner or later
2. there is a consensus in Japan that independence from American domination is desirable, and that Japan's chief interest lies in being able to treat with China on the footing of symbolic equality which the possession of a nuclear deterrent gives. America would surely do its damndest to stop Japan going nuclear , but if such consensus were emerging I imagine that China woujld show only token displeasure. Someone suggested that Japan's attempts to develop weapons would be greeted by a Chinese first strike, but for all the current mutual hostility, Japan-China is hardly Iran-Israel nor likely to become such, (And how much of China's hostility to Japan now is because it is seen, not as an inpendent threat, but as -- not America's poodle like Britain,-- but America's wolf-hound with very sharp teeth.) The first condition seems to me very likely to be fulfilled in the next 10 or 20 years, but it's hard to see the consensus described in 2 emerging even if -- in 20 or 30 years' time perhaps -- China proves to have the edge in the "missile--ABM shield--better missile--better ABM-- even better missile--even better ABM" race with the US. The pace at which Japan's defence system is being integrated with America's, the integration of Japanese and American financial systems and the American acculturation of Japan's intellectual and policy elites seems to me likely to preclude such a development -- however much romantic dreamers of post-Confucian solidarity (such as myself occasionally) might think it a rather good thing.

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 10:48 AM

September 19, 2006

[SSJ: 4210] Cancellation: DIJ Social Science Study Group on September 20, 2006

From: Harald Conrad
Date: 2006/09/19

Dear list-members,

We are sorry to inform you that we have to cancel the planned DIJ Study Group with Susanne Brucksch on September 20 (Wednesday) because our speaker has suddenly fallen ill. We apologize for the inconvenience and hope to have this presentation at some later date.

With best regards,

Harald Conrad
---------------------------------------------
Dr. Harald Conrad
Deputy Director
German Institute for Japanese Studies
Jochi Kioizaka Bldg.
7-1 Kioicho
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
102-0094 Japan
Phone: ++81(0)3-3222-5944 (direct)
Fax: ++81(0)3-3222-5420
www.dijtokyo.org

Approved by ssjmod at 11:19 AM

[SSJ: 4209] Re: Kristoff column

From: Llewelyn Hughes
Date: 2006/09/16

Arthur Alexander's point is well made. While it is often assumed that the technological constraints on Japanese nuclearization are few, this is hypothesis rather than established fact. The evidence he gives us suggests it unlikely to be as easy as assumed; one of the reasons Okazaki Hisahiko has written that a study should be carried out within government of what those technological constraints exactly are (Ronza, August 2003).

I also think it's worth thinking about institutional constraints, as well as the preferences of organizations and political actors likely. I recently finished a study on this question that is due to come out in the Spring 2007 International Security. The best evidence I could turn up suggests that the support of uniformed military officials, at least, should not be assumed even in the absence of the US-Japan alliance. Opposition amongst the public has also been pretty solid, and steady, across many decades. So if one set of actors make a push for developing an independent nuclear deterrent there is likely to be a bun-fight over what to do, and it is not clear, to me at least, who would win.

Two further points. First, even if a "nuclear hedge" exists we shouldn't assume it is national strategy. The weight of evidence points to energy security as being the driver of Japan's nuclear program, rather than a desire to maintain some latent nuclear capability. This matters because METI's position is likely to be determined, I think, by the impact of any nuclear weapons program on its ability to achieve energy security goals. Here it is worth noting that Japan has bilateral contracts with each of its suppliers of nuclear material that states it will be used only for peaceful purposes, so there are likely to be trade-offs. Second, it would be a big step, I think, for Japanse policymakers to abrogate the NPT. The evidence for now actually points in exactly the opposition direction: MoFA have been bumping up support for the NPT etc.etc., rather than equivocating.

One senior uniformed officer summed it up to me as follows: "Could we do it? Yes. Should we do it? No. Will we do it? Maybe."

Llewelyn Hughes

Approved by ssjmod at 11:07 AM

[SSJ: 4208] Re: Kristoff column

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2006/09/15

I want to second Robert Dujarric's point: developing a nuclear explosive is one thing, becoming a nuclear power is quite another. In addition to developing deliverable (i.e. small and compact) nuclear weapons, Japan would have to develop reliable and survivable delivery systems. Ironically, North Korea illustrates this distinction best. The country almost certainly has one or more nuclear explosives, but there is real doubt about whether these can be used as weapons and delivered to targets beyond the country's borders, with the possible exception of South Korea.

The ASDF has some residual capability to deliver nuclear weapons to neighboring states, but this is certainly not a reliable capability at this point. In the absence of reliable delivery systems and the US nuclear umbrella, Japan's development of one or more nuclear weapons is more likely to tempt a Chinese first strike than it is to be an effective deterrent. Undoubtedly, Japan can develop reliable land-based missile delivery systems (building on the H-2A), and even submarine based delivery systems (or purchase bombers from abroad). The point is that these developments, even with Japan's high level of technological proficiency, take time and a lot of investment. The often used phrase that Japan is a screw-driver's turn away from having a nuclear explosive is undoubtedly exaggerated, but even if we assume it's accurate, Japan is no where near be a screw-driver's turn away from developing deliverable nuclear weapons and the systems to deliver them.

Also, for psychological reasons as much as technical reasons, it is likely that Japan would feel compelled to conduct at least one nuclear test. In other words, would Japanese officials be able to sleep well at night not knowing whether their weapons would actually work? An additional reason for testing is that Japan probably does not now possess the technology to conduct subcritical tests of its nuclear weapons, which is how the US and the Russians test the reliability of their arsenals. In short, the signs of a Japan seeking to become a nuclear power would be unmistakable.

Paul Midford
Associate Professor
Director, Japan Program
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
Office # 10504
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 10:57 AM

September 15, 2006

[SSJ: 4207] Constructing identity

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/09/14

See Ko UNOKI, "Meanwhile: What it means to be Japanese," International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/07/opinion/edunoki.php

Vincent K. Pollard
____________________________

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
Asia, U.S., Hawai'i, world politics, futures
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 12:07 PM

[SSJ: 4206] Re: kaso villages

From: Sachie Mizohata
Date: 2006/09/14

Thank you very much for the interesting kaso notes. I have enjoyed reading.

Peter Matanle asked:
Where is the political accountability for this state of affairs?
What does the Japanese government plan to do about it?

I also ask the similar questions, but when accountability/responsibility is so diffused, what do we do? These days nobody wants to be responsible and there is no more hara-kiri in case of failure.

I would like to say three more things about kaso (depopulated and underdeveloped) areas.

1. Yes, J. C. Campbell-sensei, as I eagerly read your articles and books, I know that Japan's long term care insurance is a "universal entitlement." Similarly, we know those who are 70 and older are eligible for free public transportation. But, there is no such thing. In most kaso areas, there is almost no or very limited (often irregular) bus services. So, that's why I think many services are not that universal.

2. Yes, the kaso population is proportionally small, but it almost makes the population of Israel . Apparently the rural elderly are underserved and that is not OK.

Also, it must be remembered that there is a gap between the number of kaso households and of kaso individuals. Young people have moved to cities, but their older family members have stayed in rural communities; entire family members did not quit villages.

Even though kaso native sons and daughters may register their addresses/juminhyo in somewhere else, they visit kaso to take care of their old folks/old houses for weekends, national holidays, or obon/oshogatsu and to attend village gatherings/funerals. So, the kaso-related population may not be as small as registered.

3. As some feminist thinkers argue, domestic violence was (still is) considered as "a private matter" since the rights in a private sphere were/are not well recognized and protected. In the same vein, I think the problems the rural elderly have are often seen and dismissed as "personal" problems. And, that's I find unfair and unjust.

I guess Tokyo-Kasumigaseki (where Japanese bureaucrats and decisions-makers work all day-night long) is socially and geographically so distant from kaso areas. Kaso may appear distant misery.

Sachie Mizohata

doctoral student
Department of Sociology
University of Paris V, the Sorbonne

Approved by ssjmod at 12:02 PM

[SSJ: 4205] Re: Kristoff column

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/09/13

Curiously, I just sent this item off to the NBR list, so for those on both lists, excuse cross-posting.

From: Arthur Alexander

This note is in response to Tom Berger's analysis of Japan's nuclear weapons capabilities. I recently (in the past two years) participated in a US government day-long conference on just this topic. Although not classified, it was labeled, naturally, as "sensitive." Among the participants were several nuclear weapons designers with decades of real experience.

There was agreement with the first part of Tom's conclusion: "Japan has long had a very powerful, recessed nuclear weapons capacity."

There was speculation that this capability was created some time ago in the 1960s with the idea that, although it was by no means a weapons program, it could be pulled together into one in the future if the need arose.

The designers had a different view. They said that it is very difficult to design and produce a usable weapon, and that it is even harder to make one that can be carried in any kind of vehicle, let alone a miniaturized version that could fit in a missile or even a smaller aircraft. Recall that the B-29 was the largest military aircraft that the US possessed in 1945. Reliability is another issue. They recalled the story of an American aircraft that inadvertently armed a nuclear bomb when the radar or other flight control system was turned on. (I do not recall the exact details.) The crew spent an anxious several hours while they tried to figure out how to disarm the bomb. The US had been producing and testing nuclear weapons for some 20 years when this occurred.

Their point is that it takes more than plutonium, rockets, and smart scientists to produce a nuclear weapon that can be delivered on a platform smaller than a barge. It takes time and experience, including testing, which is not feasible for a country like Japan if it is not in a real war. The scale of such an effort would necessarily be large enough that it would not go unnoticed, either by interested intelligence agencies or even the general public.

However, if Japan were to abandon its restraints and go all out in a fully funded, public, weapons program, and were willing to test prototypes, it could have deliverable models in a few years, perhaps as few as five. Combining the warhead with a delivery platform, especially a rocket or submarine adds additional complexity, costs, and testing requirements.

Incidentally, this analysis also has relevance to North Korea's capabilities, which I will leave as an exercise for the students.

Approved by ssjmod at 11:52 AM

[SSJ: 4204] Re: Kristoff column

From: Robin Le Blanc
Date: 2006/09/13

As regards public will for nuclear weapons, I had an interesting conversation with a conservative, local-level politician and a group of students who work with him this summer about "going nuclear." This conversation was only a few days after North Korea's missle launchings, so perhaps it should be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, sentiment in the group ranged from some concern over the way in which having nuclear weapons would affect Japan's position in international relations to insistence that nuclear weapons have become a necessity. What struck me was the general agreement that nuclear weapons might be a reasonable strategic option, all things considered. I've been following this group since 1999, and I've seen a clear shift toward the notion that Japan can not count on its US alliance for safety and must do whatever is necessary to protect itself--sometimes voiced as a curious combination of despite for "Bush Doctrine" foreign policy and a sense that Japan must, itself, consider developing power for preemptive strikes.

This is only one group and quite a conservative one, but it does make me wonder how much change is occuring in the larger population.

Robin Le Blanc

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

[SSJ: 4203] Re: Kristoff column

From: Robert Dujarric
Date: 2006/09/13

I would recommend to those interested the Stimson Center's Japan Nuclear Option volume. One should also distinguish between a bomb, in itself not particularly useful, and the acquisition of delivery vehicles and command and control facilities along with an explosive device sufficiently small and reliable to fit the missiles and/or bombers that would take it to the target.

Robert Dujarric robertdujarric@gmail.com or rdujarric@aol.com
Japan Institute of International Affairs Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 11:34 AM

September 13, 2006

[SSJ: 4202] Re: Kristoff column

From: Todd Tilma
Date: 2006/09/13

To Ehud Harari:

Beyond the RIKEN scientists I've talked to, I've found quite a bit of dissension concerning this issue in the scientific community. My personal observation is that there would be quite a bit of public, high-profile objection by academic scientists as well as the members of some national research organizations if Japan were to embark on such a project, but there would be enough scientists in key disciplines, and located in key positions of power within the larger R&D community, that would most likely, if grudgingly, go along with the development of a nuclear capability, if the US explicitly or implicitly signed off on it, or, more importantly, if their was a radical change in the strategic situation in the region; for example, an erosion in the confidence that Japan was still under the US nuclear umbrella after a weapon test by North Korea.

Moving beyond the obvious social and emotional issues at play in Japan regarding this issue, it would seem that, unlike Iran, for Japan, it really isn't a technical issue at all - it's a political will issue.
Is there the will in the Japanese polity to do something this radical.

T. Tilma

Approved by ssjmod at 09:57 PM

[SSJ: 4201] Re: Kristoff column

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2006/09/13

T. Lima writes:

> I can concur. Having had the chance to talk to some Japanese nuclear
> scientists o v er the past year, I can say that there have been some
> interesting, internal disc us sions at labs concerning how to "go nuclear,"
> as it were, especially in the las tf ew years. For example scientists working
> for RIKEN have discussed with me the d ipl omatic fallout (no pun intended),
> that developing a usable device would cause.
>
> I found it interesting that technical and local political issues were
> secondary, t heir primary concern seemed to be focused not towards the
> reaction of China or Nor th Korea, but rather the reaction of the United
> States if Japan were to "go nuclea r." This may have been for my benefit, but
> it was still an interesting way to view the issue.

> The historical significance of RIKEN physicists discussing how to make Japan
> a nuc lear weapon state was also, to me, significant.

Very interesting indeed. Have the nuclear scientists at RIKEN intimated that they would go along with going nuclear, say if the US would not object? In the past, among the reasons those expecting that Japan would not go nuclear pointed to was that Japanese scientists would object, refuse to cooperate, and stir up public protests.

Respectfully,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:22 PM

[SSJ: 4200] Re: Kristoff column

From: Todd Tilma
Date: 2006/09/13

I can concur. Having had the chance to talk to some Japanese nuclear scientists over the past year, I can say that there have been some interesting, internal discussions at labs concerning how to "go nuclear," as it were, especially in the last few years. For example scientists working for RIKEN have discussed with me the diplomatic fallout (no pun intended), that developing a usable device would cause.

I found it interesting that technical and local political issues were secondary, their primary concern seemed to be focused not towards the reaction of China or North Korea, but rather the reaction of the United States if Japan were to "go nuclear." This may have been for my benefit, but it was still an interesting way to view the issue.

The historical significance of RIKEN physicists discussing how to make Japan a nuclear weapon state was also, to me, significant.

I hope this helps.

Sincerely,

T. Tilma

Approved by ssjmod at 03:12 PM

[SSJ: 4199] Re: Kristoff column

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2006/09/13

To Gregory Casza,

That was what Morton Halperin meant years ago when he referred to Japan as a "Could-Have" State (neither a "have state" nor a "have-not" state). Seems that "model" is still alive and Japan has not only the economic might and technological knowhow, but also a large stockpile (over 40 tons) of plutonium; about half of which is believed to be fissionable and could be used for creating military nuclear capability.

Respectfully,

Ehud Harari, A.K.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:45 PM

[SSJ: 4198] Kristoff column

From: Gregory J. Kasza
Date: 2006/09/12

Friends: Today's column by Nicholas Kristoff in the New York Times includes the following line:

"Few experts expect Iran to give up its nuclear program altogether, but it's likely that Iran could be persuaded to adopt a Japanese model: develop its capacity to the point that a bomb could be completed in weeks or months, but without testing or stockpiling weapons."

Comments? Is there evidence that this is the "Japanese model"?

Greg

Gregory J. Kasza
East Asian Languages & Cultures and Political Science
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Approved by ssjmod at 12:33 PM

September 11, 2006

[SSJ: 4196] Re: kaso villages

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/09/10

Sachie Mizuhata wrote:

> In general, rural elders rely on family and neighbors, or they are on their
> own because of lack of social services. As far as I know about Kyoto and
> Shiga, the LTCI is not there for the rural elderly. Although the LTCI
> started in 2000, the for-profit companies did not find the lucrative market
> in depopulated areas, so they quickly withdrew services and left there.
> This goes back to earlier kakusa/disparities issue.

LTCI is an entitlement program--people over 65 become eligible for benefits depending on their level of disability regardless of income or whether family or other informal help is available anywhere in Japan. Benefits range up to about $3500 a month, and beneficiaries decide what they want and who should provide it. I suppose there may be someone somewhere who is unable to get home or community-based services such as home-help, visiting nurses, and day care services due to an absence of providers. It is true that for-profit companies do not compete in the most rural areas, but in such cases at least the quasi-public municipal Social Welfare Council is always available. In particular, day-care center vans routinely pick people up an hour or more away. On islands they go by ferry.

Ms. Mizuhata thought Luxembourg has a good LTCI system. It does have one of the oldest (1994), but it's program covers only about 10 percent of the 65+ population compared to 17 percent in Japan, and the benefits are much lower.

Finally, while it is true that kaso chiiki (population-loss regions) make up a bit more than half the area of Japan, less than six percent of the population lives there. There was a big government report on this topic last month, at http://www.soumu.go.jp/c-gyousei/2001/kaso/kasomain0.htm.

There is no doubt that these municipalities, and rural Japan in general, are in severe fiscal and economic trouble. It is interesting that among the three big "gap" (kakusa) issues being discussed today, it is regional disparity that gets way more attention from politicians than either income disparity or job disparity (regular vs part-time employment). Koizumi's departure may well mean more assistance for rural areas.
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 11:21 AM

[SSJ: 4195] Re: kaso villages

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/09/08

I would hazard a guess that the biodiversity of Japan's planted cedar forests is of a lower order than that of what we loosely term deserts in other areas of the world. Antarctica and its surrounding seas, the deserts of southern Africa and so on are actually quite rich in microscopic organisms, insect, bird, plant and mammal life. By contrast the cedar monoculture in Japan appears comparatively barren. The odd tanuki notwithstanding. Not being an ecologist, however, I may be wrong.

ON Kaso villages, having recently spent some more time in Sado researching its society and depopulation, I am coming to the conclusion that governing systems at all levels appear structurally incapable of dealing with the issues. The local government wants to promote Sado as an 'environmental destination' for tourists, yet there are no facilities in place for enacting this. It appears to be an empty slogan to cover up for decades of continuing destruction in the name of economic development. Whole mountainsides are torn down leaving scars across the landscape to provide aggregates for concrete bridges linking seaside rock formations to form 'coastal defenses' and fishing ports with few or no boats. The mountain scars are then concreted over with aggregate brought from other torn down mountainsides in order to prevent landslides! The whole pantomime is of course exacerbated by the culture of spending the budget in order that it not be reduced next year, and to keep local people employed in jobs that they don't want to do ... so they leave to find work elsewhere.

In terms of developing tourism in a sustained (and sustainable) and expert fashion, most local areas are failing. The system of job rotation in the local government means that those coming into the toursim office are not experts, have little or no experience, and more often than not work from last year's manual. There are some attempts to remarket Sado and elsewhere, but without real investment on the ground in new forms of tourist activity, those that do visit leave disappointed, don't come back, and tell their friends to go to Guam instead ... it is cheaper and easier to get to.

So, where are the themed ecology holidays where groups participate in recording wildlife and repairing the habitat, as goes on in other areas of the world where they are trying to market themselves as 'environmental destinations'? Expert advice of the type that would set up these kinds of activities, which many people are willing to pay good money to engage in, is almost completely absent in Japan (though there are a couple of notable exceptions). Instead, environmental destination holidays end up being a coach trip to a local look-out point, a view to admire the city from afar, and then back to the omiyage shop and the hotel (both owned by mega- corporations based in Tokyo - as is the coach company) for a bath and lots of Kirin beer. Tourists are kept hermetically sealed from the rural habitat, in order that they spend ALL their money with the tour operator and not with local businesses.

The workaholic salaryman lifestyle prevents all but the most determined (and courageous) from taking more than two or three days holiday at a time, which militates against people spending time in an area and really exploring it, and spending money in local businesses. So local businesses cannot retain earnings for future investment and gradually fall apart. Staff cannot be retained year round because tourism in Japan is highly seasonal in its structure, with very short windows where large numbers of visitors descend on a village to view a particular flower for a week or so, and leave it empty for the rest of the year. So, staff training is expensive and experience can't be retained. Sado is now in such a state that they are having to recruit seasonal workers from China on 'kenshusei' visas to work in hotel kitchens etc. The local government encourages marriages with local people, but they are mostly a sham, with the wife returning to China for the winter and children being educated in Shanghai etc. year round because local schools are falling apart too.

The education system is resolutely modern and developmental in all its aspects and in all regions of Japan. Younger people cannot learn how to live, work and prosper in their home regions through their schooling, because the schooling is completely dedicated to turning out urban salarymen, wives for them, and factory workers (who are now convenience store workers because the factories are disappearing too). The national government is in fact engaged in centralising the curriculum still further through patriotism education - which necessarily favours the urban centre over the rural 'periphery' (see - even our language is a structural inhibitor to treating the rural properly). Sogo Gakushu and yutori kyoiku are thinly veiled concessions by a conservative elite to maintain the status quo. Thus, there is little or no training for local teachers to teach to an alternative curriculum, and the textbooks teach to university entrance exams written by the urban elite for the urban elite. The only way that younger people can learn to live and work in rural areas is by inheriting skills and knowledge from their parents. But as families now have few children and some end up with noone inheriting the business, so local businesses gradually disappear and local social and cultural capital fades away.

The system of land holding is definitely an inhibitor to rural sustainability. In suburban areas around Niigata there are loads of rice fields farmed by part-time farmers (office workers by day) who are close enough to the city to be able to continue with this way of life. Growing rice is easy peasy by comparison with fruit and veg, so the local Co-ops (Nokyo) give plenty of advice for doing the former but almost no advice is given for the latter, which means that those that try have to go it alone. However, if one goes further afield into the rural areas the income from agriculture is not enough to sustain a family, but there are few office jobs to go around, so younger people leave and the people that stay give birth to fewer children, thus exacerbating the slow population decline. Even the system of public holidays is geared to the office worker/part-time farmer, it appears. Golden Week is prime time for rice planting in and around Niigata City, so its easy for the part time farmers to take a few days to get the fields ready and plant the rice. The rest of the time all they need do is spend the odd weekend tending to the paddy banks and spreading a few chemicals.

A couple of years back the Economist even went so far as to say that the slow collapse of the Japanese population (and by implication rural society) might be a good thing for an overpopulated and resource hungry society. That could only have been written by someone who has never in his life lived in a rural area himself and who knows next to nothing about the ecological nightmare our children will inherit. In 1997 an article in Climatic Change showed that every year the world consumes more than 400 years worth of stored solar energy in the form of fossil fuels, and the rate of depletion is accelerating. Given that Japan consumes far more per unit population, since it is one of the most developed countries, to make the Japanese population neutral in its consumption of fossil fuels would require a depopulation on the scale of less than 1/400th of its current size!

Lastly, for anyone who thinks that this is only a rural problem, think again. What is happening in Sado and elsewhere is the shape of things to come for suburban and urban Japan too. Tokyo women now give birth to less than one child per woman. Since rural areas are now no longer supplying the urban centre with its population, the consequences appear disastrous. Immigration is NOT an option. It is immoral because it depletes the developing world of its social capital. It creates international instabilities which Japan will then have to pay for through increased overseas involvement and increased domestic risk. And Japan has to compete with other more attractive destinations for migrants, such as the NAmerica, Australia, and the UK. There is no real possibility for Japan to solve its population crisis by importing people from afar. Such a policy is merely papering over the cracks. As an aside, just as Japan missed the imperialism boat in the 19th century so it is missing the immigration boat now. The UK and others now recognise the global instabilities created by a policy of asking devloping countries to pay for our own inadequacies, and we are just now beginning to reduce our dependence on South African nurses etc.

My conclusion is this. Japanese society itself is a modernist and developmentalist mono-culture, just like its cedar forests. Those few shoots that do occasionally spring up to challenge the status quo are eventually wiped out by the acid soil of Japan's centralism. The consequence is a desertification of the human soul and of human sustainability.

My questions are as follows. Where is the political accountability for this state of affairs? What does the Japanese government plan to do about it?

Dr Peter Matanle
Lecturer in Japanese Studies, School of East Asian Studies
University of Sheffield, UK, Tel: +44 (0)114 222 8407
General Editor, electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies
Website: www.japanesestudies.org.uk, e-mail: editor@japanesestudies.org.uk
Personal Website: www.matanle.netl, e-mail: peter@matanle.net

Approved by ssjmod at 11:14 AM

September 08, 2006

[SSJ: 4193] kaso villages: on Japanese forests

From: Michael Smitka
Date: 2006/09/07

I forwarded the discussion to our ESP director, who does amazon forests; Sachie Mizohata is quite accurate in her sense of the pernicious impact of the cedar monoculture.

On Sep 7, 2006, at 12:20 am, James Kahn wrote:

> This is a familiar story, repeated throughout the world. Natural forests that
> were high in ecological services production were replaced by monocultures
> which are very low in services. It is usually some type of conifer or
> eucalyptus which is the villain.
>
> James R. Kahn, Director, Environmental Studies Program John F. Hendon
> Professor of Economics Washington and Lee University

Approved by ssjmod at 12:04 PM

[SSJ: 4192] Re: kaso villages

From: Sachie Mizohata
Date: 2006/09/07

I do not agree about the long term care insurance (LTCI) in rural communities.
**The problem of old people themselves in all the villages with 30-40% or more 65+ population is a good deal better now than before due to long-term-care insurance, which is also a non trivial source of jobs for women.**
You talk about semi-rural or suburban areas, no? I see "rura" as at least 40 km/one hour away by car from cities.

In general, rural elders rely on family and neighbors, or they are on their own because of lack of social services. As far as I know about Kyoto and Shiga, the LTCI is not there for the rural elderly. Although the LTCI started in 2000, the for-profit companies did not find the lucrative market in depopulated areas, so they quickly withdrew services and left there. This goes back to earlier kakusa/disparities issue.

On the other hand, I hear that the LTCI in Luxembourg is doing well. Also, I see white cars (hot meal delivery and visiting nurse) all the time in small villages in Belgium. Even in rural France, they have the MSA (la mutuelle agricole), so thanks to home help, a 90-yr-old woman can live by herself in a hamlet near the Alps.

About reforestation, several weeks ago I watched ARTE TV program (arte is a France-Germany TV channel). After WWII, Germany faced similar forest problems like Japan. Politicians asked farmers to plant a certain species of "money" tree, and later another species. German farmers soon got suspicious and hired agronomy-forest specialists. Today they keep biodiversity and equilibrium and so, their forests are much healthier and disease resistant.

Going back to my original question about rural abandonment and rural depopulation, what is going on in fishing villages? You know more than half (51.7%) of the national territory is classified as kaso, depopulated.

Sachie Mizohata

Approved by ssjmod at 11:58 AM

September 06, 2006

[SSJ: 4191] Re: kaso villages

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/09/06

The forestry discussion is interesting, and one of the results of the monoculture reforestation is the awful cedar pollen pollution-- main reason for all the face masks in the spring.

The original question was about whether and how government policies favored or did not hinder depopulation of rural areas. It seems to me (and this is pretty much the conventional wisdom I think) that without such policies as subsidized rice prices, agricultural protectionism, inhibitions on large-scale agriculture including the land transfer regulations, and heaven knows all those public works projects, rural income and therefore population would be even lower today.

The problem of old people themselves in all the villages with 30-40% or more 65+ population is a good deal better now than before due to long-term-care insurance, which is also a non trivial source of jobs for women. In some of these places, most of the employment is farming (where productivity is so high there aren't many jobs), public works construction (even now), the town office, and the social welfare council (the organization that typically does most of the LTCI care service in the countryside).

jc
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:03 PM

[SSJ: 4190] Re: kaso villages

From: Michael Smitka
Date: 2006/09/05

Thanks to Sachie for elaborating; it clarified things tremendously. In the back of my mind I was aware that wherever I went, the forests seemed the same, and there was a paucity of squirrels and little variety in the birds -- all things that make sense in an agricultural (forestry) monoculture. And certainly the cedars that are the first- growth in the sort of abandoned farms that are now housing areas in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, where I reside when not on sabbatical, are pretty successful at killing ground cover, too much to be explained just through shading. As to the kaso issue, the forested areas I've been around in Japan are all pretty rugged topography (flatter areas became hatake), so logging cannot be very economical, unless the trees are really valuable. I'm not a woodworker, but I imagine Japanese cedar is not ... unlike slow- growing broadleaf trees.

If the Japanese government was really thorough, and the clear-cutting post-war was total -- both of which I assume to be the case -- then there is no seed stock to facilitate variegated second-growth forests. (The Blue Ridge of Virginia was clear-cut more than once, much the same problem, with effects still visible in places a century or so later.) Conifers -- cedars -- emit a lot of hydrocarbons, too -- that's why it's the "blue" = hazy "ridge". So not only is the soil bad, I'm sure it contributes to air pollution.

I know George Totten has written a book (plus chapters and papers) on Japanese forestry; what I read years ago focused on the Edo era, but I suspect he didn't stop there in his later work. There must be other sources, too. Are today's policies an extension of those of yore, simply more thorough in the hands of a strong centralized government? I'm not aware however of Edo-era policies to modify seacoasts and riverbeds, though on second thought there was a lot of umetate-chi / shinden (marsh-clearing), and irrigation demanded that rivers not be left "wild," beginning in earnest in the late 15th and especially early 16th century.

But except as historians can fill in the blanks, I don't know where to take the discussion from here.

mike (no "Mr." needed in this forum!)

=======================
Michael Smitka
Fulbright Research Fellow
cell: 080-5440-3702
=======================

Approved by ssjmod at 10:15 AM

September 05, 2006

[SSJ: 4189] Re: kaso villages

From: Sachie Mizohata
Date: 2006/09/04

Hi, Michael or Mr. Smitka,
Hi, All,

OK, below, this is what I understand.
I think that our agriculture and forestry issues are closely related. After World War II, Japan lost colonial timber forests in Sakhalin, Korea, and Taiwan. Because of huge demands for housing and fuel in the post-war reconstruction process, domestic natural forests were logged and became devastated. So, the government launched kakudai-zorin or the aggressive reforestation policy in 1956, and "financed the replacement of what they saw as commercially useless natural forests [mostly oak, maple, and other broadleaf trees] with more economically productive trees. For the most part, this extraordinary experiment in environmental engineering has involved planting a single species, the Japanese cedar, because of the usefulness of its wood and the speed of its growth" (James Sterngold, January 17, 1995, The New York Times). It seems many Japanese bureaucrats and politicians did not think that these "short-sighted Government policies" of the monoculture forests would affect the lives of Japanese people in many ways later on.

In the 1950s, Japan's forestry industry had its heyday and natural forests were rapidly replaced by artificially planted conifers. At the same time, the agricultural production increased due to mechanization, chemical fertilizers, and so on. The rural households used their extra agricultural income to invest in forestry and established agro-forestry living households.

After the Liberalization of Trade and Exchange in 1960, there was a sharp increase in cheaper timber imports. Japan's cedars lost their competitiveness and many forestry companies got bankrupted. Between 1955 and 1973, Japan experienced the unprecedented economic growth and also the massive out-migration and population loss in rural communities. Large parts of private forests were left without care and abandoned because of the long recession of forestry industry and the aging forestry population.

About rice agriculture, farmers rebuilt rice farms into larger lots better adjusted for mechanization, which was encouraged and subsidized by the central government, though this soon resulted in overproduction. So, there were gentan and tensaku policies. According to some researchers, the Government thought that these policies would lead farmers to move to cooperative farms, but it did not happen. As you say, many farmers have stayed in individual; "a single farmer can't assemble enough land to make a good living (or even to keep busy!)." (Though, I guess that Japanese farmers who are usually older and diligent keep themselves busy.)

The mandatory agricultural restrictions have made it difficult to live in agriculture only, so that exacerbated rural exodus and rural depopulation.

To make a long story short, the monoculture forests of conifers (which do not develop deep roots and produce much acidity) have created many bad things: destroying biodiversity, bad water quality, allergy to cedar pollen (infamous hay fever!), increased natural disasters (soil erosion and landslides), and so on.

I am not a kaso expert yet. Please send me comments.

Thanks,
Sachie Mizohata

Approved by ssjmod at 10:43 AM

September 04, 2006

kaso villages

From: Michael Smitka
Date: 2006/09/04

I'm curious why the following were misguided policies:

- the promotion of mechanization of agriculture vs production restrictions:

- gentan and tensaku;

[- the nationwide afforestation vs mass timber imports -- I'm not familiar with this so don't comment]
[- etc -- ditto]

>From my perspective, the problems were:

- the restrictions on landholdings implemented during the US Occupation (land reform) is the source of policy problems (particularly the components that prevented an increase in land farmed per household),

- compounded by the poor infrastructure development (issuing bonds to pay for roads, resulting in toll roads, with tolls so high that it was not economical to actually use them, thus inhibiting marketing goods elsewhere and locating production in "remote" areas).

As productivity / incomes rose elsewhere in the economy, it was important to spend as little time on farming as possible, hence mechanization made sense. But since land per farmer was limited, even with very high food subsidies (explicit and implicit, through trade barriers), farming remained unattractive as a long-term business. In particular, with limits on land per household, it was difficult for one family to accumulate enough land to make a living solely from agriculture. Of course, with subsidies of various sorts, and benefits from keeping land "agricultural" exit was impeded, which in turn made farmers (the largest block of whom are 65+ year-old women) not terribly interested in pushing for reform of the system.

An indirect effect was (is!) high vegetable prices: an excessive emphasis on rice meant land was devoted to its cultivation which in the normal course of events would have been used for veggies. I don't know how strict the rules were on consolidating dry-crop land, but believe there remains the same underlying problem, that a single farmer can't assemble enough land to make a good living (or even to keep busy!).

===============
Michael Smitka
Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Researcher Chiba University Faculty of Law and Economics
1-33 Yayoi-cho, Inage-ku
Chiba, Japan 263-8522

tel: 080-5440-3702
skype: jidoshasangyo [free from US]
===============================

Approved by ssjmod at 03:57 PM

[SSJ: 4185] message

From: Sachie Mizohata
Date: 2006/09/03

Subject: Kaso villages

Dear all,

I am conducting research on the elderly in rural Japan, focusing on genkai shuraku or "villages that have reached their limits."

I understand that depopulation has occurred in kaso areas (agriculture and forestry villages) partly due to misguided public policies (e.g., the promotion of mechanization of agriculture vs production restrictions: gentan and tensaku; the nationwide afforestation vs mass timber imports, etc). But, I do not know what happened and what's going on in fishing villages. It will be appreciated if you can give me any useful references.

Arigatou!!

Sachie Mizohata
the Sorbonne

Approved by ssjmod at 11:01 AM

[SSJ: 4184] LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Koichi Nakano
Date: 2006/09/01

While I read Paul's and Ellis's posts with interest, I would like add a note of caution against too narrow a focus on Yasukuni --even as we try to make sense of Yasukuni issues.

Needless to say, Yasukuni is not the only issue of concern for anybody --neither for Koizumi nor for Abe. Political expediency is the beginning of an explanation, but then, was there ever even a mildly successful politician who was free from it? What I am saying is this: we live in highly ideological times (not just in Japan either), and we need to place Yasukuni in the wider context of changing conservative politics in Japan; in the sets of issues and causes that are jointly advocated by the conservatives; and to try to explicate the dynamics at work that brought saliency to Yasukuni under Koizumi.

There was a time when the LDP was a very broad church, and even as of 1988, Gerald Curtis famously described it as "Japan's preeminent party of the center." Not anymore. Through what appears to be a combination of institutional changes (party system and electoral rules) and very substantial generational change among politicians, the LDP emerged today as arguably more right-wing than ever. To schematize things a little, the Old LDP was dominated by a coalition of developmentalism and clientelism (as a result of the ascendancy of the factions of the Ikeda-Ohira lineage and Sato-Tanaka lineage). Koizumi led a New Right coalition of economic liberalism and reactionary nationalism, drawing amply on friends from the Mori faction (which is, of course, of the hapless Kishi-Fukuda lineage), and successfully branded the former as "forces of resistance" --and along the way, also successfully convinced the Japanese public (with the help of the unsuspecting media) that that was the only game in town, leaving the opposition parties in the cold. Koizumi is far more of an instinctive economic liberal (though apparently not a systematic thinker; more like Reagan than Thatcher, I suppose) than a reactionary nationalist, but his most loyal allies in the Mori faction included many in the latter category. Yasukuni visits, as a key cause of the reactionary conservatives, represented an issue that helped Koizumi retain a sufficiently solid power base within the party as he pursued his economic reform agenda, postal privatization in particular. For the nationalists, Koizumi may be a weirdo who perms his hair, likes the opera, and more seriously, undermined the moral fabric of the Japanese society (e.g. postal privatization, cuts on road construction, and winner-takes-all deregulation), and perhaps even a bit of a sell-out to American interests, but he does go to Yasukuni and thumbs his nose at China --and is popular too. (If anyone cares, I wrote a bit more on this in the Yasukuni book I edited.)

Abe's coalition within the LDP is currently being shaped. Abe himself is much more of a reactionary nationalist than Koizumi, and he is closely surrounded by like-minded politicians and ideologues to a greater extent than Koizumi, but with everyone now on the bandwagon, he looks more and more like a fresh graduate with a sudden, large inheritance that brought many relatives previously unknown around him. He is far less experienced than Koizumi (who, after all, lost twice before he finally won the LDP race, and he really won it too), and thus, probably quite "educable" in the same way as Obuchi Yuko was educable to the pleasure of her late father's koenkai. In that sense, it's anybody's guess who gets to educate him. Hosokawa Morihiro was also educable, and drifted away from older friends (from the time of electoral reform and new party movements: e.g. Takemura Masayoshi and Tanaka Shusei) to newer but more "reliable" friends (i.e. Ozawa) in office. Abe, too, may find his more "principled" (read nationalist) friends too "idealistic" (read ideological) to be of use in power.

The fact remains, however, that Abe's most reliable intra-party support base is among the reactionary conservatives (in contrast to Hosokawa who didn't really have an established parliamentary support base (and is now a potter)). I see two possibilities.

First, if it seems that he can get away with visits to Yasukuni, Abe would try to do so at the yearly Spring or Autumn Festivals (he already said that he always preferred those occasions to August 15th), without making announcements, dodging questions, tacitly implying that the visits are in his personal capacity, but signing "Prime Minister Abe Shinzo" (i.e. the "aimai" (or "chikan" if you are less charitable) method). He would just then repeat that his visits are apolitical, something he has always done, and not a matter to be politicized. This is different from "pulling a Koizumi" that Paul mentioned --it's rather building on Koizumi (from the nationalist's perspective). I have already mentioned earlier that the reactionary conservatives have a history of attempts to return some official status to Yasukuni throughout the postwar period. The nationalization bills didn't work, and then came the "official" visits of the PMs. That didn't work either, but then came Koizumi, apparently cheerfully ignorant of the history of it all, tried all kinds of excuses, kept on going, and eventually settled on the "non-official visits by a Prime Minister" line, which just about lets him argue that the visits are not unconstitutional. Making a "koyaku" out of it is ill-advised, not just because it is redundant given the current bandwagon for Abe, but also because it pushes closer to the unconstitutionality of the such visits in eyes of the courts (even if the promise is only internal to the LDP --see the ruling by the Osaka High Court last fall). In any case, Abe, according to this scenario, would keep on going to Yasukuni, arguing that it has nothing to do with politics, that it's "atarimae" --until it becomes "atarimae."

Second, if there is sufficient public, Zaikai, and/or US opposition to Abe's visits (which are by no means obvious at this point), he will try to be politically expedient not in a random manner, but by choosing to highlight other nationalist causes instead --from constitutional revision, the revision of the basic law on education (patriotism) to territorial disputes, North Korea, collective self-defense, or even enabling pre-emptive attacks on perceived enemy threats. None of these is going to make China or South Korea happy, but the argument would be repeated that these issues concern Japan's sovereignty, and he would stand up for the national interest. Of course, this may not work. The public opinion may dislike the consequences of his nationalist grandstanding, and his position may be quickly undermined within the party (a bit like Maehara of the DPJ). His premiership may be rather short-lived as well.

Would there be sufficient pressure on Abe on Yasukuni though? The list of the Japan hands in the US who spoke out against Yasukuni visits are getting longer, as Paul and Ellis mentioned. Paul Giarra had his article out on Asahi (both English and Japanese), and I would add Gerry Curtis (who spoke at a Senate hearing etc.), Kent Calder (Foreign Affairs), and Richard Samuels (Boston Globe/IHT) as Japan scholars. So, would American pressure work eventually? Maybe. The Japanese ruling conservative elites were pardoned by the US, given a second life in the postwar period, and they are thus forever indebted to the the US government. It was only under the aegis of American interest that the Japanese nationalists were permitted to pursue their revisionist agenda too. My doubt is rather whether there would be sustained American pressure on Japan's reactionary conservatives. Political expediency of remarkably ideological kind is driving conservative politics not just in Japan, but in the US too. "Healthy" nationalism is welcome by certain US policy-makers and scholars (e.g. Thomas Berger at a House hearing) as long as it is conducive to enabling Japan to play a greater military role in the alliance. The business leaders of Japan are already exhausted, having tried everything. Koizumi just wouldn't listen. Abe may be more malleable, but then, economics is not his forte. The Japanese public? Divided at best. More than anything, anti-Chinese sentiments are at a historic high. Hatemongering is all over the place in the popular media. It obviously sells. Many of you in political science may be in Philadelphia right now, but next time you are in Japan, check out a local bookstore and see how much hatemongering there is (in manga too). Young people are reading them, and they don't know any better.

Koichi Nakano
Associate Professor of Political Science
Faculty of Liberal Arts
Sophia University

Approved by ssjmod at 10:54 AM

September 01, 2006

[SSJ: 4182] Re: Campaign Law Changes in Japan

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain
Date: 2006/08/31

With regards to Ross Schaap's question about the timing of regulatory changes, the dates I listed are the actual years when those laws were passed. A whole series of changes were made in the 1994 package of reforms (particularly regarding campaign finance), but I didn't include those in the information I provided in the last post.

Kenneth

Approved by ssjmod at 03:36 PM

August 30, 2006

[SSJ: 4181] Re: Campaign Law Changes in Japan

From: Schaap, Ross D.
Date: 2006/08/29

Thanks to Kenneth Mori McElwain for the information of campaign regulatory change. I have just one clarification question.

He states that "below are the "significant changes", by category and the year enacted in parentheses"

I suspect the term "enacted" may be incorrect here and should simple read as "implemented." My understanding is that most of these changes were enacted in 1994 but implemented gradually thereafter. In that case, the dates don't reflect subsequent LDP coalition governments changing campaign regulations, but instead reflect the LDP acquiescing to campaign regulatory changes that were set in motion by a previous legislative majority. Can anyone clarify this matter?

Thanks,
Ross Schaap

Approved by ssjmod at 10:59 AM

August 29, 2006

[SSJ: 4179] Campaign Law Changes in Japan

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain
Date: 2006/08/29

I'm writing in response to Ethan Scheiner and Mike Thies's post regarding changes to electioneering rules in Japan since 1994. I'm currently in transit and so only have information circa 2002 handy. I obviously welcome more up-to-date data from others on the list.

Before I go on, however, I'd like to point to the excellent "Nihon Hourei Kenbiki" website (link below). It's unfortunately in Japanese only, but it lets you search for specific laws, and from there you can link to 1) changes made in those laws over time, and 2) Diet deliberations concerning those laws. I don't think you can get the text of the law from there, but you can search for the final bill separately at the House of Representatives homepage. The "Hourei Kenbiki" lets you search for all laws from the early 1900s, as well as most draft bills that didn't make it into law. In the case of Japanese electoral laws, you should search for "koushoku senkyo ho".

http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/

To get to the meat of the post, there have been relatively few "significant" changes to the Japanese electoral code post-1994 than pre-1994. By "significant", I'm focusing on rule changes that actually change the nature of campaigning/voting in favor of particular parties, voters, organizations, etc..

What I'm excluding here are:
1) administrative changes: e.g. how late polling booths are open, how early absentee ballots should be mailed out, how frequently the electoral register is updated, electronic voting, timing of by-elections
2) rules that affect specific (but minor) voting blocs: e.g. allowing fishermen to vote by fax, increasing the number of sign-language volunteers at the polling booth, simplify voting for ex-pats, changing polling locations for people whose villages/towns have amalgamated or split

I'm also skipping redistricting and seat addition/reduction changes, since these are already well documented (and don't actually deal with electioneering per se).

As I see it, below are the "significant changes", by category and the year enacted in parentheses:

1) Anti-corruption:
a) strengthening guilt-by-association laws (Renza-sei) to include: secretaries, those "planning" to run for office, campaign managers (1994); candidates whose assistants violate campaigning laws are prevented from running for office for 5 years (1994)
b) penalties for bribery: increase suspension of candidacy/voting rights by 5 years (1999)

2) Electioneering:
a) abolish public funding of policy advertisements by registered political parties in Sangiin elections (1997)
b) require removal of posters listing candidate names prior to the beginning of the campaign period (1999)

3) Re-Districting/Voting method:
a) Shuugiin Boundary Demarcation Commission established in 1994
b) Shuugiin voting changed from "kigou-shiki" to "jisho-shiki", i.e. writing in the name of the candidate (new method), as opposed to putting a mark next to the candidate's name (old method) (1995)
c) Candidates who don't reach the minimum vote threshold to reclaim candidacy deposits (I can't find the exact % right now) cannot win a PR seat as a "zombie" (2000)
d) Candidates who are elected in PR districts cannot switch parties between elections (2000)
e) Where special statutes/regulations are passed, electronic voting can be used in local elections

4) Campaign finance
a) abolish corporate donations to candidates, but still ok to parties (1999)

A few notes:
1) The LDP has historically strengthened incumbency advantage by reducing the length of the campaign period and increasing the price of candidacy deposits, but these have stayed intact since 1994. A partial reason may be that some of these rules are hard to make more restrictive: candidates can only campaign for 12 days since 1994, and it would be pretty hard to make it any shorter at this point (it used to be 30 days in 1950).
2) I _think_ rules concerning internet home pages have changed, but I'm not sure when/how. Previously, candidate webpages had to be blacked out during the campaign period, but this doesn't seem to be the case anymore. I don't know if this is formal (rules have changed) or informal (no longer enforced). Japanese laws tend to be tricky that way.
3) Certain "new" methods of campaigning, like the now-ubiquitous "manifesto", are dealt with under existing laws. For example, candidates cannot distribute pamphlets during the official campaign period, but they can pass out handbills. "Manifesto" are counted as pamphlets, which is why they can be hard to get.

Anyway, my apologies for the long post. I hope this is useful.

Kenneth McElwain

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Kenneth Mori McElwain
Lecturer
Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies
Stanford University
kmcelwain@stanford.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 04:39 PM

[SSJ: 4178] Re: Yasukuni visits & the Bush Administration

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/08/29

One of several possible hypothetical answers to Jim Fujii's interesting question might go as follows:

IF the Bush Administration envisions itself playing the role of mediator between China and Japan, then it may not want tensions over ministerial visits to Yasukuni and over related issues to evaporate.

Vincent K. Pollard
____________________________

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
Asia, U.S., Hawai'i, world politics, futures
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 03:29 PM

[SSJ: 4177] Re: More on videos in Japan

From: Harumi Befu
Date: 2006/08/29

I have shown a movie on Rokkason, a village in northern Honshu that was politically split between those who wanted to accept introduction of a nuclear plant and those who opposed. Amazing politics. This is excellent for a class on politics.

Harumi Befu, Emeritus Professor
Department of Anthropological Sciences
Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-2145

Approved by ssjmod at 12:09 PM

[SSJ: 4176] Re: LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/29

Hi Jim. My quick take on the answers to your question is:

1)Because China and Japan are the U.S.'s most important trading partners in Asia

2)Because a number of issues on which there is tension (territorial disputes; Taiwan, historical memories, etc.) could wind up escalating into real conflict which would entrap the U.S. into either supporting Japan although reluctantly against China, one of its most important economic partners and upon whom a lot of US industry's outsourcing is dependent, or abandoning Japan and undermining the most important US alliance in the Pacific

3)Because continued tension could lead Japan to rearm further and faster than already and also stimulate China to do the same leading to the "security dilemma" which often escalates into war, a war the US could be dragged into

4)Because stability and order is in the best interests of a mature superpowr like the U.S., especially when it is bogged down in a horrendously unstable Middle East.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:55 AM

[SSJ: 4175] Re: More on videos in Japan

From: Joseph Tomei
Date: 2006/08/28

> From: Ethan Scheiner
> Date: 2006/08/26
>
> 1. A while ago I asked about videos/movies to show in Japanese politics class
> es. Does anyone know of any good clips (in English) that are specifically abou
> tpollution in Japan (e.g., Minamata Disease or Itai-itai)

I'm not sure which of Noriaki Tsuchimoto's Minamata Disease-A Trilogy is subtitled, but I think Victims and their world, is subtitled in English (the Japanese title is Kanja-san to sono sekai)

There is also Hirokazu Koreeda's movie However, about the suicide of Yamanouchi Yoyomori who was responsible for compensating victims of Minamata disease. I haven't seen it , but I enjoyed Koreeda's Afterlife, so I hope to see this at some point

cheers
joe tomei
Kumamoto Gakuen University

Approved by ssjmod at 10:48 AM

August 28, 2006

[SSJ: 4174] Re: LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Jim Fujii
Date: 2006/08/28

Let me ask a naive question: why would the Bush Administration want to help reduce Japanese-Chinese tensions that are exacerbated by the prime minister's visitations to Yasukuni?

Approved by ssjmod at 12:23 PM

[SSJ: 4173] Re: LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2006/08/26

Ellis Krauss' point about Koizumi avoiding a visit to Yasukuni on August 15th of last year, just before snap elections is right on the mark. Despite the image, Koizumi has always been expedient, if not cautious, about when and how he choose to get out in front of public opinion. Yet, Abe seems to be even more so, perhaps because he recognizes that he lacks Koizumi's political skills.

About Ellis's question regarding American Japan-hands speaking up about Yasukuni, I might add that I have seen Paul Giarra speak up on this topic in a less public forum. Regarding the issue of whether US officials will finally realize that the Yasukuni controversy does not help American interests, I have been hearing indications since at least last Fall that US officials have been privately pressuring Japan on Yasukuni and other history issues. The key question in my mind is whether US officials will go public with their objections. The Armitage, Campbell, Mochizuki and Henry Hyde comments could be an indication that this might be about to happen. Of course, the question is whether public US pressure is more effective than private pressure?

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Director of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 10:24 AM

[SSJ: 4172] More on videos in Japan/Campaign Law Changes in Japan

From: Ethan Scheiner
Date: 2006/08/26

Two additional questions not having to do with LDP presidential rules or Yasukuni:

1. A while ago I asked about videos/movies to show in Japanese politics classes. Does anyone know of any good clips (in English) that are specifically about pollution in Japan (e.g., Minamata Disease or Itai-itai) and/or "outsiders" in Japan (e.g., Koreans, Burakumin). BIG apologies if someone suggested something good on this that I completely spaced out on.

2. I'd like to reiterate Mike Thies's call for any information on changes in electioneering rules. Any additional information would be great. Thanks!

"I've been unable to figure out the full extent of the changes in electioneering rules for the Lower House since the electoral reform. I grok the campaign finance changes, but I'm confused about the changes in the rules for TV/Radio advertising (I know the restrictions were relaxed, but not the details) and such things as door-to-door canvassing, polling, and newspaper ads and handbills. If anyone can summarize the new rules, I'd be very grateful. Or, if anyone knows of a good source for this information, that'd be fine too. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu."

Thanks!

Ethan

Approved by ssjmod at 10:16 AM

August 25, 2006

[SSJ: 4171] Re: photos of US occupation of Japan

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/08/25

Let me suggest that contacting directors of the photography "morgues" at the following newspapers will result in immediate clarification of how to purchase photographs of the U.S. occupation of Japan:

The New York Times
Chicago Tribune
Stars and Stripes

I surmise -- but do not know for a fact -- that the first two of the newspapers listed above and some of their competitors sent photographers to Japan for shorter and longer periods of time.

The third newspaper listed above is an official U.S. Army newspaper. See the summary of its history at http://www.estripes.com/webpages.asp?id=97 on the Web.

Vincent K. Pollard
_________________

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
Asia, U.S., Hawai'i, world politics, futures
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 04:42 PM

[SSJ: 4170] Re: LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/25

Just to add two more cents (does that make 4 cents?] to Paul Midford's interesting post, I just want to point out that Paul's description of 'pulling a Koizumi' is not the whole picture. Not only may he have commissioned p.o. polls before visiting this time on Aug 15, I'd like to point out that last August 15, less than a month before the 'snap' election over postal reform, Koizumi did not visit on that date either. Apparently, when principle comes up against political expediency for both leaders, sometimes political expediency is even too great for them. In both cases, such a visit would have turned the elections (general then and now LDP Presidential selection) into conflict over Yasukuni to both of their detriment. Additionally, I've been told by some who should know that Abe, despite his rhetoric is actually 'educable.' Indeed, it is the very ability of both of these men to learn and be quite practical if need be for political reasons, that may be one reason for Koizumi's success as PM and give some hope for Abe too?

Let me throw in a question too (does that make 4 of my cents?) about Armitage, Mochizuki, and Campbell's articles: does this perhaps mean that because the smart and knowledgeable Japan hands in the U.S. are now speaking out publicly on the issue that perhaps the US government will start to realize that the Yasukuni issue could run very counter to American interests in Asia by increasing the friction between its increasingly close ally and its deepening economic partner, China? And might even suck the U.S. into conflicts it doesn't want or need to get sucked into?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:21 PM

[SSJ: 4169] photos of US occupation of Japan

From: Yoneyuki Sugita
Date: 2006/08/24

Dear Colleagues:

I am looking for photos, especially color photos (perhaps using the Kodak films) of U.S. occupation of Japan (Japanese cities, towns, GHQ/SCAP, ordinary people, buildings, streets, etc.). Is there anyone who has those photos or does anyone know where I can get those photos?

I am wondering if GHQ/SCAP had official photographers. There must have been some. Any information?

This is what I have found out so far:

Naval Historical Center
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/japansur/js-6.htm

U.S. occupation of Japan:
http://history.independence.co.jp/ww2/eng/phtop.html#army

Ohio State University Library
http://www.lib.ohio-state.edu/sites/rarebooks/japan/2_1_photos.html

I asked the Japanese Diet Library -- All they have is microfilm duplicate and no original photos.

Best,
Yone Sugita
yone@sugita.us

Approved by ssjmod at 04:05 PM

[SSJ: 4167] Re: LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Paul Midford
Date: 2006/08/23

To add my two cents to the Yasukuni issue, the most surprising development is Abe's cautiousness on the issue. One would have expected him to "pull a Koizumi," make a "koyaku" to regularly visit, ignore the opinion polls, and hope for eventual vindecation. Indeed, if Abe was serious about continuing Koizumi's policy of trying to break the taboo against visiting Yasukuni he would have visited on August 15th as well. So far Abe has avoided taking a clear stand, producing an image of timidity. He has refused to make a "koyaku," meaning he cannot use this as a reason to visit later. His secret visit in April is also strikingly un-Koizumi like, and suggests that despite his lineage, Abe is looking for ways to escape from Koizumi's precedent of praying openly at Yasukuni. The secret April visit is also interesting because it did not provoke much opposition from China and Korea, and suggests that they might be willing to accept secret visits.

We have recently learned that despite his image of indifference to public opinion polls, even lame-duck Koizumi was apparently obsessing over public reaction to a shrine visit on August 15th, and therefore commissioned two private polls before deciding to go. Public opinion was already opposed by mid July, but became more so after revelations about Emperor Hirohito's opposition to the enshrinement of Class A War Criminals at Yasukuni. Given Abe's cautiousness (if not timidity), his refusal to publicly commit to going again, and this growth in public opposition, Abe may well surprise conventional wisdom by not going to Yasukuni, at least not openly. This might also take the wind out of the growing movement for a non-religious war memorial.

As for Aso's proposal to nationalize Yasukuni, this looks to be a non-starter, especially under the current constitution. Ironically, Yasukuni spokesmen interviewed on TV expressed the clearest opposition to Aso's proposal, since it involves removing the "religious elements" from Yasukuni. Aso's proposal is also surprising since, as Asahi reported a few months ago, many nationalists in the LDP are now glad that Yasukuni was not nationalized in the 1970s, since this would have certainly led to state interference regarding enshrinement and the Yushukan (museum). Although it is certainly possible that the government and Diet might decide not to de-enshrine the Class A War Criminals from Yasukuni, they would certainly remove much of the nationalist character from the Yushukan and make other changes that nationalists would not like. Nationalising Yasukuni would bring such pressure not only from China and Korea, but from the US as well.

The US position is beginning to receive more attention, with Kurt Campbell and Mike Mochizuki spelling out American concerns about Koizumi's shrine visits in the latest issue of Ronza. Richard Armitage criticized the Yushukan in the Japanese press for being "anti-American." Another reason for Abe's cautiousness about visiting Yasukuni could be American requests that he not go.

In a recent article in the Financial Times, Mike Mochizuki suggested that the Chinreisha (the small Spirit Pacification Shrine on the grounds of Yasukuni) might provide one possible solution to the Yasukuni issue. Established in 1965,the Chinreisha is dedicated to all war dead, regardless of nationality, including those from former adversary countries, suggesting the possibility of converting Yasukuni into a more cosmopolitan memorial. It's at least an interesting idea.

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Director of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 15 64
Cell: +47-452-15-394
http://www.ntnu.no/japan
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 03:04 PM

August 23, 2006

[SSJ: 4166] LDP Presidential Election and Yasukuni

From: Koichi Nakano
Date: 2006/08/23

As I touched upon in my post of August 16 (SSJ: 4147), Aso's "new" proposal is both old and very old. It is "old" because it's basically an attempt to recycle the "kokka goji" bills that were aborted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It didn't work then, and that is precisely why the LDP rightists started to promote the "official" visit of PM and other politicians as an alternative way to re-don an "official" status to Yasukuni, but Aso probably thinks that Japanese politics have moved sufficiently to the right today that the idea may be given a second (sixth, actually) chance, particularly if presented as a "solution" to the perceived impasse. And he does say that once Yasukuni is "nationalized," the Diet gets to decide who to commemorate in Yasukuni --suggesting that the Class-A war criminals may be removed, although of course it is possible that they get "democratic" endorsement (and in fact, Abe argues already that Class-A war criminals are not considered criminals as far as the Japanese Diet and laws are concerned, so he will be pleased if the Diet once again confirms democratically that Class-A war criminals is not a problem).

Needless to say, this idea is predicated on the notion that one can somehow make Yasukuni non-religious, and this is the "very old" part. In prewar Japan, State Shintoism was molded as a non-religious religion. Ordinary religions (like Buddhism and Christianity) were under the supervision of the Religion Bureau of the Ministry of Education, while Shitoist shrines were put under the control of the "Jinja" Bureau of the Ministry of Interior (and placed in an order according to given ranks etc. --a practice that was subsequently extended to newly built shrines in the colonies and conquered territories of the Japanese empire). Yasukuni was a special Shintoist shrine that enshrined "those who fought and died for the peace of Imperial Japan," so it was placed under the Ministries of the Army and the Navy. If Aso and his friends get to turn back the clock as far back as pre-1945, they will be able to argue that paying visits to Yasukuni is not a religious act, and that it is only a matter of expressing one's civic patriotism in a way that is only natural and traditional to the Japanese. Aso thinks that the only problem about Yasukuni today in relation to the constitutional stipulation on the separation of church and state is that Yasukuni is a "religious legal entity" (shukyo hojin). Once it is turned into another form of legal entity (i.e. "tokushu hojin" like the Highway Corporation), then the "new" state-run Yasukuni will no longer be religious, and can quietly do what it does "according to tradition." Problem solved! You may think that I am joking --check Aso's own words at MOFA's website:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0608.html#2-B

It remains to be seen whether Aso's proposal gets any serious attention. While I agree with Sven that it's not worth anything, the Japanese media has so far treated it as if it was a real proposal. This is in part because journalists have very short memory, but it is also understandable when you consider Abe's policy of simply not discussing the matter (which reminds me of those who grope on packed commuter trains (chikan) --I'm not going to say whether I touched or I didn't touch; you think I touched? well may be I did, may be I didn't; will I touch again in the future? may be I will, may be I won't; either way, I am not going to say; and why all the fuss anyway?).

What Aso and Abe think, however, is not very different in the end --they, and other reactionary nationalists in and out of the LDP, all agree and argue that "Yasukuni should not be politicized." You may have a hard time understanding this since it is as if Bush said "The Iraq War should not be made a political issue. It is inappropriate to politicize such an issue --people die in there!" Well, that is exactly what Koizumi has been saying (as "kokoro no mondai"), and this is exactly why Abe thinks he doesn't need to discuss it, and Aso thinks can be achieved by the nationalization of Yasukuni. Yasukuni is so natural, traditional, and "atarimae" that it should not be made a matter of controversy. It's not an issue, and it should not be. It's just that there are some political forces that seek to make an issue out of it. See Koizumi's interview:
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2006/08/15interview.html
Or Abe's own words:
http://www.sankei.co.jp/news/060804/sei011.htm
http://www.sankei.co.jp/news/060815/sei048.htm

What Abe will do after he is elected LDP leader and PM depends a lot on how and in what circumstances he wins. On Yasukuni, his instincts tell him to keep going ("it's simply not an issue"); in reality, he must be monitoring the opinion surveys very carefully (as Koizumi reportedly has been as well). For now, the polls indicate that there is not a clear opposition against PM's visits to Yasukuni (even when asked about Koizumi's successor), so Abe must be wondering about the timing of the visit next year, rather than whether to go or not. In that sense, it is the Japanese people who are condoning the current state of affairs. In any case, by secretly visiting the shrine in April and by leaking the story in early August, and by having secured a clear victory already, Abe bought enough time on the issue for now. What he seems to be doing is this: make a public commitment on the revision of the basic law on education and of the constitution. This is an effort to follow Koizumi's (unintended) example.

Koizumi got away with his August 15th visit to Yasukuni in the end by saying that it was his electoral promise (koyaku). It worked. Polls indicated that the Japanese people were leaning towards opposing PM's visit on August 15th, but after the event, public opinion appears to have been reversed (see last night's (22nd) Nikkei). Not everyone approved because of the "koyaku" argument, but it was apparently effective. No one seems to be bothered by the fact that the electoral promise was for an internal, LDP presidential election (and therefore a commitment to the LDP members and parliamentarians), and not for a general election. The mediatization of Koizumi's election to the LDP presidency last time had the effect of making the electorate believe that they chose him (even though the election was only internal to the LDP, and a number of fictitious LDP members with names like Tokugawa Ieyasu and Toyotomi Hideyoshi got to vote, whereas most ordinary Japanese just watched the show).

This is what Abe wants to repeat. First, to make the public believe that they voted for him as well --get as much media attention as possible, and to pretend that the contest is real, that it is not decided yet. The mainstream media are largely acquiescing because they don't want to offend the PM-to-be at this point. Second, to give the pseudo-legitimacy of "koyaku" to the right-wing issues he cares about despite the fact that only LDP members get to vote: constitutional revision and the revision of the basic law on education, and not saying anything on Yasukuni (and keep going if possible). Come October, Abe will be giving a speech as PM that his mandate is to do all that --with the crushing majority in the Lower House that Koizumi leaves him (in the general election that was supposed to be only about postal privatization.

Approved by ssjmod at 05:11 PM

[SSJ: 4165] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Sven Saaler
Date: 2006/08/23

Concerning Aso's proposal on the nationalization of Yasukuni: he thinks that it is possible that after making Yasukuni a state-run institution, a true national memorial, where everybody can visit, the state can decide about who is venerated in the "memorial" (then not a Shrine anymore). After Yasukuni has become a state institution, the state then could go ahead and de-shrine (bunshi) the "class A" war criminals (which is not possible at the moment just because Yasukuni is an *independent* religious body, dokuritsu shukyo hojin). For Aso, the veneration of the war criminals is at the center of the discussions about the Shrine and he thinks, taking them out of the lists of enshrined gods would solve the problem, would make it possible for everybody to visit Yasukuni (including the Emperor), without being criticised within Japan and from abroad. However, while the Shrine has explained that it has favored the idea of becoming a state institution since long, it is highly unlikely that Yasukuni authorities would agree to a nationalization if it was sure that it would bring government interference concerning these questions. It is also highly unlikely that Yasukuni would giving up being a religious institution (including giving up Shinto rites), which would be necessary in order to not violate the constitutional imperative of separation of state and religion. Also, Aso's proposal leaves out completely the problem of the provoking view of history in the Shrine museum Yushukan, a question rarely addressed directly, but in my opinion at the center of Japanese and foreign criticism. Due to all of these points, the "Aso proposal" is hardly worth being discussed, he probably just wanted to be the first to put a "comprehensive" "plan" for the solution of the Yasukuni problem on the table.
best,
Sven Saaler

***************************************************
Sven Saaler
Associate Professor
The University of Tokyo
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Bldg. 18 room no. 1010
Komaba 3-8-1
Meguro-ku
153-8902 Tokyo, Japan
TEL +81-3-5465-8745 (int 48745)
FAX +81-3-5454-6336
svensaaler@web.de
***************************************************

Approved by ssjmod at 02:04 PM

[SSJ: 4164] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/23

Dear Yongwook:

Hi. Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that you were arguing that Aso's proposal would resolve the foreign relations issue of Yasukuni; but I had assumed that at least Aso thought it would. Clearly, however, it would not. I agree totally with you on all counts. Mr. Aso has not always proved himself to be the most sensitive and sharpest of Japan's political leaders, and this seems to be another example.

Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu
Home Fax: 760-943-8881
oShort bio/photo: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss.php
o"Expert sheet" : http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-es.php
oCurriculum Vitae: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-cv.php
oAbout IR/PS: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/about/about.php
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 01:54 PM

Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Yongwook Ryu
Date: 2006/08/23

Dear Ellis,

I don't think that you are missing anything.

Aso's solution would not do any good to the bilateral relations with Korea and China. And if my message somehow led you to believe that it would, my apologies. That was never my intention; all I wanted to say is that Aso has put forward his own proposal about the Yasukuni issue.

Although Aso's proposal would not improve relations with China and Korea, it would resolve the constitutional issue of separation of religion from politics, however. I think that that's all Aso is trying to resolve by his proposal. After all, to many of LDP politicians, who support PM's visit to the shrine, the Yasukuni issue is essentially the consitutional issue having to do with the principle of separation of religion from politics.

How far will his proposal go? We will wait and see what happens in the debate within LDP after the election. But my view is that it won't be all that popular, since it is not going to do any good to the bilateral relations with Asian neighbors. I think that Japanese politicians are slowly but surely seeing that Korea and China really mean it when they say that the correct understanding of the past is the fundamental foundation upon which to build political relations with Japan, and that visit to the shrine does much damage to Japan's own national interests.

yongwook

-----------------------------
Yongwook Ryu
PhD Candidate
Department of Government
Harvard University
Tel:617-493-4245
Email: yryu@fas.harvard.edu
-----------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 01:39 PM

[SSJ: 4162] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/23

To Yongwook:

Thanks very much for your addition to the LDP Presidential election rule dialogue.

I just wanted to ask a question about the Yasukuni issue and the candidate: I saw that Aso proposed turning Yasukuni into a state-run institution. What has been puzzling me is what that is going to accomplish and will that make things better or worse!? If Yasukuni becomes a state-run institution won't that further legitimize the war criminals' spirits who are enshrined there? Won't that make the government of Japan MORE culpable for participating in running such an institution directly? All it seems to me it will accomplish is to take away the issue of whether when the PM visits can he/should he do so as a private citizen or in his official capacity--won't all the visits become "official" then? How does that 'solution' resolve the issues between China and Japan and Korea and Japan? Am I missing something here?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 12:41 PM

[SSJ: 4161] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Yongwook Ryu
Date: 2006/08/23

Hi Purnendra and Ellis:

My belated addition to this discussion.

The foreign policy issue will feature somewhat in the LDP Presidential elections, and I believe that all the candidates see the need to put back on track the bilateral relations with China and Korea.

However, it is clear that both Abe and Aso will try to avoid the issue altogether, if possible, since they do not stand to gain anything, while Tanigaki does not have a strong ground to use the issue for his own support because he has never made it his issue. It was always Fukuda who took the issue as his campaign banner. Furthermore, as Ellis mentioned, the domestic public care more about jobs and reforms than the Yasukuni issue. I concur that foreign policy issue won't have much impact on the outcome of the presidential elections.

Once the election is over, however, what is likely to happen is that within LDP there will be some debate to resolve the Yasukuni issue, the single issue that hampered relations with China and Korea. Aso has already put forward his own proposal,namely, to turn Yasukuni into a state-run institution. I don't know what Abe has in mind, but there will be some LDP members who will favor the creation of a new national institution to mourn the war dead.

Korea and China would be satisfied with any solution that excludes the class A war criminals from memorial service. Otherwise, the bilateral relations with Korea and China would exacerbate.

Hope that this is of some help to you. best,

yongwook

-----------------------------
Yongwook Ryu
PhD Candidate
Department of Government
Harvard University
Tel:617-493-4245
Email: yryu@fas.harvard.edu
-----------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 10:40 AM

August 18, 2006

[SSJ: 4159] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Dennis Kitt
Date: 2006/08/18

> From: Kenji Hayao
> Date: 2006/08/17
>
> Okay, now I have a question. There seems to be some disagreement about how
> the votes to the prefectures are allocated. The posts list three different
> possibilities. One is that the votes a prefecture gets is determined by its
> population. Another is that it is based on registered voters. I thought
> that it was based on the size of the LDP dues-paying membership in the
> prefecture. Which one it is could have important consequences. If it is
> based on population, then the urban and metropolitan districts would have
> much more weight. They would probably have an advantage, too, if it is
> based on registered voters. But if it's the LDP dues paying membership, I
> would have to think that would favor rural prefectures (I would assume that
> rural voters are more likely to belong to groups that given them LDP
> membership, plus LDP party membership is likely to quite low in urban and
> especially metropolitan districts).

I had a chart in my posession from the last election about the voting rules and allocation of votes, but I can't seem to find it right now. But if the rules from the last election hold, in addition to the minimum 3 votes allocated to each prefecture, prefectures are allocated additional votes based on how many constituency LDP Diet members represent the prefecture in the Diet (I hope someone can check on this). In the case of 2003, that favored rural prefectures, since the LDP was better represented there, but with last year's LDP landslide shaking the urban areas as well, it will be pretty interesting how this would affect the dynamic of the race (assuming we have a competitive election at all).

Regards,

Dennis Kitt
Fulbright Research Fellow
Sophia University Graduate School
090-6017-6336 Kitt

Approved by ssjmod at 02:07 PM

[SSJ: 4158] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ehud Harari
Date: 2006/08/17

To Purnendra Jain:

> Can anyone comment whether foreign relations ever became a key issue - as it
> has now in the context of Beijing and Seoul's criticism of Koizumi for his
> Yasukuni visit - in any previous presidential elections? I am not sure it
> could have been an issue though when Tanaka was elected party president in
> 1972, defeating Fukuda to succeed Sato Eisaku.

In 1972, foreign policy was an issue. But as far as I recall, what determined the outcome was Tanaka's ability to "financially support" Diet mambers who otherwise might have voted for Fukuda.

To Ellis Krauss:

> Interestingly, Fukuda dropped out of the race partly b/c he didn't want such
> a divisive foreign policy issue to become more salient which it would have
> if he had run,

Assuming that, whatever Fukuda says, Fukuda means.

> So it is questionable whether this foreign policy issue in fact will have
> much impact on the presidential election.

Kenneth McElwain has written, in part:

> A second factor affecting leadership selection methods is electoral success.
> Parties that have lost consecutive elections generally open up the
> presidential election process much earlier than winning parties, typically
> to make the party more appealing publicly. The Conservative Party in the UK
> adopted a one-man-one-vote process in the last few years precisely for this
> reason. Labour, on the other hand, still uses an electoral college where
> trade unions get 1/3 of the votes, party members another 1/3, and MPs the
> final 1/3. Keep in mind, the DPJ opened up its leadership selection method
> much earlier than the LDP, although the LDP - as has been its practice - has
> coopted the issue and upstaged the Democrats. Also, many losing parties
> REQUIRE leaders to stand for re-selection after the election, which results
> in more frequent cycling of party leaders.

In Japan, more prime ministers got into office somethime between elections than immediately after elections. This testifies to the importance of the leadership selection methods being discussed here. Right on!

Respectfully,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 11:53 AM

[SSJ: 4157] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2006/08/17

On Aug 16, 2006, at 1:34 AM, SSJ-Forum Moderator wrote:
>
> This is a fantastic discussion. I'd like to add another question, however:
> who gets to decide which rules to use in a given election?
>
> It appears that the process changes around fairly frequently between 1)
> primary format, 2) LDP + prefectural delegates, 3) MP vote, and 4)
> factional handshakes, but are these changes first formally ratified by the
> Party Congress, or do party leaders have significant leeway in deciding
> which rule to use? I'm guessing the latter, which leads to a larger question
> - if party leaders can rig rules to produce favorable outcomes, then are
> rule changes simply window-dressing to make the party appear more
> democratic (and subsequently win more votes) rather than serious attempts
> to pick a new leader?

Ken,

I expect a dozen other people will reply as well, but here's my take. Basically the answer is yes. The rule changes are often window dressing--like I said in my last email, that's why not too many people have written on them.

There have been three types of selection processes: a) backroom decisions by the leadership, b) contested Diet Caucus elections, and c) primaries. There is variation within each category: backroom decisions are sometimes ratified by a Diet Caucus vote, sometimes not; contested elections have different entry thresholds, and have had different rates of participation by prefectural representatives and even rank-and-file representatives; and there are a wide range of primary rules.

In each case, the ill-defined group known in the Japanese media as the "shikkoubu" makes the decision on what rules to use. The party caucus has no say in that decision (except indirect pressure, I suppose). In fact, the leadership has openly violated party by-laws-- for example, when Takeshita appointed Uno in 1989 by "acclamation" even though another candidate had gathered the required signatures to force a Diet Caucus vote.

Looking at all the LDP leadership contests, the general rule of thumb has been: if the leadership can agree on a single candidate, that candidate is selected; if it can't agree, then the leadership arranges a Diet Caucus vote (with prefectural/rank-and-file vote or not, depending on the year); if the party is currently suffering from an image problem (1978 & 1982), then it stages a primary. Like you guessed, this is an attempt to make the party look better and win subsequent votes (cf. Stephen Reed's work on how those were really just rank-and-file extensions of factional voting).

The odd thing about the 2001 selection was that for the first time since 1955, the party leadership did not unilaterally select the rules. The "primaries" were, in fact, staged by the prefectural federations in direct opposition to the will of the leadership (the "gang of 5" that had selected Mori). The prefectural federations were worried about--you guessed it--winning more votes. They specifically/publicly identified the backroom decision process that selected Mori as a reason for his abject failure, and they didn't want it to happen again.

The question is, was the 2001 case an aberration, or has there been a fundamental change in how the selection rules get decided? That isn't clear yet, but to me, the most suggestive incident happened in the 2002-2003 negotiations over selection rules. Suzuki Muneo (remember him :) was representing the anti-Koizumi crowd (who had a majority in the Diet Caucus, I seem to recall), and they wanted to tone down the prefectural votes. What happened? The prefectural votes got increased from 141 to 300! I think it would be very difficult for the LDP to try and retract those votes now (is it ever easy to reduce the franchise?).

Aoki's comment about how "the PM needs 100% support--if popular support is high, then he can have low party support, if popular support is low, he needs more party support" is still worth remembering. The new (since 2001) selection process provides prime ministers with a means of gathering and demonstrating popular support, freeing them from dependence on factional leaders. To me, the way Abe is campaigning to win rank-and-file votes is suggestive of a change in how LDP prime ministers govern. The centralization of power in the kantei that Abe urges is also reflective of a prime minister who is confident of support from outside the Diet Caucus, in contrast to previous prime ministers that left real power in the hands of factional leaders.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

[SSJ: 4156] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Kenji Hayao
Date: 2006/08/17

About who decides the rules for the LDP Presidential elections:

I believe the LDP Party Congress must formally adopt changes since these are formal rules, but clearly the threshold to change rules is not that high given how often changes have been made. Obviously, the Diet members wanted to prevent what happened in 2001, when they essentially were forced to rubber-stamp what the prefectural LDP chapters had decided. Thus, instead of winner-take-all, it was changed to a PR-type system, and the prefectural and LDP Diet votes are now announced at the same time. I believe that LDP also held open the the LDP membership vote until the day before the announcement of the result in order to prevent LDP chapters from leaking their results and influencing the outcome--which was crucial in helping Koizumi in 2001. I believe, probably rightly, that if the primary system were left in place (even with PR), that the LDP Diet contingent's vote would be made irrelevant. The first place finisher in the primary, even without a majority of votes, would likely become the de facto winner. This happened, for instance, in 1978.

When Tanaka was elected LDP president in 1972, he had a three-year term (although he was forced to resign before his term was up). This was changed back to two years in 1977. The scuttlebutt here is that Fukuda and Ohira made a secret deal in which Ohira would support Fukuda on condition that Ohira would succeed him in two years. If the scuttlebutt was true, however, Fukuda reneged because he did not voluntarily give up the presidency in 1978 (has a 'secret' promise like this ever been kept?--I'm thinking of the British Labourites, Blair and Brown). Fukuda not only decided to run, he also instituted the primary system in which LDP dues-paying members would vote in the first round to determine the two top candidates, and the winner in the run-off would be determined by the LDP Diet contingent. This proposal actually originated with Miki (Fukuda's predecessor) with the hope of increasing the party's popularity with the voters (which is probably how Fukuda sold the idea to the party). Fukuda apparently thought that he would win the primary and thus force Ohira to concede without a run-off (before the primary, Fukuda declared that the runner-up in the primary should concede the election probably because Fukuda did not think he could win the run-off). However, with Tanaka's grassroots network being much stronger, Ohira won the primary, forcing Fukuda to concede. I believe that the primary system was kept until the 2003 LDP presidential election (although I am not sure about this), when the results for the dues- paying members and the LDP Diet contingent were announced simultaneously.

The party leaders, however, are not the only group that wants to change the rules. Because party leaders have generally preferred to reach a consensus behind closed doors, backbenchers have weighed in on occasion to ask that the process be more open. In addition, the party has changed its rules in response to public perception, or, more particularly, pressure from local chapters. Both of these groups weighed in, for instance, after the Uno debacle leading to Kaifu's election in 1989. The backbenchers wanted to make sure that the LDP held an "open election" (because they had no say in Uno's selection). Thus, the number of signatures needed to qualify as a formal candidate was reduced from 50 to 20 for that one election (after that it was 30--but when was it reduced again to 20?). Then, the local chapters protested that they were being left out, so the LDP allowed one vote per prefecture (usually, I believe the LDP secretary-general of the chapter delivered the one vote). Since then, the prefectures have technically had a formal say (although the formula for counting their votes changed frequently)--and this turned out obviously to be crucial in 2001 when Koizumi upset Hashimoto.

Okay, now I have a question. There seems to be some disagreement about how the votes to the prefectures are allocated. The posts list three different possibilities. One is that the votes a prefecture gets is determined by its population. Another is that it is based on registered voters. I thought that it was based on the size of the LDP dues-paying membership in the prefecture. Which one it is could have important consequences. If it is based on population, then the urban and metropolitan districts would have much more weight. They would probably have an advantage, too, if it is based on registered voters. But if it's the LDP dues paying membership, I would have to think that would favor rural prefectures (I would assume that rural voters are more likely to belong to groups that given them LDP membership, plus LDP party membership is likely to quite low in urban and especially metropolitan districts).

I assume that this is easy to figure out, either by looking at the rules or looking at the results of the 2003 presidential election-- but I am hoping someone already has figured this one out.

I also have a question for Kenneth McElwain about the British Conservatives. As I understand it, as a result of unhappiness over Heath back in the early 1970s, the party created new rules requiring that the party leader face election every year. When they are not challenged for the leadership (which usually is the case), does the party actually hold a formal vote, or is the incumbent leader simply proclaimed the winner? Heath, as I understand it, "declared" that an election for the leadership post be held (hoping that he would receive a mandate from the party, but instead eventually led to Thatcher's election). Do candidates have to declare themselves in order be considered (in other words, can the party "draft" a candidate)? And if candidates need to declare themselves in order to be considered, are there any formal rules determining qualifications besides being a sitting MP? Similarly, I believe that Labour has a similar rule requiring an annual election for the party leadership. For the Labour party, an election obviously would involve more than just the MPs. Given the unhappiness within the party over Blair, could there have been a grassroots movement to dump Blair and replace him with Brown, or would Brown have to agree to stand in order for a formal election to be held?

Kenji Hayao
hayao@bc.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 11:31 AM

[SSJ: 4155] Rules Changes

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2006/08/17

> From: Leonard J. Schoppa
> Date: 2006/08/14
>
> Another change has the party revealing the results of the primary AT THE
> SAME TIME as the votes of the Diet members (instead of before, like last
> time). Both of these changes increase the likelihood that LDP Diet members
> will be able to vote freely without feeling obliged to follow the lead of
> the primary voters. Unlike Koizumi, who effectively presented the party
> with a fait accompli after the primary vote last time, someone who does well
> in the primary will also have to be popular with Diet members (and maybe
> faction bosses).

It's hard to overstate just how much the timing rules helped Koizumi in the 2001 election. It would be interesting to do a quick comparison of how Diet members voted relative to their faction and their constituents in 2001 (with prior announcement) and 2005 (with the 1990-style timing rules), but I don't know of anywhere that reports each Diet Member's vote. I would imagine they'd keep it secret, but does anyone know if it exists? If Abe continues to gather endorsements the point might be moot, but still...

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:19 AM

August 16, 2006

[SSJ: 4154] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/16

Hi Purnendra:

I have been told that indeed, the Tanaka/Fukuda 1972 race for LDP Prez did involve foreign policy issues, especially relations with China I think. And Yasukuni and relations with China/Korea will figure into this next race somewhat, especially after Koizumi's visit triggers the expected reactions from those countries. But polls have consistently shown that although more Japanese would like the PM not to go to Yasukuni than want him to go, this issue is not among the top 2-3 of concern to the public in this LDP leadership selection: domestic issues like pension reform and other reform are. Further, it is beginning to look as if Abe may have it sown up already and so the issue may be moot in any event. Interestingly, Fukuda dropped out of the race partly b/c he didn't want such a divisive foreign policy issue to become more salient which it would have if he had run, and although Tanigaki has mentioned the issue and said he won't go to Yasukuni, he also has not played it up and I believe said he wasn't going to.

So it is questionable whether this foreign policy issue in fact will have much impact on the presidential election. We'll see.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:55 PM

[SSJ: 4153] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Purnendra Jain
Date: 2006/08/16

I have learned a lot about the old and new systems of electing LDP presidents through various posts. Thanks to all those who have shared their knowledge with us.

I have another question in relation to the presidential election. Can anyone comment whether foreign relations ever became a key issue - as it has now in the context of Beijing and Seoul's criticism of Koizumi for his Yasukuni visit - in any previous presidential elections? I am not sure it could have been an issue though when Tanaka was elected party president in 1972, defeating Fukuda to succeed Sato Eisaku.

Regards
--
Purnendra JAIN
Professor and Head, Centre for Asian Studies
Adelaide University, AUSTRALIA 5005
Ph : +61 8 8303 4688
Fax : +61 8 8303 4388
e-mail: purnendra.jain@adelaide.edu.au

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Approved by ssjmod at 03:17 PM

[SSJ: 4152] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Kenneth McElwain
Date: 2006/08/16

This is a fantastic discussion. I'd like to add another question, however: who gets to decide which rules to use in a given election?

It appears that the process changes around fairly frequently between 1) primary format, 2) LDP + prefectural delegates, 3) MP vote, and 4) factional handshakes, but are these changes first formally ratified by the Party Congress, or do party leaders have significant leeway in deciding which rule to use? I'm guessing the latter, which leads to a larger question - if party leaders can rig rules to produce favorable outcomes, then are rule changes simply window-dressing to make the party appear more democratic (and subsequently win more votes) rather than serious attempts to pick a new leader?

Looking at European parties, my understanding is that there are two key factors explaining cross-national / cross-party variances in party president selection. First is institutional history, specifically between parties on the left and the right. Conservative parties tend to have started with an elite-dominated, cadre structure, and the parliamentary party is much stronger than the party on the ground (rank-and-file membership is very low in many such parties). In these cases, MPs dominate the leadership selection process. Socialist parties, on the other hand, generally began as political extensions of pre-existing labor unions, and the party on the ground exerts significant control over the parliamentary party. Leaders here are disproportionately selected through party congresses, and in many instances, the parliamentary party leader is distinct from - and clearly subordinate to - the party chairman. Unsurprisingly(?), the LDP exemplifies the cadre structure of other conservative parties.

A second factor affecting leadership selection methods is electoral success. Parties that have lost consecutive elections generally open up the presidential election process much earlier than winning parties, typically to make the party more appealing publicly. The Conservative Party in the UK adopted a one-man-one-vote process in the last few years precisely for this reason. Labour, on the other hand, still uses an electoral college where trade unions get 1/3 of the votes, party members another 1/3, and MPs the final 1/3. Keep in mind, the DPJ opened up its leadership selection method much earlier than the LDP, although the LDP - as has been its practice - has coopted the issue and upstaged the Democrats. Also, many losing parties REQUIRE leaders to stand for re-selection after the election, which results in more frequent cycling of party leaders.

But going back to the Japanese case, are there any attempts within the LDP to formally codify leadership selection rules and prevent party bosses from switching the process around as they please?

Kenneth McElwain
Post-Doctoral Fellow
Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies,
Stanford University

Approved by ssjmod at 02:35 PM

[SSJ: 4150] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Chao-Chi Lin
Date: 2006/08/15

> From: Ethan Scheiner
> Date: 2006/08/11
>
>Could someone summarize the different changes that have occurred?

Below is my understanding of recent changes. Also, I am attaching the email discussion with Ethan.

Best,
Chao-Chi

*****

In 2001, each preferctural chapter got three votes.
--- 346 Diet member votes + 141 Preferectual representative votes.
Local chapters used primaries (NOT officially regulated) to decide how three votes would be allocated to candidates and most of them adopted the winner-take-all system to cast all three votes for the candidate who won the primary in the prefecture.

In 2003, the total number of local votes was increased to 300 from 141.
--- 357 Diet member votes + 300 Prefectural representative votes
Basically, each chapter got three votes. 159 votes were allocated in proportion to the size of the party members/party friends. Primaries have been institutionalized. Prefectural representative votes were calculated in proportion to the votes candidates receive in primaries.

In 2006, the rules remain the same.
--- 403 Diet member votes + 300 prefectural representative votes

In 1978 and 1982, elections were carried out in two stages. First, party members and party friends participated voted. The top two candidates nationwide advanced to the second stage, in which Diet members elected the president by a majority vote. (the ways prefectural chapters calculated votes were not the same. )

The difference between the current system and primaries of 1978/1982 is that the current primaries decide to which candidates local representative votes will be allocated and local representative votes are cast together with Diet member votes but in 1978 primaries decide who were eligible to enter the second stage in which only Diet members voted.

> So, my I ask a couple of quick follow up questions?
>
> For the 2001, 2003, and 2006 primaries, was it a vote of all kengi? All
> elected representatives in the prefecture? All LDP members, even if not an
> elected representative?

The primaries were not limited to local elected representatives. Anyone who paid the party member fee for two years could vote.

> And if no one got a majority in the first round (I can't quite remember what
> happened now...), did everyone vote again in the second round or just the
> Diet members?

Yes, the requirement for a majority vote still holds. Only Diet members can vote if there is a run-off.

> And, aside from 2001 and after and 1978/1982, the LDP president was simply
> determined by a vote of Lower and Upper House LDP members, with a majority
> necessary for election, right?

No. It is really an interesting and also surprising part. Prior to Miki, party leaders were elected by all Diet members of the two houses and delegates from each prefectural chapter. In 1962, the number of representatives from each local prefectural chapter was reduced from two to one. Since 47 prefectural delegates, compared to more than three or four hundred Diet member votes, only accounted for a minority, the real choice of party presidents was mainly in the hands of Diet members. Between Miki and Uno, party leaders were elected either through informal negotiations or primaries. In 1989, Kaifu was elected by all Diet members and one representative from each prefectural chapter as the party rules initially stipulated.

In 1995, the LDP amended the party presidential rules and extended the electorate to party members again. Each 10,000 votes by party members counted as one Diet member vote. Also, according to the party rules, when the party leader vacates his seat during his term, the successor shall be elected by all Diet members and one representative from each prefectural chapter. This is the way how Obuchi got elected in 1998.

For the old primary system, some textbooks (ex. Baerwald, Hrebenar, Richardson) mentioned it. As for recent elections, Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999) document the 1995 election. Otake sensei's "Nihon Gata Populism", T. Shinoda's article on the anti-terrorism legislation and also Harukata's new book all touch the 2001 election. Maybe I should promote my paper. If you are interested in the references, I will send you a copy when I finish revising it.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:06 PM

[SSJ: 4149] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2006/08/15

> From: Ethan Scheiner
> Date: 2006/08/11
>
> I'm interested in any that have occurred in general since 1955, but I'm especially
> interested in what the specific rules have been under Koizumi and what they are
> going to be in September.

There is a helpful web page with the details of all past LDP primaries and information on the 2005 rules at:

http://www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet-Stock/7643/sosaisen.html

Also, any good citations on this would be great.

There isn't a whole lot on this--the problem is that until 2001, the leadership has, whenever possible, adjusted the rules each time to suit its purposes, so the rules are viewed as largely epiphenomenal. You could take a look at these, though:

Tanaka, Zenichiro. (1985) jyuuminshutouno toushusenshutsutetsukiruuruto habatsu kenryoku. The Annals of the Japanese Political Science Association 1985, 1-33.
-----. (1986). jimintouno doramatsurugi: sousaisenshutsuto habatsu. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.

Hope that helps,

George

Approved by ssjmod at 11:48 AM

[SSJ: 4148] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Leonard J. Schoppa
Date: 2006/08/14

Ethan asked about the system that will be used for selecting the LDP president this time. The LDP website (Japanese version) gives a lot of information about how it will work:
http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/sousai06/index.html

In a talk I gave back in May, when everyone expected the race to come down to a contest between Abe and Fukuda, I summarized the latest LDP presidential selection rules (on pages 7-8) and place them in historical context by discussing how this compares with the way leaders were selected before. You can find the paper online at:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k/csis-koizumi%20replacement06.pdf

Again, the discussion of scenarios at the end is now completely outdated because Fukuda is out of the race, but the discussion of historical context and the latest rules may be of interest.

For those who don't have time to check out the talk, here's the summary of the latest change in rules:

The main changes involve the number and role of rank-and-file representatives who participate in the process only if there are two or more candidates and only on the first ballot. Instead of having 141 rank-and-file reps allocated three to each prefecture like last time, this time there are slated to be 300 reps, with 4 to 10 allocated to each prefecture, depending on the number of voters in each prefecture. So this change boosts urban representation within the LDP. It also brings the rank-and-file numbers up close to the number of Lower and Upper House reps (405 this year), so that they can more easily swing the outcome.

At the same time, however, the party decided to end the practice used previously where the winner of a prefectures primary got ALL three prefectural rank-and-file reps. This time, the 4-10 rank-and-file reps are to be allocated by proportional representation. Last time, Koizumi got a big boost because he won most prefectures in a multi-candidate race (often with 40-50 percent of the vote) but got almost ALL of the rank-and-file vote, allowing him to steamroll the rest of the party. This time, even the loser(s) will get some rank-and-file reps. Another change has the party revealing the results of the primary AT THE SAME TIME as the votes of the Diet members (instead of before, like last time). Both of these changes increase the likelihood that LDP Diet members will be able to vote freely without feeling obliged to follow the lead of the primary voters. Unlike Koizumi, who effectively presented the party with a fait accompli after the primary vote last time, someone who does well in the primary will also have to be popular with Diet members (and maybe faction bosses).

Of course, since it looks like Abe will be hugely popular with both the rank-and-file and the Diet membership this time, all of this may be academic, but it still is important since this set of rules has been at work in the background influencing the decisions of various candidates to run or not to run.

Len Schoppa
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
tel (434) 924-3211
fax (434) 924-3359
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k

Approved by ssjmod at 11:38 AM

[SSJ: 4146] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Amy Catalinac
Date: 2006/08/13

Hello everyone,

In response to Ethan: the election of the LDP President is decided by both LDP extra-parliamentary members and LDP Dietmembers. The extra-parliamentary Members get a total of 300 votes, and these are divided by region: each prefectures gets a basic number of three votes, and then (based on its population) can receive up to 8 more votes (a total of 3-11 votes per region). They vote by post. Each LDP Dietmember gets one vote.

The candidate who gets a majority of votes from both the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary elections (in practice these are just added together) becomes LDP President. If no candidate can secure a majority, then the Party conducts a kessen touhyo (a final run-off election) with the two top vote-getters from the first stage, just among the LDP candidates.

So, just yesterday the Yomiuri reported that Abe had now secured the support of the Ibuki faction, and both Nukaga Fukushiro and Yamasaki Taku had hinted that they wouldn't be running. This means that Abe now has support from the majority of the 403 LDP Dietmembers. The newspaper reported that it is very likely Abe will secure a majority of the 703 votes. If he doesn't he will have to engage in a run off election (between him and the second-place-getter), but the newspaper confidently predicted that he'd win this easily.

Other information: at the moment the LDP President's term is three years. Until 1972 it was 2 years, from 1972-1977 it was changed to three, from 1978-2001 it was two, and then from 2002 it was changed back to three. Since 1974 no candidate has been allowed to seek a third term (an exception was made for Nakasone, he was allowed a one-year extension on his second term).

Incidentally, if you look up jimintou sousaisenkyou on the Japanese version of wikipedia they actually have a breakdown of the number of votes secured by each President in each election since the 1956 election between Hatoyama and Kishi.

Interestingly, the LDP has just released a new poster for their election. It is blue and depicts a baton being exchanged with the words "who will hold Japan next?" (tsugi no nihon, dareni) No one at the Party HQ could give me an answer for why the LDP needed such a poster for the election ... they said its to rally everyone around the election. I thought it was an interesting choice of words ... they really don't seem to fear the Minshuto much (if at all).

This was my first post to the list, I hope it was somewhat helpful!

Amy Catalinac

--
Amy L. Catalinac
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University
Associate, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Resident Tutor in Government, Adams House, Harvard University

Mail: 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Home: 492 Adams Mail Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617 417 8467 (cell); 617 493 3448 (home)
Web: http://www.gov.harvard.edu/student/acatalinac/

Approved by ssjmod at 11:07 AM

[SSJ: 4145] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Michael Thies
Date: 2006/08/13

Rather than answer Ethan's good question, I'd like to tack on another.

I've been unable to figure out the full extent of the changes in electioneering rules for the Lower House since the electoral reform. I grok the campaign finance changes, but I'm confused about the changes in the rules for TV/Radio advertising (I know the restrictions were relaxed, but not the details) and such things as door-to-door canvassing, polling, and newspaper ads and handbills. If anyone can summarize the new rules, I'd be very grateful. Or, if anyone knows of a good source for this information, that'd be fine too. Yoroshiku onegaishimasu.

Approved by ssjmod at 10:58 AM

[SSJ: 4144] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Kenji Hayao
Date: 2006/08/12

Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

In my book, Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy, I have a list of changes made to the rules for selecting the LDP president from 1955 to the early 1990s. It's in one of the (many) appendices.

I believe that the LDP website has the current rules. Here is my understanding of the rules for the Sept. 20 election. A disclaimer: I haven't looked at the rules in a little while, so my understanding may not be completely accurate.

In order to run, a candidate needs to gather at least 20 signatures from among the LDP Diet delegation. (This may be important for Aso, in particular. In 2003, Aso had to "borrow" some people from the Komura group in order to run.) Candidates must submit their petitions by Sept 8. If only one candidate emerges, then the Party Convention will presumably proclaim that candidate the new LDP president.

If more than one candidate emerges, then there is a formal election:

LDP members who have paid their dues for two years are eligible to vote. The party members are given 300 votes altogether (this is more than double the number votes they had in 2001). Party members must submit their votes by September 19. Their votes are counted by prefecture. The number of votes given to the prefectures are allocated in proportion to the number of party members. The votes of each prefecture are allocated to the candidates in PR manner according to the d'Hondt system (which I must admit, I really don't understand very well). This is different from the winner-take-all system used in 2001.

Each LDP Diet member receives one vote (LH-295 votes; UH-112 votes -- > 407 votes) . They must vote by September 20.

On September 20, the results of the votes from party members and the votes from Diet members are released together. This is different, of course, from 2001 when many LDP prefectural chapters announced their results well in advance of the LDP Diet vote.

If one candidate receives a majority of the votes, that candidate becomes the new LDP president. If no candidates receive a majority, the top two finishers have a run-off in which the LDP Diet delegation chooses the winner.

I think that's it. If anyone sees any errors, I'd certainly like to know about them, too!

Kenji Hayao
hayao@bc.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 10:48 AM

[SSJ: 4143] Re: LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/12

Thanks, Ethan, for asking a question that's been bothering me too. There've been a lot of changes. I know that from 1955 until about 1978 it was a party convention in which all Diet Members plus 2 Prefectural Federation members would vote. Then because of the Lockheed Scandal, the LDP decided to become more 'democratic' and allow all party members to vote in a 'primary' style election in which I believe the top two vote-getters [it was something like our Electoral College system whereby the top winner in each prefecture would get all the 'points' for that prefecture and points for the prefecture were determined by the no. of party members I think]. This resulted in the 'massification' of factions, as each faction mobilized as many party members as they could to join the party in their district order to maximize the votes for the faction leader. Then the top two winners of this primary would then face a run-off to determine the winner only among LDP DMs. This was the election in which PM Fukuda was so confident of victory that he said publicly if he wasn't the top vote-getter after the primary phase, he'd resign. And of course Tanaka mobilized his faction behind Ohira and Ohira came out on top of the primary whereby Fukuda honored his promise to resign but the bad blood between Fukuda and Ohira continued after Ohira became PM and resulted in the so-called Ou-Fuku 'war' within the party and eventually Ohira losing the vote of no-confidence that led to the 1980 election, during which Ohira died.

After that I believe the LDP changed its rules once again to say that there would only be a primary if there were 3 or more candidates in the race. Then I think they made that 4 so that there weren't necessarily primaries each time. Then I lost track til 2001 when the prefectural federations forced the party to adopt a primary again because they were so concerned about the party's low standing in the wake of Mori's gaffes and low popularity in the next HOC election; and the rest is history--Koizumi sweeping to victory over Hashimoto in the primary and become PM.

But can anyone answer Ethan's [and my] question about what the rules are now for this next selection in September?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 10:39 AM

August 12, 2006

[SSJ: 4142] Re: happinesss

From: George Ehrhardt
Date: 2006/08/12

> From: Walter Hatch (whatch@u.washington.edu)
> Date: 2006/08/10
>
> I don't think this tells us very much, except to confirm what we already
> know: The Japanese are extraordinarly majime

The happiness data he uses bears examination. Apparently it's from the "New Economics Foundation" a think-tank dedicated to persuading people that (basically) consumption does not equal happiness. Looking at the actual data they use to make calculations, actually Japanese people don't fare so badly on the "how satisfied are you with your life" question that they use as a measure of happiness. What hurts Japan (and why almost no rich countries are at the top of the list) is they have a large "ecological footprint." The formula is (happiness*life expectancy)/ecological footprint. So when Japanese and Americans drive cars, releasing CO2, that makes them unhappy (I'll try to remember to be unhappy on the way home today). This isn't necessarily a problem, but when dealing with index statistics, we should be aware of the creator's purposes.

> For me, the world map of happiness does, however, contain one really
> fascinating finding: The people of Vanuatu (with a per k income of less than
> $3,000 per year) are pretty happy (#24 in the world

The New Economics Foundation report itself celebrates Bhutan as being the 13th happiest country in the world. Never would have guessed that. So I guess we should be seeing a rush of immigration from G8 countries to Vanatu and Bhutan?

George

Approved by ssjmod at 02:24 PM

[SSJ: 4141] Re: happinesss

From: Sanford Jacoby
Date: 2006/08/12

I suggest to all that, if they are interested in this topic, they check out the work done by economist Dick Easterlin at USC.

Approved by ssjmod at 02:13 PM

[SSJ: 4140] LDP Presidential Election Rules

From: Ethan Scheiner
Date: 2006/08/11

Hi. I now realize that I'm not certain I'm up to date on the rules that elect the LDP president. Every time I think I've got the past 3 rules or so down, little pieces get changed again.

Could someone summarize the different changes that have occurred?

I'm interested in any that have occurred in general since 1955, but I'm especially interested in what the specific rules have been under Koizumi and what they are going to be in September.

Also, any good citations on this would be great.

Thanks,

Ethan

Approved by ssjmod at 02:07 PM

August 11, 2006

[SSJ: 4139] Re: happiness

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/08/11

Thanks for the comments, Walter, and to some extent I tend to agree with you when we consider public opinion surveys and the like. Moreover, and as I said before, these things are vague, general and uncertain at best, and certainly don't do much to alert us to the wide variations of subjective well being at an individual level or within different societies according to class, gender, race, culture, age, and so on.

Nevertheless, I have a couple of points.

1. Adrian White's data is pretty comprehensive, including many different variables.

2. It is often a tactic of the neo-liberal economics school to debunk theories and data they don't agree with by using cultural variables (especially in international comparison studies), as if culture matters, and then they turn around and say that culture is unimportant and everyone is really a market animal. Strikes me that there is a bit of theory protecting going on at times ... Personally, I think culture matters, but so does price.

3. If one looks at surveys in social psychology that have been controlled (at least as much as is known about control in this area) for cultural differences in self reporting and self assessment, then Japan still ranks lower than most other countries in its economic class, and including other East Asian countries with somewhat similar cultures, such as South Korea, China etc. Now that is interesting in my opinion and leads me to think that this is not simply a question of survey bias but that there is something real being measured. For more on this you can read Diener's work, as well as that of Markus and Kitayama and others. A good book is Culture and Subjective Well-Being edited by Diener and Suh (MIT Press).

4. There are very good and easily discerned reasons to believe that Japanese people may not be as happy as those in Western/Central Europe and NAmerica and Australia/NZ etc. These are the following:

a) The quality of the nation's housing stock is poor in comparison, with large numbers still living in cramped and sub-standard accommodation. Amazingly, some people are still living in temporary accommodation built after World War II, for example.
b) Japan has a difficult climate with wide variations in temperature and conditions. Large volumes of snow in winter followed by high levels of rain, heat and humidity in summer/autumn don't help people go about their business with a happy smile.
c) Comparatively speaking Japan is more prone to natural disasters, which raises general and background levels of personal anxiety about the future.
d) Japanese urban areas are not well organised, comparatively speaking, which causes background anxieties and stresses to rise. Visual, noise , and smell pollution is high in cities.
e) Japan has quite high levels of personal accidents such as poor traffic safety, poor domestic safety, and so on, which causes background anxieties to rise.
f) Personal mobility, both geographically and socially is actually quite low, at least lower than many people would like it to be. For example, high initial housing costs for rental accommodation discourage mobility and force people to commute long distances rather than move house, which causes stress to rise.
g) Basic and expected levels of the distribution of material goods and opportunities are eroding fast in a changing socio-economy. I was interviewing someone only today who said that big gaps were appearing in his organisation between people of ostensibly the same rank and it was not well understood within the organisation why some people were being favoured and some weren't.

Anecdotally speaking I am always amazed by how many Japanese are so stoical in their approach to life, with so many hopes and dreams for themselves and so little means and opportunity to realise them. an example. I remember when I was a JET participant in the late 1991 and I collaborated with a fellow Japanese English Teacher to research the effect of good communicative English teaching on students' potential exam success. Our students, a science class, beat the English specialists in the grade up exercise that year for the first time in the school's history. My colleague wrote up her project and submitted it to a British Council competition. She won first prize, which was a ticket to the UK for a month over the summer and attendance at summer school in the UK free of charge. What happened? Well, the Kyoto sensei heard about all this and instead of congratulating her and using her as an example to spur on the rest of the school, said she was not allowed to go and promptly scheduled her to take hoshuu classes every morning for the whole summer, thus making it impossible for her to take her prize. His reason? Well, it would be singling out one teacher above the others and would harm morale among the other teachers. However, the other English teachers in the school were outraged and asked the Kyoto sensei if they could replace her for the hoshuu classes. But he dug his heels and she didn't go. She is still an English teacher, battling away for her students against the mind-numbing conformity of the school system. These sorts of things happen so often it is not true. Amazingly, and with great credit to them in one way, Japanese people who are the victims of the stone headed bucho-san or Kyoto sensei seem to just soak it up somehow and with great dignity just get on with the rest of their lives. Personally, I don't know how they do it. But one thing I suspect is that they are not particularly HAPPY about how things have turned out for themselves after all that effort and creativity.

That's it for Friday afternoon, I am afraid. Time to enjoy and be happy at the beach!

Cheers,

Peter

--
Dr. Peter Matanle
Lecturer in Japanese Studies,
National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield,
Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK.

JSPS Post-Doctoral Fellow,
Faculty of Education and Human Sciences, Niigata University,
8050 Ikarashi 2 no cho, Niigata City, 950-2181, Japan.

general editor,
electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies - ejcjs,
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk.

Approved by ssjmod at 04:53 PM

[SSJ: 4138] Re: happiness map

From: Bruce Henry Lambert
Date: 2006/08/11

Just now Adrian White's World Map of Happiness pages at Univ. of Leicester seem to be offline, though some detail can be gleaned from a look at Google's cached page; try: http://tinyurl.com/q5p56

I looked at this last month when it was in the news, and thought at the time that the 'access to education' indicator was odd; ranking Japan, South Korea and the USA rather poorly and thus bumping them down the league table. The statistic is described as "5. Access to secondary education rating from UNESCO (2002)"

Access to education score (5)
Japan 102.1
South Korea 97.4
Spain 112.8
Sweden 152.8
UK 157.2
USA 94.6
Mauritius 107.3
Australia ---
Belgium 145.4

Sweden has no university tuition fees, so access may be higher? But why the big difference between UK and the USA, and why no Australian data? I've found UNESCO statistics in other cases to be spotty in that some key national data is unreported.

In teaching destination marketing and looking at international mobility of the highly skilled, I regularly use some two dozen collections of such country ranking meta-data to illustrate varying ways to look at nations and how they might competitively improve.

White claims to incorporate over 100 studies into his rankings; perhaps he'll supply more detail before long...

Bruce Henry Lambert
Helpnet, Stockholm

Approved by ssjmod at 03:51 PM

[SSJ: 4137] Re: happinesss

From: Walter Hatch
Date: 2006/08/10

Peter,

I don't think this tells us very much, except to confirm what we already know: The Japanese are extraordinarly majime (which, in public opinion surveys, is routinely expressed as pessimism about the future, and negativity about existing conditions). I'm sure it would be different if more Japanese respondents were polled in izakaya, but -- alas -- they are usually polled at home.

For me, the world map of happiness does, however, contain one really fascinating finding: The people of Vanuatu (with a per k income of less than $3,000 per year) are pretty happy (#24 in the world -- just behind the ridiculously upbeat Americans, #23, and well ahead of the stable but dour Brits, #41) -- even though their island country is slowly but steadily disappearing under a rising sea level caused by global warming.

Cheers (and I mean that cheerily),

Walter Hatch
Colby College (assistant professor, government)
University of Washington (visiting scholar)

Approved by ssjmod at 12:49 PM

August 09, 2006

[SSJ: 4136] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/08/09

Adrian White at the University of Leicester has produced a World Map of Happiness. He takes data from a number of places, including the New Economics Foundation, the WHO, UNESCO, the CIA and so on. Despite having the highest life expectancy, one of the highest GDPs, and one of the highest levels of access to secondary education in the world, Japan is ranked at an extremely low 90th place in terms of overall happiness. This is beaten by most of South America (except Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador - Venezuela ranked 25) and by China (82), Mongolia (59), Malaysia (17), Philippines (78), and others in Asia. As we might predict, the highest levels of happiness are likely to be found in those countries with the highest levels of development, the highest levels of equality, the highest levels of access, as well as the highest levels of confluence between that society's values and their fulfillment. The data shows that health is the most important predictor, followed by wealth, and access to education. The happiest people in the world are from Denmark and others in Central Europe and Scandinavia. The UK beats Japan at 41 and the US ranks 23. Of course, happiness is a measurement of subjective well being, which is dependent not simply on absolute levels of development and equality, but on perceptions of these in relation to the values that a society and individuals espouse for themselves. Thus, the USA scores reasonably highly, though American society values material equality less than other societies where there are higher levels of equality - interesting.

Of course, this map is of a very vague and general nature, but you can see it here:

http://www.le.ac.uk/pc/aw57/world/sample.html

The New Economics Foundation is the first to measure a country's environmental efficiency in producing overall happiness. The G8 countries score as follows:

Italy 66
Germany 81
Japan 95
UK 108
Canada 111
France 129
USA 150
Russia 172

Central America has the highest score for any region in this index. The most environmentally efficient at producing subjective wellbeing is Vanuatu. Of course, Vanuatu is one of those island countries that will probably disappear as global warming melts the ice in Greenland and Antarctica and sea levels rise! Currently humans are consuming nature at 22 percent of the earth's carrying capacity - that is the ability of nature to regenerate itself. In essence we are borrowing from the unborn and consigning to them the task of having to devise ways to repay nature if they are to live as happily as us.

You can see more at the following website:

http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/

Cheers.

Peter

--
Dr. Peter Matanle
Lecturer in Japanese Studies,
National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of East Asian Studies,
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK.

JSPS Post-Doctoral Fellow,
Faculty of Education and Human Sciences, Niigata University,
8050 Ikarashi 2 no cho, Niigata City, 950-2181, Japan.

general editor,
electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies - ejcjs,
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:51 PM

August 08, 2006

[SSJ: 4135] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Ronald Dore
Date: 2006/08/08

Don't allow Arthur Alexander to persuade you that increasing inequality is all so complicated that no-one can ever hope to understand it. You can't, if you assume as the studies he cites do, that everyhody in the labour market is a price-taker, whose take is the result of overwhelming market forces. As Paul Krugman pointed out in the NYTimes Review several years ago, the reason why the CEOs of the Fortune top 100 were taking 39 times the average wage in 1970 and now take over a 1000 times, is not because they are smarter or more sophisticated in their use of new technology, but because, as Galbraith pointed out at the time, in the 1960s, CEOs power to set their own wages in a shareholder-absent Berle-Means corporate society was tempered by an ethic of self-restraint. That ethic has eroded and been replaced by winner-take-all legitimation of greed. Everybody agrees that increasing inequality in the US is far more a matter of the top soaring away from the median than of the bottom falling. CEOs salries bonuses and stock options, set the benchamark for the CFOs, the chief personnel man and so on, some way, if only a little way, down.

Thanks to all the wonderful reforms, Japan is now poised to follow the same route to modernity. If you look at the hojin kigyou tokei, over the four years 2001-4, in Japan's biggest non-financial corporations, employing some 7 million workers, average worker remuneration fell by 5% while directors' salaries and bonuses rose by 59%. Dividends went up by 70%. A vastly different story from the last recovery from recession 1986-9 when the figures were respectively, 14%, 21% and 6%. For my explanation of the change see my recent Iwanami shinsho, Dare no tame no kaisha ni suru ka

Ronald Dore
loc. Cavanazza 14
Veggio
Grizzana Morandi
40030 BO
Tel: 39051 913550
Fax: 39051 6730128
rdore@alinet.it

Approved by ssjmod at 06:23 PM

[SSJ: 4134] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/08/08

[SSJ: 4133] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/08/07

Hi Paul (et al):

The industries making the greatest contribution to growth in the 1997-2002 period are, in order:

Business services
Finance and insurance
Electrical machinery
Community, social services
Renting of dwellings
Public administration
Communications

Note that, except for electrical machinery, these are all services.

Thoise making significant subtractions from overall growth are:
Transport
Fabricated metal products
Retail trade
Machinery
Construction
Wholesale trade

I am emailing you offline the paper on which this based.

Arthur Alexander

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

[SSJ: 4132] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Mary Alice Haddad
Date: 2006/08/07

Thanks to all for the terrific discussion. Two observations to add to the mix.

1) Although the irresponsible gathering of wealth and flaunting of society's values is certainly evident in Japan today (perhaps most obviously in Roppongi Hills), we should remember that not everyone is taking that route. Many of the newly wealthy and/or newly retired/downsized/layed-off are taking alternative, more socially productive (in my opinion) routes. They are starting up NPOs; they are returning to local and rural communities to run for public offices; they are using their professional skills to give back to their communities in one way or another.

2) Many of the youth are opting out of the whole thing. I recently spent a couple of weeks in Tanegashima (first island south of Kyushu). The island is home to a bunch of young people who left the big cities and (sometimes good) jobs to opt for a simpler life. Some are working in odd jobs, farming, etc. Many are part of the social group termed "surfers" because their primary social identity is as a surfer, no matter what their job may be (you can recognize them easily as they are all very fit and several shades darker than the rest of the population). Some of the surfers have "real" jobs like civil servant, but many are essentially freeters.

Is their lifestyle sustainable? No. (I didn't see any 60 yr. old surfers while I was there) Is is fun? Certainly. What will they do in the future? I'm not sure that they care. Is this social phenomenon a problem for Japan because it represents a breakdown of traditional work-a-holic and family values in favor of a freer choose-you-own-lifestyle value system? I don't know. If we keep watching, I'm sure we'll find out.

Best,
Mary Alice

Mary Alice Haddad, Ph.D.
Harvard Academy Scholar
Assistant Professor of Government and East Asian Studies
Wesleyan University (on leave)
(860) 685-4865
mahaddad@wesleyan.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 11:34 AM

[SSJ: 4131] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/08/07

Prompted by comments by Peter Mantanle and others, observations in this discussion thread might also be understood in light of literature worth reviewing.

To be specific, James C. Davies' classic "J-Curve" might be heuristically suggestive for those in a position carefully to to link absolute changes in Japanese income, say, by deciles over time with perceptions of expected improvements in well-being -- and pereceptions of unacceptable gaps after improvements have stalled.

Among several other studies of perceptions and effects of relative deprivation by Davies, see his seminal article "Towards a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, 27 (1962):5-18. Davies was not simply interested in the likelihood of collective violence. His interest in the circumstances under which relative and absolute deprivation are perceived as acceptable or not appears relevant.

Vincent K. Pollard
University of Hawai'i System

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
Asian, U.S., Hawai'i, world politics, futures

Approved by ssjmod at 11:20 AM

August 07, 2006

[SSJ: 4130] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/08/07

Very nice discussion so far. I think the level of interest is indicative of the need for more research to be done, at a statistical level to ascertain the objective levels of wealth and income gaps, and at a qualitative level to ascertain what Japanese people feel about that, because we must try not to confuse the two. They are distinct but related phenomena.

Thus absolute levels of quality of life are as important as subjective levels. As Galbraith correctly noted, it is not just how much one earns that determines how one feels about one's quality of life, it is also how much one earns relative to others. Moreover, there is much research piling up recently that suggests that political and societal stability can be threatened if extreme differences in subjective well being become widespread, though it is also common-sensical to assume that this process adheres. So this is not simply an interesting diversion but has a direct impact on the course of national and regional life in any society.

It is a bit dangerous to compare subjective wellbeing, absolute levels of quality of life, and attitudes pertaining to these over time because culture changes. Thus, even though the gini coefficient was wider in the prewar period than today, that does not mean people are wrong to feel so bad about wealth gaps today. Values and attitudes towards equality have changed over time, and are changing now, so it is possible that prewar people felt better about the wealth gap than people do today, even though the actual gap may have been wider at that time.

So, subjective wellbeing depends upon the values in a culture, and an individual's personal values, and the degree to which those values are being fulfilled on an individual and a societal basis. What seems to be happening in Japan is that there is a growing miss-match between societal values and their actual fulfillment: that society values material equality highly but that equality is breaking down and differences are growing. There also appears to be a miss-match in people's values regarding life chances and how open Japanese society is in terms of equality of opportunity. Thus, individuals are cynical that talent and hard work will always win through in the end, even though they value those things very highly in society. There is a pervasive belief that money, personal connections, and proximity to the center talk louder than the values that society espouses. To the extent that normative values are not being fulfilled on a society wide basis, and to the extent that people FEEL that these values are not being fulfilled, these things will cause feelings of subjective wellbeing to drop on a societal basis and will tend to increase social and political instability.

> From: Henry Laurence
> Date: 2006/08/05
>
> I second Jonathan Lewis. Horie and Murakamis activities were certainly
> illegal, distasteful, and provoked schadenfreude by the bucketful. But insider
> trading and other financial shennanigans have been absolutely standard practice
> in Japanese financial markets throughout the postwar period. And I have a very
> hard time believing they are more morally reprehensible than, say, the bosses
> at Chisso knowingly pumping poison into Minamata Bay and then hiring thugs to
> beat up protesting victims, or bosses at Mitsui bringing in gangsters to
> murder union organizers during the Miike coalminers strike. Elites in the
> 60s and 70s may have been more polite, but they dont seem to have been any
> less disdainful of those below them. And Horie never killed anyone.

Absolutely right if we are simply looking at the 'facts' of each case. However, I think there is a tendency sometimes to confuse what the researcher thinks and what Japanese people think. Nevertheless, neither I nor anyone else said anything about Horie and Murakami being worse than the bosses of Chisso Corp. so lets please try not to create straw men out of things that people have not said.

Most Japanese people would agree to a reasoned argument as presented above, and many of those who are most critical of Horie and Murakami are puzzled as to why they received much harsher treatment in police questioning than Aneha and his associates, for example. That does not mean, however, that those Japanese people who are critical of Horie and Murakami are wrong, or do so for the wrong reasons.

What we are here trying to ascertain is not only what is objectively reasonable, but what Japanese people conclude in their own minds about what is going on their society. Thus, it is not just the crimes themselves that Japanese people object to - and there is no doubt an aspect of schadenfreude included here - but the attitudes and demeanours that Horie and Murakami and others have brought to their activities and that they evoke in public that disappoints so many people. Second, the fact that many people simply say, 'well insider trading is common practice, so why single out these two' is itself also indicative of what some people feel is going wrong. In that sense, many Japanese feel that the young and the brash lack a moral compass.

So, Horie runs for a Diet seat and is the darling of the highest echelons of the LDP, but really he is a liar and a thief. Murakami makes deals with the Governor of the Bank of Japan, but he is also in reality a crook (at least we are assuming they are). Many Japanese people understand that these are serious problems that are more than simply another case of insider trading. These Japanese are also disappointed by those who simply look at the crime and see it as being no big deal, given the implications of these two people's relationships to power. Moreover, although criminals of all sorts have tried to legitimise themselves by attaching themselves to the seats of power, the fact is that Horie is caught on camera shouting at the top of his lungs how great it is to make money and it doesn't matter at all how it is done. Many Japanese feel terrible when they see this stuff and think that their society is in deep trouble for producing such behaviour, lack of remorse, lack of enryo, and so on. It really doesn't matter what I think about it, though I am sure the reader of this will not find it difficult to deduce. We as researchers and scholars need simply to record what is happening and to make sense of it, though we are also entitled to our personal opinions.

> I would also echo earlier posts to the effect that
> references to"equality" in the postwar context are
> usually applicable only to men. My sense is that
> the yawning gap in economic and political
> opportunities between men and women (and ethnic
> minorities) is getting smaller - I would welcome
> sources or references on this point.

Yes, of course you are right objectively, but how this translates into Japanese people's feelings of wellbeing is another more complicated issue. Everyone knows that Japanese society is not gender equal, especially in terms of opportunities in the formal economy. However, how women and men feel about this will be the primary determinant of their feelings of subjective wellbeing and this is the key motivating factor in terms of their subsequent behaviour. This is because values and attitudes, and their fulfillment, are the well-springs of motivation and motivation is the well-spring of social action. Thus, in the 1950s and 60s it may well have been that, even though male-female gaps were wider than today, because society valued a gendered division of labour more highly than they do today, negative feelings towards gender inequality may be higher today in a more gender equal society. I know this is counter-intuitive to some, but it is backed up by a huge body of research on values and subjective wellbeing worldwide, and that includes Japan. The point again here is that objective conditions need to be filtered through human thoughts before translating into social action, and thus the conditions themselves are as important as the thoughts that they are filtered through.

Anyway, lets talk about this some more.

Peter

--
Dr. Peter Matanle
Lecturer in Japanese Studies
National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of East Asian Studies University of Sheffield Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK

JSPS Post-Doctoral Fellow
Faculty of Education and Human Sciences, Niigata University 8050 Ikarashi 2 no cho, Niigata City, 950-2181, Japan

general editor
electronic journal of contemporary japanese studies - ejcjs
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk

Approved by ssjmod at 04:28 PM

[SSJ: 4129] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Sebastien LECHEVALIER
Date: 2006/08/06

This discussion on gaps/kakusa is very interesting.
Let me inform that nichi futsu kaikan / Maison franco japonaise is organising, on October 27th (Friday) from 6 pm, a debate on this topic ("social inequalities") between Toshiaki Tachibanaki (Kyoto University) and Robert Boyer (EHESS, CNRS).You can find more complete information about this debate on the website of nichi futsu kaikan (http://www.mfj.gr.jp/index-j.html)
Notice that this debate will be in Japanese/French (simultaneous interpretation).
Looking forward to seeing you then

Sebastien Lechevalier
Maison Franco Japonaise
3-9-25 Ebisu, Shibuya-ku
Tokyo 150-0013 Japon
Email: lechevalier@mfj.gr.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 11:16 AM

[SSJ: 4128] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Henry Laurence
Date: 2006/08/05

I second Jonathan Lewis. Horie and Murakamis activities were certainly illegal, distasteful, and provoked schadenfreude by the bucketful. But insider trading and other financial shennanigans have been absolutely standard practice in Japanese financial markets throughout the postwar period. And I have a very hard time believing they are more morally reprehensible than, say, the bosses at Chisso knowingly pumping poison into Minamata Bay and then hiring thugs to beat up protesting victims, or bosses at Mitsui bringing in gangsters to murder union organizers during the Miike coalminers strike. Elites in the 60s and 70s may have been more polite, but they dont seem to have been any less disdainful of those below them. And Horie never killed anyone.

I would also echo earlier posts to the effect that references to"equality" in the postwar context are usually applicable only to men. My sense is that the yawning gap in economic and political opportunities between men and women (and ethnic minorities) is getting smaller - I would welcome sources or references on this point.

Thanks to all for a fascinating discussion

Henry Laurence

Department of Government
Bowdoin College
ME 04011

Approved by ssjmod at 11:06 AM

[SSJ: 4127] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Paul J. Scalise
Date: 2006/08/05

> In my own work, I am finding that industry restructuring
> is much more varied in Japan since the 1990s than in
> previous periods, and more varied than in the US.
> That is, a few industries account for all GDP growth,
> with a significant number in decline. This is not
> simply a matter of slower growth, but a real change
> in how the economy operates.

I'm curious: Which liberalized/re-regulated sectors grew and which contracted?

Best,
Paul J. Scalise

Approved by ssjmod at 10:56 AM

August 05, 2006

[SSJ: 4126] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/08/04

Before claiming that growing inequality in Japan violates historic or cultural norms, it might be useful to look at the data. According to a data base of Gini coefficients, prewar Gini coefficients were considerably higher than the postwar values. (prewar: 42-46; postwar: 32-37) Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient declined steadily until the mid-1970s, and then started rising. By 1990, the value was back to the 1960 level. Whatever change that might have occurred since 1990, continues a trend that began when growth decelerated in the 1970s.

In my own work, I am finding that industry restructuring is much more varied in Japan since the 1990s than in previous periods, and more varied than in the US. That is, a few industries account for all GDP growth, with a significant number in decline. This is not simply a matter of slower growth, but a real change in how the economy operates. One could interpret these data as reflecting an earlier inhibition to change. Many of those barriers are now weakened, so that accumulated pressures can be relieved, with consequences for income inequality and greater geographical dispersion of fortune.

The gini data can be found at: Deininger, K. and Squire, L. (2004) Measuring Income Inequality: a New Database, Washington: World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm

Approved by ssjmod at 03:31 PM

August 04, 2006

[SSJ: 4125] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Anthony D'Costa
Date: 2006/08/04

This is an interesting discussion. A third factor could be globalization, meaning greater competitive pressure on high cost producers thus a variety of restructuring measures, including but not limited to off-shoring of production. This factor can be traced to the early 1980s, a period marked by the height of Japanese affluence, but the seeds of restructuring were sown then and inequality felt by the time the long recession hit. Of course high growth itself produces its own inequalizing tendencies since different sectors grow unevenly.

As to the question what Japan could do, perhaps the Scandinavian model (or whatever is left of it) is still relevant: internationalize, socialize, social protection and welfare, high tax.

Cheers, Anthony
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Anthony P. D'Costa, Professor/Senior Visiting Scholar, University of Oslo
Comparative International Development
University of Washington
1900 Commerce Street
Tacoma, WA 98402, USA
Phone: (253) 692-4462
Fax : (253) 692-5718
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Approved by ssjmod at 02:25 PM

[SSJ: 4124] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Tom Hope
Date: 2006/08/04

A very interesting discussion going on here. I think, for me, the most interesting part is not whether the gap is actually widening or not (for, as we have seen in Leonard's, Walter's and other's comments, the gap is becoming greater than before), but rather the way that this is being perceived and talked about in Japan.

I have been surprised by how, even though they apparently rarely view the news or newspapers, young people are extremely aware of this widening gap and how 'new' it is. Anecdotal evidence, yes, but it appears to be very real. It will be interesting to see if the perception of this particular gap will help those living in Japan become aware of other 'gaps'.

Regards,

Tom Hope
Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society, JST
http://www.ristex.jp
Personal web: http://www.sheepchase.net

Approved by ssjmod at 02:20 PM

[SSJ: 4122] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Leonard J. Schoppa
Date: 2006/08/02

Very interesting discussion of whether the widening gap is real or mostly a change in perceptions. In a paper in an edited volume, published in 2002, I presented data on Japan and other OECD nations up to that point showing that inequality worsened steadily in Japan through the 1980s and 1990s, more than in other nations (in other words, before Koizumi, so this is not a brand new trend).

The data in the OECD recommended by Lee Woolgar suggests the widening of the gap continued through 2002, the last date for which gini coefficient data is presented. It also shows that levels of inequality deteriorated in Japan between 1980 and 2000 by more than any OECD nation except Britain.

Those interest in seeing my piece can find it online at: http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k/contracts.pdf

The paper is included in an edited volume that is relevant to this discussion: Olivier Zunz, Leonard Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari, eds., Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century (New York: Russell Sage, 2002).

Finally, a plug for my new 2006 book, which also covers this topic:
Race for the Exits: The Unraveling of Japan's System of Social Protection (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

Len Schoppa
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
tel (434) 924-3211
fax (434) 924-3359
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k

Approved by ssjmod at 01:05 PM

[SSJ: 4121] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Jonathan Lewis
Date: 2006/08/02

>
> From: Peter Matanle (peter_matanle@yahoo.co.jp)
> Date: 2006/08/01
>

> Lastly, what also is new is the sort of 'get rich
> quick and who cares how it is done' mentality of
> people such as Horie and Murakami and the way in
> which they lord it over everyone else and thumb
> their noses at conventional ideas of polite
> restraint and reserve, or enryo. There is a deep
> level of disappointment among many people that
> Japanese society has produced these people. While
> most have toiled away throughout their lives,
> diligently paid their taxes and been good 'shakaijin',
> they find that Horie and Murakami and whoever else
> have all the time had their noses in the trough.
> Most have no faith

Depends who you talk to, I guess. I'm doing research on Japanese open source software communities. A lot of my contacts have set up their own small companies, and are anything but rich. But they saw the media hounding of Horie and Murakami as completely disproportionate to the offenses committed, and as indicative of how difficult it is to set up new kinds of businesses in Japan.

Incidentally, the first Open Source Conference Niigata was held in June. Some guys there are putting together a Niigata Linux distribution. My well-informed contact's impression is that Niigata is not yet a big centre of open source development, but at least some people there are trying new approaches to wealth creation.

http://www.niigata-oss.org (Niigata Open Source Association)

Best wishes,

Jonathan Lewis

Hitotsubashi University

Approved by ssjmod at 12:51 PM

[SSJ: 4120] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Austin Uzama
Date: 2006/08/02

As we talk about this income inequity in the Japanese society, we shouldn't forget to mention the origin of this inequity-market and corporate restructuring that started after the bubble bust in the early 1990s. As the government continues to reform the economy and do away with the zombie companies of the likes of the Daieis, and the surviving companies try to imitate their western counterparts by doing away with the traditional Japanese dual emphasis on long-term market focus with less shareholders pressures and employees' welfare, the gap in income will continuously increase.

Personally, though I don't support a situation of a CEO earning 5000 times than the average salaryman in the company, but this is the reality and beauty of capitalism. A New Orleans vs. Manhattans in the US. A Peakham-Rye vs. Westminster in the UK. It's a survival of the fittest game not the past 'because I'm Nihon-jin, or I'm Oya-san of that tatemono' style. Whether you're in the Tokyo or 'inaka' city, everyone should compete for customers, while a salaryman should earn his salary base on his/her productivity level not the past of just going to the office to spend the whole day in the office either sleeping or repeatedly doing the same job several times.

While I acknowledge lots of comments and the OECD's report concerning this matter of income inequity, I'm also worried about how Japan can pull out from its low domestic productivity level without rocking the income balance boat.

Does anyone think the government can reform the economy without widening the income gap?

Cheers!

Austin Uzama

Approved by ssjmod at 12:42 PM

August 02, 2006

[SSJ: 4119] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Lee Woolgar
Date: 2006/08/02

Was just checking out the new OECD Economic Survey of Japan. There's a whole chapter on this issue with appropriate stats.

http://new.sourceoecd.org/rpsv/periodical/p7_about.htm?jnlissn=03766438

Approved by ssjmod at 05:12 PM

[SSJ: 4118] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/08/02

Re Jim Fujii's post.

Yes, wealth and income gaps have increased in Japan, as well as life chances. No doubt about that. I suppose what I was trying to say, in response to Michael Smitka's comment that wealth gaps themselves are not new in Japan, was to agree with this and his subsidiary point that there has been a change in perception recently, away from a consensus that Japanese society was mostly middle-classed to one that recognises that big gaps do actually exist in wealth and life chances. Probably this consensus has changed because the gaps have grown progressively wider over time, as you rightly point out, and have therefore become that much more noticeable; to the extent that they cannot be comfortably ignored anymore.

Cheers.

Peter

Approved by ssjmod at 04:44 PM

[SSJ: 4117] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Jim Fujii
Date: 2006/08/02

Re Peter Matanle's post: I am not a social scientist or someone with ready information about this, but I find it hard to believe that the kakusa in Japanese society has not increased, and done so rather steeply. After all Japan, like the U.S. has managed to create immense wealth over the past few decades at the same time that is has (like the U.S.) instituted policies working against more equitable redistribution of wealth (e.g., greater reliance on flat taxes like sales tax, increasing the threshold for inheritance taxes). During my ten month stay in Tokyo this year and last, many articles based on government data attested to such increases.

Jim Fujii

Approved by ssjmod at 01:05 PM

[SSJ: 4116] Re: Gaps / kakusa

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/08/01

Thanks to Michael Smitka for his interesting comments on gaps/kakusa in Japanese society. Yes, you are absolutely right that this is not a new problem and that most of what is 'new' is a change in perception rather than the appearance of sudden gaps appearing where they had not existed before.

I would add the following, though, as some sort of context for some of the problem as I see it.

The population of Sado Island has dropped from its postwar high of approx 125,000 in 1950 to the present figure of 67,000, a fall of nearly 50 percent in 50 years. The population profile has changed too, the largest group on the island being the 65+ age group. All age groups except that of 65+ are gradually falling in terms of number and there are few children living on the island now. The population decline will accelerate still further, and the downward curve has recently steepened. Anyone who is interested can read more about this in an article of mine to be published in Japanstudien 18 later this year. In an interview with a prefectural official working on the island, he estimated that the population might fall to below 30,000 before it levels off. I think he may be being optimistic.

The cause of the postwar drop has been mainly young people seeking out opportunities in larger cities in the following ways:

1. Junior and Senior high school grads seeking secure industrial employment/marriage.
2. The above seeking tertiary educational opportunities in large cities and secure salaried employment/marriage thereafter.

There is no tertiary education in Sado, and never have been as far as I know. The so-called University of the Air is no such thing and has only very recently begun broadcasting outside of the Kanto area, on SkyPerfect TV of all places. Its actual and intended functions have always been a contradiction. Niigata University has a small research facility for marine biology there, but nothing else as far as I know. The brightest must leave to find education elsewhere and most never come back once they have made that leap.

Well-rewarded and stable industrial employment in the past meant that large numbers of people left the island to work in big cities. Much of this has now dried up as large corps downsize, lower level suppliers go bust, and middle aged people hog the remaining jobs. The education system is still geared to rural areas supplying urban areas with a disciplined, literate and numerate industrial workforce, except that industrial work no longer awaits most people that leave Sado's schools. They are unable and unwilling to work in the island's traditional industries of forestry, fishing, farming and so on, and have no training or background in many of the arts and crafts of Sado. It may surprise some, but Sado has a rich artistic, performing arts, and crafts heritage that is kept alive, only just, by some very hardworking and dedicated people with limited support from elsewhere. The unemployment rate in Sado is actually lower than the national average. There is work, but the education system steers young people away from indigenous forms of employment or ignores local industries.

Many young people end up drifting in and out of various forms of temporary/part time service sector work once they arrive in the urban areas and pass through what are laughingly called 'universities'. They cannot develop a distinct career because these occupations require few skills and little training. They have no knowledge and skills to speak of because the 'universities' have not taught anything. They cannot commit to anything like raising a family because they are on low incomes. They become stuck in a sort of twilight zone of career drift and singledom as they inhabit the netherworld of Japan's vast urban sprawls. They cannot return to Sado because they have no background in the forms of employment that are required there and would be unable to settle in the countryside after living a mostly nocturnal existence working in the convenience stores, restaurant chains, and petrol stations of suburban Japan. As an aside, have you ever wondered where the people who serve in these outlets come from and where they are going?

The schools in Sado say that they leave it to families to train the next generations of artists/craftspeople/family entrepreneurs (admitting that they have abandoned the island's heritage). However, families claim, where there are only one or two children (where previously there were 4 or 5), it is not reasonable to expect that at least one of them will stay behind to carry on the ie. Some do, but many don't, and so there is a slow decline in the number of artists and craftspeople. There is also the loss of many generations worth of accumulated skills, tacit nowledge and socio-economic networks.

There is some evidence of u-turn. There is also some evidence of those seeking a more bohemian existence to escape the zombie lifestyle of urban salarymen. But, the island's heritage and its society are disintegrating and will probably never recover. Of course, this may be the sign of things to come for the rest of Japan. Small towns in Honshu and some larger cities are shrinking now. Sometime in the future, within 50 years, the rest of Japan will be experiencing what is happening in Sado right now if present trends continue. Females in Tokyo now give birth on average to less than 1 child per woman, less than the birth rate of Sado.

The last decade or so has really begun to open a lot of people's eyes, especially in rural and suburban areas, to what has been happening to their their communities. It is only really now that knowledge of the costs of industrialisation is coming to permeate into ordinary people's consciousness in sufficient depth and among a sufficient number of people for there to be an aggregating sense that all is not well; that some have benefited hugely and that there are many others who have slowly and silently endured. More and more people are understanding that their own situations are not isolated and rare, but actually are rather common.

Just as an example, if you drive over one of the main road bridges over the Niigata-Nagaoka railway line, on the right you will see some prefab housing for about 300 families that lies to the side of the bridge and inside a JR siding, where freight trains pull in and out all night. This housing is completely full up, even now, with families displaced by the Chuetsu Earthquake in 2004, two years ago nearly. This is not the only place where people huddle together and wait for something to happen. What are Koizumi and his mates doing? Arguing ceaselessly about whether or not to visit Yasukuni. Of course, these discussions are, at best, distractions from the business of facing up to the fact that there are people living in refugee housing in the second richest country in the world that broadcasts to the world that it has a successful egalitarian model of capitalism. Anyone walked along the banks of the Kamo River in Kyoto recently? Did you notice the tiny villages of homeless lurking under each bridge? Many people simply laugh when they see Nagatacho on the telly now. Its a sort of sardonic humour for the masses.

This is a change in perception, yes, but it is also a sort of a slow realisation of what has been happening. While rural and working class Japan had a lot of strength in depth in previous decades, the human and natural resources from rural areas and working class and craftsman entrepreneur families have now been depleted to such an extent that, for the first time, there is precious little left within Japan's own borders, so industry goes elsewhere in search of lower cost regimes and new sources of labour power and nature. This is the essence of globalisation. While local areas continued to supply what capital wanted, noone seemed to notice very much that these areas were not reproducing themselves at the same rate as the rate at which they were being depleted. Now that the resources have been more or less exhausted people realise that their communities are now at a more radical stage in their decline.

It is true that many parents of small businesses did not necessarily want their children to succeed them. Why not? Because they had been convinced that what awaited their children was a better and more secure life in salaried employment working for big capital. For a while that worked and there was a neat bargain struck between the urban centre and rural/suburban periphery. But big capital is not recruiting in Japan any more like it used to and there are few family businesses to inherit. So what happens to the children now? They slope off into freeterhood, as NEETs, and so on.

Lastly, what also is new is the sort of 'get rich quick and who cares how it is done' mentality of people such as Horie and Murakami and the way in which they lord it over everyone else and thumb their noses at conventional ideas of polite restraint and reserve, or enryo. There is a deep level of disappointment among many people that Japanese society has produced these people. While most have toiled away throughout their lives, diligently paid their taxes and been good 'shakaijin', they find that Horie and Murakami and whoever else have all the time had their noses in the trough. Most have no faith whatsoever in the power of the ballot box because they know that that too is rigged against them, so they don't even vote.

What is to be done? I have some ideas. But what do you think?

Cheers.

Peter

Approved by ssjmod at 01:02 PM

August 01, 2006

[SSJ: 4115] Re: Tanaka and his party

From: Ellis Krauss
Date: 2006/08/01

To Mr. Sasanuma:

Think you're reading an American interpretation of "independent" into that. Japanese local candidates, especially for Mayor or Governor often do not list themselves as being from a particular party on the ballot or when they file. The fiction is that they have to represent a large and diverse group of people being the only people in Japan elected via a direct 'presidential' style ballot so they should nominally be 'independent." Also they are frequently supported or endorsed by more than one party. Don't think you should read too much into that.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 12:52 PM

[SSJ: 4114] Tanaka and his party

From: Joe M. Michael Sasanuma
Date: 2006/08/01

I was reading a newspaper article about poll numbers in Nagano's governor's race and noticed that Tanaka is listed as an "Independent." I find this bizarre since he is the president of the New Party Japan. Has there been any discussion about this in Japan? I wonder if this is proof that the New Party Japan is not a functioning party unlike the New People's Party, which is actually endorsing and running candidates for next year's Upper House elections.

Joe Sasanuma
Boston College Law School '07
Boston College '04

Approved by ssjmod at 11:13 AM

July 31, 2006

[SSJ: 4113] Gaps / kakusa

From: Michael Smitka
Date: 2006/07/29

I'm belatedly replying to posts by Matanle and Campbell (among others).

I've not examined the statistics to see to what extent there is a sharp rise in inequality, but I've always been puzzled by the perception of Japan as uniformly middle class. The huge postwar migrations away from the countryside were because of large income gaps. Similarly, the lust for education reflected the sharp difference in lifestyle between blue collar workers and "lifetime" employees. In the 1980s I stayed with friends living in a danchi in suburban Tokyo, and frequently visited others in early-1960s-vintage blue-collar company housing. Pretty grim, even if one of the two (an artist) was eventually able to move to better digs.

Maybe part of the perception of equality was because, except for the elite, (i) even "good" housing was pretty bad, (ii) no one had cars, and (iii) "good" and bad housing were mixed together (outside of the danchi and the newest suburbs) so that at least in urban areas, geography did not in general predict status. The visible distinctions were less than in (say) the US.

Now there's a lot of housing that's not so bad (though it sprawls on forever), and outside of core urban areas cars are essential, while the newer suburbs are much more homogeneous (and up-scale).

That rurals areas are in decline has been less than news for 40 years now, and rural areas of course are still seeing exit. Perhaps there's a tipping point, though, after which communities are so shrunk -- at least of those under age 50 -- as to be qualitatively different. I suspect Niigata is at that point. In the past decade I've spent a few months in rural Niigata (Uonuma-gun) and a couple weeks in semi-rural Shizuoka (Susono-shi). All are hit by long-run trends, but they are clearly long-run, not something that suddenly occurred under "liberal" market reforms, and can be laid at Koizumi's feet.

I also revisit a shitamachi (Sumida-ku) "shoten-gai" periodically; even in the early 1980s, the proprietors (when rational) objected to their children carrying on the family business, long before the rise of suburban shopping malls or large-scale, modern supermarkets or for that matter convenience stores. In other words, they saw little future in small-scale retailing even before the rise of new retail formats (and locations) and changes in distribution channels.

There may well be a significant shift in inequality, given shifts in labor markets at both the youngest and oldest end of the spectrum, and the sharp rise in longevity. I strongly suspect that the recent media coverage is due to perceptions, not to any sudden social revolution (devolution?).

Back to packing; in Japan for the academic year, from this coming Tuesday.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:22 PM

June 05, 2006

[SSJ: 4094] The Gap and the Media

From: Arthur Alexander
Date: 2006/06/02

My contribution here is not related to the media, but to the underlying economic behavior.

I have been grappling with the changing distribution of economic activity over time, prefectures, and industries. The picture is not uniform.

GDP per capita has become more uniform across prefectures since the late 1980s, as measured by the standard deviation/mean and a few other dispersion indices.

Similarly, the share of absolute GDP growth was more evenly distributed across prefectures in the the most recent period (1994-2002) than in earlier ones.

Population variability increased rapidly until the 1970s, and then continued to rise at a much slower rate.

Bank loans to firms became less variable across prefectures after the late 1980s.

Variability of output growth across industries has increased markedly since about 1990.

The standard deviation of industry change divided by average change was fairly stable until the 1990s; variability then climbed rapidly.

To clarify what is being demonstrated in the industry data, I should mention what is not changing. The Gini coefficient showing the inequality of industry GDP is stable. Unchanging Gini coefficients of output over time would be consistent with the following scenario. Suppose that the steel industry accounted for 30 percent of total output for the 40 years from 1950 to 1990, and that electronics produced 10 percent. If, in the 1990s, electronics jumped from 10 percent to 30 percent and steel fell from 30 percent to 10 percent, the Gini coefficient measuring the distribution of industry output would not change. In contrast, measures of the variability of CHANGES in output would produce big jumps in the latest period compared with no change in the preceding 40 years.

Another example in which greater variability is observed is land prices, which have been falling since around 1990. This phenomenon had occurred in every prefecture and for every type of land. However, despite the ubiquity of falling prices, it has not been uniform. To consider just the Tokyo region, large differences have appeared since 2000. A construction boom in central Tokyo has attracted commercial and residential customers from less desirable outlying areas. As a result, prices have become more diverse.

Commercial land prices in Chiba, to the east of Tokyo Bay, have fallen by 45 percent since 2000, whereas central Tokyo is down only 17 percent and actually increased by 2.5 percent in the past year.

NOTE: These changes preceded the Koizumi reign. It is difficult to identify specific policies in the last few years that accelerated the process. Perhaps, requiring banks to rid themselves of nonperforming loans is one such policy.

In a recent report on the subject, I came to the following conclusions.

Variability of economic fortunes is becoming the new norm. A future with greater variance will require policies that allow and encourage greater mobility of people, capital, and other resources so that new opportunities can be exploited. Such policies would include not discouraging the exit of insolvent firms and declining industries, easing the creation of new businesses, making pensions more portable, encouraging more flexible housing markets, and loosening employment practices (including both hiring and layoffs). It also includes the ability to construct needed infrastructure in new areas and abandon it in declining ones. It means that public policy to assist individuals suffering from misfortune must be sharpened, so that the affected people can be helped without creating incentives for others to take advantage of public assistance.

The urge of government policymakers and politicians is to preserve old patterns, to subsidize declining industries, and to underwrite regions with few prospects. That approach to dealing with differentiation will become even more costly in the future than it has been in the past because there will be more cases of decline, even as new opportunities for growth arise.

The tension will be between assisting individuals versus preserving larger collectives such as industries and regions. Policies that enhance productivity growth will make life riskier for individuals. Policies that attempt to preserve predictability by supporting declining firms, industries, and regions will retard productivity and growth, and reduce the resources that can be delivered to unlucky individuals. Not only is the economy of Japan changing, but the pressures on politicians to adapt to this more differentiated world will also be keenly felt.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:41 PM

June 02, 2006

[SSJ: 4093] gaps, and perceptions

From: Gavan McCormack
Date: 2006/06/02

SSJ-Forum,

1) In October last year, following the elections, I wrote a piece that contained some discussion of these issues: "Koizumi's Kingdom of Illusion", Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=422

2) In the current (June) issue of Ronza, Yamaguchi Jiro and Miyamoto Taro have a very interesting study of gaps, regional gaps in perception of the social gap, and the political implications.
The survey on which they base their article is on the web, at:
http://www.global-g.jp/report200602/

Gavan McCormack
Australian National University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:31 PM

[SSJ: 4092] Re: The Gap and the Media

From: Peter Cave
Date: 2006/06/01

There was a long feature on this issue on one of NHK's morning programmes (I think it was 'Seikatsu Hotto Mooruningu', but it might have been 'Ohayo Nippon') in March this year. About 30 minutes or longer. It focused on the case of one young woman in her twenties who left her seishain job with a travel agency to study for a year in Germany and improve her German language skills, then returned to find she could only get haken jobs and could hardly survive. I think it also dealt with other cases such as impoverished older people. I was surprised because the whole tone was very different from the cheerful, upbeat topics that the programme normally focuses on. In fact it was very hard-hitting, to the extent of being shocking - I was impressed, and got the feeling (combined with the 'Bunretsu Nippon' series in the Asahi) that there are a number of people in the media who are starting to pick up on this issue and give it serious coverage. So it might be worth looking at how NHK has been covering this issue elsewhere. Unfortunately I am not assiduous enough at watching the NHK cable channel that I pay for to be sure.

Peter Cave
M.A., M.Phil., D.Phil. (Oxon)
Assistant Professor
Department of Japanese Studies
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
Tel: (+852) 2859-2879
Fax: (+852) 2548-7399
Email: petercav@hkucc.hku.hk
Homepage: www.hku.hk/japanese/peter.html

Approved by ssjmod at 01:44 PM

[SSJ: 4091] Re: The Gap and the Media

From: Annette Schad-Seifert
Date: 2006/06/01

Just let me add a few remarks to the question about when the issue of widening gaps in Japanese society was first put on the agenda. I suppose that the discussion goes back much further than last February in the Asahi newspaper or even last year when Atsushi Miura's book 'Karyu Shakai' (lower class society) came out.

After the collapse of Japan's speculative bubble economy the frequent appearance of the terms "winners" (kachigumi) and "losers" (makegumi) has become obvious in the Japanese media. Actually created as terms to indicate the difference between corporations of the new economy that had been able to gain huge profits and those companies that had to turn down, public usage of the language "winners" and "losers" proliferated and these words are now commonly attributed to almost every part of Japanese society. The language of competition seemed to indicate a growing consciousness of "widening disparities" in Japanese society and was seen as evidence for the break-up of Japan's socially homogenous middle class society. This discourse on "Japan's great middle class" has without doubt obscured already existing social inequalities as well as gender disparities. What is striking is that the reality of a growing gap between "winners" and "losers" is particularly believed by those who have conventionally been the privileged members of middle class society.

An editorial team of Chuo Koron published a paperback in 2001 under the title "Ronso – Churyu Hokai (Discussion—the breaking up of the middle)" that gives a concise overview of the first media coverage and academic discussions of topics such as 'break-up of the great middle (class)', 'class society', 'unequal society' in Japan. According to this book one of the first media articles that covered the issue was a 'shocking report' on the topic 'Shin Kaikyu Shakai Nippon (New class society Japan)', published in May 2000 by the Japanese journal Bungei Shunju, a monthly periodical that is mainly targeted at middle-aged and older male white collar employees. The "shocking report" was more or less an account of male biographies that no longer fit into the standard Japanese version of a white collar career pattern because the men described had international MBA diplomas, fluent English language skills and were employed in investment corporations, earning extraordinarily high profit-sharing annual incomes of far more than 10 million yen (about 90.000 USD). This new type of young urban executive is now a common feature in discussions about the subject. The Bungei Shunju article itself was not particularly innovative but simply drawing on earlier academic discussions that paid attention to the growing polarization of incomes in the Japanese corporate community such as Toshiaki Tachibanaki's 'Nihon no Keizai Kakusa' (Japan's economic disparities) published 1998, a best-seller that analysed the factors contributing to the polarization such as introduction of performance-oriented practices and the increase of non-regular employment and Toshiki Sato's book 'Fubyodo Shakai' Nihon (Japan's unequal society) published 2000.

The Japanese sociologist Masahiro Yamada in his book 'Kibo Kakusa Shakai – "Makezoku" no Zetsubokan ga Nihon o Hikisaku (Society of expectation gaps – The despair of the 'losers' is tearing up Japan, 2004) has differently pointed out that statistically verified data of quantitative income gaps do not necessarily correspond to a person's individual sense of living in poor social conditions. He therefore suggests taking into account qualitative perceptions of disparities. The re-differentiation of Japanese society according to Yamada is particularly sensed by Japan's younger generation, felt as a loss of career chances and personal future options. Yamada therefore identifies Japan as a "society of expectation gaps" (kibo kakusa shakai). The social status of the rapidly increasing male furiitaa workforce (part time employees) for example should not only be considered as being badly compensated in financial terms but is characterized by a poor accumulation of knowledge, a low level of social security and a bad social prestige as an unattractive potential marriage partner. The sense of a growing social insecurity according to Yamada will have a negative influence on social values, attitudes and individual behavior and is going to threaten Japan's social order. Yamada's critique of Japanese society as a "society of gaps" (kakusa shakai) is quite convincing but in its depressing outlook still indebted to the traditional conception that young men as the potential bread-winners of their families should be guaranteed secure jobs and steady income since without economic stability marriages and therefore – as a demographic problem – the birth of children will be in decline. The question remains, whether much of the negative interpretations of the "new misfits" in Japanese society do adequately take into consideration the complexity of individual opinions and motives of the younger generation.

--
Dr. Annette Schad-Seifert
German Institute for Japanese Studies Tokyo (DIJ)
Nissei Kojimachi Bldg.
3-3-6 Kudan-Minami, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0074
Japan
Tel. (03)3222-5077 (DIJ), Fax (03)3222-5420

Approved by ssjmod at 01:36 PM

[SSJ: 4089] Re: Kakusa

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/06/01

Many thanks to Peter Matanie for his fascinating post about Niigata, Sado, and much else. Living as I do right between Hiroo and Ebisu in beautiful Shibuya-ku, I can only say touche to the following:

> Moreover, I would urge anyone visiting Japan for
> research to really get out and about and see the
> other side, to really talk with local people about
> what is happening in their lives right now. Of
> course Tokyo and its chattering classes are part of
> Japan, but it is only one aspect of this huge
> country.

I also got a couple of messages offline that I think are quite pertinent to my particular interest in how kakusa got (is getting?) on the policy agenda. Both messagers said it was ok to post them, in the interests of further discussion.

From Jim Fujii:

I may be missing some context here, so please forgive me, but having spent the last seven months in Tokyo, I can assure you that even the broadcast media has made much of the increasing gap between the haves and have-nots in Japan under the Koizumi Administration. Over this period, the Koizumi Administration went out of its way providing figures that ostensibly discredited the notion of an increasing gap, but almost no one takes that seriously. And it is pretty commonly accepted that (1) neo-liberal policies imposed on Japan in the form of reforms--min'ekika in many guises from houjink-ka to the rise of NPOs and former govt officials who have found new agencies (NPOs) to which they can amakudaru--are largely to blame; (2) as in the US, the move from progressive to flat taxes also contribute to this general condition.

From Gill Steel:

Some random thoughts on your interesting posting about why the disparity issue became prominent when it did (two issues -- regional disparities and income inequality -- have become intertwined).I don't think the media are solely responsible for putting this issue on the public agenda. While the media (particularly the Asahi) are responsible for disseminating information on the disparity, they seem to be reflecting, rather than shaping public opinion (although this is obviously an arguable point).Atsushi Miura's Karyu Shakai became a bestseller at the end of last year, with some people who considered themselves part of the underclass embracing the description (and the book). The Cabinet Office reported a rise in the Gini coefficient at the end of January.This promoted inevitable criticisms that Koizumi's reforms favor the rich. Mikio Aoki pointed out in the Diet the country was being polarized by the reforms, since the economy was only improving in some regions. Then -- possibly in response -- the Asahi conducted a survey at the beginning of Feb (reported Feb 5th). I believe 74 per cent of respondents felt the income gap was growing (58 per cent also said they were unhappy with the media's propensity for categorizing people as either winners or losers). Unusually, the Asahi editorial argued: What we must avoid is doing away with structural reforms, which promote a fairer and more efficient society, just because of the growing disparity.

Clearly the general concern has been around for some time, and mounting. Perhaps it originated in academe and by writers like Miura. Then, politicians--first somebody in Minshuto, then Fukuda, then Abe? I'll have to look back to see who asked the question that got Koizumi to deny the gap.

I plan to write something more shortly. Further contributions welcome.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:09 PM

[SSJ: 4088] Re: The Gap and the Media

From: Shunichi Takekawa
Date: 2006/06/01

Mainichi Shinbun started its series of articles titled "Tatenarabi shakai: Kakusa no genba kara" on December 30, 2005. This series has continued at least by this April. Perhaps this is "nenkan kikaku," a one-year series of articles on a particular issue. If so, it will continue throughout this year. Its articles are available at the site below:

http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/shakai/wadai/tatenarabi/archive/

I do not know whether or not other newspapers publicized any series of articles regarding "kakusa shakai" or economic inequality in Japan.

Probably prior to major newspapers, scholars and freelance writers already published books regarding economic inequality in Japan. Perhaps the earliest book is Tachibanaki's Nihon no keizai kakusa, published by Iwanami in 1998.

A useful list of "kakusa shakai" books made by a college student is available at Amacon.co.jp:

http://www.amazon.co.jp/gp/richpub/listmania/fullview/1FIOQQDDRXJU1/503-3198249-0851951?%5Fencoding=UTF8

---------------------------------
Shunichi Takekawa
PhD Candidate (Political Science)
University of Hawaii at Manoa
++++++++++++++++++++++++
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stakekaw/

Approved by ssjmod at 12:54 PM

May 31, 2006

[SSJ: 4087] Re: The Gap and the Media

From: Peter Matanle
Date: 2006/05/31

I just had to throw something in to add to John Campbell's excellent post on the kakusa issue. Sorry about the length.

Here in Niigata there have been some fairly significant changes in the city's and the prefecture's socio-economic makeup since even the first time I came here in 2000. Some of these may relate to the earthquake in 2004, but I am positive they are caused in the main by the widening gap between the metropolitan core and the regions, and between large organisations and family businesses, that the Koizumi reforms are exacerbating, since they were occuring before the earthquake struck.

1. The area called Furumachi in Niigata City used to be, even as recently as 2000, a bustling area of shops, cafe's, restaurants, bars, snacks, and the occasional juku. There was always a buzz about the place, especially on Friday and Saturday evenings and on Sundays during the day. This was where people went to have fun. Nearly all of the businesses there were owned by families and small time entrepreneurs who worked hard, saved their money for their children, and were happy and proud in their autonomy, self-reliance, and the contributions they were making to society and life in the city. Now the area is almost deserted of potential customers and many of the business have closed down or are in the process of doing so. Those that remain are depressed and struggling. The area around Bandai, to the north of Bandai Bridge and nearer Niigata Station, has taken over as the main attraction for shopping and eating and drinking in the city, as well as the further distant Saty shopping complex and surrounding stores situated along the bypass. The businesses in Bandai and the Saty area are chains run out of Tokyo and beyond: Isetan, Kinokuniya, Virgin records, Starbucks, Tokyo Interior and so on. Talking with shopkeepers and bar/restaurant staff in Furumachi reveals that many of these people have become much poorer and now live much more precarious lives since Bandai and Saty were developed.

Just as a sort of vignette. Last week was the first time that I locked my bike up when I cycled into the city centre to listen to a concert. Nothing had ever happened to it or me previously, but I have begun to feel that the city at night is becoming a more sinister place, having heard increasing numbers of stories of crimes and strange occurences there, and having seen increasing numbers of shifty looking characters wandering the streets. That night was also the first time that my bike was vandalised, right outside the concert hall. The vandals/thieves were not very good since they could have simply carted the thing off, but they managed to break my rather smart front light (JPY4,000) and, unknown to me at the time, nearly sever the screw holding my saddle on in an attempt (failed) to steal both. I nearly caused myself a terrible injury two days later when my saddle suddenly snapped off while I was cycling into the campus!

2. If you go out to areas beyond Niigata City, such as Shibata, Tokamachi, Naoetsu, Murakami and so on, the feeling of depression and slow decline into collapse becomes even more palpable. The problem here is that of large out of town shopping centres, supermarkets and transport systems geared to the requirements of the large operators. The main street in Shibata, again, used to be a thriving area for the community to come together and for proud autonomous family businesspeople and entrepreneurs to make themselves a living. Now, again, since the building of the local Jusco superstore, it is almost deserted, even on a Sunday afternoon. The centre of the town has taken on a sort of shabby windswept feeling that hints at impending collapse, with about ten percent (I counted) of stores now boarded up and out of business. Talking with shopkeepers there a few months ago it became obvious that most shopping is now done at the local Jusco, or people drive down the new bypass towards the new superstore area behind Niigata City around Saty. The same is true of Murakami City, where the square and streets in front of the station are now also almost completely deserted after the out of town Jusco was built. Jusco has now been able to acquire the land on one corner of that street as so many businesses have gone bust, cleared it, and is now building a superstore right in front of the station itself. Nearby shops that are still open have no chance against this type of onslaught.

Also, one of the big problems in these areas has become the snow in winter. Without younger people to clear the roofs and paths, older people have to do it themselves and it is much more dangerous for them. Younger people are fleeing the rural towns to escape precariousness, poor pay, and boring work because the opportunities for self-determination are becoming ever fewer and more narrowly defined. This winter (a particularly snowy one, it has to be said) has seen a larger than usual number of older people being injured or even killed in snow related accidents. One old man fell off his roof into a snow drift and was found a week later by worried locals frozen solid! I don't remember the newspaper saying where his family or children had gone.

3. If you go to Sado Island, the sense of collapse is even worse. The population there has declined by 40-50 per cent in just 50 years and there are few young people left. This winter I visited a junior high school there that ten years ago had been newly built out of merging two schools together and now there are just 50 students in the entire school! Again, convenience stores headquartered in Niigata City or Tokyo open in a small community and force out the local shop owners, many of whom were elderly and unable to change swiftly to accommodate global economic changes into their businesses and lives. Superstores and restaurant chains headquartered in Tokyo have now made their appearance on the island. It is almost impossible now for local shops, restaurants and producers to survive, or if they do they have to resign themselves to a life of struggle for a few pennies here and there. One of the problems in this and the above scenarios is that a smaller proportion of the sales revenue stays in the local economy, because the profits are shipped back to Tokyo. Many of the managers in the new stores are tanshin funin sent from Tokyo rather than local employees, so there is a progressive shift in the proportion of local employment and personal security from permanent to part time/temp and from autonomy to precariousness.

One man I listened to while taking a bath in a local onsen was absolutely livid that the national and prefectural governments could be actively promoting and participating in this run down of Japan's regions. He was saying that it is impossible now for rural couples to have children because they need to earn three or four people's wages (part time/temp as there are few permanent posts now) to be able just to send one child to university in Tokyo. The thing is, he said, you have to pay for education three times over now. Once in the form of taxes, once in the form of university tuition fees, and once to put the same child through senmon gakko to study for professional exams, because the universities have abandoned their educational function and now simply concentrate on social class reproduction. This man has to do tanshin funin in Yamagata during the week because he can't get a decent job in Sado and so his wife is alone at home in Sado during this time (children moved away as is the norm now), which is especially problematic in winter when the ferry frequently gets cancelled due to the rough crossing. He was quite funny at one point because he said, more or less word for word, the following. 'When I was a kid there were lots of good jobs in Sado in private companies and the pay and conditions were good. So the bright kids used to apply to these companies and get those jobs. The pay in the local government offices at that time was poor, so the stupid (yes, he did say baka) kids were the ones who got those jobs. Now we are the ones who are out of work or who have to leave the island, and it is the stupid kids who are now the buchos running the new City office making all the stupid decisions that the rest of us have to live by [Sado is now one local admin entity as a result of gappei and is now Sado Shi - although I couldn't imagine anywhere in Japan less like a city than Sado].'

4. While walking in Shikoku last August (yes, it was blindingly hot but great fun) in a local cafe I came across an article in the Kochi Shimbun in a series called 'Futatsu no Nippon'. The article's title was 'Kurofune ga Yatte Kita' and the general gist goes like this. A family run consumer electronics store goes bust because the elderly owners cannot compete in the new economy. The shop gets bought by an electricals chain run out of Tokyo and the locals are pleased that they can get cheap and modern equipment. However, the employees in the store are now part timers in precarious employment with no prospects for building themselves up other than to leave and do something else, and the profits get shipped back to Tokyo, thus starving the local community of funds. The newspaper's conclusion was that this time the Black Ships are not from overseas, but are other Japanese come to exploit their own people. I am sure many people on this have heard the expression 'Heisei no Kuro Fune', well the Kochi Shimbun was referring to that, except that the globalisation effect is not coming from outside of Japan but from inside.

5. I remember back in the mid-1990s when the Dead Fukuzawa Society was in its heyday, there were arguments going back and forth about the Large Retail Stores law and its reform. Many posts were highly critical of the apparently sclerotic Japanese distribution and retail industries that were apparently holding up hte economy from recovery and ignoring the possible social and human consequences. Well, just as predicted by the cynics, the above is the consequence of these and subsequent reforms for Japan. Rich people at the top of the corporate tree in Tokyo getting richer by the day, and proud middle classed people in Niigata, Shibata, Murakami and beyond sliding down into precariousness and what might be termed the working classes, but that is not the right term. The thing is, where there used to be good jobs in manufacturing for the second and third sons (and daughters) of self-sufficient families in the 1960s and 1970s, these jobs are now going to China and these families are now producing only one child if any at all. Good on the Chinese for raising millions of people out of poverty, but Koizumi and his crew have not responded to these changes by building up a new society for Japan; they have simply participated in grabbing what they can out of the slow death of the old system and leaving many millions of people living in pretty awful conditions as a result.

6. Of course, these are problems that are occuring all over the developed world as capital makes further inroads into people's lives and wrecks the very socities that give it the opportunity to thrive. You only have to look at the recent documentary on Walmart, 'The High Cost of Low Price' (http://www.walmartmovie.com/), or read recent books about the retail industry and society published by the New Economics Foundation in the UK (Ghost Town Britain and Clone Town Britain - http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/) to understand the extent to which these changes have already taken place in the USA and UK and impoverished our social and cultural lives as a consequence of the sheer greed of big capital.

7. Although there were prior murmerings in the media, as the Kochi Shimbun story above show, as far as I can tell, the kakusa issue really kicked off in the media last year around September, a little earlier than John suggests, with the publication of the bestseller 'Karyuu Shakai', published as a shinsho by Koubunsha, though it had been simmering in the public consciousness before that. The book isn't the best piece of research, but in it the author introduces the idea of the middle classes becoming a sort of underclass and the upper strata becoming even richer, occupying a sort of stratosphere of wealth. I suppose this new stratosphere could be most graphically symbolised by the opening of the Roppongi Hills complex in 2003 and loads of media and new rich moving in there, such as Horie. There is little doubt in conversations that I have had here in Niigata that the opening of that building, the hype that surrounded it, and the shameless publicity seeking and opulent lifestyles that people such as Horie indulged in contributed to a feeling elsewhere among Japanese that big gaps were opening up in their society - that society had become somehow fractured where it had once been, even if just in their imaginations, singular and whole. The building opened at a time when Japanese people felt that their economy and society were on a precarious footing (many still do feel that) and many people felt that, therefore, the building's owners and tenants were sort of thumbing their noses at the rest of society who were still suffering from the 'lost decade(s)'. Interestingly, the author of Karyuu Shakai has just published a follow up called 'Mai Houmures Chairudo: Karyuu Shakai no Wakamono-tachi'.

8. Last thing, I don't want to bang the drum of wandering Japan's regions too much, but many journalists and scholars, and especially journalists and scholars from western countries when they visit Japan, get only fleeting glimpses of what are pretty profound changes going on in Japanese society and sometimes don't really grasp their significance. The former because they have corporate and other day to day interests to attend to and the latter because they attend short term visits to prestigious institutes and universities in the metropolitan core and rarely move beyond that. Yes, hobnobbing with the rich, influential and famous is important because these people make significant decisions, but they are simply those who are the most visible ini society and who are at the top of a very large heap. What is going on inside that heap is also important. Yes, central Tokyo looks great these days as the streets have been steadily smartened, pavements constructed, overhead wires brought underground, trees planted and so on. But this belies something else going on elsewhere, which millions of Japanese people have to live with, but get so little opportunity to have their voice heard. So it is gratifying that the Asahi Shimbun has taken a step back from day to day concerns in Tokyo and the machinations of politicians, bureaucrats and business people to think about the other side of Japan's reforms and question the apparent renaissance of the economy, because what the Asahi Shimbun (and others such as the Kochi Shimbun above) is saying has real resonance in the cities, towns and villages of Japan's regions. Moreover, I would urge anyone visiting Japan for research to really get out and about and see the other side, to really talk with local people about what is happening in their lives right now. Of course Tokyo and its chattering classes are part of Japan, but it is only one aspect of this huge country.

Cheers.

Peter

Approved by ssjmod at 06:25 PM

[SSJ: 4086] The Gap and the Media

From: John Campbell
Date: 2006/05/31

I posted this on the NBR Japan Forum and as usual when I say something there I got little reaction. The points I raise are probably too academic so SSJ is more appropriate.
__________________________

Last night [May 28] the Good Day Bookstore in Ebisu hosted a talk by Dick Samuels. The topic was his book Machiavelli's Children, but the discussion found its way to talking about the kakusa (gap, inequality) issue. Dick had been out of Japan in January and February, when the issue really first appeared, and he asked "who put it on the agenda?"--a very good question.

Oddly enough, this morning's Asahi provides the (or anyway an) answer. In the new column Shimen Monitaa, which infuriatingly is not on the Asahi regular website, Economics Editor Watanabe Akira replied to readers' inquiries and criticisms (three letters are included) about the paper's coverage of Bunretsu Nippon. It has been really extensive, starting in February with a series on a large, poor danchi complex in Adachi-ku in Tokyo, two special pieces in March, and continuing last week with a series called Shimanami Kaidou about the area of the new bridge from Hiroshima-ken to Ehime-ken. For the latter report on communities in dire straits, six reporters spent six weeks there. The bulk of the stories have "anecdotal," stories about particular people, though there has been some more general analysis too.

Here is a translation of part of Watanabe's piece:

One motive in starting this series was the self-reflection (hansei) among a group of reporters that "they had been so caught up in pursuing day-to-day events they were missing the big changes in people's lives." After a heated discussion we took "kakusa" as the key word, and decided (klmemashita) that "isn't it true that the broad middle class whose energy and hard work had made Japan prosperous is crumbling and the 'break up' (bunretsu) of society has begun." (We?)(They?) were aware (ishiki shimashita) of the connection between Koizumi's reforms and the gap.

In the rest of it he describes their coverage a bit, and acknowledges readers' concerns that it only showed the bad side, gaps are natural, and there should be more on what to do about it. He then came down pretty emphatically on the gap as a side effect of the recent reforms and questioned if they should go on. The whole article is well worth reading if you can get hold of the print paper.

I take this as a pretty straightforward assertion that the media, or actually a single paper, put this issue on the public agenda. I argued in an old essay* that such cases are rather unusual, though there are precedents--Michael Reich's story about how Asahi pushed the animal feed contamination case** decades ago is one. More often the media's role in policy change is as a tool for other actors (including "policy sponsors"), and in fact somebody in the audience suggested the Minshuto was really behind the kakusa issue. I got to Tokyo at the beginning of February and can't say, but maybe someone else has an idea.

Anyway, this Asahi piece fits nicely into recent threads in Eco, Soc and Pol in the Forum.

*"Media and Policy Change in Japan." In Media and Politics in Japan, ed. by Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996; pp. 187-212. Available on request.

**"Troubles, Issues, and Politics in Japan: The Case of Kanemi Yushi" and "Crisis and Routine: Pollution Reporting by the Japanese Press," in Institutions for Change in Japanese Society, ed. by George DeVos (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), pp. 114-165.
__________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
Apt #1005, Hiroo Center Heights
23-2 5-chome, Hiroo
Shibuya-ku Tokyo 150-0012 Japan
Tel & Fax: 050 8881 9303
(from abroad +81 50 8881 9303)

Approved by ssjmod at 02:28 PM

April 28, 2006

[SSJ: 4072] "Parasaito shingeru" - online images?

From: Vincent K Pollard
Date: 2006/04/26

Dear Colleagues,

For an undergraduate research symposium presentation and for her Honors Thesis, an undergraduate student of mine needs online images (photographs, cartoons) of the so-called "parasito shingeru."

Also, the same student is looking for an online photograph of YAMADA Masahiro, author of "Parasaito shingeru no jidai" (1999).

If you have any URLs to share with this student, I'll forward them to her and, simultaneously put you in touch with her.

E-MAIL: pollard@hawaii.edu
WEB: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

************************************************************
SSJ-FORUM Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo
Access the SSJ-Forum website via the ISS home page:
http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ Please obtain the consent of the author of any message before quoting it.
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Approved by ssjmod at 05:23 PM

March 07, 2006

[SSJ: 4050] Re: Japanese in the United States

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2006/03/02

Hello.

An additional reason why "these stats are not very accurate" is the explosion of options for self-identification in the 2000 U.S. Census.

Indeed, almost one third of Japanese respondents made use of the rich array of personal choices -- more than almost any other self-identified Asian group. In turn, the widespread use of the new options by Japanese respondents makes hard-and-fast comparisons with 1990 Census data treacherous.

Below is some background and documentation. In most cases, URLs are provided.

http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html
is the link to an official series of U.S. Census Bureau questions and detailed answers (12 April 2000). It includes information on "the revised [Office of Management and Budget] standards for federal data on race and ethncity." These originated with the Interagency Committee for the Review of Racial and Ethnic Standards.

The State Demographic Center of Minnesota
:
made the following comment:

"With all the various combinations of single and multiple races, there are 63 possible racial identifications in the 2000 census. Most users will want to combine some of these categories. any census reports will collapse all the 57 combinations of two or more races into a category called 'Two or More Races,' giving seven mutually exclusive categories: American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Asian alone, Black or African American alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, Some Other Race alone, White alone, and Two or more races.

"Six Asian groups- Asian Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino and Vietnamese - appeared as check-offs on the census form....."

The Minnesota document from which those two unconnected quotations originate also has a useful link to a copy of the 2000 Census questionnaire. Understatedly, the document concludes:

"The 2000 census will provide a vast amount of data on the ethnic and racial composition of the population. Users should be aware that this information will not be comparable to data from earlier censuses and may not be comparable to other sources of information. "

By dint of check-off and write-in options, an individual of Japanese family heritage could identify herself as "Japanese," "Asian," "American" and even otherwise.

Finally, to quote another government publication, "Of the six largest specified Asian groups, Japanese were most likely to report one or more other races or Asian groups. Of all respondents who reported Japanese, either alone or in combination, 31 per cent reported one or more other races or Asian groups....." (Bureau of the Census, _The Asian Population: 2000_).

Search the title above as a phrase in Google Advanced Search to access a downloadable .pdf file.

A constructivist's delight!

Vincent K. Pollard

E-MAIL: pollard@hawaii.edu
WEB: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

Approved by ssjmod at 02:57 PM

[SSJ: 4049] Re: Japanese in the United States

From: Clark Tufts (TCTufts53@aol.com)
Date: 2006/03/02

Robert,

Without any statistics, just observation, I'd say that many are students and interns, both medical and corporate. It is probable that these show up in the MOFA statistics, and it indicates that the level of English command, though still not great, is good enough to get into the universities and survive to a greater degree than formerly. Certainly for the 3 month statistic.

Clark Tufts
Cleveland, OH
MA candidate in Asia Pacific Studies
U of Leeds

Approved by ssjmod at 02:40 PM

March 02, 2006

[SSJ: 4047] Japanese in the United States

From: Robert Dujarric (rdujarric@aol.com)
Date: 2006/03/01

Japanese MOFA statistics show a rapid increase in Japanese nationals based in the US (defined as staying more than 3 months) from 121,000 in 1980 to 264,000 in 1995 to 332,000 in 2003 (rounded to closest k). US Census (2000) data seems to back up MOFA stats, though they indicate that Japanese arrived mostly in the 1990s. According to American figures 52.9% of Japanese (defined as those indicated Japanese ethnicity on their US Census form) arrived in the US in the 1990s. MOFA data also shows a notable increase in Japanese in western Europe, especially in the 1980s (1980 11,000 in the UK, 44,000 in 1990, 51,000 in 2003; similarly large increases in Germany and even more France).

Obviously these stats are not very accurate. Many individuals do not register with their consulate, fail to properly complete Census forms, or for one reason or another are not included in the data. It is possible that the percentage who register with Japanese consulates, rather than the underlying numbers, increased.

However, given the magnitude of the changes reported, I wonder if members of this group have any idea of who these Japanese are. What do they do? Where do they work?

Robert Dujarric

Mobile telephone (090) 3476-3985 (from outside Japan +81 90 3476-3985)
Visiting Research Fellow
Japan Institute of International Affairs (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyusho)
Kasumigaseki Building 11th Floor
Kasumigaseki 3-2-5, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6011
rdujarric@aol.com (use robertdujarric@gmail.com if you are having problems with AOL)
www.jiia.or.jp
Office telephone (03) 3503-7802 x305 [Please leave all messages on email or mobile]
Subway stop: Toranomon (Exit 5, Ginza Line), Kasumigaseki (Exit A-13, Chiyoda, Marunouchi, Hibiya Lines), Tameike Sanno (Exit 8, Ginza, Namboku Lines)
For a map showing the location of the building, please visit http://www.jiia.or.jp/index-en.html; go to "about us" and then to "access" or call JIIA (03) 3503-7801.

Approved by ssjmod at 02:22 PM

February 13, 2006

[SSJ: 4037] Tokugawa Shogunate (Genroku period): Entrepreneurs & restaurants

From: Vincent K. Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2006/02/11

Dear Colleagues,

This semester, I'm team-teaching an interdisciplinary research course to a small class of college juniors. As part of this enterprise, I'm advising a student who is a double-major in Japanese and economics. During the current semester, the student is expected to complete a proposal for an undergraduate honors thesis in Japanese economic history. Thereafter, he will work under the direction of a thesis mentor for another ten or twelve months.

With a focus on the Genroku period (1688-1704) of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the student wishes to explain how the rise of the merchant class affected the origins and development of restaurants.

In your view, what are the one or two books, book chapters or journal articles that best address that aspect of economic and cultural development? Aside from English, the student can also read Japanese and French -- each with considerable dictionary work.

If you think others subscribing to SSJ-Forum would benefit from your suggestions, you might post them directly to this e-mail list. And thank you for considering my request.

Vincent K. Pollard

E-MAIL: pollard@hawaii.edu
WEB: http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

Approved by ssjmod at 11:51 AM

February 02, 2006

[SSJ: 4031] LDP programmes

From: Elena I. Atanassova (elena.atanassova@operamail.com)
Date: 2006/02/02

Dear Forum members,

could anyone give me some ideas where I could fine the LDP's policy programmes, manifesto and other documents from the 1990s on (apart from what is available on the party's website). As I am not currently in Japan, I need online materials but would also be interested in secondary sources, i.e. analyses of the party's documents by other scholars.

Thanks in advance!

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
PhD researcher
Catholic University of Leuven
Belgium

Approved by ssjmod at 03:41 PM

January 26, 2006

[SSJ: 4027] Re: Keidanren chairman's explanation of Japan's economic recovery

From: Anthony P. D'Costa (dcosta@u.washington.edu)
Date: 2006/01/25

I understand that there are costs of Japanese style capitalism. But are Japanese companies uncompetitive? In what sense? Cost of production, market share? Clearly there are sectors such as the auto industry in which they are strong. In the ICT sector, they are strong in semiconductors, design, and other related products. Cutting costs will be necessary but to what extent? Should they follow further hollowing out like the US? Is jobless growth preferable to no growth but relatively stable employment? How much more productivity should they be squeezing out? IMHO at the societal level the Japanese seem to be doing quite well. Perhaps the cost is well worth it.

Cheers, Anthony

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Anthony P. D'Costa, Professor
Comparative International Development
University of Washington
1900 Commerce Street
Tacoma, WA 98402, USA
Phone: (253) 692-4462
Fax : (253) 692-5718
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Approved by ssjmod at 06:06 PM

[SSJ: 4026] Re: Quantifying Lifetime Employment

From: Leonard J. Schoppa (ljs2k@cms.mail.virginia.edu)
Date: 2006/01/25

Hiroshi Ono has a recent (2005) article that surveys thedifferent ways in which lifetime employment has beendefined and measured. It is available on-line at

http://www.hhs.se/NR/rdonlyres/A3AA9910-96CA-41E2-AC36-D14DB4A647C6/0/NBER2005.pdf.

Not surprising, whether you see lifetime employment as shrinking or not depends on how you measure it.

He points out that some people define lifetime employees as those who work at large (over 500) firms and for the government. By this measure, the share of the workforce covered has declined from 23.4 percent in 1985 to 19.2 percent in 2003.

But of course many workers in medium sized firms are covered by employment protections of some kind. In fact, all firms that employ workers for over a year (on "standard" terms) face some restrictions on their ability to lay off workers. These protections do not apply to those in temporary or part-time positions. Again, there has been some decline in "standard" employment arrangements, which covered 80.2 percent of workers in 1991 but now cover just 69.6 percent. Note that the proportion of MEN covered by standard contracts continues to stand at 84.5 percent, so the decline has been largely due to the large number of women on non-standard contracts.

Few are willing to use any of the standard employment numbers as the figure of lifetime employment since indeed firm size does affect the ability to firms to keep workers on the payroll. Therefore Ono favors using the government's wage census to measure how many workers near the end of their work career (age 50-54) have actually stayed with the same employers since the beginning of their working life. By this measure, the proportion covered by lifetime employment is actually UP. The proportion of male and female workers aged 50-54 who are still working where they began their careers went up from 7.4 percent in 1985 to 17.9 percent in 2000. The increase is particularly striking among male university grads, up from 28.7 percent to 41.3 percent, but it is also up among male high school grads from 11.4 to 19.1.

In my opinion, even the above numbers understate the proportion of workers who are effectively covered by long-term employment commitments, since some workers naturally explore several jobs in their youth before they settle on one. Chuma found that relaxing the "start a job right after graduation" requirement led to the following result: the proportion of 50-54 year old male university grads working long term went from 38 to 53 percent between 1980 and 1994. The proportion of high school grads went from 17 to 33.

How does one square this evidence of expanding lifetime employment with popular reporting of its demise? One reason is because all of these numbers are well short of 100 percent. Many workers are not covered and do get laid off. Second, it seems that younger cohorts are not finding a toe-hold on the lifetime employment ladders their fathers climbed. When these workers get to 50-54, we may see in the wage census data evidence that there has been a decline in the proportion covered. But for today's core male middle-aged workers, lifetime employment remains as real (and probably more real) than it was before the recession.

Len Schoppa
Associate Professor
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
tel (434) 924-3192
fax (434) 924-3359
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k

Approved by ssjmod at 05:57 PM

[SSJ: 4025] Re: Quantifying Lifetime Employment

From: Peter Matanle (peter_matanle@yahoo.co.jp)
Date: 2006/01/24

Responding to Paul Scalise's enquiry I have the following to add to the discussion on lifetime employment. Sorry about the length of the post, but the question raises all sorts of complex issues and nuanced interpretations. If anyone disagrees or has anything to add I would welcome it.

On the basis of my own research very few Japanese employers would ever say that they offer lifetime employment to their staff, now or in the past. So, on that basis a quantitative anaylsis might yield very low returns indeed, in comparison to what we can observe around us in a qualitative sense. Most of the time a Japanese managerial response to an enquiry of this sort would be along the lines of (the quote by a manager below taken directly from p. 50 of my book (2003, Routledge)):

... it is often said that a characteristic of the Japanese system is lifetime employment. However, I said earlier that I had never heard the company make that promise but I think it [lifetime employment] exists in the company. The effect of Japan's economic growth has been the existence of it, even though there has never been a contract to that effect. [end quote]

Thus, firms do not offer lifetime employment and few or no contracts of employment exist to that effect, yet it operates in the background of employment in many organizations (public and private sector, large and small) as a kind of entrenched and mutually understood socio-economic/cultural custom among mostly male regular employees, and this is as dependent on company performance (what people do) as much as it is on the intentions of either management or employees (what
people say). It is right to say that firms do reduce employment levels beyond reduced hiring and this happens when a firm is in some difficulty. Although employment customs are said to be changing, there is still a pervasive belief within Japan that it is only really possible, or ethical, to fire en masse (rather than the occasional practice of pressuring particular underperforming individuals to voluntarily quit) when the firm faces bankruptcy if it does not. This rule, or mutual understanding, has been tested in the courts and plaintiffs supported by their unions have won on many occasions. Some say (Araki and others) that the courts are reinterpreting the law, but I think we are yet to see a large effect in this regard. It seems that the law exists in this way to reflect as well as to regulate (rather than to direct or alter in a particular direction) already established social custom.

However, to say 'watch what firms do and not what they say', while wise advice, is only part of the story, since it may lead us to ignore how the particpants themselves interpret their own and others' circumstances and futures. Many people who are fired when a firm is in difficulty had previously assumed, along with their management, that they were covered. It is only when they understand that their firm is really going to go under, that the realisation dawns that their position is not so secure as they had imagined. Does this mean that they were never covered, or those presently in employment are not covered, even if their firm is the picture of health? ... so there are many employees and managers out there who right now really believe that they are employed for the rest of their working life at their company, unless something goes drastically wrong. Just because the firm, in the unlikely event of its facing bankruptcy, MAY one day have to get rid of them, or MAY one day go bust, doesn't mean that currently they are in completely insecure positions. Moreover, since it is rare indeed for a public sector organisation to go bust or to have to lay off en masse at a moment's notice, how should we think about their employment conditions?

As for calculating what percentage of the workforce is covered, that is, I am sure Prof Scalise would agree, a very difficult thing to do. Because the custom is not formalised in any way by firms and other organisations, it really depends on how a person interprets customs, practices, statements and, yes, what firms actually do, as to how the practice can be defined and therefore how people interpret the width and thickness of the umbrella (and the strength and persistence
of the rain falling on it). The highest figure I have read is 87 per cent in Araki's Labour and Employment Law in Japan (2002, Japan Institute of Labor). Rebick in his recent book (2005, OUP) (I haven't yet been able to get hold of a copy myself) reportedly estimates somewhere around 50-60 per cent I recall, though I don't know how this is calculated so can't comment. I have also read a paper by Florida and Kenney published in the early 1990s that estimates the figure to be in the 20-30 percent range. However, the following should be born in mind when thinking about this, in addition to the issue of interpreting exactly what 'lifetime employment' actually is.

One should not assume, as some scholars have in the past, that workers in SMEs should be exempt from inclusion in the figure simply by dint of the size of firm. Neither should one exempt the public sector without explanation, as some scholars have done, since they make up a sizeable proportion of the labour force and the public sector very much influences how practices are played out and interpreted in the private sector (the reverse is true also).

Also, taking these things into account, it is interesting to look at the international comparisons of job retention among employees in the whole society, male employees of large firms, and male management track employees of large firms. For the first, Japan is more or less at the same level as, or a little ahead of, the continental Western European countries. For the middle one it leads all large OECD countries in terms of employment tenure, but not by a long way since France and Germany are not far behind I seem to recall. For the last, Japan is a complete outlier in the stats because managerial track employees of large private enterprises (as opposed to public sector and SMEs) in all larger OECD countries except Japan appear to practice what Storey, Edwards and Sisson (1997) call a multi-company career chimney and the equivalent Japanese managerial employees practice, again on the whole, a single company career chimney. Thus, although companies do practice laying off (when in real trouble) and employees themselves voluntarily sever their employment for many different reasons (and there is a location in between this which has been referred to often as 'enforced voluntary retirement' (basically meaning taking a negotiated redundancy package)), very long term employment tenure in Japan is no lower than elsewhere if one takes the whole labour force into account, is higher in Japan when one considers male employees of large organisations, and is in a completely different universe than the rest of the world's large 'advanced' countries if one considers managerial employees of large organisations. The latter can become a bit complicated if broken down by industry, but on the whole it holds true. Moreover, with regard to small firms, the employees there are sometimes not counted by scholars because they don't have such high tenure rates as elsewhere in the economy. However, as with any economy, SMEs tend to have been established much more recently than larger firms and, therefore, would naturally show lower tenure rates, even if they had never fired a single employee and noone had ever voluntarily left or retired. This would not mean, however, that regular employees in SMEs did not have similar prospects to employees in larger firms, simply by dint of firm size. However, it must also be born in mind that company survivability when in times of distress is higher among larger firms and so security of employment in this regard is higher among employees of such enterprises.

Last, it is not right, as has been claimed repeatedly since the late 1960s, that lifetime employment, or what might more usefully be termed 'very long term employment tenure', is collapsing or has already come to an end. Many employees at large and small firms alike have been there in the same job for more than 20 years and plan to stay until they retire. Whether than constitutes lifetime employment I don't know, but it seems to me that they are there at least with the tacit agreement of their employer if not with their active support in most cases. Moreover, there is a sorting mechanism going on in the first three years after university graduation for males and, to some extent, females, and one should be aware of this and not interpret it as younger people shunning long term employment. Many new graduates intend to 'try out' a company to see if they fit into it and it fits them. If it does, then well and good and many intend to stay there for a long time, precisely how long many cannot say, but 'a long time' is what many do say. If you ask them if they intend to stay until retirement, most will say 'no' or that they have 'no idea' but 'probably not', however, that was the same in the 1960s and 1970s and many of those are still in their companies and now coming up for retirement! If the company doesn't 'fit' in some way then the youngster is often encouraged to leave of his/her own accord and find another employer, if he/she can. If that company fits then great, and so on. But too many times quitting and joining (how many times is up to interpretation) or too long (more than 5 years it seems), and any employer looking for a long term regular to enter the OJT (On the job training) system will be very wary to take someone on whith that kind of record.

Thus, these are customs and structures that have built up over many decades and seem to be self-reinforcing, in that the structures of employment in the different economies to a very great degree constrain individual behaviour such that individual behaviour then reinforces and reproduces the structure ... and so on and on. Defining precisely what those structures are and how big they are in a quantitative sense is very difficult to say because that relies so much on
the qualitative judgment and interpretation of the scholar to decide what kind of person fits and what kind doesn't, rather than letting the employees and employers speak for themselves.

Also, when I wass researching at a private utility provider the employees told me on a number of occasions that the company never offocially practices lifetime employment, but that it must exist. The fact is, this was until recently a regional monopoly provider and an employee would find it impossible to find another job in his local area using the knowledge and skills he (usually he, unfortunately) had acquired. Thus, the company more or less offers lifetime employment to employees because they would find it impossible to find a job and the company would find it impossible to find a replacement, by dint of the very nature of the work itself and the structure of the industry. Moreover, as a regional monopoly provider it needs to have a good relationship with customers as an employer of respect in the community and, thus again, cannot wilfully hire and fire and still maintain the trust and admiration of the customers in their area. These are matters that employers take very seriously and employees are very aware about, but that scholars sometimes are apt not to look into in depth in their search for a clear quantitative outcome to their enquiry.

Lastly, if you had asked my brother in the UK when he left school in the late 1970s if he had intended to stay at the same company (a bank) until he was in his late 40s then he would have said, 'not on your life mate!' But he is still there, a little higher up, in the same locale, and intends now to stay for a good while yet, if he can. Does that mean the UK practices lifetime employment? I don't know, but people say that it has completely disappeared. Thus, it seems to me that in
Japan and elsewhere we are witnessing a divergence between rhetoric and reality as it is interpreted by schlars and the actual participants. Just as with the UK the normative assumption in Japan is growing that lifetime employment is defunct, yet Japanese job retention stats show a different story. In the UK also, my brother's experience belies the assumption that 'a job for life' ended for everyone with Mrs Thatcher. Look at the UK armed forces and the National Health Service and you will find very high rates of job tenure because of the nature of the work that these people do, the nationalised structure of their employment, and the variety of jobs and challenges that await them in their careers that encourages them to remain. Look at Japanese private hospitals and clinics (private sector here) and see what happens to the doctors there ...

Anyway, I hope that helps rather than complicates matters!

Peter
Visiting Scholar
Niigata University

Approved by ssjmod at 05:35 PM

January 24, 2006

[SSJ: 4024] Re: Quantifying Lifetime Employment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@huji.ac.il)
Date: 2006/01/24

Paul J. Scalise wrote

> On the subject of "lifetime" employment in Japan, would
> anyone happen to know what percentage of firms actually
> employ the practice nationwide?
>
> I'm wondering if there is a consensus figure and how, in
> fact, it was (or can be) estimated by economists.

In the heyday of "permanent employment," it was reported to be around 35%, based on various government surveys. For starters, check with scholars next door at SHAKEN, such as Nitta Michio. Works separating myth from reality had already apeared way back in the 1960s - by Taira Kouji and by Robert Cole.

Best regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:39 PM

[SSJ: 4023] Re: Quantifying Lifetime Employment

From: Paul J. Scalise (paul.scalise@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
Date: 2006/01/23

"Finally, despite the rhetoric of 'lifetime' employment, the reality is that Japanese companies *do* reduce employment levels, even beyond what could be accounted for by reduced hiring. (Nakata) Watch what they do, not what they say."

On the subject of "lifetime" employment in Japan, would anyone happen to know what percentage of firms actually employ the practice nationwide?

I'm wondering if there is a consensus figure and how, in fact, it was (or can be) estimated by economists.

Paul J. Scalise
Visiting Research Scholar
Institute of Social Science
University of Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 03:43 PM

January 23, 2006

[SSJ: 4022] Okuda

From: Sanford Jacoby (sanford.jacoby@anderson.ucla.edu)
Date: 2006/01/21

The old argument for U.S. firms used to be that labor retention during recession was a good thing because firms were able to retain human-capital investments and also expand more rapidly during recovery. It's possible that the human capital profile of Japanese and U.S. firms is diverging, with Japanese companies utilizing employees with relatively higher firm-specific skills, and U.S. firms relying more on industry-specific skills. If this were the case, then the logic for or against labor shedding would be different in the two economies. In any event, no one has any idea of the extent to which slow growth of the Japanese economy was or was not related to labor retention by large firms.

Even if labor retention were "bad," one would have to take into account hours worked and real wages, not just employment levels, to determine the impact on employers. The evidence suggests that real wages fell in Japan in the late 1990s and that hours worked were sensitive to output fluctuations.

Finally, despite the rhetoric of "lifetime" employment, the reality is that Japanese companies *do* reduce employment levels, even beyond what could be accounted for by reduced hiring. (Nakata) Watch what they do, not what they say.

As for R&D, although both the US and Japan have R&D spending that is sensitive to growth (so that Japanese spending declined relative to the US through 2001), it's still the case that industrial R&D spending as a percentage of GDP was higher in Japan than the U.S in 2001, this right before the Japanese recovery started and the U.S. economy stalled (2.3 vs. 2.0).

Approved by ssjmod at 01:24 PM

January 20, 2006

[SSJ: 4019] Re: Keidanren chairman's explanation of Japan's economic recovery

From: Arthur Alexander (arthur.alexander@att.net)
Date: 2006/01/20

From: Arthur Alexander
(arthur.alexander@att.net)

Okuda's assessment can be challenged on both counts. There is no evidence that Japan's employment practices brought strength to the economy. After employment peaked in 1997, it required more than five years to adjust the number of jobs to desired levels; the result was five years of a weak economy, an adjustment that would have required approximately 6 months in the US. Of course, there were other factors that slowed the economy, not just slowness in responding to excess employment. I don't know how one can claim that economic strength in 2005 is better than recovery in 2000.

Assessments of R&D spending indicate that US firms are no more likely to cut back on R&D during downturns than are Japanese firms. According to Brian Hall and David Weinstein (NBER WP5818, November 1996), "the evidence suggest that financial distress causes R&D to fall in both countries by approximately the same amount ... and that Japanese firms do not invest more than US firms after the onset of distress."

On a broader front, if US firms were penalized by their near-sighted myopia, they would be forgoing possible gains that firms with keener eyesight would be capturing. The result would be higher returns on investment for those not suffering from shortsightedness. All the evidence points to considerably higher returns among American companies. It is clearly the Japanese firms that have the fuzzier perception of reality.

Approved by ssjmod at 01:37 PM

January 19, 2006

[SSJ: 4017] Keidanren chairman's explanation of Japan's economic recovery

From: Mark A Elder (elderm@msu.edu)
Date: 2006/01/18

Okuda Hiroshi, chairman of Toyota and Nippon Keidanren, attributed Japan's recent economic recovery in part to minimization of layoffs and emphasizing job security, consistent emphasis on R&D (not cutting during tough business conditions), and in general a long term perspective,
according to Nikkei on Fri. Jan. 13.

Nikkei said, "according to Okuda, there are two core characteristics of the Japanese style of corporate management: having a long-term perspective and emphasizing job security. ... That firms remained reluctant to lay off workers even in times of sluggish earnings helped prevent a crash landing of the Japanese economy, making a recovery easier, he said."

"Japanese companies protected their R&D operations as sacred cows and continued to invest in research and personnel training even after the bursting of the asset bubble in the late 1980s, and these efforts later led to technological advances, he explained."

The article also notes that "Canon Inc. President Fujio Mitarai, who is set to take over as Nippon Keidanren's chairman when Okuda steps down in May, has vowed to protect lifetime employment."

The rest of the article contains the caveats:

"But Okuda's lecture was not an outright endorsement of the traditional management style. The corporate sector "has been making necessary adjustments to accommodate the globalization of the economy while giving consideration to job security," he said. Companies have "tackled various reforms, by, for example, reviewing their rigid seniority systems and introducing merit-based compensation."Japanese firms will be under constant pressure to survive cutthroat competition with global players. It is thus unlikely that they will revive old customs -- cross-shareholdings, cartels protective of members' interests, and business plans that focus on size at the expense of profitability -- that hindered growth and eroded competitiveness in the past. Blue chip firms have many traits in common, such as an emphasis on team play. With the increasing globalization of the economy, it will no longer be a clear-cut choice between the Japanese style and the U.S. style. Blue chips, Japanese or foreign, will end up adopting similar management approaches to stay competitive."

Mark Elder
Visiting Researcher
University of Tokyo Institue of Social Science
Assistant Professor of International Relations and Political Economy
James Madison College
Michigan State University

Approved by ssjmod at 01:39 PM

January 10, 2006

[SSJ: 4013] WW2 film: Otokotachi no Yamato

From: Mark A Elder (elderm@msu.edu)
Date: 2006/01/09

The other day I saw the movie "Otokotachi no Yamato." The Yamato was the largest and most powerful battleship in the world during WW2, and it was sunk by US aircraft on a suicide mission in 1945, in which it was to be sent to Okinawa by itself without any air cover (or even destroyer escorts). The Yamato had a crew of about 3000 men, many of them young teenagers.

For those interested in Japan's security policy, the film (in Japanese only) is probably worth seeing. Perhaps others may have had different impressions, but the movie did not seem jingoistic to me. Rather, the feeling that I had throughout the movie was what a senseless, tragic waste of lives (of course, this was the feeling that I was expecting/hoping to have).

Everyone knew that the ship's final mission was a suicide mission, from the lowest sailor to the ship's captain to Navy headquarters in Tokyo, which ordered the mission. There was a large meeting including the Yamato's captain and Navy staff officials, in which the Captain questioned the mission and pointed out that it would be suicidal without any air support. (The Captain's life was on the line as well.) The response of HQ was something to the effect that the Army had complained to them "don't you have even one ship to send to help us" in Okinawa, and so the Navy HQ felt embarrassed and decided to send as a sacrifice one ship, the Yamato. The sailors all had one last shore leave to say sayonara to their loved ones, who also knew the chances of returning home alive were slim. For any sailor who missed the fact that this would be a suicide mission, one of the officers explained this to them and invited them to scream goodbye to their loved ones one last time out at sea one last time before the battle. A significant part of the film was devoted to the preparations for the suicide mission. There was not much in the film about needing to sacrifice oneself for the emperor (there was one scene of a debate about the mission among group of officers which escalated into a bitter brawl), but there was quite a bit of fear of dying.

Instead, the film spent a lot of time on the theme of feeling guilty about the possibility of surviving when most everyone else perished. One of the main characters, who had suffered a severe injury in a previous engagement (lost an eye) and was thus eligible to sit out the rest of the war in the hospital (I forgot the technical term for this kind of serious "life saving" injury), went to great lengths to sneak back on the ship (against regulations) to fight the last battle with his fellow crewmates. He felt very guilty about surviving the previous engagement when other crew members in his team on an antiaircraft turret did not survive. Of course, he was finished off the last time around.

Some people might ask whether the film advances the idea of Japan as victim. The Yamato's crew is clearly victimized here, but it seemed to me that the film portrays them as victims more of Navy HQ than US planes. I suppose I should also add that they fought valiantly, for what that's worth. And, at least according to the film, it took quite a few planes to actually sink the Yamato, which took a lot of hits, and it took some US planes down with it. A few survivors were pulled out of the water at the end of the battle.

On a side note, I have always wondered why those ships needed so many crew members in those days, and the movie finally answered this question for me. Even just one antiaircraft gun required a whole squad of sailors to operate, including a commander, two to operate the cranks that moved it around, one to fire the gun, and several to handle the ammunition, etc. Having such a large staff also meant that the gun could still be operated to some extent (albeit with reduced effectiveness) even after its crew had suffered heavy casualties. A battleship like the Yamato would have had many antiaircraft batteries. (The movie focused mainly on the crew of one of the antiaircraft guns.) (A 3000 man ship also would have needed a large kitchen and medical staff, also featured in the movie.)

Mark Elder
Visiting Researcher
University of Tokyo Institue of Social Science
Assistant Professor of International Relations and Political Economy
James Madison College
Michigan State University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:32 PM

December 26, 2005

[SSJ: 4007] Re: NBR'S JAPAN FORUM (POL) Japan's Fair Trade Commission

From: Mark Elder (elderm@msu.edu)
Date: 2005/12/22

I think it's important to be more specific about what we mean by "newer" agencies. If we are speaking of the ones that used to be under the Prime Minister's office (and which now are under Naikaku-Fu) like JFTC, Self Defense Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency, I don't think that you can say that most, if any at all, were under the control of just one ministry (I'm not sure about the former Okinawa Development Agency). Typically more than one old-line ministry had influence through personnel assignments. This is in contrast to other "Agencies," such as Energy & Natural Resources Agency, the tax agency, and the various forestry & food agencies, which have always been basically directly under the control of one ministry (though these "agencies" are not really "new"). Come to think of it, JFTC and JSDA aren't really that "new" either, at least in comparison with the Environmental Protection Agency/Ministry (of course they are newer than MOF, METI, and the various ministries descended from the old Naimusho).

By the way, the Environmental Protection Agency now has the status of a Ministry, even though the administrative vice minister comes from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and other top leaders come from that and other ministries. And now the LDP has proposed raising the status of the Self Defense Agency to a Ministry (Maehara also seems to support this, though it's not clear how many others in his party do). It's an open question whether ministerial status will reduce the influence of the other ministries.

Regarding the JFTC, it is actually not true that it was dominated by MITI/METI. It is true that it had a significant number of public disputes with MITI, but the Chair traditionally came from the Ministry of Finance (and so did the Jimmu Souchou); MITI usually had only one commissioner seat (iin), and one or more lesser staff positions. (This may explain why the JFTC is typically not remembered for clashing with MOF or investigating financial services industries.) The other commissionerships were divided between other ministries, including the national police agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then one typically went to a career JFTC official, if I remember correctly. These and perhaps other ministries may have had lower level staff positions that don't show up on published lists of these things. The current iinkai lineup shows a MOF ob as iincho, one METI, and one JFTC, one with the listing shiho shushusei (perhaps a lawyer?) and one with no affiliation listed (though this doesn't mean she doesn't have one). The current Jimmu Souchou is not from MOF, but from JFTC itself (though MOF retains a shingikan post).

It is also important to remember that the JSDA was not influenced only by MOF and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MITI typically held the position in charge of procurement.

Mark Elder
Visiting Researcher
University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science
Assistant Professor of International Relations and Political Economy
James Madison College
Michigan State University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:38 PM

December 22, 2005

[SSJ: 4006] Re: NBR'S JAPAN FORUM (POL) Japan's Fair TradeCommission

From: Kenji Suzuki (Kenji.Suzuki@hhs.se)
Date: 2005/12/22

John Campbell's idea of "change-promoting institutionalization" is very interesting. With specific regard to JFTC, however, we should remember that JFTC is a special case because it has the decision-making part (Chairman and Commissioners) separate from the implementation part (the Secretariat), and the external recruitment has been firmly institutionalized in the former (the Secretariat personnel keeps one Commissioner position from the 1970s, but always just one). It may also be important to note that the latter keeps accepting secondments from other ministries.

I don't know much about EPA, Environmental Agency or Defense Agency, but I understand that the Cabinet Office is mainly a collection of secondments from other ministries, at least by now.

Kenji Suzuki
European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm School
of Economics

Approved by ssjmod at 05:34 PM

[SSJ: 4005] Re: NBR'S JAPAN FORUM (POL) Japan's Fair Trade Commission

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/12/22

To John Campbell's post about the FTC and 'institutionalization' occurring when a bureaucratic organization starts recruiting and nurturing its own personnel rather than relying on officials posted from other ministries:

If I am not mistaken exactly the same thing has occurred in recent years at the Cabinet Office [and the JDA?].

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:02 PM

[SSJ: 4004] Fwd: NBR'S JAPAN FORUM (POL) Japan's Fair Trade Commission

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2005/12/21

This entry got no reply on NBR Japan Forum, unsurprisingly since it is quite an academic question. Anybody on SSJ have a comment?

Begin forwarded message:

From: John Campbell
Date: December 18, 2005 8:42:00 PM GMT-05:00
To: "Japan-U.S. Discussion Forum"
Subject: NBR'S JAPAN FORUM (POL) Japan's Fair Trade Commission
Reply-To: "Japan-U.S. Discussion Forum"

Ulrike Schaede wrote:

>The JFTC has probably always tried to leave a mark
>but was kept back greatly in the 1950s and 1960s. Note
>also that for the first 30 years of its existence it was staffed,
>in the senior positions, with folks from MITI etc. This
>changed only in the late 1970s (when proper JFTC had
>grown into senior positions) and JFTC bite has increased
>since.

This remark about the Fair Trade Commission reminds me that back when I was obsessed with structure and process in the Japanese bureaucracy, particularly tatewari gyousei or sectionalism, I was quite interested in "new" agencies (their first 20 years or so). Those pretty much under the thumb of a single ministry, like the JFTC, mostly functioned as a subordinate until the "proper" officials hired directly by he agency came into senior kachou positions and pushed for more independence. Agencies where the top jobs were shared by more than one ministry were more battlefields than policy-making bodies. The Economic Planning Agency (MITI and MOF), environmental Agency (MHW and MITI), and the Defense Agency (MOFA and MOF) were examples if memory serves.

I have moved on to other topics, but I wonder if anyone has looked systematically at how policies and the amount of influence changed when such agencies reached maturity. It is an interesting case in "historical institutionalism" because institutionalization brings change rather than inertia, I think.

________________________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
7725 Haven Hall, 505 S State St
Ann Arbor MI 48109-1045
734-615-9134; fax 734-764-3522, home 734-662-5076.
jccamp@umich.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 02:49 PM

December 20, 2005

[SSJ: 4001] Re: The LDP-Koumei Coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/12/20

I agree with everyting in Kenneth's analysis of the probability of reform. My bet is still that Koumei will be unable to get what it wants though I am less certain about what they will do after they figure this out.

I also wish to add two points.

First, Koumei may get what it wants. If for some reason Koumei cooperation is doubtful but necessary for something the LDP wishes to do, then this would be a possible quid pro quo. Under some unlikely but still conceivable circumstances, Koumei might provide the compelling reason for reform.

Second, for many LDP politicians getting rid of the double candidacy provision would increase their short-term certainty. People who currently have no serious challenger for their SMD could increase their certainty by making sure the opposition could not field a challenger using a PR seat as the reward for making the effort. Those in Costa Rica arrangements, those whose opponent won a PR seat in the last election, etc. should feel uneasy about getting rid of their second chance to win a seat but those who are currently unchallenged should prefer reform to the status quo. Getting rid of double candidacy might also win some extra votes because the provision is not popular with the public or the mass media.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 06:57 PM

December 16, 2005

[SSJ: 3999] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain (kmcelwain@wcfia.harvard.edu)
Date: 2005/12/16

A couple of thoughts on Steven Reed's post on whether we'll actually see a return to SNTV.

The one reason I think it MAY be possible is that Koizumi doesn't have a history of supporting SMDs, or even the mixed system. In the late 1980s, when Kaifu was trying to change the electoral system to SMD-PR, Koizumi staged a mini-revolt with about 100 other MPs, saying that they'd rather leave the party than accept reform. He's changed his story around a bit over time, but his main public arguments were:
1) SMDs are not temperamentally suited to the Japanese people, because it creates adversarial, rather than consensual, politics
2) PR is unconstitutional, because the Constitution says that laws are made by POLITICIANS elected from districts. Under PR, voters pick the PARTY, not the candidate, and so the system itself is illegal.

I'm not entirely swayed by these arguments, and Koizumi hasn't mentioned the good old days of SNTV seriously since the early 90s. The most compelling argument I've heard about his opposition to SMD-PR in the late 80s is that he was afraid the new system would disproportionately strengthen the Takeshita faction, with whom he didn't get along. With that being less relevant these days, I don't think he cares that much personally about returning to SNTV.

At the party level, I don't think most members of the LDP would vote to change the electoral system because they don't have a compelling reason to do so. Generally, there are two scenarios under which parties alter electoral rules:
1) majoritarian parties that anticipate a huge vote loss occasionally switch to more proportionate rules, in order to minimize the magnitude of vote loss (e.g. the French Socialists in 1986)
2) an almost-majoritarian party (generally one that also has a 10-20% lead in vote share to the second party) might switch to more disproportionate rules, in order to win more seats with the same number of votes.

For either of these measures to pass, however, the party leader has to be able to convince the rest of the MPs to sacrifice some short-term uncertainty that accompanies massive redistricting, for the welfare of the party as a whole. Given how well the LDP did the last time, however, there's no sense of urgency among the rank-and-file MPs to accept a return to SNTV. The devil you know is better than the devil you don't.

Getting rid of dual candidacy is a different beast altogether. No politician likes to have his district tampered with, but separating the SMD and PR portions more formally won't actually affect district design. Without dual candidacy, though, there's no incentive for PR candidates to actually campaign (as Steve pointed out), which may end up weakening the LDP. I think the odds are low on this reform going through too (nobody within the LDP seems to benefit), but I'm less positive than with the chances of going back to SNTV.

My bet is that Koizumi will mention reform a few times, and maybe even convene an LDP / Diet subcommittee to study the issue. At most, the LDP may legally delegate redistricting to a non-partisan commission, to assuage concerns and avoid fights about how to divide up metropolitan areas.

Since Koumei doesn't seem to regard the electoral system as a deal breaker, however, I think the prospects for change are low. The best sign is that LDP MPs aren't making a big deal about the idea. If they thought the possibility was real, we'd probably have heard a lot more about it.

Kenneth McElwain

Advanced Research Fellow
Program on US-Japan Relations
Harvard University

Approved by ssjmod at 11:20 PM

[SSJ: 3998] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/12/16

I looked over the article and see that the age has been raised from 3rd to 6th grade of grade school. I have no behind-the-scenes knowledge about Koumeitou's influence. I know only that they have had this on their agenda for some time now.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 10:44 PM

December 13, 2005

[SSJ: 3993] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Joyce Gelb (joycegelb@msn.com)
Date: 2005/12/12

It would be helpful to get some idea of the direction the new approach to child allowances will take, and what the influence of Koumei was exactly.
thanks Joyce Gelb

Approved by ssjmod at 09:18 AM

December 12, 2005

[SSJ: 3992] Dietmembers' Pensions

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/12/09

The two major parties have come up with proposals to tamper with Dietmembers' pensions, if not abolish them altogether.

Like electoral reform, this issue affects Dietmembers directly.

Any insights about the similarities and differences in the background, actors, and dynamics involved?

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:51 PM

December 09, 2005

[SSJ: 3991] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Susanne Kreitz-Sandberg (kreitz-sandberg@telia.com)
Date: 2005/12/08

Steven,

Do you have further information into which direction child allowances will be revised. Or hints with sources on that?

Thanks a lot,

Susanne Kreitz-Sandberg

Approved by ssjmod at 01:01 PM

[SSJ: 3990] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/12/08

The news on the coalition keeps on coming. Koizumi has promised to rethink the electoral system by 2010.

One of the topics to be discussed is the use of two and three member districts. The logic is that it makes no sense to divide a municipality into two or three districts. It would make more sense to give larger cities multiple seats. Of course, the fact that Koumei could win a second or third seat in larger cities is just a happy byproduct of making good sense.

The other topic is dual nominations in SMD and PR. The logic here is that SMD losers should not be allowed to be resurrected in PR and that some districts should not have more mulitiple representatives. Dual nominations have produced some wierd anomalies but the main thing they have produced is competition. No matter how strong your base, the other party can always run someone against you if they wish using the PR nomination as the reward for fighting a losing battle. Most candidates now have to actually campaign in their districts! It also, slowly but surely, is producing a flow of candidates from the LDP to the DPJ. If you cannot get the LDP nomination, you can run as an independent or run for the DPJ. In the latter case, you can win a PR seat even if you cannot beat the incumbent. Of course, Koizumi used dual nominations to field his assasins and gain control over the party. Nevertheless, getting rid of dual nominations might make sense for the LDP by reducing competition especially in rural areas and reducing the incentive to switch to the DPJ in order to win a PR seat.

Italy appears ready to abandon its similar system to prevent Berlusconi's allies from losing too badly, like the DPJ this time or the British Conservatives in 1997. We better study this electoral system while we can. The data may soon dry up.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 12:58 PM

December 08, 2005

[SSJ: 3988] The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/12/07

Yomiuri reported yesterday that Koumei had just won a great victory in getting child allowances revised. They had been fighting for this for a long time. They also have reported recently that Koumei supporters are upset by the decision to keep troops in Iraq. I rather imagine this is the fate of most junior coalition partners around the world.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 01:35 PM

December 02, 2005

[SSJ: 3984] Re: Japanese savings

From: Scott North (north@hus.osaka-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/12/01

The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training's "Japan Labor Flash" (No. 51) reported today that savings are continuing to fall. Additional information and subscriptions to the Flash are available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/index.html

Here's the blurb from v. 51:
-23.8 % of Households have No Savings-

On November 2, the Central Council for Financial Services Information (whose secretariat is the Bank of Japan) published the results of its 2005 Public Opinion Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities. Of the households surveyed (41.1 percent of the single-person households surveyed, and 22.8 percent of those with more than one family member) 23.8 percent replied that they had no savings. This is an increase of 0.9 percentage points over last year's survey. The
average financial assets of the households surveyed overall, including those with no savings, amounted to 10.85 million yen, and the median, which gives a picture of the financial situation of ordinary households, was four million yen.

By type of financial asset, savings and deposits (excluding postal savings) accounted for the largest proportion, about 40 percent of the whole, followed by postal savings (some 20 percent), with these two types together accounting for some 60 percent.

The proportion of households with money borrowed stood at around 40 percent, more or less the same as in the previous year. The average amount of money borrowed was 5.55 million yen overall, and the average figure for those with outstanding debts was 14.52 million yen, both showing an increase over last year.

US$=119yen (December 1, 2005)

Scott North
Osaka University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:53 PM

December 01, 2005

[SSJ: 3983] Re: Japanese savings

From: Jennifer Amyx (jamyx@sas.upenn.edu)
Date: 2005/11/29

The piece pasted below is from the Far Eastern Economic Review and relates to the question Robert Pekkanen passed on to the list about what Japanese savings is likely to look like in the future. The article is by Robert Madsen, a senior fellow at the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was written in rebuttal to an earlier piece that appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review in the spring by Diana Farrell of the McKinsey Global Institute (apologies- I don't have a copy of that earlier article on hand). Madsen argues that the decline in Japan's savings rate is a* welcome development*-- for Japan. He does not discuss in this article the implications for the funding of US deficits. However, if the concern of Robert's colleague has primarily to do with sustaining massive deficits, then I would suggest that Japan faces the greater challenge here.

Jennifer Amyx
Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Asst Prof. of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania (on leave)
Institute for International Monetary Affairs (IIMA)
1-3-2 Nihombashi, Hongoku-cho, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-0021 Japan
Tel: +81-3-3245-9043; Cell: +81-80-3128-0432; Fax: +81-3-3231-5422

The Silver Lining of an Aging Japan
October 2005

by Robert Madsen

The aging of the Japanese population, it is widely acknowledged, will reduce the supply of labor available to companies and consequently lower the country's capacity for economic growth. However, in the April issue of the review, Diana Farrell, director of the McKinsey Global Institute, went a step further, arguing that the wave of retirement will also harm the country by depressing the national savings rate and thereby retarding the accumulation of new household wealth. To mitigate these losses, she argued, Tokyo must promote corporate restructuring while also encouraging Japanese to keep saving at very high levels.

This, however, is precisely the wrong prescription for Japan. In fact, household and corporate frugality contributed to the country's long commercial stagnation and severely undermined its future living standards. Correctly understood, therefore, the coming decline in the savings rate is a welcome development.

Ms. Farrell contends that households saved so much between 1989 and 2003 that they overcame the deleterious effects of Japan's long deflation and added to their net worth by an average of 2.9% per year. But since the savings rate will soon begin to decrease, so too will the speed with which new assets are acquired. As a result, $8 trillion in gains that would otherwise have accrued will never materialize.

In evaluating this argument, however, it is helpful to bear in mind that the author does not measure wealth the same way most economists do. The research project on which the Farrell article is based, and which is summarized in an MGI document entitled "The Coming Demographic Deficit," sought not only to predict future living standards for several different countries but also to estimate the supply of funds to global capital markets over the next two decades. Because of this focus on liquidity and the need to make comparisons between different statistical systems, the McKinsey researchers settled upon a definition of "net financial wealth" that ignores changes both in the value of residential real estate and in the size of the national debt-and people's future tax burdens.

If one agrees with the conventional view that these two factors should be included when considering household financial well-being, a quite different picture of Japan emerges. For example, between 1989 and 2003 the gross national debt expanded by 99% of the latter year's GDP, negating virtually all of the progress attributed to the household sector by the MGI study.

Calculating the losses caused by the collapse in property prices is trickier, but assuming that the data published by the official Economic and Social Research Institute are acceptable as a rough approximation, the total value of Japanese residential real estate peaked in 1990 and then plummeted by some 650 trillion yen, or another 131% of 2003 GDP, by the end of the period in question. With this in mind, the proposition that Japanese households grew more prosperous over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s is plainly false.

Why Japan Saves

The primary cause of the enormous losses incurred during the last 15 years was in fact the very parsimony of Japanese households. To understand this point, it is first necessary to appreciate why they insisted on saving so much for so long.

The normal pattern in economics is for a developing country to exhibit high savings and investment rates during the period when it is "catching up" with the industrialized nations, but for those rates subsequently to fall. In the early stages of the development process the country typically has an insufficient stock of plant and equipment, so the returns offered by investment are attractive and households have good reason to lend their money to the corporate sector rather than spending it on consumption.

Eventually, though, a country reaches a point where it has amassed enough productive capacity, employed almost all of its workforce and adopted most of the world's advanced technologies. Now it is more difficult to find profitable investment opportunities, so rates of return decline and households shift more of their income from savings to consumption. Judging from the experiences of the United States, Germany and other advanced economies, the appropriate rate of private nonresidential investment for a fully industrialized country is some 10% to 11% of yearly GDP.

If an industrialized country exceeds this level of capital expenditures for any length of time-as the United States did in the late 1990s, when its investment-to-GDP ratio rose steadily toward 15%-the upshot is almost always a bubble in productive capacity, the puncturing of which entails a precipitous and painful economic slowdown. Rather than risk such a setback, it is better for a country that is approaching structural maturity to let its investment and savings rates decline, and its consumption and living standards rise.

Japan never completed this transition. By the time it entered the ranks of the advanced industrialized economies between 1980 and 1984, its investment ratio had dropped from the very high levels appropriate to a developing country to an average of just 13.4% of GDP. Then, however, two phenomena intervened to preclude further progress.

The first of these was the weak corporate governance for which Japan is well known, for this left companies free to hoard their earnings rather than disgorging them to shareholders. Accordingly, the corporate sector largely financed itself in the 1980s and 1990s and had little need to borrow from households.

Second, during the 1980s, a very large number of Japanese entered the 40-year to 64-year age bracket. With a disproportionate number of people putting aside money in preparation for retirement, Japan's gross national savings rate stayed far above the range that one would otherwise have expected of so sophisticated an economy. By the OECD's reckoning, it surpassed 30% of GDP through the late 1990s, as opposed to 20% to 22% for the European Union and even less for the admittedly improvident United States. Japan was thus awash in capital even though it now required much less investment than in the past.

Comparing Japan's savings rate either to those of the European Union or to its own declining investment needs indicates that the yearly volume of excess capital may have amounted to as much as 8% to 10% of GDP. Textbook theory suggests that this capital should have flowed overseas so that foreigners could procure more of Japan's products and services, thereby sustaining full employment in that country while also lowering global interest rates. But while states like Singapore and Switzerland have run current account surpluses of nearly one-tenth of GDP for long stretches of time, in Japan this never happened.

This was due both to diplomatic considerations-recall the international anger when the country's external surplus surpassed 4% of GDP in the middle 1980s-and to the structural limits on how much Japanese capital the rest of the world could absorb. So the current account surplus remained about one-third of the size necessary to keep the economy from succumbing to prolonged recession or even depression. Given this fact, the puzzle is not that the Japanese economy grew so slowly during the 1990s and 2000s but rather that it managed to perform as well as it actually did.

An extremely inefficient corporate system and an immense national debt are Japan's most conspicuous structural flaws, and both stemmed in large part from the country's attempts to compensate for the lack of overseas demand. The best way to see this is simply to follow the money.

The most salient development of the late 1980s was the inflation of the asset bubble. A combination of diplomatic pressure, expansionary monetary policy, regulatory malfeasance, and reckless banking produced a surge in the supply of credit, which immediately fed into speculative bubbles in the real-estate and stock markets and simultaneously provoked a binge of corporate spending on plant and equipment.

>From an average of 13.4% of GDP in the early 1980s,
>the rate of private nonresidential investment rose to 20%
>in 1990 and 1991. Japan was now spending roughly
>twice as much on productive capital as it could hope
>profitably to utilize given the weakness of consumption
>and the constraints on net exports. The consequent
>excess capacity, in turn, depressed the efficiency of the
>domestic economy, vitiated enterprise profitability, and
>lowered the rates of return that households earned on
>their savings.

Then came the bursting of the bubble at the turn of the decade, an event which exposed and intensified the economy's underlying deflationary tendencies. In 1992, firms began slowly to rein in their investment expenditures in what was, on a microeconomic level, a praiseworthy attempt to cut costs and elevate productivity. In macroeconomic terms, however, this decline in spending at a time when the gross national savings rate was still very high was dangerous. For unless some other sector of the economy expanded to replace the lost corporate demand, the weight of surplus funds would again bog the country down in deflation, recession, and conceivably even depression.

It was therefore no coincidence that in 1992 the government budget moved from a position of surplus into deficit. Through the rest of the decade and into the early 2000s that deficit would widen ever further, neutralizing the gradual contraction in company demand and providing enough additional momentum to generate GDP growth averaging slightly over 1%.

But while this modest growth was far preferable to what would have occurred in the absence of aggressive fiscal spending, a collateral effect of the stimulus was to drive up the national debt by 495 trillion yen through 2003 and even more thereafter. Thus the unusually high savings rate undermined household wealth not only by depressing the rates of return available on those savings but also by rendering future tax burdens vastly more onerous.

A Natural Resolution

Since an overabundance of capital is the fundamental cause of Japan's most entrenched structural distortions, encouraging households to persist in their historical frugality would be a grave mistake. The country evokes the Keynesian nightmare in which the "output gap"-meaning the degree to which aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand-is so large that ordinary monetary and fiscal measures cannot bring the economy back to full employment. It needs to close the output gap and resume moderately inflationary growth.

There are, however, only two healthy ways in which this may be accomplished: lowering the savings rate so that the volume of excess funds shrinks, or doubling or tripling the current account surplus so that more of that money flows abroad. If the international community's tolerance for the export of Japanese capital-or, equivalently, of Japanese goods and services-is as limited today as it was in the 1980s and 1990s, then there is no real choice.

Fortunately, demographic trends are already effecting this change. At the turn of the century, the first wave of Japan's previously middle-aged workers quit the labor force and, their income contracting markedly relative to their spending, embarked upon comparatively spendthrift retirements. Meanwhile, the older generations have also started transferring large sums of wealth to unexpectedly profligate children and grandchildren.

The household financial surplus has plummeted. On a flow-of-funds basis this variable had ranged between 6% and 9% of GDP until 1998, but then declined to 1.7% in 2002 and moved briefly into negative territory in 2003 before rising slightly. The beneficial effect of this diminution has so far been muted by the corporate sector, which from 1998 onwards dramatically expanded its savings in order to pay down its copious bank debt. But this adjustment is nearing its conclusion.

Once the gap between aggregate supply and aggregate demand has closed-perhaps early in the 2010s-demand will consistently surpass supply, GDP growth will ensue at the trend level of marginally above 1% per annum, and price inflation of perhaps 2% to 3% per annum will become a permanent feature of Japanese life.

If one assumes an output gap of approximately 3% of GDP, the economy could expand by 2.5% per annum for some three years before Japan entered the slow-growth period dictated by its shrinking labor force in about 2008 or 2009. In this way the excess of supply over demand would become an advantage, facilitating a strong recovery in the medium term and bringing an earlier return to significant inflation. The likelihood of a prolonged recession or banking crisis should be much smaller than over the last 15 years.

Unresolved Problems

While brightening the outlook for the next decade, the decrease in the savings rate is not a cure-all. Consider first the role of the state. The Japanese government would be ill-advised to follow McKinsey's recommendation by promoting more aggressive corporate restructuring before the output gap has closed, since that would undermine aggregate demand, discourage GDP growth and needlessly prolong the country's struggle against deflation. But a second, if perhaps paradoxical, concern is that Japan may not shift to a strategy of aggressive reform when the time is right.

Once the output gap has closed and inflation is firmly established, the potential rate of real GDP growth will fall towards an average of 1.0% per annum unless the government admits millions of additional immigrants or markedly improves the efficiency with which labor and capital are allocated. It is at this point that the deregulation and corporate cost-cutting advocated by Ms. Farrell will become not only safe, but essential.

A degree of skepticism is warranted in this regard, for it would take strong political leadership to persuade the electorate of the need for such traumatic change-especially since Japan will by then have become a nation dominated by pensioners, many of whom may not share their government's presumed commitment to long-term financial stability. So while a declining savings rate gives cause for relative optimism regarding the country's medium-term prospects, clouds still loom on the horizon.

Mr. Madsen is a senior fellow at the Center of International
Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Approved by ssjmod at 04:41 PM

November 29, 2005

[SSJ: 3982] Japanese savings

From: Robert Pekkanen (pekkanen@u.washington.edu)
Date: 2005/11/28

A colleague of mine asked me the below question. I didn't have any answer, and wondered if anyone on SSJ Forum might know.

Do you know of any credible studies (in English) about what Japanese savings will look like in the future as the population ages and shrinks? (In other words, will Japan be able to continue to fund US deficits).

Robert Pekkanen
Assistant Professor
University of Washington

Approved by ssjmod at 03:04 PM

November 28, 2005

[SSJ: 3978] Re: LDP's draft for a new constitution

From: Fred Uleman (fuleman@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/11/25

Objecting to the condo rules, Mr Dujarric writes:
> It strikes me that (a) they violate
> legitimate property rights but not allowing larger
> shareholders to have more clout than small ones
> (b) they allow a very small minority, possibly paid
> by some corrupt outsiders, to block decisions
> and (c) it explains to me why Japanese prefer small
> individual houses to more comfortable apartments.

The larger shareholders do have more clout. They just do not have sufficient clout to ride roughshod over a substantial minority. The 80% of both shares and shareholders rule is there to protect the smaller shareholders' rights in rebuilding.

The minority needed to block rebuilding is 20% or more. If that is a "very small minority," then a very small minority can block it. But I have not heard of such resistance being funded by corrupt outsiders. Indeed, there are much easier ways for corrupt outsiders to make money in the real estate market. That is, however, another thread for another day.

The difficulty of rebuilding is not why people prefer stand-alones. Indeed, even that preference is weaker now than it was, say, 40 years ago, and there are even people who prefer condos because they do not impose community interaction obligations.

Finally, I remind you that rebuilding is a very special situation with a higher approval bar than, say, changing the condo association rules or the still-easier approving annual budgets. And I was not suggesting that Constitution revision should require 80% approval. I was simply wondering why a simple majority should suffice when not even condo rules (kanri kiyaku) can be amended by a simple majority.

--
Fred Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 04:13 PM

November 25, 2005

[SSJ: 3977] Re: LDP's draft for a new constitution

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrhardtgc@appstate.edu)
Date: 2005/11/25

On Nov 24, 2005, at 12:26 AM, SSJ-Forum Moderator wrote:
> From: Robert Dujarric (RDUJARRIC@aol.com)
> Date: 2005/11/22
>
> Re (a) it is logical for all citizens to have one vote
> regardless of their income, but Condos are not a country
> writ small, they are like corporations, where shareholders
> should have right comensurate with their holdings.
> Japanese condos look like corporations where not all
> shareholders are equal.
>

They look like what we call "Property Owners' Associations" in America. I don't have the numbers in front of me, but I believe that the majority of new single-family houses in America are now being built on land that is part of a POA by deed restriction (mostly because houses in POA have a higher resale value than houses not in a POA).

Having bought into one myself, I've been thinking about this. They are _not_ corporations, they _are_ like miniature governments. Think about how it works: we pay "taxes" in the form of a yearly POA fee, we have association meetings to decide things like fee amounts, how much to spend on upkeep of communal areas, who to elect as president, etc., and the POA provides "public goods" (to those in the POA) just like a government does (such as road repair/upkeep, parks, mowing public areas, etc.), and enforces "laws" (e.g. no junked cars in your front yard). On the other hand, there is no "product" or "profit" or "employees" as a corporation would have.

Think back to social contract theory--the POA is a perfect example of it. We all agree to live by a covenant, we agree to abide by an authorities' decisions about taxes and demand that authority provide public goods, and to control it all we use representative government.

There are a number of books (and I assume articles) out there on POAs if you are interested in this sort of thing.

George

Approved by ssjmod at 03:39 PM

[SSJ: 3976] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/11/24

George Ehrhardt poses some interesting points to which I wish to respond.

Koumei has a disciplined electorate but not because they mindlessly follow wherever the leadership goes. It is because they are well organized.

If the model is that each individual voter reads the manifestoes and measures the difference between their ideal position and each party's position, then all voters are "mindless" in the sense that no one does this. Koumei voters are no more "mindless" than anyone else. Rather, all voters are more "mindless" that some of our models assume.

Elections are more about organization than about policy, always have been. Organizations tell the voter who is "us" and who is "them". Religious organizations everywhere do joint projects and a campaign falls into that category. Let's get together and help the old people living around here or do something to reduce juvenile crime or elect our guy Yamada to the Diet.

The second thing is that Koumei organization is local, fitting neatly into George's interests I suspect. One word from the top and all voters move in the same direction is not the way it works. In 2003 there were still some local organizations supporting DPJ candidates. Thus it makes sense for all candidates to seek local Koumei support. Local organizations also split so you might get half of it. If you get Koumei support, you get a bunch of happy, energetic campaigners who are also well connected to a specific community. This is what I called a disciplined electorate, a mobilizable network.

All of this does not mean that policy is unimportant. As I have said here before, when Koumei supported sending troops to Iraq, they went to extraordinary efforts to convince their supporters that they had done the right thing. It worked but it was not easy because Koumei voters are not mindless. If you look at what percentage of Koumei supporters vote for any given LDP candidate, you see that it varies by candidate (less about policy than about whether the candidate is cooperative) and over time. Most LDP candidates have gotten increasing support from Koumei because they have participated more in the Koumei community, becoming more a part of the organization. Koumei did not all move as one. It took time to get a high percentage of them mobilized.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:28 PM

November 24, 2005

[SSJ: 3975] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/11/24

Patrick Koellner may have put his finger on one more reason the Komeitou stays in the coalition despite not getting a lot of what it wants, as Patrick illustrates with specific examples. I mean his citing the LDP cozying up to the DPJ on Diet Members' pension bill: fear that the LDP could go into a 'grand coalition' with the DPJ on some matters and isolate them. I believe this was the way the LDP got the Anti-terrorism Law through at one point a few years ago--making overtures to DPJ and the Komeitou then quickly moved to what the LDP wanted. I wonder if the LDP isn't playing the two off against each other on some bills? Is that threat realistic enough for CGP to respond so much to the LDP? I wonder.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:47 PM

[SSJ: 3974] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrhardtgc@appstate.edu)
Date: 2005/11/22

> From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
> Date: 2005/11/22

> How have they done it? First and foremost, they have a
> discplined electorate so they have a bargaining chip that
> no other party has. ... It took several elections before
> Koumei could redirect its local organizations to support
> LDP instead of DPJ candidates. ... Koumei sacrifices a
> lot of policy stances to stay in power but it gets some
> policy preferences enacted as well.

I too have been curious about this. Why do Koumei voters follow the leadership vote recommendations even when it seems to support policies contrary to those the party has always stood for? When I was in Japan this spring I asked some local politicians about this, and the response was that Koumei members never thought for themselves, they always did what they were told. The "disciplined electorate" that Steve mentions. This put some cold water on my curiousity, I admit.

But then I saw some interesting news this September. I follow Gifu politics, off and on, and as you know, it was a hot spot for LDP- Assassin battles. The fascinating thing (at least I thought it was) is that both sides (the LDP and the Assassins) were competing for Koumei votes. Both candidates went to local Koumei organizations to get their support.

What does this mean?

a) Maybe nothing. Steve knows I have a bee in my bonnet about local party organizations and I may just be seeing what I want to see. The Koumei voters may have done what the central leadership says regardless of what happened at the local level.

b) On the other hand, somebody with a great deal of specific knowledge about how those particular voters act decided that it was worth it to spend resources on wooing those voters. And local reporters (who know an awful lot about their locality) thought it worth reporting. To me, this means that experts believed in a meaningful probability that Koumei voters would be swayed by a campaign directed at local organizations.

I've heard the standard explanations of Koumei's behavior, and Steve's arguments about whether Koumei will or will not eventually de facto merge with the LDP and I'm still having trouble with it. The standard explanation seems to require either a) Koumei members are mindless, or b) In the space of 5-10 years, long-time Koumei members decided en masse to chuck their "ideology" out the window and vote for the LDP to be in power and get political pork. I have real trouble
believing either one.

But maybe it's just me.

George

BTW: if anyone knows of good articles in Japanese-language journals about Koumei or the Koumei-LDP coalition, I'd appreciate any citations. Thanks!!

Approved by ssjmod at 03:44 PM

[SSJ: 3973] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Patrick Koellner (koellner@ifa.duei.de)
Date: 2005/11/22

Thanks also to Peter for bringing up this interesting and indeed timely question. As you might know, the LDP and the New Komeito entered in early October the (fateful?) seventh year of their marriage of convenience.

I would like to follow up on Ellis and Steve with whose comments on the general interests of New Komeito and the specific role of electoral cooperation I agree wholeheartedly. Certainly the big worry on the part of Komeito these days is in how far the LDP will consider the positions and interests of its junior coalition partner, now that it has achieved such a big majority in the Lower House. Already in the past the LDP has not been very forthcoming on a number of issues that Komeito considers important. Over the years, the issue of foreign permanent residents' participation in local elections has been stonewalled by the LDP. More recently, the establishment of a secular memorial place for Japan's war dead, in which Komeito is interested, has not received broad backing from the LDP, to say the least. Komeito was also not too happy about Koizumi dropping the Komeito-led legislative bill on reforming Diet members' pensions in the last parliamentary session (Koizumi did so in order to make friends with the DPJ). Finally, in terms of personnel, Koizumi has recently again ignored the desire of Komeito to get their people in vice minister slots in the Gaimusho and the Boeicho. See the Asahi shinbun of 6 November, p. 2 and the Tokyo shinbun of 6 October, p. 2 for articles on these issues.

Looking from the other side, it remains to be seen whether Komeito can continue to block changes in the basic law on education which are not to its liking (the insertion of the notion of patriotism comes to mind). In general terms, aligning the interests of both coalition partners seems to have become more difficult after the last general election. Certainly, the coalition between the two parties is not set in stone. Much depends, I would suggest, on whether the LDP's appreciation of the Komeito's role in terms of mobilising votes and guaranteeing majorities in the Upper House will translate into policy concessions which Komeito can sell to its members and supporters.

A final question: Does anyone know why Komeito was interested in keeping the infrastructure portfolio in the last cabinet reshuffle? I would have assumed that a portfolio such as welfare would be of more interest to the party in terms of keeping its clientele happy.

Cheers,

Patrick

--------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. habil. Patrick Koellner
Senior Research Fellow/Head of Research Programme
Institut fur Asienkunde/Deutsches Ubersee-Institut

Rothenbaumchaussee 32 Tel.: +49 (0)40 428 874 - 29
D-20148 Hamburg Fax: +49 (0)40 410 79 45

Internet:
---------------------------------------------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 03:29 PM

November 22, 2005

[SSJ: 3969] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/11/22

Thanks to Peter for bringing this up. See, betting is not as hazardous to your health as everyone seems to think. In fact this is a perfect example of why I think we should all be doing it. Betting is a no lose situation. If you are right you feel smart and if you are wrong you learn something.

Actually, Koumei has yet to give up the idea of returning to MMD but, more importantly, it has found a (perhaps the only) way for a small party to prosper under the heiritsu-sei. Surprised me! I did not think there was any way and that hypothesis was the basis of my bet.

How have they done it? First and foremost, they have a discplined electorate so they have a bargaining chip that no other party has. (I wonder if the JCP could get its voters to support another party if it tried.) They have the same problem as the other parties: they can win no SMDs without the cooperation of a big party. What they have done is become an indispensable part of the LDP. There were two major secrets to the LDP's victory in 2005: Koizumi's superb manipulation of the media and Koumei. Both were necessary conditions of the victory.

Being in coalition with the LDP means they can bargain for SMD nominations. The percentage of LDP supporters voting for Koumei nominees in these districts is going up every election. In many (probably most) districts the LDP candidate needs Koumei votes to win the SMD and he therefore campaigns on "Vote for me in the SMD and Koumei in PR." It would be nice to know how effective this is but it clearly increases Koumei PR wins to some degree. In other words, a return to MMD is no longer necessary to Koumei survival but continuing coalition with the LDP is. In the Kanagawa HC by-election, the LDP and Koumei established a joint campaign committee in a test case that may become a trend.

Koumei has always wanted to play the balance wheel between LDP and DPJ but they are now stuck with the LDP. It took several elections before Koumei could redirect its local organizations to support LDP instead of DPJ candidates. It took even longer to get LDP voters to vote for Koumei candidates. If Koumei tries to change sides it will take at least three elections and they will suffer major (perhaps irreversible) losses in the interim.

The question of what policy Koumei gets out of the coalition is an important topic that deserves more study. You see summaries in the newspapers every once in a while but I have seen nothing systematic so far. Nevertheless, it is far from zero. Koumei sacrifices a lot of policy stances to stay in power but it gets some policy preferences enacted as well.

The most important bill enacted in the current Koizumi cabinet so far reforms the election law. It sets a limit on the amount of money a party shibu can give to a kouenkai, closing the most egregious loophole in the law. This was presumably a Koumei demand. The LDP got the ability to dissolve rebel shibu in return. I would have never have guessed that an LDP government would close their favorite loophole.

I still stand by the statement that the only reason Koumei joined the coalition in the first place was to get a return to MMD. Original purposes are seldom important predictors of future behavior. My prediction was based on the hypothesis that they had no other choice but they managed to create a new option that I had not envisaged.

Several of my predictions for the 2005 election were also wrong and I thus learned a lot. Several of them involved Koizumi creating options I had not envisioned. I had no idea he would be able to paint the DPJ as allies of the anti-reformers in the LDP. Masterful! Note also that he dominated the media from the day the Diet was dissolved until the formal campaign began. I kept thinking the DPJ would be able to turn it around but, once the campaign period begins, nothing that might raise interest is allowed.

I am embarassed to admit that I did not envision the assassins. I knew that the DPJ used PR nominations to get candidates to run in hopeless SMDs and could have easily seen the possibility for the LDP but did not. I predicted that Koizumi would not be able to find candidates to run against established incumbents, especially in rural areas. I forgot PR but Koizumi did not. The LDPhas always allowed rebels and independents back into the party as long as they won a seat. The new system makes that harder as well because the LDP now has an incumbent (mostly PR zombies) heading up the local shibu.

Finally, there is a move on to get rid of the double-nomination system whereby candidates can run in both SMD and PR. This is a move to reduce competition in the SMDs. Established incumbents are tired of seeing young challengers and want to get back to the good old days when your incumbency advantage meant that you did not have to campaign at all.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 02:03 PM

[SSJ: 3968] Re: The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/11/21

Quick response to Peter Cave on LDP-CGP coalition.

From LDP's side, it needs CGP for majority in upper house. From CGP's side, it seems to prefer being in power [and influencing things some types of policy?] and at least being a bit of a restraint on LDP going rightward even more. It's true it's dissatisfied with LDP of late, but losses in the last election were due as much to the sudden nature of it w/o preparation than anything else. It's started already to rebuild its base in preparation for othr elections. It's also true it has less clout now that LDP has a majority on its own; but LDP needs it for constitutional revision and 2/3 majority necessary, so has some leverage; and if LDP alienates it and it leaves coalition, who knows that it won't need it again after next HOR election? This too might be giving it some leverage. So I think it's not irrational for them to stay in. For now.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 01:10 PM

November 21, 2005

[SSJ: 3967] The LDP-Koumei coalition

From: Peter Cave (petercav@hkucc.hku.hk)
Date: 2005/11/21

Several years ago (in 2001), Steve Reed suggested that Koumeito wanted to get back to the old MMD electoral system and that if this wasn't achieved, then it would leave the coalition (see below). I feel it's a shame I didn't have a bet with him on this one. But anyway, it does prompt the question in my mind, why is Koumeito still in coalition with the LDP? Is it getting anything out of the coalition, and if so, what? There seems little doubt that Koumeito is not very happy about some of the LDP's policies and attitudes (especially the banging of the patriotic drum). And, it actually lost seats in the recent Lower House election, even while the LDP was gaining seats hand-over-fist. So, its continued presence in the coalition seems rather mysterious. Has anyone been studying this issue? And, does Steve propose to offer a bet on whether Koumeito will still be in coalition with the LDP this time next year?

----- Original Message -----
From: "SSJ-Forum Moderator"
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 12:57 PM
Subject: An election soon?

> ---- Message 1 of 1 ----
>
> From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
> Date: 2001.10.25
>

> the electoral system
> really is more important for the survival of the Koizumi
> cabinet than is terrorism. If they cannot return to the
> old middle sized system soon, Koumei will leave the
> cabinet.
>
> Why did Koumei join the LDP in coalition? On almost
> all issues, Koumei is closer to the DPJ than the LDP.
> The most popular explanation is a yen for power.
> While Koumei leader may enjoy being in power, this
> explanation is fundamentally mistaken. Joining the LDP
> cost Koumei a lot in time and energy spent telling their
> supporters that the enemy had now become a friend.
> The basic reason Koumei joined the LDP is to get rid
> of the heiritsu-sei. The SMDs are killing the party and
> the only road to survival is a return to three-member
> districts. If the LDP cannot deliver on this "promise",
> Koumei has no reason to remain in the coalition.
>
> Steven R. Reed
>

Approved by ssjmod at 03:49 PM

[SSJ: 3966] Re: LDP's draft for a new constitution

From: Jean-Christophe Helary (helary@eskimo.com)
Date: 2005/11/18

I think the modifications concerning religious activities authorized to state officials is to be noted too. This has a lot of ramifications that go down to compulsory education etc.

Jean-Christophe Helary

Approved by ssjmod at 03:27 PM

[SSJ: 3965] Re: LDP's draft for a new constitution

From: Fred Uleman (fuleman@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/11/18

Just a quick comment on one aspect of the Constitution.

The current requirement for amendments is a 2/3 majority of both houses plus a majority of votes cast in a national referendum. The LDP wants to make it easier to amend, and is willing to wait on other things that might be more contraversial (such as removing all fig leaves from the military).

If you have ever owned a unit in a reasonably well-run condo ("mansion"), you will recall that the condo rules -- the kanri kiyaku -- what might be called the condo's Constitution -- can only be amended by 3/4 approval of the owners, and that this 3/4 has to be both 3/4 of the votes and 3/4 of the people. (The distinction here is that some owners may own multiple units or otherwise havemore voting clout than some other owners, but the dual requirement protects the rights of the small-vote owners.) To decide to rebuild the condo requires 4/5 approval -- again, 4/5 of the votes and 4/5 of the people. Note also that this is not 3/4 or 4/5 of the votes cast or the people voting. It is 3/4 or 4/5 of the total votes or voters existing, effectively meaning that abstention counts as a nay.

Why, I wonder, should it be easier to change the society's underlying rules governing people's lives -- the Constitution -- than it is to decide what to do with communal property?

--
F.Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 03:20 PM

November 17, 2005

[SSJ:3964] LDP's draft for a new constitution

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain (kmcelwain@wcfia.harvard.edu)
Date: 2005/11/17

I finally read the LDP's draft constitution (published 10/31), and I thought I would share some ideas and kick-start a conversation on its ramifications. I've included a link to the LDP proposal here (Mizuno Mitsuaki provided the same link in a previous post), but I believe it's still only available
in Japanese. The document shows the new plan and current constitution side-by-side, which makes it easier to spot the changes (although the legal language is still a bit difficult to
comprehend).

http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/index.html

Since the main impetus for constitutional reform seems to revolve around Article 9, it's not surprising that the LDP plan makes some significant changes. As has been reported in the media, the new proposal explicitly allows the self-defense force to participate in international peace-keeping operations. There are also a number of changes in the preamble, with regard to the citizens' duties to love their country, care for others, etc..

In terms of political organization, I think the most substantive reform is in Article 94, which deals with the rights of local government. The LDP plan appears to include a provision granting more fiscal autonomy to local bodies, especially the right to raise taxes. While this seems to be a step towards the fiscal decentralization that Koizumi has been calling for, Article 94 also writes that local governments must coordinate with one another and share responsibilities ("yakuwari-buntan"). It's quite possible that I misread the actual language here, and the provisions are general enough that I don't know what they mean in real budgetary terms, but I'd welcome other people's input.

Apart from that, however, it's interesting to see that there are very few changes to other portions of the constitution, particularly with regard to the legislative organization of the Diet. In the LDP sub-committee, there seemed to be a lot of discussion about eliminating the Upper House, specifying an SMD electoral system, and installing direct elections for the prime minister, but none of these made the cut.

The most obvious reason for not making radical, structural changes to the Diet is that constitutional revision currently requires a 2/3 super-majority in parliament, as well as 50% of the votes in a national referendum. While the LDP coalition has the seats now, I would think that there are a number of politicians who would balk at these provisions - particularly electoral reform - thus possibly scuttling constitutional revision altogether. It's hard to imagine that Komeito would be happy with these changes either, since its influence is mostly felt in the Upper House.

There is, however, a significant twist at the end of the document. The LDP plan lowers the hurdle to amending the constitution from a 2/3 super-majority to a 1/2 simple majority (the referendum requirement is still there). While the LDP may have a hard time winning 66% of the seats in the future, 50% is still a plausible benchmark. This opens the door to more frequent constitutional amendments down the road, including direct PM elections, the specification of the electoral system, etc., which the LDP is foregoing at this point in time. Indeed, if the hurdle is lowered to 50%, the LDP should be able to ignore Komeito altogether and make substantive, partisan changes as it sees fit.

It's worth noting that the referendum requirement is fairly potent. In Ireland, which also requires referenda for constitutional amendments (and 1/2 of parliament), voters have rejected almost all proposals that did not have bipartisan support.

Having said that, I think it would be in the DPJ's interest to insist on keeping the 2/3 super-majority requirement, since it will help prevent unilateral constitutional manipulation by the LDP. The DPJ's preferences should change if it thinks it can win a parliamentary majority, but this seems unlikely in the short-term.

Kenneth McElwain

##########################################
Kenneth Mori McElwain
Advanced Research Fellow
Program on US-Japan Relations
Harvard University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:43 PM

November 11, 2005

[SSJ: 3957] Request for advice

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/11/11

Dear All,

Can anyone please advise on the following:

Within the LDP's organisational headquarters (Soshiki Honbu), there is something called a Dantai Soukyoku, of which, according to the LDP's website, the official English translation is 'Interest Group Policy Division'. Within this division, there are numerous so-called Kankei Dantai Iinkai (the official English translation of which is 'Interest Group Committees').

Can anyone tell me what these committees do? They appear to follow the broad divisions within the central bureaucracy (e.g. education, culture, sports committee etc.) I am particularly interested in the Kokudo, Kensetsu Kankei Dantai Iinkai. Is there anyone that has the inside word on what this does?

Many thanks,

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 03:10 PM

October 24, 2005

[SSJ: 3954] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Yusaku Horiuchi (yusaku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au)
Date: 2005/10/23

I co-authored a related paper with Ryota Natori and presented it at this year's Nihon Seiji Gakkai. In this paper, we merged Lower House (LH) Election data with Prefectural Assembly (PA) Election data at the municipality-level (together with other municipality-level demographic and economic data), and examined the impacts of the effective number of candidates in the PA Election, which is highly correlated with the district magnitude in the PA election [ranging from 1 to 19]), on the ffective number of candidates in the LH Election (SMD). As you can expect, the effective
number of candidates in the LH election is significantly larger when the effective number of candidates in the PA election is larger.

The current version of this paper is Japanese, but we will re-write in English, revise it, and present it various conferences in the next year (including the IPSA-Fukuoka Conference and, hopefully, the 2006 APSA).

If you are interested in this paper, please contact me.

Yusaku Horiuchi, PhD.
Asia Pacific School of Economics & Government
The Australian National University
J G Crawford Building (Building 13)
Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 2 6125 4295
Fax: +61 2 6125 5570
Email: yusaku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au

> Subject: [SSJ: 3951] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down
> From: Dennis Kitt (dkitt99@gmail.com)
> Date: 2005/10/20

> Dear All,
> Much has been said about how the SMD system promotes
> incentives for a two-party system to develop. But I wonder
> how the lack of electoral reform at the local level has affected
> the development of the two-party system. The DPJ does not
> have a broad network of local assembly members it can call
> upon to help canvass during national elections. Even in urban
> areas, the DPJ's presence in local assemblies is surprsingly
> thin. The persistance of SNTV system at the local level seems
> to perpetuate trends of conservative dominance and fractured
> oppostion in local assembiles. Is the DPJ doomed unless
> SNTV is eliminated at the local level? I'd be happy to hear
> any comments. Has anyone written on this (in English or
> Japanese)? Best, Dennis Kitt Sophia University

Approved by ssjmod at 02:57 PM

October 21, 2005

[SSJ: 3951] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Dennis Kitt (dkitt99@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/10/20

Dear All,
Much has been said about how the SMD system promotes incentives for a two-party system to develop. But I wonder how the lack of electoral reform at the local level has affected the development of the two-party system. The DPJ does not have a broad network of local assembly members it can call upon to help canvass during national elections. Even in urban areas, the DPJ's presence in local assemblies is surprsingly thin. The persistance of SNTV system at the local level seems to perpetuate trends of conservative dominance and fractured oppostion in local assembiles. Is the DPJ doomed unless SNTV is eliminated at the local level? I'd be happy to hear any comments. Has anyone written on this (in English or Japanese)?
Best,
Dennis Kitt
Sophia University

Approved by ssjmod at 07:22 PM

October 17, 2005

[SSJ: 3947] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrhardtgc@appstate.edu)
Date: 2005/10/14

> This actually brings to mind a larger problem / pet peeve I
> have about most cross-national studies - the tendency to
> treat parties as monolithic actors. Not that it's easy to
> operationalize intra-party unity/discipline, but I think too
> many research programs miss a significant amount of
> variance in policy outcomes, institutional choice, coalitional
> arrangements, etc., by assuming that all political parties
> have high levels of internal cohesion.
>
> Has anybody read any good systematic studies that tackle
> this issue of party-level variance?

Kenneth,

This study is just of Japan, not cross-national, but it does specifically address that issue in the LDP. Right now it's under review at JJS.

Approved by ssjmod at 03:41 PM

October 14, 2005

[SSJ: 3944] Re: question on educational background of Aum sect

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/10/14

Steffen Hertog is asking an interesting question. However, let me suggest a few additional questions that might be asked.

1. In the case of individuals in Aum or any other organization or movement, is it only the final academic degree that is allegedly indicative of future behavior?

2. Or possibly being provocative: Is there an assumption that engineers are insensitive to symphonies? Or that novelists can't comprehend the value of algebraic equations or trigonometry? (It seems decreasingly likely that we will hear this much any more, although perhaps I am too optimistic. Anyway, I just thought of four political scientists whse research has explicitly humanistic implications and who happened to earn their first academic degree in mathematics, electrical engineering and civil engineering.)

So, it might be good to examine individuals' shared cohort/social histories of which education/schooling is an important part. For example, are engineering students educated at religiously influenced schools (of any denomination or faith in any society) more likely to be socially and politically active than ones schooled at secular institutions?

Perhaps this approach will offset the chances of making weakly founded inferences that are simply based on a crosscultural mix of people who have earned the same (final) degree.

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
.....................................
//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\///\\\//\\\//\\\
\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\.~.
_________________________________________________________

Approved by ssjmod at 05:12 PM

[SSJ: 3943] Re: question on educational background of Aum sect

From: Jeffrey Broadbent (broad001@umn.edu)
Date: 2005/10/13

Response to Steffen
You are studying the comparative social bases of social movement participation, and in particular the puzzle of middle class radicalism, a fascinating topic and one that is coming more into prominence now (for one reason, of course, for the very issues you focus on). There was a great article in Science on the social bases of particpants in radical Islamic movements. As for Aum, I have not written on that movement. But considering middle-class movements more generally, Brendon Barrett and I have a chapter in a new book on the changing social basis of Japanese environmental movements, from more worker/farmer/high school teacher basis in the 1960s to more middle class basis today.* This kind of transition also bears upon New Social Movements theories that predict more middle class involvement in status-oriented movements (trying to attain "rights" for gender, ethnic group, or lifestyle issues including environment as amenity) in prosperous countries (Inglehart; Kriesi, et al 1995). So, both Aum and al Qaeda could be seen as "new social movements" led by educated middle-class radicals who are striving to raise the status and social recognition of a religion that has become extremely important to their personal identities. Osama bin Laden seems to fit that description, as do engineers in Arab society and scientists in Japanese society. The early leaders and "joiners" in both movements are individuals from highly educated groups who, through their education and prosperity, no longer are driven by immediate economic need, and rather have come to seek "post-material" goals of personal and social "self-actualization" (to use Maslow's terms). They come to perceive the
surrounding society, for different reasons in Arab lands and in Japan, as highly oppressive and restrictive, not fulfilling, and become primed for some alternative. Among such people, some for personal reasons or by chance, come across a radical alternative, and take to it whole-heartedly carrying it to radical extremes. Does that theory work for your cases?
Best
Jeff

*Jeffrey Broadbent and Brendan Barrett, "Chapter 5: Social Movements and the Environment," in Brendan Barrett and Dana Fisher, eds., Ecological Modernization in Japan. Routledge (2005)

Jeffrey Broadbent
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
Institute for Global Studies
909 Social Science Building
University of Minnesota
267 19th Ave. S.
Minneapolis, Minnesota
USA 55455
Tel. 612-624-1828
Fax. 612-624-7020
Email: broad001@umn.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 05:04 PM

[SSJ: 3942] Re: The small district system

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/10/13

Thanks to both Robin and Ellis for their comments, which were both very helpful. I think in the case of the farmer I quoted, he was really whingeing because he disliked the politician he had to vote for if he wanted the LDP to win and the SMD system gave him no other choice.

Best,

Aurelia

Approved by ssjmod at 04:51 PM

[SSJ: 3941] Re: The small district system

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/10/13

Thanks to Robin Le Blanc for providing us with more valuable insights on the views of Japanese rural residents on the new electoral system. In part, she wrote:

"Second, as long as the multiparty system lingers in some form, voters confront the frustration that elected representatives win100 percent of the district's seat with a minority share of the vote."

I think what Robin means here is the frustration of watching candidates get elected with a mere plurality of the vote. However, it is likely that this outcome will continue to be relatively common, as it is in England and to a lesser extent the US, even after the emergence of a two-party system. After all, Japan's SMD system is known elsewhere as the plurality or first-past-the-post system, since all you need is the most number of votes, not an absolute majority. As in other two-party democracies, third party candidates will persist, and they will grab a small share of the vote, even if they gain few to no parliamentary seats. This outcome is likely even if the PR system is abolished. On the other hand, compared to urban districts, plurality victories are
already quite uncommon in rural districts, most of which are uncompetitive and produce a lopsided LDP (or in a few localities DPJ) victory.

Robin also wrote:

Finally, in the district where I heard this complaint voters were also frustrated by the reduced selection of LDP-type candidates. Where two very different LDP members from two distinct factions had represented the area prior to the 1990s, voters now have to choose from a list typically including a single LDP candidate, a Communist, and a DPJ candidate (read by my frustrated informants as "actually a socialist").

This is an important insight reenforcing the point that under SNTV the factionalized LDP was able to play opposition side as well as ruling side, just like it did (albeit with very different tactics) in last month's election.

Best,

Paul

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 04:45 PM

[SSJ: 3940] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/10/13

Kenneth Mori McElwain wrote:

> I agree with everybody's comments so far concerning
> the diverse causes of electoral rule change. In many
> ways, Josep Colomer's argument that political parties
> harbor partisan motives when choosing electoral rules
> isn't particularly surprising or new - Lipset and Rokkan
> made the same point about 50 years ago.

Lakeman and Lambert, 1955, make this point in relation to Weimar Germany and underlying social cleavages: a large number of small groups with narrow and intense views in opposition to each other led to the adoption of a PR electoral system. This argument was made in reaction to Hermens, 1941 and others who argued that PR produced a proliferation of small parties and ultimately political deadlock. Weimar Germany is probably the origin of the Chicken and Egg debate regarding parties structure and electoral system.

This actually brings to mind a larger problem / pet peeve I have about most cross-national studies - the tendency to treat parties as monolithic actors. Not that it's easy to operationalize intra-party unity/discipline, but I think too many research programs miss a significant amount of variance in policy outcomes, institutional choice, coalitional arrangements, etc., by assuming that all political parties have high levels of internal cohesion.

Has anybody read any good systematic studies that tackle this issue of party-level variance?

Although you might not find his model developed enough, Lijphart, in Patterns of Democracy, when measuring the effective number of political parties counts parties that are highly factionalized as 1.5 parties. Thus, the LDP counts as 1.5 parties.

I certainly share your peave regarding Japan: I have read too many accounts of Japan being a "one-party state" since 1955, if not 1945. Besides the fact that one-party governments have been the rare exception rather than the rule over the past decade, shifts from LDP mainstream to anti-mainstream, or perhaps more ambiguously from one faction to another, have produced meaningful changes of government.

Cheers,

Paul

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 04:24 PM

[SSJ: 3939] Re: The small district system

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/10/13

Thanks to Aurelia for providing us with an interesting piece of data and posing an interesting question. Compared to SNTV, and even more to a PR system, there can be no doubt that the small district system eliminates choice, as Duverger's law would predict. The two remaining major candidates, unless effective choice drops down to one (C=S), will compete for the median voter, and hence, resemble each other in policy. Nonetheless, as I and others have commented, Duverger's law (if we can call any social science generalization a "law" without blushing) is taking longer to show its effects in more districts than one would have expected. Once the DPJ resecures (or less likely another party secures) widespread recognition as the second major party, candidate choice should again begin rapidly narrowing in more and more districts.

Cheers,

Paul

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway
Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 04:10 PM

October 13, 2005

[SSJ: 3938] Re: The small district system

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/10/13

To Robin Le Blanc:

I'm not sure that anyone thinks pr has said that SMD or 'move towards a two party system' leads to greater 'policy accountability.' All that's been said is that it leads to greater 'efficiency' because governments are assured pretty much of a majority to govern with less of the fragmentation that Robin Lim noted in NZ and Germany these days. Also, that voters don't get a coalition in power that they didn't know in advance were their likely governors as in PR systems.

Also, while I can understand the frustration and dissatisfaction of your and Aurelia's farmers with the new system, wouldn't you think that much of it can be attributed to:

1)the fact they are not used to it and had the SMD system for 60+ years? [also prewar but Japan also had an SMD system I believe for part of prewar too].
2)they made out like bandits with all sorts of agricultural and rural subsidies and essentially 'rural welfare' under the SNTV system because particular interest groups captured policymaking in particular sectors and used lots of government funds for the self-interest of a minority of the population? Not to mention even more malapportionment before reform than afterwards that gave them 3 times the representation per capita as a voter in an urban area!
3)Koizumi has tried to deprive rural voters of their cushy existence under the old '55 system' and now since the last election, the LDP may become more of an urban paryt and continue in that path?

These are all reasons why rural voters obviously have reasons not to like the new system and its results, however dressed up in 'democratic' rhetoric. On the other hand, the majority of Japanese voters in urban areas got screwed under the old system and if one goes by Mills' maxim of 'greatest good for the greatest number...."

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:15 PM

[SSJ: 3935] question on educational background of Aum sect

From: Steffen Hertog (shertog@gmx.de)
Date: 2005/10/11

Dear members of the SSJ list,

I would like to tap you combined wisdom no the following question: An Oxford professor of Sociology and I are researching the puzzle why there are so many engineers among radical Islamists, whereas in most Western radical movements, humanities people tended to predominate. Currently we are also looking at the Aum sect as one apparent exception: From what we know, at least the guys operationally involved in the subway attack were predominantly scientists.

Which is where my question comes in: Would you know about good sources where I could verify this? List of biographies or general surveys on socio-economic/educational background of sect members, either in books, articles or on the web? It would be interesting to check both those involved in the attacks and a decent sample of those not involved to see whether there were educational biases. Luckily my fiance reads Japanese, so any hints on Japanese sources would also be appreciated!

Thanks a lot

Steffen

Approved by ssjmod at 03:45 PM

[SSJ: 3934] Re: The small district system

From: Robin Le Blanc (LeBlancR@wlu.edu)
Date: 2005/10/11

Dear Aurelia,
I think the question of "choice" is quite complex. In order to answer it fully, we would have to weigh the effect of electoral systems on party discipline and the effect of party discipline on party competition and the effect of party competition on the policymaking agenda. However, I have also heard exactly the sort of complaint your Aso Town farmer is making from rural voters in northern Japan. When probed further, these voters explained to me that they felt less fully represented when only one of the candidates from their district was able to take a seat in the Diet. They also said that they felt that the single member district allowed elected representatives to more easily ignore whole sections of the electorate. In truth, rural voters are getting less representation since the introduction of the SMD. First, rural prefectures have fewer representatives per voter than they had prior to the introduction of the1994 reforms; at least as a ratio of seats to votes, rural voices are now weaker. Second, as long as the multiparty system lingers in some form, voters confront the frustration that elected representatives win 100 percent of the district's seat with a minority share of the vote. Finally, in the district where I heard this complaint voters were also frustrated by the reduced selection of LDP-type candidates. Where two very different LDP members from two distinct factions had represented the area prior to the 1990s, voters now have to choose from a list typically including a single LDP candidate, a Communist, and a DPJ candidate (read by my frustrated informants as "actually a socialist").

Political scientists tend to see a movement toward a two-party system as a move in the direction of fuller policy accountability, but I think my informants saw it as a reduction of valuable diversity in the leading party. It is interesting to hear they are not alone.

Robin Le Blanc
Associate Professor of Politics
Washington and Lee University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:20 PM

October 11, 2005

[SSJ: 3930] The small district system

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/10/10

Dear All,

Does the small district system reduce choice? One farmer in Aso Town, Kumamoto Prefecture, thinks so. He complains: "these kinds of people (a reference to the Lower House Diet member representing his district) thrive because our choices are being eliminated by the small electorate system. We're stressed about that."

What are your thoughts?

Best,

Aurelia

Approved by ssjmod at 04:50 PM

[SSJ: 3929] Re: Asia-Pacific Political Parties and the Global Party

From: Stephen Day (S.R.Day@newcastle.ac.uk)
Date: 2005/10/09

I wonder if anyone can help. I am seeking to look at the role and significance of the global Party Internationals (Centrist Democratic International; Global Greens; International Democratic Union; Liberal International and Socialist International). I am reasonably well informed about these
organisations and the national member parties that play an ACTIVE role in them from a European perspective but an just beginning the process of looking at them from an Asia-Pacific perspective.

I wonder if anyone can help?

1. Are the Japanese parties members of such organisations? -am really only aware that Shaminto is a member of the SI

2. Have there been any regional initiatives/declarations from political parties of the same political family of any note in recent times?

3. Have any highprofile politicians made speeches highlighting the significance of contacts with sister parties across the region?

4. Has there been any relevant literature, concerning this topic, that I should be aware of?

Any additional pointers gratefully received

Many thanks

Stephen Day
Oita University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:45 PM

[SSJ: 3926] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Kenneth Mori McElwain (kmcelwain@wcfia.harvard.edu)
Date: 2005/10/08

I agree with everybody's comments so far concerning the diverse causes of electoral rule change. In many ways, Josep Colomer's argument that political parties harbor partisan motives when choosing electoral rules isn't particularly surprising or new - Lipset and Rokkan made the same point about 50 years ago.

In the Japanese case, there were three specific episodes when the LDP tried to alter the electoral system. In 1956, the Hatoyama Cabinet tried to adopt an SMD system so that the LDP could win the 2/3 majority needed to change Article 9 of the Constitution. In 1973, Tanaka tried to switch to a mixed-member majoritarian system, and in 1989, Kaifu proposed the MMM alternative again. Needless to say, all of these initiatives failed.

What's fascinating about the Japanese case - and what it highlights about electoral rule manipulation in general - is that political parties often DON'T change electoral rules even when the expected benefits are large. Contemporary simulations between the 1950s-80s all showed that the LDP could have won between 66-83% of the seats had it switched from SNTV to SMD or MMM.

For the LDP, the key impediment has always been the "weakness" of the LDP leadership. All major electoral rule changes require district boundaries to be redrawn or incumbents to move to new districts, both of which are highly unpopular among rank-and-file MPs. Because the LDP leadership had little coercive power over their backbenchers, however, they were unable to force a party-line vote on electoral rule change. In fact, the threat of defection from rank-and-file MPs was enough for the party leaders to back off of reform.

Has anybody read any good systematic studies that tackle this issue of party-level variance?

Kenneth

Approved by ssjmod at 03:32 PM

October 07, 2005

[SSJ: 3924] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/10/06

Ellis Krauss:
One thing that usually happens, whatever the particular form
> of electoral system adopted, is that the parties, whatever
> the new system, usually manage to make sure that the
> new system has some elements of the old one--thus NZ
> preserved a voting for candidates from its previous SMD
> system in its new MMP system, Italy, added SMD to its
> previous PR system, and Japan has the dual-listing,
> 'zombie' provisions that essentially make a lot of PR
> candidates into pseudo-SMD candidates too.

Ehud: True. And in Israel in 1994, the politicians managed to retain the PR system for electing the parliament while introducing direct elections of prime ministers, turning Israel, temporarily, into what I call "presimentary democracy." This rounds up the electoral reforms instituted in rapid succession in the early 1990s after a very long interlude - N.Z., Japan, Italy, and Israel.

Best regards.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:32 PM

[SSJ: 3923] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/10/06

I agree with Aurelia, who wrote:

> The argument from the 'Duverger's Law Upside Down'
> paper is interesting but it depends on the assumption that
> it is the political parties that determine the choice of
> electoral system. In some cases e.g. the recent electoral
> reform in New Zealand, the new system was imposed by
> popular referendum against the interests and opposition
> of the major parties (and hence brought a lot of new
> players in the parliament). Other countries undergoing
> radical constitutional change may experience the same
> process. If the parties are in charge, on the other hand,
> they will certainly tend to support a system that suits
> their interests, but the initial premise of the argument is far
> from universally true.

Japan and Israel are other examples, albeit of politicians being forced by "public opinion," rather than by referendum, to change the electoral system. As Reed and others have shown in more than one publication, there had been several attempts before 1994 by LDP leaders, notably Tanaka, to change the electoral system in order to perpetuate LDP's advantage. Those attempts were unsuccessful because of opposition not only from opposition parties, but also from those among LDP members likely to be negatively affected. It was public opinion, in combination with politicians interested in reform, which played a major role in the electoral reform enacted in 1994.

In Israel, there had been several unsuccessful attempts at electoral reform before the introduction of direct election of prime minsiters in 1994. The1994 reform was prompted by a "mass movement" well-orchestrated by a group consisting largely of law professors. All Knesset (Parliament) members of the party heading the coalition government (Likud), except for one, voted against the reform bill. Labor, the other largest party, in opposition at the time, voted for. It is true that the electoral system to the Knesset remained intact; but the expectations of the reformers was that the new system would change the structure of the party system by dcecimating the small parties. The result was the opposite: both Likud and Labor lost considerably to the smaller parties. Which is why in 2001, both agreed to return to the old PR parliamentary system with a few modifications, notably a constructive non-confidence vote a-la Germany.

Best.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:26 PM

October 06, 2005

[SSJ: 3922] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@UCSD.Edu)
Date: 2005/10/06

I might also add to Aurelia George Mulgan's post on "Duberger's Law Upside Down' [haven't had a chance to read it yet though] that even when parties determine electoral systems, the adopted system may have to be the result of a compromise among several parties and the results may not be perfectly in accord with any of their interests or preferences. That's what happened in Japan, and I believe to some extent in Italy [where a referendum forced a change in the system, but party negotiations determined what form the new system would be]. One thing that usually happens, whatever the particular form of electoral system adopted, is that the parties, whatever the new system, usually manage to make sure that the new system has some elements of the old one--thus NZ preserved a voting for candidates from its previous SMD system in its new MMP system, Italy, added SMD to its previous PR system, and Japan has the dual-listing, 'zombie' provisions that essentially make a lot of PR candidates into pseudo-SMD candidates too.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 05:14 PM

[SSJ: 3921] Re: Duverger's Law Upside Down

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/10/05

The argument from the 'Duverger's Law Upside Down' paper is interesting but it depends on the assumption that it is the political parties that determine the choice of electoral system. In some cases e.g. the recent electoral reform in New Zealand, the new system was imposed by popular referendum against the interests and opposition of the major parties (and hence brought a lot of new players in the parliament). Other countries undergoing radical constitutional change may experience the same process. If the parties are in charge, on the other hand, they will certainly tend to support a system that suits their interests, but the initial premise of the argument is far
from universally true.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 12:50 PM

October 04, 2005

[SSJ: 3918] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/10/03

> Ok, I'll give you the 3:1 odds and bet that your scenario
> does not take place. Of course after all these emails, I'm
> not sure I remember all the details of your scenario, but
> if it comes about let me know, I'll go back and check the
> details, and happy to pay you 75 yen. Whereas, if it
> doesn't come about, I'll let you know and you owe me
> 25 yen. Agreed?
> Best,
> Ellis

Agreed. If my wild scenario comes about, you will not have to wait for me to tell you about it. It will be the major headline in all the papers.

Best and Shana Tova.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:40 PM

October 03, 2005

[SSJ: 3917] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/10/03

Ehud:

Ok, I'll give you the 3:1 odds and bet that your scenario does not take place. Of course after all these emails, I'm not sure I remember all the details of your scenario, but if it comes about let me know, I'll go back and check the details, and happy to pay you 75 yen. Whereas, if it doesn't come about, I'll let you know and you owe me 25 yen. Agreed?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 05:16 PM

[SSJ: 3915] Re: Next general election

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/30

Nitta Sensei wrote, in part:

> The principle of the general election system is a comprehensive vote of confidence for the ruling party,

Ehud: Voters vote for different reasons and vote the way they vote (in support of a particular individual candidate or a specific party list) for different reasons. A comprehensive vote of confidence is one. Examples of others include the following. When the election is multi-issue, some voters tend to vote with one issue in mind, rather than with the whole gamut of issues. For them, the election is a single-issue one. And there are those who vote the way they vote because they follow opinion leaders.

Nitta: but it is undeniable that this past election was genuinely a single-issue referendum.

Ehud: Strictly speaking Koizumi won a one-issue election, not a one-issue referendum. If the Asahi analysis of the vote is correct, while the LDP won a majority of the SEATS, the party did not win a majority of the VOTES. The electoral system had something to do with this, of course. But, as Ellis points out, no electoral system is perfect, each one has its tradeoffs.

Nitta: I expect that this will cause political problems because of a lack of agreement on the larger LDP agenda.
Ehud: So do I.
Best.
Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:08 PM

[SSJ: 3914] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/30

Ellis:
The 100 yen bet with Steve is all yours.
As change is always less likely than continuity, and my scenario being wild, my counter offer re Koizumi is 75/25.
Best.
Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:01 PM

September 30, 2005

[SSJ: 3912] Re: Next general election

From: Joe Michael Sasanuma (sasanuma@bc.edu)
Date: 2005/09/29

My view of the election (and past elections) mirror Sudhir's.

But can't the last election really be summarized even simpler, in the campaign slogans? "Won't give up on Japan" vs. "Don't stop the Reform." Add to that the awful commercial that the DPJ ran, is it really any surprise that Okada got no traction? Who votes for a person who thought about giving up?

Joe Sasanuma
Boston College Law '07

Approved by ssjmod at 02:10 PM

[SSJ: 3911] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/28

Yes, Ehud, you were, that's right.Thanks. How about a friendly offer you can refuse: if we win the bet with Steve, I'll split the Y100 from Steve with you. Then, only if we win the Y50 each, we'll assume we have a bet that your scenario about Koizumi and LDP doesn't play out [me] or that it does [you]?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:07 PM

September 29, 2005

[SSJ: 3910] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/29

I already have a Yen 100 public
> bet with Steve Reed that constitutional revision will get
> passed in the next 7 years or so; so probably I shouldn't
> bet any more anyway: as the Japanese economy gets
> better in the near future and the US one flounders, the
> yen could reach parity with the dollar! #;=)

A reminder: I was with you on this one, against Reed and Campbell.

Best.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:20 PM

[SSJ: 3909] Re: Next general election

From: Sudhir Mishra (mishra_su@yahoo.com)
Date: 2005/09/28

Hello!
Its been interesting to go through so many reference and suggestion on the last election. There has been much discussion on Koizumi euphoria and also his autocratic manner in declaring the election when there was large opposition to that both inside and outside his party.It is true that no one predicted that Koizumi will win the election overwhelmingly but at the same time I must question on what ground the main opposition party, the DPJ was adjudged suitable to win and rule the country.They have never been a dominant opposition ever since their formation and they suffer from severe policy contradiction.They have been struggling to formulate alternative policy to challenge the ruling coalition.Japanese voters are wise enough to chose from the possible alternatives and they opted for Koizumi and his party as best to provide leadership. Just after this election it is pity to hear from the leaders of main opposition parties especially from the anti- postal reform camp, chastising Japanese voters for their misjudgement in choosing the Koizumi-led coalition.Such criticism is highly unexpected from a responsible political party representing people's opinion. In fact they should have accepted the election humbly and promised to work hard to win people's trust. I have been closely studying all the Japan's post-war election and I never have the feeling that Japanese voters acted in irresponsible manner in choosing a political party to power. The fact that the LDP dominated for nearly half a century as because the oppositions were too weak and the voters had no alternative to choose from. The situation is no different now and I strongly believe it will continue for some more years unless the parties at opposition mend their own ways. I don't agree with the prediction that since the present Koizumi administration gathered under one political platform-postal reform, it will loose momentum once that is achieved. The present referendum is a stepping stone for Kozumi and the subsequent LDP leaders that follow to build consensus on rest of the major issues and I strongly believe the future LDP administration will have more conformity than the crisis years of 1990s.
Thanks
Sudhir Mishra
Hitotsubashi University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:13 PM

[SSJ: 3908] Re: Next general election

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/28

I think there is not much chance, barring some major crisis in LDP again or a split that there will be an election for another 3-4 years.

Parliamentary parties are under no obligation to have their 'comprehensive agenda' ratified by the public when the public loses confidence in the ruling party or its popularity declines. In fact, the power of Prime Ministers in parliamentary systems to determine the timing of when they call an election almost guarantees they will call an election when they think they will do well even if it's because of a specific issue. Margaret Thatcher, according to polls, was losing popularity quickly before the Fauklands War. When Britain won that war and her popularity went very high, she called an election and the Conservatives were reelected with a large majority. This was basically a nationalist popularity based on one issue--winning the war. It happens all the time. Koizumi was just smart to focus on that one issue in this past election.

Indeed, if the public seems to lose a lot of confidence in the LDP and the next PM there is even more reason for them not to call an election for as long as possible.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:00 PM

September 28, 2005

[SSJ: 3906] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/27

Thanks, Ehud for your clarifications. Sorry I didn't see the 'wild' part of the scenario. I think it is 'wild' and unlikely that all of the elements will occur. I agree his big election victory doesn't mean every LDP DM is going to vote along with him on every issue or even agree with him. But I do think that 1)all DMs there now, especially the new ones, owe their election to him and aren't going to defy him a lot during his last year in office. 2)after the last election, no one is going to outright rebel on a major and important bill on which the majority of the party are agreed. They'll whittle down things they don't like, force compromises within PARC and the party maybe, but unlike to outright defy the party leaders on a vote for a while. Whether this lasts beyond Koizumi or not, is of course the Yen 64,000 question. Will the stronger role and influence of party leaders and PM in getting policy conformity in their own party be institutionalized or not. I think it will be, at least more than it was before this election. But I am not willing to bet on that either!

I agree the Koizumi 'spell' may not last if he doesn't step down next year. The LDP will become more preoccupied with succession after postal reform gets passed this next month. He will gradually but increasingly be seen as a 'lame duck' if he looks like he will step down as planned. That is one reason he may be sincere about that--why announce in advance you will step down for sure and make yourself into a lame duck? Unless he is counting on the party begging him to stay to legitimize his staying. But I thinkt he odds are 65-35 in favor of his actually stepping down.

As for the election really being 'snap' or not, I think it was, at least in the sense that no one besides Koizumi thought he would do it and prepared. Even his former faction leader Mori tried to persuade him against it. CGP certainly wasn't prepared for the election. So I think you are right--he probably thought he could get postal reform through the party almost to the end. But I think he also had decided in advance that he had nothing to lose if it failed and would roll the dice and kick the zoohan out of the party and call an election.

Alas, I would be willing to bet it never plays out, but since you won't bet that it does....no bet! I already have a Yen 100 public bet with Steve Reed that constitutional revision will get passed in the next 7 years or so; so probably I shouldn't bet any more anyway: as the Japanese economy gets better in the near future and the US one flounders, the yen could reach parity with the dollar! #;=)>

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:13 PM

[SSJ: 3905] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/27

Thanks, Paul, for your long and thoughful response to my response.

After reading your clarifications and arguments in the latest email, I don't think we are that far off after all, although still at bit:

1)IWe seem to agree DPJ will bounce back, either this next [HOC or HOR] election or the one after that assuming it doesn't implode which I agree, as time goes on, becomes less likely

2)We agree that Shamintoo is going to stay a minor party, although it may pick up some 'pacifist' votes if defense and/or constitutional revision become key issues during an election

3)We slightly disagree on Koizumi's themes in this election. If he did indeed say that he would destroy the LDP if he couldn't get his reform through, that's quite different than saying he's running against his own party in THIS election. Also, I don't believe it was the major theme of his speeches and campaign at all.

4)On the legacy of SNTV, I'm not denying there are some who still see elections in those terms--certainly the zoohan to their detriment didn't seem to understand the new electoral system at all. But if the media focused on intra-LDP battles between Koizumi and the zoohan, let's face it--that WAS the cause of and major goal of Koizumi in this election. I still contend it was primarily because of the celebrity/human interest/drama aspects. They didn't after all focus equally on all the candidates running in those districts which would have been more true if they were acting from SNTV legacy motivations. And, the fear of 'LDP losing power and an unknown opposition party coming to power' I don't think has anything to do with an "SNTV legacy " in the minds of voters. This LDP 'equilibrium myth' as Steve calls it could operate under any electoral system where one party has held power for most of the last half century. And, one would think that some at least of this 'dominant party' legacy would have dissipated after the opposition party coalition of 1993-4.

So still some differences, but not as much as I had thought after the first postings. Thanks for clarifying.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:59 PM

[SSJ: 3904] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes

From: Suzanne Ryan (cansell@socrates.berkeley.edu)
Date: 2005/09/28

Yet another movie suggestion...

In a political science course last spring at Berkeley (on military occupation with a heavy Japan focus), I used various clips from docmentaries already referenced, but I also showed two films with subtitles.

I showed MacArthur's Children by Shinoda--I liked that the focus was on the children in a rural setting (more removed from the wartime devastation and then not).

I also assigned for viewing a Mizoguch film set directly after the occupation and during the campaigns to rid Japan of prostitution: Street of Shame. One of the take away points for the student was that some problems precede, endure and continue on after occupation; the lectures were focusing on legacies of occupation with a specific focus on women).

Students liked both, but I also agree that giving them a viewer's guide or something like it will greatly enhance the the learning experience.

Good luck.
Suzanne Ryan

Approved by ssjmod at 02:52 PM

[SSJ: 3903] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes

From: Kristina Troost (kktroost@acpub.duke.edu)
Date: 2005/09/27

I have not used it in teaching, but when I saw it, I wondered if Kamikaze Taxi would be useful in Japanese politics courses. One of the two main characters is a Nikkeijin born in Latin America to a father who was a disillusioned kamikaze pilot. The description from the catalog (which probably comes from the box) says: "Road film, political commentary, satire and gangland drama, Kamikaze taxi is the story of Tatsuo and the taxi-driver, Kantake, and their quest for revenge for the murder of Tatsuo's girlfriend."

We were quite struck by the political commentary aspect. If you have not seen it, you might enjoy watching it.

Kris Troost
Duke

Approved by ssjmod at 02:47 PM

[SSJ: 3902] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/09/27

Following up on David Leheny's note that "The Last Samurai"was popular with neo-nationalists on his campus, it struck me and a Korean graduate student viewer (in December 2003) that a background or subliminal message from "The Last Samurai" is that now is the time for Japan and the United States to stand together against unspecified opponents, perhaps China.

For those considering use of any segment of "The Last Samurai" with students, let me suggest first taking a look at Jonathan Dresner's scathing but detailed "How True to History is Tom Cruise's _The Last Samurai_?" in _History News Network_, 1-05-04,
http://hnn.us/articles/2746.html

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 02:42 PM

[SSJ: 3901] Next general election

From: Michio Nitta (nitta@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/27

Hello -- I have been reading and enjoying the discussions of the recent election, and I wanted to add a question that I view as crucial but that hasn't yet come up in the discussion.

When we think about the types of change likely to follow from Koizumi's dissolution of the parliament and his subsequent electoral victory, we also need to ask "when will there be another general election?" Reportedly, Koizumi said that there would be no election for another four years, and from the viewpoint of the LDP, this makes sense; of course, one would want to extend the party's hold on power. The problem, however, is that this election was practically created as a referendum on postal reform. At Koizumi's press conference after the rejection of his postal reform bill, he said "I would like to ask the Japanese people if they do not really want privatization of the postal system," which he basically espoused as the entire reason for holding another election. During the campaign itself, nothing but postal privatization became a focal issue. There was no discussion of Yasukuni and none of Iraq, for example.

The principle of the general election system is a comprehensive vote of confidence for the ruling party, but it is undeniable that this past election was genuinely a single-issue referendum. I expect that this will cause political problems because of a lack of agreement on the larger LDP agenda. In a sense, the parliament should probably be dissolved after passage of postal privatization, since that was the core of its election this time. The government has not been endowed with the majority's confidence in other issue areas. Of course, the LDP isn't going to part with power that easily, and it is highly unlikely that there will be another general election this autumn or next spring. But I think it very possible that some kind of political deadlock will make it necessary to hold another general election perhaps in two years because of the possibility that the government will have little public confidence in issues beyond the postal reform. And so when we think about the long-term consequences of this election, we really do need to consider the probability that this government will not last as long as Koizumi and his supporters might hope.

Approved by ssjmod at 02:28 PM

September 27, 2005

[SSJ: 3900] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes

From: Hugo Dobson (H.Dobson@sheffield.ac.uk)
Date: 2005/09/27

Just to add to the ever-growing list of movies...
I'm not saying anything about the quality or political standpoint of the films but they are interesting in their own ways and students have responded positively to them:

1) Kotei no inai hachigatsu (1978)
Based on the novel by Kobayashi Kyuzo, it's all about the SDF staging a coup d'etat. Difficult to get hold off, but I managed to get a reasonably priced second-hand copy in good condition through Amazon's marketplace.

2) Ikiru (1952)
Surely, one of the best films on the Japanese bureaucracy.

3) Puraido: unmei no toki (1998)
A revisionist view of the Tokyo Trials and Tojo Hideki.

4) Murudeka 17805 (2001)
>From some of the people who brought you Puraido, this offering looks at Japan's contribution to Indonesia's independence.

5) Godzilla (1954)
Make sure it is the original and not the butchered US version that was released in 1956 and removed all references to the war and atomic/hydrogen bombs. Good to watch after having read William Tsutsui's Godzilla on My Mind (Palgrave 2004).

Cheers
Hugo

Dr Hugo Dobson
Senior Lecturer in Japan's International Relations,
School of East Asian Studies,
University of Sheffield,
Sheffield S10 2TN
UK
Tel: 0114 2228437
Fax: 0114 2228432

Approved by ssjmod at 05:53 PM

[SSJ: 3899] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/09/26

If the teacher wishes to emphasize development, the changeability of practices and institutions, and agency of organized groups outside official governments, then one has additional choices.

In "Japanese Politics" and "World Politics" classes, for example, I've used part or all of Nanako Kurihara's 57-minute video "Ripples of Change" (New York: Women Make Movies, 1993).

The sound track of "Ripples of Change" is in English and Japanese-- with about 80% of the Japanese subtitled.

Let me recommend that the teacher write a viewing guide for this video -- to draw student's attention to details that they might overlook and to tip them off to questions for discussion
after the viewing.

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 05:49 PM

[SSJ: 3898] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/09/27

Thanks Ellis, for your responses. The first part of your response perhaps reflects my failure to explain my position very well. The second part seems to reflect significant differences of perception.

"First, although I agree if the DPJ doesn't remain the second largest party the Shamintoo might expand to fill that void, and that this is most likely if the DPJ implodes and the LDP tries to push through Constitutional revision of Art 9 without adequate persuasion of the public or tries to push through a maximum change rather than a minimum one. Then the Shamintoo might become the possible second alternative to LDP. But all this rests on various 'ifs' not all or many are likely
to happen, or at least not the whole sequence."

I certainly did not want to suggest that Shamintou will successfully expand to become the 2nd largest party if the DPJ implodes ( I believe a DPJ implosion is not likely in any case). This is exceedingly unlikely, although your point about constitutional reform reminds me that when Article 9 becomes the top issue Shamintou may benefit somewhat, since it still probably best represents the pacifist vote.

Nonetheless, I do not see Shamintou reemerging as the second major party. What I do see is a decline in strategic voting and a rise in sincere voting among yato voters in the next election. The results of this election will confuse many voters and politicians about whether the DPJ is still the number two party or a party in free-fall. This is especially the case in urban areas where the DPJ's collapse this time was simply spectacular. For example, in Tokyo they only won a single constituency (Kan Naoto's), and in Hyogo, they did not win any SMDs this time. In Osaka, "small party" Komei won twice as many seats as did the DPJ. Because of this result fewer communist and Shamintou/pacifist/floating will vote DPJ as the lesser of two evils. More Shamintou and mushazoku candidates will think they have a chance of winning. These dynamics will protect some vulnerable LDP urban incumbents and slow the DPJ's recovery. Again, however, I predict that by the election after next the DPJ will be back where it was on August 8th, as the almost niversally acknowledged and unchallenged second major party. I don't think high DPJ popularity ratings and successful political maneuvers before the next election will make much difference. I believe voters and politicians will focus more on the outcome of this (the last) election. However, the "next election" could be an upper house election, and a strong showing there might clear up confusion about whether the DPJ is really the number two party before the next lower house election.

Regarding the second part of your post, we were indeed probably seeing different elections.

"Nothing else, and particularly not 'smashing the LDP' when a)Koizumi never said that and b)that would have been very difficult for him to do since he's now the 'face' of the LDP and has been for the past 4 years..."

Although I have not gone back to pull up the exact quote (I do not have full newspaper data bases available at the moment), it is clear to me that Koizumi did say he would smash the LDP. The quote as I remember it was "Jimintou wo bu- kowasu." If any one on this forum can more accurately recite this quotation, I would invite them to do so. To be sure, in the original context Koizumi prefaced this with a subjunctive indicating that he would smash the LDP if he could not reform it. However, I remember the "Jimintou wo bu- kowasu" line running repeatedly on LDP internet banner adds and being much discussed in the press. I am not in a position to claim, beyond my own casual empiricism, that this message was common in the overall campaign, but I do not think it was rare. We know from opinion polls over the past four years, a pattern that was repeated from this July through the September 11th election, that Koizumi's support ratings always increase when he criticizes the LDP. I think it was Koizumi's anti-LDP rhetoric, not postal privatization per se that caught voters' imagination. In your post you apparently express disbelief that Koizumi could get away with this after four years as the "face" of the LDP. I share a sense of amazement if not disbelief. Certainly, no Democrat, Republican, Labor or Conservative leader could win an election running against their own party (Tony Blair's new labor slogan perhaps comes the closest).

My answer to this paradox is SNTV: the election rules have changed but many of the perceptions of the SNTV era persist, despite the changes in electoral institutions. I did not mean to suggest that the media was pro-LDP, merely that they often focused more on the LDP vs. anti-LDP race more than on the LDP versus DPJ two-major party election. Steven Reed made essentially the same point before the election. Partly this reflects the SNTV legacy of focusing on internal LDP struggles, partly it reflects the SNTV era strategy of LDP candidates and main and anti-ainstream groups playing opposition as well as ruling side roles at the district level. Partly it reflects the folk version of what Steve calls the LDP's equilibrium myth-that LDP rule is the equilibrium in Japanese politics; another legacy of SNTV. (Why bother focusing on the opposition if the mainstream or anti-mainstream LDP group is certain to form the next government?) I am struck by how many Japanese acquaintances (most of whom do not actually support Koizumi or the LDP) have resurrected the folk version of this equilibrium myth to explain the LDP's victory--i.e. Japanese voters are frightened of the LDP losing power and therefore increase their support for the LDP when the party looks in danger of losing power. I am not claiming these myths and perceptions are accurate under the new system, quite the opposite. All I am saying is that the old SNTV perceptions of how politics works are proving to be amazingly stubborn. I suppose a constructivist could take my argument further and claim that social constructions of elections in Japan may prevent the SMD portion of the electoral system from ever producing something like a two-party system. I, however, am not a constructivist.

I think the new electoral system will eventually produce a two-party system with alternations in power, and that the DPJ might even achieve power in the election after next. But the results of this election reinforce Steve's point that learning and adjusting to the new system is taking "longer than I thought." The way this election was fought and the dramatic collapse of
the DPJ in urban areas will confuse matters and slow the learning process through the next election cycle, at least.

Best Regards,

Paul Midford

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64

Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 05:34 PM

[SSJ: 3896] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Yoichiro Sato (satoy@apcss.org)
Date: 2005/09/26

I used to use (and still do sometimes) Pacific Century's "Japan, Inc."
as a intro to postwar Japanese political economy.

Yoichiro Sato, Ph.D
Associate Professor, Regional Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Honolulu, Hawaii

Approved by ssjmod at 03:14 PM

[SSJ: 3895] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Ted Gilman (tgilman@fas.harvard.edu)
Date: 2005/09/26

Hi Ethan,

I second Horiuchi-sensei's suggestion. "Running and Running for Mayor" is quite dated but still the best video on election campaigning. I've used it in my Japanese Politics classes for years, and it always generates a lot of discussion. It should be used in conjunction with readings about koenkai, urban-rural differences, and personalized campaign approaches. And it'sshort!

A less well-known full-length film my students like is:

Poppoya (The Railroader)
1999
Directed by Yasuo Furuhata
Starring Ken Takakura

The film is about an aging railroad employee (Takakura) stationed at the end of the line in northern Japan. He does his job at the one man station faithfully. He greets the old familiar commuters with the station name, shovels snow off the platform, sends the train off with a ritualistic check list. He did this almost all his life with the same mechanical precision. He had a family once. His daughter died at a very young age and more recently his wife died. The town is dying and the line will be closed. Despite all this sadness, the main character has a warm relationship with (the ghost of) his daughter.

The film deals with two of my favorite themes in Japanese politics: (1)bureaucracy and (2) the decline of small towns. It also deals with duty and obligation in a BIG way. The supernatural aspect is not clear until the end of the film.

I hope this helps. Best,
--Ted

***************
Theodore J. Gilman, Ph.D.
Associate Director
Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies
Harvard University
1730 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
TEL: 617-495-3220
FAX: 617-496-8083
email: tgilman@fas.harvard.edu
***************

Approved by ssjmod at 03:08 PM

[SSJ: 3893] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Henry Laurence (hlaurenc@bowdoin.edu)
Date: 2005/09/26

Re: Ethan's question about movies/clips for class:

To David's predictably great list I'd add the following movies:

"Minbo (Anti-Extortion Woman)", by Juzo Itami, gives good talking points on crime, society and the Yakuza in Japan, and is always well- received.

"Mishima, A Life in Four Chapters": (dir Paul Schrader, 1985). I love it, but it's as wierd as the man himself. Great to use clips when dealing with nationalism. Students who haven't read anything by him report being a bit confused at times when they watch the whole thing, but the story of the Shield Society and his last day at the SDF headquarters are fascinating.

"Grave of the Fireflies": deeply depressing, but a powerful way to illustrate the immediate post-War period and the strength of pacifism.

Documentaries:

I strongly, strongly recommend the "Pacific Century" series (in the Annerberg/CPB series, by PBI/Jigsaw, written and produced by Alex Gibney). There are 10 in the series (helpful if you are stuck doing an Asian politics survey course) with 3 specifically on Japan. "Reinventing Japan" covers the Occupation, and has interviews with SCAP personnel, Japanese luminaries (Nakasone, Kurasawa, Miyazawa among others) and fantastic contemporary newsreel footage . The clip
beginning "Our problem's in the brain, inside the Japanese head" from 'Our Job in Japan' is alone good for an hour's worth of discussion about nation-building. "Inside Japan Inc" also has some shocking footage of the 1960 Anpo crisis in the Diet, the Miike Coal strike, Asanuma's assassination, and so on. "The Meiji Revolution" is great if your syllabus goes back that far, as
is an extended piece on Kita Ikki and the road to war in "Writers and Revolutionaries". The series is a bit dated (lots of railing against unfair business practices, etc) but overall very, very helpful. Personally I intersperse short sections in class, but they can be shown in their entirety (50 mins each I think).

"The Colonel Comes to Japan" (WGBH, John Nathan) is about the KFC franchise in Japan. It is the one of the funniest TV programs I have ever seen (perhaps unintentionally) as the crass US manager attempts to master the supposed mystic intricacies of Japanese corporate life. We see the new employees learn the correct way to hand over the bags of chicken (two hands, bow first), the Dentsu guys promoting KFC's aristocratic elegance, a shinto priest purifying the new franchise, and the US manager getting drunk at a party. We also hear out about long-term financing, employment practices, etc. I still haven't quite figured out if it was intended as a spoof on all of those "Japanese Way of Business" documentaries, but I don't think so. Anyway, it's great, and your students will thank you brokenly. Good to assign with Emiko Ehnuki-Tierney's chapter in "Golden Arches East" and a bucket of wings.

Good luck, and congratulations on the book!

Henry

Approved by ssjmod at 02:50 PM

[SSJ: 3892] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/26

Thanks Ellis for responding to my scenario about Koizumi's intents.

A few clarifications:

First, I labeled the scenario 'wild.' Second, the assumption should be taken to mean possibilities; for example, assumption (a) is the most tenuous; I share Ellis' doubt that Koizumi can see beyond postal reform, which is why I put it first; or, as Ellis puts it, 'Only question is whether he has any
interest in anything beyond postal reform'; my feeling is that Koizumi does not, but, having been wrong before on more than one occasion, I could be wrong on this one as well.

Then,

Ellis: Why would his reforms not be passed when he has a 2/3 majority [withCGP] in the Diet? Why wouldn't he have more influence in the party after pulling off that 'coup' in the election?

Ehud: True, he has greatly been responsible for the 2/3 majority in the last election. That doesn't mean that the 2/3 majority is 'his' when it comes to legislation. In time, even the 'rookies,' who owe him their election, could get a different perspective on their political life as the end of his term as LDP President gets nearer and if he sticks to his intention to step down. The fact that all LDP members are pleased with the results of the elections does not mean they like the man and wouldn't use the first opportunity to cut his mane down to size, assuming he is not going to lead the party in another election. If he does seek an extension as LDP President, they would have to keep their heads low for a while longer.

Ellis: I think with some inter-party compromises and inter-party ones with Komeito [and fewer than those he had to make before the election], he's likely to pass whatever he pushes.

Ehud: See previous response writ larger.

Ellis: Also, assuming he is sincere about retirement on schedule next year [and I have it from someone who should know that he is], why would he want to come back 'to the limelight'--he has plenty of 'limelight' as President of LDP and PM and power. If he wants more of it all he has to do is suggest he'd be willing to stay on for another year or two to carry out further reforms if the party wanted him to.

Ehud: The party may not want him to stay longer than one year, say beyond the July 2007 election. Besides, there is no guarantee that the Koizumi spell will be as powerful in July 2007 as it was on 9/11.

Ellis: The time for Koizumi to have split the LDP and realigned and formed a new party was when the zoku in his own party stymied his previous reform efforts, namely highway construction and then postal reform. If he didn't do it then, he ain't going to do it now.

Ehud: Makes sense. Still, I am not sure about timing, but it seems to me that Koizumi had to be well prepared for the 'snap election.' In this respect it was not a snap election, but a well prepared one. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that he thought he could have the postal reform bills passed after agreeing that they be watered down the way they had been. And, Hashimoto's disgraceful hanamichi must have also played into Koizumi's hands.

Ellis: I'd be willing to bet that scenario never plays out.

Ehud: Having labeled the scenario 'wild,' I am not willing to bet on it, but I am not willing to bet that it never plays out.

Best regards.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 02:38 PM

September 26, 2005

[SSJ: 3891] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: David Leheny (dleheny@facstaff.wisc.edu)
Date: 2005/09/26

HI --

OK, movies! Now we're talking my language.

A few recommendations for Ethan, who is already pretty well aware of my movie tastes.

I utterly despised "The Last Samurai," which made it great to show a few scenes regarding Western (especially American) constructions of the samurai. Because the film was quite popular among some of the neo-nationalists here, including writers on the "Channel 2" Internet chat site, it's an interesting way of viewing the samurai as protectors of some inherently valuable tradition rather than as warlords or as political actors with more than their own pride to fight for. It's also a nice way of catching how history is reconstructed to fit the needs of the present. Again, I really recommend showing these clips only if you enjoy making fun of Tom Cruise as much as I do. If I could find the clip of him doing a publicity interview for the movie -- during which he made a young female reporter grab his forearm to show how strong he'd gotten in his kendo training -- I'd send that to Ethan. Of course, the weirdness of that is now dwarfed by his Oprah interview.

Some Japanese movies that students might enjoy and that might be useful:

"A Taxing Woman" by Itami Juzo is a terrific study of women in professional positions. It's a bit dated but it nicely shows the joy that the main character has when she enters the Ministry of Finance as a tax inspector.

The sequel, "A Taxing Woman 2" (or "A Taxing Woman Returns") is, for my money, perhaps even better, though it's more far-fetched and weirder. It's awfully funny, though, and has some really nice images of political corruption as well as the political power of a "new new religion" (to use Helen Hardacre's term, though she wasn't talking about this film). It also has one of my favorite final shots in history.

"High and Low," one of Kurosawa's finest, is a great, great study of class politics in 1960s Japan and ought to give the lie to the myth of harmony in Japan's economic rise in the era. It's a fantastic crime movie on its own terms, based partly on an Ed McBain novel, but it movies into emotionally resonant political territory in its second act. Like the other two, it's a bit long, over two hours, so you'd need to break it up across classes or have a showing outside of class hours.

And, just because I love it, "Battle Royale" is a wonderful action movie that paints a really dystoptian image of Japan's future, in which the society has grown so dysfunctional that it essentially blames its problems on its children. My students who have seen it love it, though I should point out that perhaps most SSJ readers won't relish the sight of a bunch of junior-high school students killing each other on an island for two hours. Of course, I hated junior high school, so I think that I can say without hyperbole that this movie is my favorite artistic achievement of all time, and I regret only that its director, Fukasaku Kinji, is no longer along the living, since I'd been planning to nominate him for an honorary degree from my university.

The sequel, by the way, is "Battle Royale 2: Requiem." It's worth watching as a study of how America is viewed by at least some. It's not nearly as good a movie as "Battle Royale," but any movie that has, sort of as its heroes, a group of Japanese teenagers who have essentially become al Qaeda-Lite has to be considered at least a nominally interesting artifact of the era.

Dave

Approved by ssjmod at 05:42 PM

[SSJ: 3890] Re: Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Yusaku Horiuchi (yusaku.horiuchi@ozemail.com.au)
Date: 2005/09/26

Hi, Ethan

Just a quick reply to your new post:

Faces of Japan
12. Running and running for mayorNew York: TeleJapan USA, 1986 VHS, 27min

I highly suggest this for your course! When I was a PhD student, I showed this to my supervisors who did not know much about Japanese politcs.

Bought your book at APSA and would like to join your discussions with Aurelia some other time.

Yusaku Horiuchi, PhD.
Asia Pacific School of Economics & Government
The Australian National University
J G Crawford Building (Building 13)
Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 2 6125 4295
Fax: +61 2 6125 5570
Email: yusaku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au

Approved by ssjmod at 05:27 PM

[SSJ: 3889] Movies/clips for Japanese politics classes?

From: Ethan Scheiner (escheiner@ucdavis.edu)
Date: 2005/09/24

I'm looking for something video - films (whether "educational" or popular), TV shows, newsreel, whatever - to show to my Japanese politics lecture class. Of course it will need to be in English or have subtitles, but, other than that, anything about Japanese politics and society that the students would enjoy and "learn" from would be great.

Any suggestions?

Best,

Ethan

Approved by ssjmod at 03:30 PM

[SSJ: 3888] Some other questions re the elections

From: Peter Matanle (peter_matanle@yahoo.co.jp)
Date: 2005/09/22

I haven't been following things too closely but wanted to ask a couple of questions - and please excuse my ignorance of some of the issues.

1. Did any of the parties put environmental issues near the top of their party platforms (or mention them at all)? If so which? If not why not? By environmental issues I mean more than the parochial issues of pouring concrete over the domestic countryside and coastline, though that is an important problem, but also climate change/global warming (whatever you wish to call it), global pollution, biodiversity, and so on. It seems a two party system militates against environmentalism entering into mainstream politics and PR provides an outlet for it. Germany has a functioning Green Party that actually participate(d?)(s?) in power. In the UK Tony Blair makes a speech about it come election time and then we hear nothing of it again till the next time. What of Japan that has both first past the post and PR?

2. Is there a satirical party in Japan and what kind of level of support/notice does it get? What does the presence or lack of a satirical party tell us about the state of politics in a particular country? In the UK we have 'The Official Monster Raving Loony Party' founded by the late 'Screaming Lord Sutch' and now headed by Alan 'Howling Laud' Hope. Lord Sutch actually
gathered more than 1,000 votes (>1%) in the 1994 Rotherham by-election, according to the party website (http://www.omrlp.com/). In Germany there is 'Die Partei' - my wife noticed it on her voting paper from Nordrhein Westfalen the other week. They received around 0.5 percent of the vote which, with an electorate of 40 million plus adds up to quite a lot of votes (the size of a small city or the entire population of Iceland)!

3. Does the Japanese state recognise a single opposition party and its leader as the official 'opposition', 'Leader of the Opposition', and 'Shadow Cabinet' in the way that the UK does? This system, and the way it is conveyed to the public through the media filter has, I understand and believe, a major bearing on the development of a two party consciousness and
system in the UK.

4. The number of candidates per constituency in Japan seems low for the first past the post part of the system when compared to the UK. Last election there were 5 candidates in my constituency in the UK (Sheffield, Hillsborough), and this was low compared to others nearby. Next door Sheffield Hallam had 7 candidates, Sheffield Heeley had 7, and Sheffield Central 7. Even though we have a two (perhaps 3) party system operating on a day to day basis in parliament we do not in elections with, especially more recently, many parties running on all manner of serious and not so serious platforms. Even though few are ever elected, their voices are heard and do affect public discourse in many ways as a result of their participation.

Cheers for any enlightenment.

Peter

Approved by ssjmod at 03:21 PM

[SSJ: 3887] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/22

Thanks, Paul, for your insights and response. But I still have to disagree with you on several points, although not on others. First, although I agree if the DPJ doesn't remain the second largest party the Shamintoo might expand to fill that void, and that this is most likely if the DPJ implodes and the LDP tries to push through Constitutional revision of Art 9 without adequate persuasion of the public or tries to push through a maximum change rather than a minimum one. Then the Shamintoo might become the possible second alternative to LDP. But all this rests on various 'ifs' not all or many are likely to happen, or at least not the whole sequence. And the SMD portion of the system is likely to reward the second largest party. As long as the DPJ remains the second largest party and the Shamintoo remains small it is likely to continue to remain small. And as the NHK poll a few days ago indicated, the LDP 'party supporters' share rose 7% but the DPJ's also rose 4%. And the % of Japanese who are glad the LDP won such a large majority was smaller than those who didn't think it was good. There's still a lot of leeway for the DPJ to regain, especially in urban areas and especially if 1)post-Koisumi PM choice is not appealing 2)LDP appears arrogant in its use of power in the next few years.

Second, I think we must have been observing two different elections. I saw nothing to indicate that media perception of and play on LDP factions under SNTV had anything to do with the results at all. The media focused on the 'celebrity' races like Horie vs. Kamei and Sato vs. Noda, etc.as media tends to do everywhere--focus on the individual human/celebrity drama. It also was not particularly pro-LDP at all--much of the media was highly critical of Koizumi's Diet dissolution and his harping on postal reform and none of that had any impact on the results clearly. I fail to see what SNTV has to do with this at all. Finally, again, Koizumi did NOT stress 'breaking' the LDP in this election but rather [and totally consistently according to the content analyses of speeches by the printed press] only on postal reform and it being a prerequisite to all other reforms, and fulfilling his promise to change it [this time by defeating both the zoohan candidates and the DPJ]. It's not that more people supported postal reform than for example pension reform [the DPJ stress] or even as more important, but only that Koizumi managed through the campaign to change perceptions and convince enough urban voters that his postal reform crusade was important both for reform in general and for changing the LDP. Surely you are not suggesting that postal reform was not important in this election and related to the results? Nothing else, and particularly not 'smashing the LDP' when a)Koizumi never said that and b)that would have been very difficult for him to do since he's now the 'face' of the LDP and has been for the past 4 years,
explains the outcomes I think.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:07 PM

[SSJ: 3886] Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/22

Thanks Ehud for interesting scenario. But I have to think that at least c) and e) are highly unlikely as is the 'outcome' possibility you suggest. Why would his reforms not be passed when he has a 2/3 majority [with CGP] in the Diet? Why wouldn't he have more influence in the party after rulling off that 'coup' in the election? Only question is whether he has any interest in anything beyond postal reform. I think with some inter-party compromises and inter-party ones with Komeito [and fewer than those he had to make before the election], he's likely to pass whatever he pushes. Only question is what/whether he wants to push or not. Also, assuming he is sincere about retirement on schedule next year [and I have it from someone who should know that he is], why would he want to come back 'to the limelight'--he has plenty of 'limelight' as President of LDP and PM and power. If he wants more of it all he has to do is suggest he'd be willing to stay on for another year or two to carry out further reforms if the party wanted him to.

Finally, I don't think there's any reform left after postal reform he cares enough about to now break up or challenge the party that he's led so successfully through this election. The time for
Koizumi to have split the LDP and realigned and formed a new party was when the zoku in his own party stymied his previous reform efforts, namely highway construction and then postal reform. If he didn't do it then, he ain't going to do it now. I'd be willing to bet that scenario never plays out.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:54 PM

[SSJ: 3885] Re: Scheiner Book on Opposition Failure in Japan/2005 Election

From: Ethan Scheiner (escheiner@ucdavis.edu)
Date: 2005/09/23

I would really like to thank Aurelia George Mulgan for her extremely kind comments and for bringing up some really interesting points about one of the critical concepts in my book.

Given the importance of clientelism to my argument, I offer considerable space discussing the notion of clientelism in my book (especially chapters 1 and 3), but clientelism is an incredibly slippery concept and I think there will undoubtedly be very good and valid critiques of how I use it.

There is A LOT more (beyond what I say here) that can be said about the clientelism issue and a lot of discussion that could better refine what I "try" to keep "short" below: On this, I recommend checking out my book, looking at the Kitschelt cite I mention below, and, most especially, the below mentioned Kitschelt/Wilkins volume that will be coming out in 2006 at Cambridge University Press (entitled PATRONS OR POLICIES? PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND POLITICAL COMPETITION).

Rather than bore everyone with all the details I offer on the concept in the book, let me just give the briefest and most general depiction of the concept (from my chapter 3), which will probably make some people happy and will cause others to want to start digging in their claws: "Clientelism refers to the exchange of benefits (by the government, parties and/orpoliticians) for voter or organization support. Clientelist benefits are those awarded to people who support a specific party or candidate and withheld from those who do not." (I borrow heavily from the following article in my definition here: Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." Comparative Political Studies 33: 845-879.)

I am not saying that a system is clientelistic whenever a politician or a party gives benefits to groups that support it. If you simply give benefits to all farmers, because farmers tend to support you, that is not clientelistic. You are probably rewarding a lot of people who didn't support you and you don't have any mechanism to ensure that the exchange is actually working both ways.

However, where you (as a politician or a party) give particular groups benefits, the groups give you something in return, you are able to monitor that you are getting this reward, and you are able to punish them if they don't give it to you, that is clientelistic.

I think the distinctions Aurelia makes are extremely useful. But I would actually feel relatively comfortable putting variants of all 3 of her distinctive cases into the clientelism category.
Clientelism: Obviously fits into the clientelism category. Localism: In rural areas, vote counting occurs at the very lowest levels: If you are a politician, you know how many people out of only a couple of 100 are supporting you and therefore you are clearly able to monitor (collectively) how much support you are getting (presumably, in part in exchange for the things you provided the locality). If you are a national politician, punishing local politicians for not getting you enough support in their district is one outstanding way of ensuring that the exchange mechanism works.
Sectionalism: At the broadest level, I actually think that the farm interests example Aurelia offers is more programmatic behavior. However, as is suggested in an in press edited volume on clientelistic and programmatic politics (edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkins), club goods such as specific tariffs are harder to pin down. But in many cases, such tariffs actually fit the clientelistic type quite well. This would especially seem to be the case with, say, the Gumma yam tariff.

All that said, for many types of things, it might be more useful to use Aurelia's distinctions.

For my own purposes - in particular, my effort to understand Japanese politics within a larger class of political systems - I am more comfortable with and find it more useful to create more of
a dichotomous pairing of clientelism and programmatic politics.

But I think neither classification scheme (Aurelia's 3-pronged, or probably 4-pronged if you include "programmatic" politics and my clientelism-programmatic pairing), rules out the other.

A quick closing comment: I completely agree with the importance of individual politician politics in much of this system to this point (and that there may be changes afoot on this as well), but the LDP's control of the government has created a party-based advantage to the whole thing as well. In particular, local levels of the LDP are really advantaged because of the clientelist system for countless reasons, but one I focus on is that they can build up a substantial base of supporters, and especially, candidates/politicians/elites because of the importance of developing ties to the national government-controlling LDP.

Ok, this is way too much. And, I am quite certain that it raises as many questions as it answers.

Best,
Ethan

Approved by ssjmod at 02:13 PM

September 22, 2005

[SSJ: 3882] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Paul Midford (paul.midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/09/20

Thanks to Patrick Koellner and Ellis Krause for their responses to my post.
I have a few comments/clarifications

Duverger's Law

Ellis wrote:

"2)I have to go with Rob Weiner on the Shamintoo ultimate fate
if not in this election . No, they didn't disappear this time but they
won two more seats than before and one of those was in Tokyo
only because the LDP failed to run enough PR candidates due to
their winning far more votes than even the LDP expected, thus
handing the SMT a 'gift' of a seat. They are going to continue to
be a marginalized party without much of a future unless the
LDP-CGP and DPJ in a future election split the seats nearly
equally and SMT winds up being the difference between a
majority or not and throws its lot in with the DPJ and joins the
resulting cabinet. It'll struggle along, winning primarily in PR like
the Communists and eventually fade away or merge with the DPJ.
That's my prediction."

Ultimately, this would be my prediction as well. Movement toward
Shamintou's extinction was halted in this election, and to some extent
shifted into reverse. Moreover, I believe Shamintoo will put up more
serious SMD candidates next time and this will hurt Minshyuto.

The depressing (non-competitive) version of Duverger's law that Rob Weiner
has discussed, i.e. S = C rather than S + 1 = C, fared relatively well this
election, but a monkey wrench was thrown in the classic competitive version,
at least temporarily. There are various reasons. One is the decline if not
breakdown of DPJ-Shamintou election cooperation. This is not a surprise: as
a small party Shamintou cares more about survival now than governing (if
they ever did), consequently they are becoming more and more anti-DPJ in
their campaign tactics. It's the DPJ, not the LDP, which threatens to
destroy Shamintou. As Patrick rightly points out, the SDP only won a single
SMD district. However, in a number of other districts DPJ incumbents almost
certainly went down to defeat because SDP candidates and/or Mushozoku
candidates drained off significant numbers of Yato votes (again, Hyogo 6th
is one of the clearest examples of this; there is a similar example in Osaka
10th).

The collapse of the DPJ in urban areas this time also harms two party
competition in the short-run. In the next election there will be a lot of
urban districts with vulnerable looking first-time LDP SMD incumbents. This
situation, plus the overall collapse in DPJ support this year will encourage
the SDP and a lot of Mushozoku candidates to think that they will be the
Yato candidate who topples the vulnerable LDP incumbent. Many Yato
supporting voters will probably think these non-DPJ Yato candidates have a
good shot as well. The result will be that the LDP vote will decline
significantly, but their share of seats will not decline so much.
Duverger's law depends on the perceptions of candidates and voters (and on
voters' reluctance to vote for candidates likely to lose). If the
perception that two major parties exist is absent, Duverger's law won't
work.

Clearly, the image of the DPJ as the only and sure viable second party has
been tarnished. An NTV poll conducted a few days after the election found
that over 60% of respondents now believe a "two party system" is distant.
In the 2003 and 2004 elections we saw rising numbers of even Communist
voters begin to vote DPJ, apparently convinced that a vote for the Communist
would end up being a vote for the LDP. This perception and consequent
strategic voting will be weaker in the next election; at the very least this
trend will be stalled. Like Ellis and Patrick, I also expect the DPJ to
bounce back in urban areas, but the bounce will be noticeably smaller thanks
to a proliferation of Yato candidates in urban areas. By the election after
next we will be back to where we were on August 8th, with the DPJ as the
undisputed second major party.

SNTV and Un-SNTV Aspects of this Election

Ellis also wrote:

"...there is a great difference between the SNTV system in which
people of the same party competed against each other mostly on
the basis of mobilized 'personal vote' and pork barrel
accomplishments and this election. in which the major competition
was between a major party and a splinter group and was on a
policy issue, and the rivals were not in the same party. I think the
"SNTV" analogy has only a single superficial resemblance--in
some districts two conservatives [present and past LDP] were
running in the same district."

I agree that the current electoral system is very different from SNTV. This
election represented an interesting contest between institutions defined as
legal arrangements and rules and institutions defined as converging
expectations. Koizumi was able to run against the LDP this time only
because everyone, especially the media, was familiar with LDP mainstream and
anti-mainstream dynamics, factions, etc. Without this SNTV legacy,
Koizumi's strategy would not have worked. I disagree that the rebels were
not of the same party. Legally they were not LDP, but politically they were
LDP. If Koizumi had lost, they would have rejoined the party. Thus, the
contest was credibly cast as being about smashing or remaking the LDP; it
was clearly not an LDP vs. Kokumintou contest. In my view, the SNTV
resemblance has less to do with the district level competition between LDP
and LDP rebel candidates and more to do with the media campaign centered on
remaking/breaking the LDP. Again, this media campaign worked because of the
institutional (perceptual) legacy of SNTV.

I have not seen any polling data suggesting that popular enthusiasm for
postal reform per se rose significantly and that this accounts for the LDP
victory. The post-election NTV poll found, if anything, reduced support for
postal privatization. Only 46.8% supported the enactment of Koizumi's bill,
versus 43.2% who were "cautious" (Shincho) and 6.8% who were opposed.
Rather, the negative message of smashing/remaking the LDP seems to what
voters were responding to. Because, Koizumi was so successful, this
strategy cannot work again.

Cheers,

Paul Midford

Approved by ssjmod at 03:08 PM

[SSJ: 3881] Subject: Re: Party System Realignment

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/20

Ellis Krauss wrote:
"...And, I would predict
> that, barring more LDP or DPJ splits and a party recombination
> in the future, if the DPJ can get its act together 'post-Koizumi'
> with much better strategy, appealing leadership with a good and
> appealing tv image, and tv advertising [they should fire their
> American PR firm that did their ads right away!], they could just
> as easily make big advances and then the 'super majority' aspects
> of the SMD would work in their favor."

Picking up Elliss' caveat, i.e., "barring more LDP or DPJ splits and a party recombination in the future," I would like to make a second attempt to generate some interest, and invite predictions/speculations, regarding possible party realignments in the foreseeable future. My first attempt was in response to LDP secretary general Takebe's pre-election prediction/hope that, following the election, the DPJ would split and part of its members would join the LDP. Would Ellis and others venture coming up with possible scenarios?

Let me offer one of my own, a very wild one. First, several assumptions: (a) Koizumi can see beyond postal reform; (b) he pushes forward one or several reform items on the laundry list in the LDP's pre-election manifesto; (c) he fails to have any of these reforms passed; (d) he makes good on his promise not to seek reelection to the party presidency in September 2006; after all, credibility has been one of his major trademarks (e) he thinks it is too early for him to perform his hanamichi and part with the limelights, which have been so kind to him, and be relegated to the role of eleder statesman or become a "remokosan" (remote controller behind the scenes, which he seems to have shunned throughout his political career); and (f) Koizumi hasn't lost his audacity.

The scenario: Koizumi tries to pull a fast big bang. He leaves the LDP, forms a new party and rallies "reform-oriented politicians" - in the LDP and in other parties, primarily from the DPJ. Whether he does it before or after next September, whether or not he succeeds, and what type of party system would emerge are good questions.

Regards.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 02:52 PM

September 21, 2005

[SSJ: 3880] Re: Scheiner Book on Opposition Failure in Japan/2005

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/09/20

Many thanks to Ethan Scheiner for flagging his new book which I'm sure will become a talking point amongst Japan politics specialists for a long time to come. Having read his book summary, however, I just wanted to complicate things a little based on my intensive research into an archetypal LDP farm politician in the House of Reps. Ethan seems to be making a clear distinction between clientelist (pork-based) and programmatic (policy-based) party systems. There is a lot to be said for this distinction. However, my research into the electoral power base and political/policy activities of the key farm politician in question suggests a combination of three main behaviours: clientelism for sure, but also localism i.e. bringing benefits back to his locality which is wider than clientelism (I understand this to be doing favours and producing benefits for individual supporters through personal links), and sectionalism, which is bringing benefits back to a broader group to which large numbers of his constituents belong (i.e. farmers). In particular, and this seems to be very important, clientelism and sectionalism lead to very different political and policy behaviours. First, the former is covert and completely lacking in transparency (the politician acts as a broker or private mediator), while the latter is overt and even propagandised (the politician acts as a policymaker in formal policymaking contexts and claims public credit for what he does). Second, the former leads to policy 'interference' with bureaucrats, while the latter leads to policy 'intervention' by the PARC. Third, sectionalism has a lot more in common with programmatic policy-based behaviours than clientelist ones. A lot of the sectionalism by the politician I am researching involves delivering broad policy benefits that apply to the entire farm sector in Japan (not just his own constituency). Last but not least, the predominant focus in all this analysis is not on parties per se, but on individual Diet members. The LDP, historically, has been an individual Diet member-dominated party. In this, I am with Tatebayashi, but agree that 2005 will probably be seen as a watershed in the reconstruction of the LDP into a coherent, leader-dominated, policy-orientated party. Even the politician I'm researching - formerly a prominent member of the teikou seiryoku - has blinked in the face of the Koizumi onslaught.

Perhaps the qualifications and distinctions alluded to above have already been made in the book. In any case, I greatly look forward to reading it.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:16 PM

September 20, 2005

[SSJ: 3876] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Patrick Koellner (koellner@ifa.duei.de)
Date: 2005/09/16

Just a small addendum to my last mail.

First, my apologies for incorrectly stating the total number of candidates in the last lower house election. I quoted from an earlier projection. Sorry! The correct number is 1,132 and thus just slightly below the 1,159 we saw in 2003. Still the trends towards lower number of candidates held in spite of the particular phenomenon of the postal rebels.

Secondly, we should not forget that Japan's electoral system for the lower house is not pure majoritarian. 37.5 percent of lower house members get elected by means of the proportional component of the electoral system. This is in fact the lifeline which has kept the JCP and the SDP afloat so far. In the 9/11 election only one candidate from these two parties managed to get elected directly (a SDP candidate in Okinawa if I remember correctly). All other candidates of the JCP and the SDP were elected unter the proportional representation component of the electoral system. Curiously, one candidate of the SDP in Tokyo got elected because the LDP did not have enough candidates on its own party list in the Tokyo proportional district! The LDP just did not anticipate the magnitude of this electoral landslide.

As long as parties can build on some kind of solid constituency (such as the Souka gakkai in case of the Koumeitou), they can expect to survive - even if just so - under Japan's electoral system. This raises the questions of how solid the support bases of the JCP and the JSP are. My hunch (it is really no more than that) is that the JCP can still rely on a support base that is sufficiently big for the party to survive in the medium term. With regard to the JSP, I am not so sure. What do members of this forum think?

Best regards

Patrick

--------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. habil. Patrick Koelllner
Senior Research Fellow/Head of Research Programme
Institute of Asian Affairs
Rothenbaumchaussee 32 Tel.: +49 (0)40 428 874 - 29
D-20148 Hamburg Fax: +49 (0)40 410 79 45

Internet:
---------------------------------------------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 02:33 PM

[SSJ: 3875] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/16

I agree with Paul Midford that Koizumi was able to 'run against the LDP' one more time and in the rebel's districts voters had a choice between former LDP and 'assassins.' Indeed as I've said before, Koizumi owes the zoohan a great debt of gratitude because without them he wouldn't have been able to 'run against the LDP again' and cast himself as such a reformer without them. Hard to run against your own party when you are now the face of the party. I also agree that the DPJ did better than people expected from a party that was characterized as primarily an urban one. DPJ won almost a third of the vote in rural areas [to 49% for the LDP] and 39% in 'mixed' districts in SMD.

But I would have to disagree on a couple of other points:

1)there is a great difference between the SNTV system in which people of the same party competed against each other mostly on the basis of mobilized 'personal vote' and pork barrel accomplishments and this election in which the major competition was between a major party and a splinter group and was on a policy issue, and the rivals were not in the same party. I think the "SNTV" analogy has only a single superficial resemblence--in some districts two conservatives [present and past LDP] were running in the same district.

2)I have to go with Rob Weiner on the Shamintoo ultimate fate if not in this election . No, they didn't disappear this time but they won two more seats than before and one of those was in Tokyo only because the LDP failed to run enough PR candidates due to their winning far more votes than even the LDP expected, thus handing the SMT a 'gift' of a seat. They are going to continue to be a marginalized party without much of a future unless the LDP-CGP and DPJ in a future election split the seats nearly equally and SMT winds up being the difference between a majority or not and throws its lot in with the DPJ and joins the resulting cabinet. It'll struggle along, winning primarily in PR like the Communists and eventually fade away or merge with the DPJ. That's my prediction.

3)I didn't find Koizumi and the ads emphasizing 'smashing the LDP' as much as saying "I promised you last time that I would change the LDP. Now I'm on the verge of doing that. Help me" and focusing on postal reform as the absolute requirement for that and all subsequent reforms. Saying you are fulfililling your promise to change the 'old LDP' and saying you are 'smashing the LDP' is a bit different. And even the former message all identified the way to do that as postal reform.

4)In the sense that the results showed again that SMD produces 'super majorities' and that the game is still primarily between two major parties [and would be more so if it wasn't for the PR portion] I would have to defend Duverger. And, I would predict that, barring more LDP or DPJ splits and a party recombination in the future, if the DPJ can get its act together 'post-Koizumi' with much better strategy, appealing leadership with a good and appealing tv image, and tv advertising [they should fire their American PR firm that did their ads right away!], they could just as easily make big advances and then the 'super majority' aspects of the SMD would work in their favor.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:19 PM

[SSJ: 3874] Re: The Last SNTV Election?

From: Patrick Koellner (koellner@ifa.duei.de)
Date: 2005/09/16

With regard to Paul Midford's thoughful mail on the election last Sunday, I would like to disagree in one respect. Paul suggests that the election was 'not a good election for Duverger's hyothesis'. I do not see it that way. All Duverger was saying regarding majoritarian electoral systems was that they tend to bipolar competition at the local (not necessarily national) level. This trend has continued as far as I can tell (I am sure Steve Reed will have to say something about this as well).

First we can note that the overall number of candidates running in the election dropped to a new low of 1,003 (2003: 1,159). Out of these 989 competed for a mandate from a local electoral
district. Even the JCP which has traditionally contested - as a matter of principle - all local districts (without any real chance of getting a single candidate through), this time 'only' presented 275 candidates in local districts. I think this is significant. Significantly, the LDP and the Koumeitou also cooperated again in electoral terms by presenting only one government candidate per electoral district (290 for the LDP, 9 for the Koumeitou, and Horie in Hiroshima 6). Isn't this beautiful?

On average, the number of candidates per district in this election stood at 3.3. If you count the JCP candidates out, you get to 2.38. If that is not close to bipolar competition at the local level I don't know. And this in spite of the 'intervening variable' of the zouhan!

One other thing: majoritarian electoral systems (the Japanese one has at least a strong majoritarian component) promote - by way of definition - clear majorities. Electoral landslides are perfectly feasible - one way or the other. This is exactly what we saw last Sunday. As far as I remember, there is nothing in Duverger's book on political parties to suggest that we will see alterations in power all the time (or routinely) under majoritarian electoral systems.

Certainly last week's electoral victory has added a new positive chapter to the history of the LDP. But this triumph is no guarantee for continued success. Looking at the difficult and painful decisions the government has to face with respect to reforming Japan's social security system, Koizumi's successors will find that the inheritance they are taking on is not too attractive.

Cheers,

Patrick

--------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. habil. Patrick Koellner
Senior Research Fellow/Head of Research Programme
Institute of Asian Affairs
Rothenbaumchaussee 32 Tel.: +49 (0)40 428 874 - 29
D-20148 Hamburg Fax: +49 (0)40 410 79 45

Internet:
---------------------------------------------------------------

Approved by ssjmod at 01:12 PM

[SSJ: 3873] Re: Local Public Service Employees

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/16

I am grateful to Charles Weathers for suggesting, and presenting some evidence, that local employees also are held in low regard by the public, just as higher civil servants are. I have searched for opinion polls on this issue, but the only one I have found does not deal specifically with local public employees. References to opinion polls dealing with public employees, in general and category-specific, would be helpful to my research and highly appreciated.

Best regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 12:57 PM

[SSJ: 3872] Literature, Data on Municipality Mergers?

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/09/15

Can any one on this forum provide me with good secondary literature and/or data and URLs (English or Japanese) on local muncipality mergers in Japan. Over the course of the next year or so many of Japan's villages are scheduled to be merged out of existence and into cities. For example, near Kanazawa several mountain villages are merging with Matto city to form Hakusan City. Any citations on this subject would be greatly appreciated!

Best,

Paul Midford

Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 12:51 PM

September 16, 2005

[SSJ: 3870] The Last SNTV Election?

From: Paul Midford (paul.midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/09/15

In at least one respect, last Sunday's election would seem to be the last SNTV election. Although executed differently, the LDP was able to rerun one of its favorite SNTV strategies-running against itself. Although Koizumi is the first LDP leader to run on an explicit platform of "smashing the LDP," as we know, under SNTV individual LDP candidates competing against each other in medium sized electoral districts were often able to play opposition as well as ruling side roles

In answer to Arthur Alexander's question from last week, most Japanese voters did not fear a change of parties. A majority of the Japanese electorate has not voted for the LDP in an LH election since 1963. And a significant number of the minority who did vote LDP undoubtedly voted for anti-mainstream LDP candidates in the hope that their victory would bring a change in government. And sometimes they got their wish. To take but the most recent example, who can doubt that the transition from Obuchi to Koizumi via the transitional figure of Mori did not constitute a genuine change of government in terms of policy and personnel, if not in terms of party label? I fully agree with Rick Katz that a change in power between parties, rather than merely within the LDP would be a good thing for Japan. But the frequently repeated claim that the LDP has an almost unbroken record of fifty years of rule is nothing but misleading.

Already with Obuchi, the new electoral system was contributing to the decline of LDP factions (e.g. their declining influence over cabinet picks). Nonetheless, the main-stream anti-mainstream distinction survived until last month when Koizumi, in effect, externalized the hard-core anti-mainstream. Even then, he could run against LDP rebels as if they were still in the party; it was common knowledge they would rejoin the LDP if Koizumi lost. This allowed Koizumi to run the LDP against itself one last time. In this sense this was the last SNTV election. This was the last because Koizumi and his successors cannot run against their party again. On Sunday the LDP in effect became, at least perceptually, the KLDP. Len and others who note that the LDP is still a divided party are probably right, but at least in the minds of voters, Koizumi succeeded in destroying the old LDP and creating a new one. He and his successors cannot win the next election by promising to "smash the LDP again." Next time, the LDP will have to run on its record and against the DPJ.

A few additional observations:

I am struck by how often Koizumi and the LDP, especially in their internet ads, focused on smashing the LDP as opposed to postal privatization per se. Although Koizumi has run against the LDP many times, this time represented a new crescendo. By comparison, Okada failed to rise to the occasion. Instead of competing with Koizumi over which of them could be counted on to finish the job of smashing and burying the LDP, Okada, as far as I could see, said virtually nothing about smashing the LDP. An inattentive voter could be forgiven for thinking that Okada was more pro-LDP than Koizumi. If the last three elections were about who was best qualified to end LDP rule, it is easy to see why the DPJ won relatively in 2003, absolutely in 2004, and why Koizumi won big in 2005.

This may reflect Okada's timidity, and/or it might reflect real norms of political discourse in Japan. Although Koizumi could get away with promising to smash his own party and LDP rebels could apparently get away with comparing Koizumi to Hitler, this sort of negative campaigning appears to be almost totally absent from inter-party rhetorical exchanges. Perhaps this is why it sometimes seems easier to have a real debate within the LDP rather than between parties.

The DPJ' s spectacular losses in urban areas conceal their relative strength in less urbanized areas. Their losses were much smaller there and they made gains in some areas. They consolidated their majority of single-district seats in Niigata and in Hokkaido, where they also won the PR vote. Most impressively, the DPJ gained two districts in Okayama, beating Koizumi's hand-picked would-be assassin, the mayor of Okayama, even after the LDP rebel had dropped out, and Hashimoto's son; the DPJ candidate who beat Hashimoto Gaku was a first time winner (shin). Although Koizumi acts as though the rural vote is a captive vote the LDP can take for granted, these results suggest rural voters could begin switching. The decision to not only expel rebels but also "punish" LDP branches that supported rebels could well accelerate this trend. This decision certainly indicates a willingness to take rural areas for granted (all the branches in question are in rural areas).

Rob Weiner's hypothesis (which I fully agreed with) that this election could witness significant movement toward the extinction of Shaminto was clearly falsified. Not only did they gain seats, but the deputy head of Shaminto, Yokomitsu, who switched to the DPJ just before the election and ran in his district in Oita was apparently punished by voters for this defection. Given that Oita is not particularly LDP friendly, and that a DPJ candidate succeeded in unseating an LDP rebel in Oita 1, Yokomitsu's defeat by an LDP candidate in Oita 3 is telling. Shaminto also recruited additional candidates to run in competitive urban districts.

The number of Mushozoku candidates in these districts also increased. In one district I watched, Hyogo 6th, the DPJ incumbent was set upon by three other yato candidates: besides the expected Communist, he faced Shyaminto and Mushozoku candidates. Even so, he came very close to beating the LDP newcomer. All in all, not a good election for Duverger's hypothesis, and not a good omen for the DPJ or for the prospects of a turnover in power in the near future. It's a good bet that the LDP will get far fewer votes next time, but if the yato vote is divided up as much or more among competing candidates, the LDP might not lose many seats.

Paul Midford

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64

Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no
midfordp@yahoo.co.jp

Approved by ssjmod at 03:44 PM

September 15, 2005

[SSJ: 3868] Re: LDP landslide

From: Robert Dujarric (RDUJARRIC@aol.com)
Date: 2005/09/14

Thanks for Richard's analysis of the votes. What would be interested to know is how have the Rebels fared compared to the previous election? Did their share of the vote go down significantly? Obviously it must have since there were two LDP candidates (one Rebel, one Assassin) but it would be interesting to what these constituencies reaveal about the intra-LDP balance.

Robert Dujarric
Japan Institute of International Affairs Tokyo
_rdujarric@aol.com_ (mailto:rdujarric@aol.com)

Approved by ssjmod at 04:02 PM

[SSJ: 3866] Re: campaign themes

From: Charles Weathers (weathers@econ.osaka-cu.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/14

I would like to follow up on Ehud Harari's informative message of
September 7 on civil servants. Unfortunately, I think he is wrong
on one key point - every Japanese acquaintance I have asked
since then think that the image of both national AND local civil
servants is negative (regardless of what they themselves believe),
not only the elite national bureaucrats as Prof. Harari stated. (Since
we at Osaka City University are local civil servants, my colleagues
have perhaps a "privileged"perspective on the issue). The
complaints generally include wasting tax money and sometimes
lack of ability of the lower level civil servants.

Another important point is that civil servants here are often
vulnerable to bashing. This has been quite evident in Kansai for the
last few months where there has been a long-running media scandal
about various fringe benefits provided to Osaka civil servants,
including annual gifts, gift coupons (for restaurants, shows, etc), and
secretive subsidies to insurance funds. The most damaging may have
been the free suits received by many civil servants. Some civil
servants became subject to nasty verbal and other abuse. (To be
sure, the benefits needed to be eliminated, but that was not the fault
of we individuals.)

Yet to a large extent some of these benefits were received in lieu of
higher pay that civil servants probably should have received in years
past when the economy was healthier. But a lot of people just
perceived a parasitic civil service, along with administrations pandering
to unions (the latter at least partly true). Osaka is exceptional, but I
have seen signs elsewhere that squeezing civil servants is an easy path
for some politicians to take. Also, it is likely that the mess here, by
damaging the image the public sector in general, has indirectly helped
conservatives to push their market-oriented reforms. Unfortunately,
what the public never much considers is that squeezing here can also
have a detrimental impact on employment in other sectors.

Charles Weathers
Osaka City University (non-public as of next April)

Approved by ssjmod at 03:20 PM

September 14, 2005

[SSJ: 3865] Re: LDP landslide

From: Jean-Christophe Helary (helary@eskimo.com)
Date: 2005/09/13

> support networks (back to TV again). The minus is that rural voters
> may be becoming as fickle as their urban counterparts.
>
> Jonathan Lewis

In rural Kagawa where I live, only Minshuto supporter were mostly
supportive of their declared party. About 1/3 of LPD/Komeito
supporting voters are said to have voted for Minshuto. Out of the 3
LPD candidates only Ono (Defense Agency Director General) made
it easily. The Hirai-LPD/Ogawa-MST duel lasted until midnight and
Ogawa eventually made it with the hireidaihyou. As for
Kimura-LPD/Tamaki-MST it was decided early enough in favor of
LPD but only thanks to Komeito voters, against a candidate that
declared himself/quit his job only one month before the election. Ono
support is not likely to fade away quickly but Kimura and Hirai are
likely to fail next time and election is called. The general feeling being
not so much "fickleness" of voters but the fact that they seem to have
changed from a "name" perspective to a "policy" perspective. Although
that remains to be confirmed by other elections.

Jean-Christophe Helary

Approved by ssjmod at 02:52 PM

[SSJ: 3864] Re: LDP landslide

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/09/13

The LDP landslide looks less impressive when one looks at the
share of the vote compared to the share of seats.

In the SMD districts, the LDP's vote share went up from 44% to
48%, enough to raise its SMD seats percentage from 56% to 73%.

The DPJ's share of the SMD vote went down slightly from 37%
to 36%, but that was enough to halve its SMD seat share from
35% to 17%.

In the PR vote, the LDP share went up only slightly from 37% in
2003 to 38% in 2005, but the DPJ's share plunged from 40% to 31%.

So, while the DPJ was soundly thrashed, particularly in the PR vote,
the hike in LDP support was not as big as it first seemed. I echo
Len Schoppa's comment that the floating urban voters who turned
toward the charismatic Koizumi this time around may not stick with
the LDP in the post-Koizumi era. This is particularly true if it fails to
delivery sufficient economic growth in the era of aging.

The LDP is comparatively more urban than before, but still
disproportionately rural and still filled with anti-reformers who will
vote for whatever Koizumi wants out of fear. But what will they do
once he's gone? I don't believe Koizumi's claim that the LDP is a new
party or born-again reformers. It's a deeply divided party beneath the
surface.

The advent of truly contested elections has been delayed, but I still
see that in Japan's future.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 02:46 PM

[SSJ: 3863] the inaka isn't fickle

From: Robert Weiner (rw96@cornell.edu)
Date: 2005/09/13

Jonathan Lewis wrote on 2005/9/13, "[ . . . ]Koizumi parachuted
assassins into rural constituencies with which they had little
connection, and most of them performed respectably. Of the 33
"rebel" districts LDP candidates won 13, and came third in only
five. The plus for parties, or at least the LDP, is that they can
deliver their message to voters without rural support networks
(back to TV again). The minus is that rural voters may be
becoming as fickle as their urban counterparts."

I'd disagree -- urban-rural patterns don't seem to have changed.
Winning assassins (and those who did well in losing causes) were
mostly current or former LDP incumbents with roots in their
districts and/or running in urban districts. Losing assassins
(especially those who did most poorly) were mostly first-time
campaigners and/or running in rural districts. Back-of-the-envelope
evidence is below -

- Rob

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I'm working from the list of rebel districts at
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election2005/yusei/ . Other information is only
based on quick eyeballing and probably not complete.

Districts with "assassin" victories and rebel losses (candidate details
refer to the assassin winners):

- Aomori 4 LDP SMD incumbent
- Saitama 11 rural part of an urban prefecture
- Tokyo 10 urban
- Tokyo 12 urban, Koumeitou SMD incumbent
- Fukui 1 capital of a rural prefecture
- Shizuoka 7 urban
- Gifu 4 PR LDP incumbent (on Costa Rica rotation?) who won in 2000
- Kyoto 4 urban-rural mix within an urban prefecture
- Osaka 2 urban
- Nara 2 former PR incumbent, 2003 runner-up, past winner in Nara 1
- Tottori 2 rural
- Shimane 2 LDP SMD incumbent Takeshita Wataru
- Fukuoka 10 urban, pure-PR LDP incumbent
- Kagoshima 3 PR LDP incumbent (on Costa Rica rotation) who won in 2003

Districts with rebel wins and assassin losses (in order of assassin vote
percentage relative to the winner [zanpairitsu]):

- Yamanashi 2, 0.99 rural
- Fukuoka 11, 0.99 urban-rural mix; LDP 2003 runner-up & 2000 winner
- Nara 1, 0.91 urban
- Toyama 3, 0.84 pure-PR LDP incumbent who won there under SNTV
- Gifu 1, 0.84 urban
- Yamanashi 3, 0.81 rural
- Shiga 2, 0.80 looks like urban-rural mix but I'm not sure offhand
- Miyazaki 3, 0.80 runner-up in 2000, son of former incumbent
- Hiroshima 6, 0.76 rural
- Tokushima 2, 0.70 LDP PR incumbent from the district, 2003 runner-up
- Akita 2, 0.66 rural
- Gifu 5, 0.62 looks rural
- Miyazaki 2, 0.61 LDP 2004 Upper House runner-up & 1998 UH incumbent
- Okayama 3, 0.59 looks rural
- Hokkaido 10, 0.57 looks rural
- Saga 3, 0.56 looks rural
- Saga 2, 0.52 rural
- Kagoshima 5, 0.51 rural
- Oita 1, 0.49 urban, pure-PR incumbent

Approved by ssjmod at 02:38 PM

September 13, 2005

[SSJ: 3862] Re: LDP landslide

From: Jonathan Lewis (jonathan_lewis@mac.com)
Date: 2005/09/13

In connection with Len's post on the LDP's new urban support base,
the Asahi today points to the urbanization of rural Japanese
politics. Koizumi parachuted assassins into rural constituencies with
which they had little connection, and most of them performed
respectably. Of the 33 "rebel" districts LDP candidates won 13, and
came third in only five. The plus for parties, or at least the LDP,
is that they can deliver their message to voters without rural
support networks (back to TV again). The minus is that rural voters
may be becoming as fickle as their urban counterparts.

Jonathan Lewis

Hitotsubashi University

Approved by ssjmod at 04:03 PM

[SSJ: 3861] LDP landslide

From: Leonard J. Schoppa (ljs2k@cms.mail.virginia.edu)
Date: 2005/09/12

The most striking outcome of the election on Sunday was the
LDP's ability to win virtually every single member district in
urban areas of Japan (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Hyogo...) These
were areas that had been trending toward the Democrats.
An LDP that had been heavily rural in its Diet membership and
support base now has a sizable contingent of urban Diet
members and urban voters who were willing to support the
party (at least this time).

Some have argued that Koizumi has succeeded in fundamentally
remaking the LDP, and this result suggests that he certainly HAS
THE OPPORTUNITY to do so. He has expelled 37 rebels,
mostly from the rural wing, and he has created an opportunity for
the LDP to move further in the direction of becoming the party
of the urban and suburban voters who favor "reform". To do so,
however, much additional surgery is required. About half of the
LDP's seats are still in rural and semi-rural districts. To become
the party of urban / reform, the LDP will need to do things that
antagonize this base. Will Koizumi or his
successor take this next step?

Two reasons they may not are:

1) the urban support base is very soft. These voters switch parties
easily and often don't turn up at the polls. Will LDP Diet members
be willing to bet their future on this group if fickle voters at the
expense of the loyal and organized rural base?

2) urban voters don't know what they want. They want a "small
state" with low taxes and smaller bureaucracy, but they also want
their pensions and don't want any further erosion
in the system of social protection that keeps weak companies in
business and allows them to keep on their core employees. Japan
now faces some tough choices about how to move a budget that is
deep in the red in the direction of balance, even as the number of
working age adults is shrinking. Will the LDP be able to keep urban
support even after it raises the consumption tax and imposes deep
cuts in the budget, perhaps triggering another recession? Or will it
hesitate in the face of these actions and allow the budget deficit to
balloon further?

I don't think we know the answer to these questions yet, especially
since Koizumi keeps saying he won't seek a change in LDP rules to
allow him to extend his term and we have no idea who will succeed
him or which policies the LDP will turn to once postal reform is
passed.

Len Schoppa
Associate Professor
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
tel (434) 924-3192
fax (434) 924-3359
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k

Approved by ssjmod at 03:31 PM

[SSJ: 3860] Re: Research Paper

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/12

Dear Rachel:
Thanks for writing but I know nothing about the issue you are
researching. I am a political scientist doing research on Japanese
political parties, elections etc. and US-Japan relations. Sorry.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:30 PM

[SSJ: 3859] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/12

I agree with Ehud on the role of 'statecraft' in addition to institutional
change. There is no question that the electoral reform and the role
of tv has transformed the role of the PM in Japan, a process that
began with Nakasone and of which Koizumi is merely the
culmination and not the aberration. This is an argument Ben Nyblade
and I made in an article on the 'Presidentialization' of the PM in
Japanese elections in the April issue of the British Journal of Political
Science, and backed up with evidence. An article I might add that
looks pretty darn prescient after yesterday's election.

BUT, I think two points Ehud refers to are quite important to
remember: 1)the rise in the importance of party leadership image
means only that leaders are more likelty to succeed OR fail based
on such image, not always to succeed. It means a leader with poor
media management and image is much more likely to fail [witness
Mori!] while one with better management and image is more likely
to succeed [witness Koizumi] 2)The ability to understand and take
advantage of the institutional and media changes is where statecraft
comes in. The election Sunday was a perfect example. Okada and
the DPJ thought they could vote against postal reform on technical
grounds, make Koizumi look like a reformer failure and convert him
into a humiliated lame-duck PM and then take the next election
handily by emphasizing pension reform which they knew the public
cared about more than postal reform. In the abstract a rational
strategy. What they didn't count on was the zoohan handing Koizumi
[and his strategy and media 'brain' Iijima] a ready-made opportunity,
on a silver platter, to throw the zoohan out, call an election and
transform that election into a referendum on postal reform as a
fundamental symbol of, and preprequisite to all other reforms, thus
making Koizumi into the great reformer of the LDP and Japan that he
came to office claiming he would be and giving Koizumi the
opportunity to display his media image skills in contrast to Okada
during the campaign. Brilliant! And it worked like a charm. As
Schattschneider argued, he who can define the issues and 'mobilize
bias' gets the power.

With the 20-20 vision of hindsight, had Okada and the DPJ voted for
postal reform it might have passed, but then the LDP might have split
anyway or had the image of a party in great conflict, and Koizumi
would have been in office with a much reduced majority and out of
steam on reform, making the LDP a sitting duck for the next election
after Koizumi retired. Or with a more appealing leader than Okada
who also might have figured out a way to puncture Koizumi's strategy
during the campaign..... Institutions provide the incentives; actors have
different capabilities to respond to those in effective or non-effective
ways.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 03:29 PM

September 12, 2005

[SSJ :3857] Re: Longer than I thought Westminster System

From: Robert Dujarric (rdujarric@aol.com)
Date: 2005/09/10

In a message dated 2005-09-08 15:14:08 Tokyo Standard Time,
ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp writes:

It seems to me that, as many of the political scientists here
have stated, it would accelerate the move to party-centric,
policy-centric elections a la Westminster. However, suppose
it does so while delaying the move toward a genuine
alternation of parties in power? What are the political and
policy implications of that?

There is much talk about a Westminster System in Japan. As is
often the case, I am not sure that its proponents, nor for that
matter its opponents, have a clear idea of what the British
political system. Thus, just a few comments:

1. Politics does not play out in a vacuum. Outside actors behave
very differently in the UK and Japan. This is especially the case of
the media, which is far more aggressive and capable of swinging
votes in Britain. The legal systems also operate very differently in
both countries. Moreover, Britain has two large parties which,
even though they now advocate fairly similar economic policies,
are old organizations with distinct and very different socio-cultural
characteristics.

2. It is not obvious that policy-outcomes are necessarily better in a
Westminster system. The UK's economic performance has been
remarkable in the past two decades, but the same political structure
delivered wretched economic performance in the 1960s and 1970s.

3. There is a good argument to be made about Japan's need for a
strong PM to undertake a radical liberalization of the economy. But
give a man like Ishihara Shintaro Thatcher-like powers, and I doubt
we will like the outcome.

Robert Dujarric
_rdujarric@aol.com_ (mailto:rdujarric@aol.com)
Japan Institute of International Affairs
Tokyo

Approved by ssjmod at 03:27 PM

[SSJ: 3856] election reform

From: Fred Uleman (fuleman@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/09/10

Since it takes majority disapproval to oust a justice from the
supreme court, why doesn't it take majority approval to elect
someone to the Diet -- at least in the single-representative
districts? (As well as to elect governors and other
sole-incumbent officials.)

But, you will object, in the justices' ballot, there are only two
choices possible on each justice. There are more than two
people running for each seat in the Diet. But that is not an
objection. That is simply an argument for adopting an
instant-runoff system.

I know there are also other election-system reforms needed,
but this one never gets mentioned. So I mention it. Now.
Before it looks like it is inspired by tomorrow's results.

F.Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 03:16 PM

[SSJ: 3855] Re: Polls and Sympathy Votes

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/10

Couldn't expectations of "overwhelming victory" for the LDP
based on results of opinion polls in the last few days generate
some "sympathy vote" for DPJ in the PR elections?

Any way of finding out?

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:10 PM

[ SSJ: 3854] Re:Takebe's Wish

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/09

Yomiuri reports that LDP secretary general Takebe pointed out
that a new LDP, Koumeitou, and Former Minshatou alignment
would stabilize the political situation. This, of course, would
materialize in case the DPJ were to split.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20050909ia21.htm

A realistic "vision"? Campaign strategy? A pipe dream?

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

[SSJ: 3853] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/09

There are, of course, signs that Japan is moving in the direction
of a two-party system and is undergoing a process of
"presidentialization" of its parliamentary system. [This term,
presidentialization, was coined by political scientists in reference
to parliamentary systems in Europe and Israel]. Structural
changes supporting this conclusion that have been emphasized in
the discussion here indeed matter. But we shouldn't underestimate
prime ministers' role perceptions and leadership styles. After all,
Nakasone, who set a precedent and presided over reforms
bolstering the position of the prime minister, was followed by
prime ministers with different styles. Hashimoto picked up [from]
where Nakasone had left and presided, very energetically I might
add, over attempts to institute reforms, some of them successful.
Having been held responsible for a wrong economic policy move,
he had to resign, and was replaced by Oubuchi and Mori, two
politicians with a different leadership style. Koizumi has definitely
built on the foundations set up by Nakasone and Hashimoto; but
there is no guarantee that his successors would be as skillful as he
hasbeen in this regard.

It can be argued, of course, that the likelihood that a politician
with a role perception and leadership style other than Koizumi's to
become prime minister has markedly decreased as a result of the
combination of the structural factors and Koizumi's legacy. We'll
have to wait and see.

The movement of the Japanese political system may indeed be in
the stated direction. But like a ship in the ocean having to navigate
through rough weather conditions, it may zig zag until it gets where
it is heading.

Regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:02 PM

[SSJ: 3852] Re: campaign themes

From: Andrew DeWit (dewit@rikkyo.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/09/09

> On Sunday I happened to stumble across an LDP campaign
> meeting in Oita. The candidate was supported by Minister
> Takenaka whose speech went along the following lines:
>
> 1. You dislike the idea of a taxation state which Japan will
> become without reform. You dislike the idea of heaven for
> civil servants

Personally, I think Takenaka Heizo's talk about paying taxes
nicely symbolizes the plentiful ironies and elisions of this election.
Google in Japanese for his name, "tax dodge" (datsuzei) and
"residents tax" (juuminzei) and you'll find there's considerable
evidence he dodged his local income tax payments in the 1990s.
Apparently, he did this by shifting residence status to the US
rather than be counted as a resident on January 1. This is said
to have happened over several years, and it seems he bragged
about it to his colleagues at Keio when he worked there. He
took the magazine "Friday" to court on this artful dodger charge
and won last year, on the narrow point that they couldn't prove
he didn't pay, but critics argue he has not filed evidence of local
tax payments from the years in question
(http://snsi-j.jp/boards/cb.cgi?room=sarashi)

In any case, one reform working its way through Japan's
much-maligned (and, pace Takenaka, already very small)
bureaucracy is to have procedures for local income tax payments
piggybacked on the national system, which would perhaps help
close the current loophole to the taxless state heaven that
Takenaka was probably not talking about in the above.

Also, all this trashing of the public sector going on in this
campaign reminds me of Ezra Suleiman's "Dismantling Democratic
States" (2003 http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/7657.html),
a great comparative treatment of the politics and consequences of
state-bashing. There's a section on Japan that both Koizumi and
Okada ought to read. The continuing tragedy in New Orleans and
the role that the Bush regime "turkey farm" of FEMA played in
exacerbating it probably comes too late in this campaign to serve
as food for thought. But it suggests people ought to be careful of
what they wish for.

On the other hand - or from outer space, if you will - the radicals
on the Wall Street Journal editorial page have of course interpreted
the chaos in New Orleans as evidence that the state should be even
smaller.

http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110007201

All the best,
Andrew DeWit

Approved by ssjmod at 02:11 PM

September 09, 2005

[SSJ: 3850] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Arthur Alexander (arthur.alexander@att.net)
Date: 2005/09/08

One point on Rick Katz's questions.

It may not make much of a difference just what the stated policies
of a party are in a campaign. The fact that a new group is in power
may be the most important outcome; a new group with different
client interests, different priorities, different personnel, and less
dependence on networks of relationships built up over the years.

A study of economic outcomes in eastern Europe and former USSR
republics suggests that countries with more leadership changes had
the best outcomes. The author interpreted the finding by noting that no
policies had proven track records, but that if one set of policies did
not work, the appropriate response was to throw out those leaders
and get in a new set, and to keep doing it until someone came up with
policies that worked. Democracy by trial and error and trial again.

What is remarkable about Japan is the utter fear of trying something
new in politics. Or, is it the combination of institutions, rules, and
existing structures that produce the appearance of political
trepidation on the part of the voters?

Approved by ssjmod at 03:08 PM

[SSJ: 3849] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/08

> One more thought about the election that not many have talked
> about recently in this forum: the party tv ads. Watching the LDP
> ads for both its Chiba and Tokyo candidates, I'm struck with how
> slick, professional, and effective they are this time, particularly
> visually. A quantum leap I think over previous elections possibly.
> On the other hand, the DPJ ads are really boring. Okada sits there
> with a female moderator who asks him questions, he stares in his
> majime and straightforward way answers the questions.He'd pass
> his Phd exams in political science and public administration, but
> that's not what the ads are supposed to prove!

Is it possible one reason the LDP and its postal reform one-dimensional
message has still not gotten tiresome to the public and it's maintaining
its lead is that they are doing a hugely better job than the DPJ in
introducing their individual candidates in particular regions with such
slick ads that both make the candidates attractive and also repeat the
message in a visually interesting way?

Has anyone else noticed this who has been watching the ads?
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:44 PM

[SSJ: 3848] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/08

Quick response to Richard Katz:

I agree that even if the current election centralizes the LDP it could
delay alternation in power in Japan and perhaps a more reformist
party like the DPJ taking power. That isn't necessarily good. And,
as I've pointed out before Japan is not going to be as centralized as
Britain.That elections are held on policy issues, with choices in policy
being offered to the voter--although no electoral system makes it
really a referendum on a specific set of policies because especially in
SMD systems there is also a 'personal' vote for individual candidates
and a lot of issues and reasons that can motivate voters to vote for a
specific party or candidate--and that the LDP's greater centralization
makes choices and consequences clearer is better for representation
and accountability. These are all political/democratic values, not
economic policy ones.

The 'content' of a particular policy, with the exception of postal
reform in this election, and the Westminster system I think are not
necessarily predictable. Depends on the party leaders, doesn't it? It's
just as likely if LDP becomes a more centralized party with PM and
party leader influence that a nationalist like Abe can also get his way,
pay more attention to foreign affairs than domestic reform, and bring
his party with him. Or, a more active LDP leader who believes in
fiscal and other reform can become leader and do more than Koizumi
has to bring about reform. Dissatisfaction with the LDP and growing
strength of opposition parties like DPJ can move LDP to more reform
too. Difficult to say from pure structural, institutional changes.

Further, the current tension between the LDP and Komeito in this
election might prove to be a big mistake on the part of the LDP. I
understand a lot of CGP pols are asking "What the heck did we get
out of coalition and support for the LDP all these years if they aren't
willing to help us out in this election [called for their self-interests,
not
ours] and are trying for their own majority so fiercely?" If the election
doesn't prove as good to the LDP as is predicted or if post-Koizumi
the public turns away from the LDP and it loses its own majority, will
the CGP just have the incentive to go with the DPJ next time, bringing
it to power even if it doesn't win much this time?

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:38 PM

September 08, 2005

[SSJ: 3846] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/09/07

I'd like to think out loud a bit about the coming election and
throw out some questions to our political experts.

Let's assume for a moment that the polls are right and that
Koizumi will win big, with the LDP perhaps even gaining a
majority on its own and the DPJ losing seats.

(One anecdote: some friends of mine, longtime Minshuto
voters, say they are going to vote for Koizumi [that's how
they put it] because postal reform shows he's for small
government. Asked whether there aren't other issues, they
say yes, but in this election, postal is the dividing line
between big and small government.)

So, what does this mean for Japan's political evolution? What
parts of that political evolution (progress) would a big win
accelerate and what parts would it delay?

What is the political science argument for why a "Westminister"
system is "better?" I infer from previous postings rhat
proponents believe it will cause the elected government to
make better decisions. Better seems to be defined as more
responsive to the interests, or at least desires, of the median
voter rather than an aggregation of narrow interest groups. It
also seems to be assumed that interests and desires are
roughly the same. Correct me if I'm wrong on this.

I certainly agree that a big LDP win would mean more
centralization of the LDP under the PM (not just Koizumi, but
his successors as well) and that broad national policies, or at
least something that looks like policy, would become more
important than local interest groups in determing outcomes--
along with a good media image.

However, in the case at hand, I don't believe that the LDP
really is a reformist party (in the sense of economic reform). Nor
do I think it will become so, even if it has shed its most anti-reform
element and is somewhat more reliant on the urban vote. It will be
a bit more reformist than it had been, but I think we all agree that
even Koizumi has done far more on the political and foreign policy
front than on the economic front. I think the reform content of the
postal privatization is far, far less than advertised. I'm not sure
about his successor's will or ability to advance economic reform.
Again, correct me if you think I'm wrong here.

I also think that, if the DPJ loses votes, it will be demoralized, in
some disarray and endowed with far less "aura of inevitability" than
just a few months ago. That, it would seem to me, would delay the
days of truly contested elections (i.e. elections where the opposition
wins, or at least has a very good chance of doing so.)

So, if my premise about the way the LDP and elections are run is
correct, and yet its longevity in power is extended, how does that
make the political system more responsive to the needs, at least the
economic needs, of the typical voter?

Perhaps the process is paradoxical. It delays the advent of truly
contested elections, but it helps set up the preconditions by which
they will eventually emerge. I'm trying to imagine what this scenario
might look like, its probability, and the duration of the process. I
would be interested to hear what others think.

BTW, thanks to Paul Midford for correcting my mistake in leaving
out Sweden among the one-party dominant states. Can we now say
just Japan and Sweden among the industrial democracies. Anything
about Sweden's experience that sheds any light on Japan's prospects?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 03:34 PM

[SSJ: 3845] Re: campaign themes

From: Robert Dujarric (RDUJARRIC@aol.com)
Date: 2005/09/07

In a message dated 2005-09-07 15:03:49 Tokyo Standard Time,
ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp writes:

How 'privileged' are civil servants? Is
a post office worker, a local government officer or teacher in
such an advantages position (an envied aristocracy of labour?)

In the "Old system" which guaranteed lifetime employment to
those working for large corporations and a relatively predictible
for others in smaller companies thanks to economic growth and
their ties to big business, civil servants were not particularly
privileged. In a situation where there are far more Japanese
who are either unemployed or in jobs where there are no
prospect of tenure, civil servants become relatively privileged.
The same situation has developed in Europe.

Robert Dujarric
Mobile telephone (090) 3476-3985 (from outside Japan +81 90 3476-3985)
Visiting Research Fellow
Japan Institute of International Affairs (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyusho)
Kasumigaseki Building 11th Floor
Kasumigaseki 3-2-5, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6011
rdujarric@aol.com
_www.jiia.or.jp_ (http://www.jiia.or.jp/)
Office telephone (03) 3503-7802 x305 [Please leave all messages
on email or mobile]
Subway stop: Toranomon (Exit 5, Ginza Line), Kasumigaseki (Exit A-13,
Chiyoda, Marunouchi, Hibiya Lines), Tameike Sanno (Exit 8, Ginza,
Namboku Lines)
For a map showing the location of the building, please visit
_http://www.jiia.or.jp/index-en.html_ (http://www.jiia.or.jp/index-en.html);
go to "about us" and then to "access" or call JIIA (03) 3503-7801.

Approved by ssjmod at 03:19 PM

[SSJ: 3844] Re: campaign themes

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/09/07

How 'privileged' are civil servants? Is
> a post office worker, a local government officer or teacher in
> such an advantages position (an envied aristocracy of labour?)
> in relation to entry qualifications and time served compared to
> the private sector?

Post office workers, local government officers, and teachers
belong to three different categories although all are koumuin
[public employees] . More likely than not, when "people"
criticize koumuin, they mean employees belonging to a fourth
category, kokka koumuin, translated as civil servants, and,
in fact, not all civil servants, but the higher echelons of civil
servants, usually referred to as the "bureaucrats." These are the
bureaucrats who, in the past, before the burst of the bubble,
widely attributed to the bureaucrats' incompetence, and
revelations of several cases of corruption of bureaucrats, used
to be regarded by Japanese and admiring foreigners alike as
the best, the brightest, and the most honest, albeit also the most
haughty, feeling like being nobody's servants. BTW, as you
know, faculty members of the (former) national university were
also civil servants, but those I know, and I know quite a number,
are bright but modest. Tokyo University president used to be
the highest paid civil servant.

Post office workers are national koumuin. Teachers and local
officers are local government employees.

Now to the question about the disparity between the public
sector and the private sector.

Generally, local government koumuin's pay is known to be
higher than that of national koumuin.

The process of wage determination in the public service is
somewhat complicated and I won't get into it. The "government",
on one hand, and the unions of the koumuin, on the other, have
long disagreed regarding the comparability of wages in the two
sectors. In addition to pointing out that, by law, they cannot
bargain collectively, and in the case of those who are allowed to
bargain, the result is not binding on the government, unions argue
that the comparison is unfair. Why? Because private-sector
employees belonging to the so-called "aristocracy of labor," are
employed by large scale enterprises; koumuin are also employed
by large scale organizations, but their pay is compared with the
pay of employees of enterprises of various sizes, not only the large
scale ones. The government's position has been as follows: a. even
now, when private enterprises are "restructuring" (among other
things, getting rid of employees, including "permanent" ones),
employment of koumuin is secured [this is, of course, the mantra
one gets in the mass media each time the issue of koumuin labor
conditions comes up]; and b. depends how pay is calculated; if you
calculate life-long earnings, including not only bonuses but also
pensions, koumuin are in a better position. Critics also throw in the
practice of amakudari hopping from one staellite organization of
their ministry or public enterprise to another, with fat severance
payments obtained in each of these moves. These issue, arguments
and counter arguments are a major reason why efforts to reform
the public service employment system have hit a snag.

Regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 03:11 PM

[SSJ: 3843] Re: LDP candidates amenable to party binding; DPJ candidates not so

From: Paul Midford (midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/07

Aurelia's point about the LDP becoming a more centralized party
as a result of the recent purges is well taken. However, telling a
pollster that a Diet member should be allowed not to follow the
party's decisions is one thing, acting on that belief is something
entirely different. In fact, recent history indicates that the DPJ
has been more successful at maintaining party discipline than has
the LDP. There is certainly no evidence that party discipline in
the DPJ is at risk. Also, in the present campaign, saying you are
for strong party discipline can be a proxy for saying "I'm pro-
Koizumi," whereas saying you are for individual members' right to
choose is a way of saying "I'm anti-Koizumi."

Cheers,

Paul

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

**************
Paul Midford
Professor
School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University
Phone, Fax: +81-79-565-7957, 7605

Approved by ssjmod at 03:00 PM

September 07, 2005

[SSJ: 3842] campaign themes

From: Stephen Day (S.R.Day@newcastle.ac.uk)
Date: 2005/09/06

On Sunday I happened to stumble across an LDP campaign
meeting in Oita. The candidate was supported by Minister
Takenaka whose speech went along the following lines:

The purpose of the election is very clear - to privatise or not;
to continue the reform or not.

The role played by the Post Office - delivery, savings and
insurance - can all be done by the private sector. We will
privatise but we will ensure we keep local post offices open.
Civil servants have a lot of privileges - there are more civil
servants than members of the SDF.

On Minshuto and the LDP defectors he argued:

a). they had no alternative ideas

b). they try to keep the privileges of the special interests for
example a local post master gets 80 per cent relieve on
inheritance tax if the house is used as a post office.

c). They [Minshuto] are not thinking about you [the voters]
but them [the special interests]

He also left the audience with two issues to think about:

1. You dislike the idea of a taxation state which Japan will
become without reform. You dislike the idea of heaven for
civil servants

2. Think about who will become Prime Minister? If you
vote for Okada-san remember he changes his opinion a lot
- he will change his mind again tomorrow.

****************************************

This idea of the people verses the civil servants strikes me as
particularly interesting. How 'privileged' are civil servants? Is
a post office worker, a local government officer or teacher in
such an advantages position (an envied aristocracy of labour?)
in relation to entry qualifications and time served compared to
the private sector?

On the second issue how vulnerable is Okada-san to the
charge?

I am not a specialist in Japanese politics more a curious
spectator who has been learning a lot from the exchanges on
this list in recent weeks

Stephen Day
Faculty of Economics
Oita University

Approved by ssjmod at 03:52 PM

September 06, 2005

[SSJ: 3841] Re: LDP candidates amenable to party binding; DPJ candidates not so

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/06

First, thanks to Aurelia George Mulgan for the Mainichi Shinbun cite.
Second, I also wish to agree with her earlier point on the polls. Granted
that one should be careful interpreting polls and there are still a lot of
undecided voters, but both the Asahi and Yomiuri large-n polls, the local
newspaper polls that I have seen, and reports from the districts all tell
the same story: the LDP is winning in urban areas.

Basically Koizumi has succeeded in selling postal reform as the litmus test
of support for reform and in painting the DPJ as against reform. We are
probably witnessing Japan's first national, media, issue general election
campaign. The parameters have changed, though we will have to await the
final results to see how much they have changed.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 02:37 PM

September 05, 2005

[SSJ: 3840] LDP candidates amenable to party binding; DPJ candidates not so

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/09/05

A propos the point about the LDP becoming a more coherent,
centralised organization as a result of the events of the last few
weeks, the Mainichi Shimbun on 1 September conducted a
survey of all 1,132 candidates running in the HofReps election.
Amongst LDP candidates, the vast majority (82 per cent) said
it was only natural for a political party's members to follow its
decisions, while more than a half (57 per cent) of DPJ
candidates said a political party's members should be allowed
NOT to follow its decisions.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 04:48 PM

[SSJ: 3839] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ofer Feldman (ofeldman@mail.doshisha.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/03

A quick note to reflect on the recent exchange of messages
regarding the election campaign in Japan.

My students and I follow very closely the campaign in Kyoto
Prefecture. Here we have variety of candidates (excluding
Komeito), but yet the LDP, the DPJ, and the JCP are
represented in each of the six electoral districts in the
prefecture. On the top of this, one "famous" zouhan, supported
by the former LDP powerful man Nonaka Hiromu, also runs
(and, so it seems, very successfully) in one of the districts.
There is a great deal of media attention (also on the national
level) to what is going on in Kyoto because of the closed
competition between the LDP and the DPJ candidates; several
election polls published by some weeklies gave each of the
candidates 50 percent chances of success.

My students and I attend political gathering in the prefecture
and, using videotape cameras, videotape (among other things)
the speeches of the main candidates. This is part of my on-going
study entitled tentatively "Political Cliche and the 'Generation of
Reactions:' Speaker and Audiences Interaction during Political
Speech Meetings in Japan." The study started from last year's
upper house election, examining questions regarding how
politicians, or political candidates, disseminate their ideas: What
presentational techniques do they use to communicate their
messages and why? What forms of speaker/audience interaction
occur during the politicians' lectures? And, What impacts do
audience members' immediate reactions have on the speakers'
modes of presentation? The data I am collecting now through
the videotapes will eventually be transcribed and analyzed using
various social psychological and communication analysis techniques.

So far we have attended meetings with, and videotaped, 16
different candidates in various locations in the prefecture. For
various reasons I focus in particular on closed-door gatherings
(shitsu-nai enzetsu-kai, or okunai enzetsu-kai) rather than on
open-door, street lectures (gaitou enzetsu). It will take of
course some time to transcribe the speeches, analyze the data
in detail, and to get into some conclusions. (Only recently I
have got some results regarding last year upper house election
campaign where I used the same research method but with
smaller sample of candidates. I presented some of these results
last month during the ISPP meeting, and I plan to further detail
my results during next week's ECPR Budapest meeting--which
means that unfortunately, I will have to leave Japan by mid-next
week, as we enter perhaps the most fascinating season of the
campaign. Koizumi just did not consider my schedule before
deciding on this time election day. My students will be here of
course to continue to gather the data until the end of the campaign
even without having me around).

In any case, from what we saw until now during the first week
of the campaign during political gatherings (including meetings
of individual candidates with as small groups of 20 people up
to a larger group of 800 voters), is somehow different from the
impression one gets while watching (or reading) the national media.
There is less focus on national/international issues; more time is
devoted to compare the personalities and visions of Koizumi (as
present and future PM) and Okada (as the possible next leader);
endless use of the term "manifesuto" without getting into specifics
or details related to it; and much talk on community affairs, quality
of candidates, their motivation to seek political office, and their
determination to help the prefecture or local associations.
Needless to mention the fact that during each of these meetings,
local level (city/prefectural) politicians appear to detail episodes
related to their connections with the candidates, why people in
the audience should vote (and also convince other friends to vote)
for this particular candidate, and what messy the community could
be like if the other candidate is elected. In short, more of the same
dobuita style we are so much used to in Japan.

Typically, a candidate will lecture in a school gymnasium or a
community room for something between 8 to 18 minutes (this was
the usual time during the first week. Lectures may get longer as we
enter the last week of the campaign). The candidates' speeches
much resemble (they are not suppose to, though) university lectures,
training seminars, and sermons. The audience sit there quietly (some
even sleep) and wait until the end of the speech to applause politely
for 10-15 seconds and then to greet the candidates who immediately
leaves either to another supporters' gathering or to their offices.

For my own research goals I discovered that, in comparison to a
related data from the USA and the UK, there are very few places
where the speaker indicates through the rhetorical structure when
and where applause (laugh, or cheering) are appropriate (the term
I use in my research is "invited applauses;" and there is even less
direct responses such as applause, cheering, etc--initiated
independently by the audience or certain sectors of it, to specific
aspects of the speech content. It gives thus the impression that one
attends a lecture of a very obedient students at a university rather
than a political meeting (the exceptional cases are during the
speeches delivered by JCP candidates). Handshakes are integral
part of the campaign and we were able to even distinguish (through
the videotapes) between several types of handshakes candidates
had with selected supporters (Which might be another idea for a
future study).

What is interesting in terms of the campaign rhetoric is that to a
certain extent speeches of members of both "camps" are easily
distinguishable. Those candidates supported by the LDP are using
what is termed "the puzzle-solution device:" the speaker begins
their talk by establishing some kind of a problem (usually the
challenges Japan faces in the coming few months or years) and
then offers the solution (usually by repeatedly mentioning the name
of Koizumi and his ideas for reforms as often as possible); The
puzzle invites the audience to anticipate or guess at its solution,
while at the same time listening carefully to the speaker's own
solution when it is delivered (alternatively, some of these candidates
also use "the headline-punchline device," where they propose to
make a declaration or announcement and then proceeds to make it.
The speaker might use headline phrases such as "I'll say why...,"
"And our number one priority is...," or "And I can announce to you
that..." but ending always with the same keyword--that is, Koizumi.

Candidates from the opposition parties, on the other hand, rely
mainly on "the Contrasts device:" boasting about their own side,
attacking the LDP and Koizumi, or --which is the case most often
--doing both things at the same time.

It might be too early, and perhaps too simplistic to try to reach
conclusions on these aspects of the campaign, but still it might
indicate perhaps that the discourse of both camps is rather
different, as they probably try to appeal to different type of
(floating, undecided) voters. But if one incidentally crosses Kyoto
Station in mid-day with close eyes, they could immediately identify
to which group the candidate-speaker belongs to only by the
devices mentioned above.

Interestingly, some of the DPJ candidates are extremely reluctant
to collaborate in my research, and one of them did not allow us
(so far) to videotape his speeches. Traditionally, this was the case
of (the old?) JCP; yet this time (in fact also during last year upper
house election) the JCP candidates (and officials) appear more
open to collaborate, suggesting even where to locate to camera to
get a better angle of the speaker and the audience. I have several
assumptions in this regard and will check them later.

Still keeping the finger on the election pulse.

Until soon, Ofer
--
**************************************
Ofer Feldman, Ph.D.
Faculty of Policy Studies
& the Graduate School of Policy and Management
Doshisha University
Keisuikan 228
Kamigyo-ku, Imadegawa, Kyoto
JAPAN 602-8580
Tel/Fax: (+81) 75-251-3502
e-mail : ofeldman@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
**************************************

Approved by ssjmod at 04:42 PM

[SSJ: 3837] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Fred Uleman (fuleman@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/09/03

There has been extensive commentary from academics and
other close observers likening Koizumi's LDP to Blair's Labour
Party. But to some more casual observers, it is looking more
like Rove's Republican Party in its vicious enforcement of the
fumie de jour.

F.Uleman

Approved by ssjmod at 03:41 PM

[SSJ: 3836] Agreeing with Ellis again

From: Steven R. Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/09/03

I find myself in complete agreement with Ellis's post once
again. In an effort to avoid being too boring, I will add a
more controversial methodological argument.

If you look back at my posts, you will find that I never talk
about the final equilibrium. (Actually, I remember saying
something once about the equilibrium under the new
electoral system but added that I expected the equilibrium
to reached after 1,000 elections, barring any intervening
politically relevant events.) One of the points of trying to
get people to bet on predictions was to force everyone
to notice that knowing the final equilibrium does not tell
you very much. I argue that thinking about choice sets,
decision rules, and mechanisms gives you a very good
handle on what is going to happen next, even if it does
not tell you what will happen in the mythical long run.
There's a hornet's nest around here somewhere. I hope
I did not poke it too hard.

I have two other comments.

First, there is a precedent for the two new "parties". In
1967 Secretary-general Fukuda tried to get unnominated
LDP candidates to step down. In response, the
independents organized the "Pure LDP League" (Jimin
Shukutou Renmei) to support people who wanted to run
without the nomination. The Liberal Alliance (Jiyuu
Rengou) of more recent times has also served the purpose
of providing an umbrella for conservative independents. A
couple of the candidates nominated by one of the two new
"parties" previously ran for the Liberal Alliance. When
Watanuki was asked how many seats the Kokumin Shintou
would win, he said over 30, even though they are not
running 30 candidates. He was including candidates running
for Nippon and as independents.

Second, now that the election has formally begun, all of
the regulations come into effect. This upsets both the
media and political scientists. I think I spotted the problem:
they are letting the politicians talk too much and politicians
are endlessly repetitive. Boring!! On the other hand, perhaps
it is not such a bad idea to let candidates talk directly to
voters without commentary. I find official campaigns boring
and often argue that Japanese voters are not well informed
by the process but, upon reflection, I realized I do not really
know that to be the case. Research around the world has
shown the educational effect of political campaigning. I
wonder how Japan compares.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:36 PM

[SSJ: 3835] Re: PR voting

From: Paul Midford (midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/02

Aurelia is right, we should not read too much into polls, especially
a single iteration in a series. Actually, Asahi polls 2-4 showed
the DPJ gaining on the LDP before the clear reversal in the latest
iteration. The reasons for the sudden reversal were not specified.

My personal hunch is this reflects a strong performance by Koizumi
during the TV debate the other night; he is clearly dominating the
air war. However, when voters focus on the ground war, local
candidates and issues, the DPJ does better. This was what was
happening before the debate and might be the trend again after the
debate. Sometimes a strong debate performance can turn an
election. On the other hand, as we saw last year, John Kerry's post
debate lead evaporated in the final weeks of campaigning.

Cheers,

Paul

**************
Paul Midford
Professor
School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University
Phone, Fax: +81-79-565-7957, 7605

Approved by ssjmod at 03:27 PM

[SSJ: 3834] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Michael Thies (thies@polisci.ucla.edu)
Date: 2005/09/02

I've enjoyed reading this board over the last couple weeks.
I think that Ellis Krauss and Steve Reed make especially
interesting points, and I find myself in complete agreement.
I don't think I've ever met an "electoral determinist," although
I've heard the term a lot. My guess is that if I ever were to
meet one, he'd have at least a little straw poking out of his
ears and from under his hat.

Approved by ssjmod at 03:21 PM

September 02, 2005

[SSJ: 3832] Internet & the 9-11 Diet elections

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/09/02

See Hiroko Tabuchi [dateline: Tokyo], "Candidates Hampered
by Japan Election Laws," _Yahoo! News_, 1 September 2005,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050901/ap_on_re_as/japan_elections;_ylt=AgygpYx7SxLSDOfjllMnkh0Bxg8F;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

Approved by ssjmod at 04:27 PM

[SSJ: 3831] Re: PR voting

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/09/02

Reading too much into polls is always risky, but what I think
the latest Asahi poll, brought to our attention by Joe Sasanuma,
is underlining is the LDP's transition (under Koizumi) from a
rural-based, special interest-dependent party to an
urban-orientated, programmatic appeals-based party. I'm not
sure the figures support the idea of a "reversal" between the
LDP and the DPJ. They suggest that the LDP is still the major
party in rural areas, but what is striking is that it seems to be
becoming the major party in urban areas as well. All up, not
good news for the DPJ.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

[SSJ: 3830] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/01

Let me just add one "PS" to my message of yesterday about
Koizumi and changing Japanese politics.

The last few posts I have emphasized how much has changed
as a result of electoral reform and the increasing importance
of the PM in Japanese politics [which is also due to the
increasing influence of television as well as electoral and
administrative reform]. And I believe it really has. But this is
not to say that everything has changed, nor did I mean to
imply that Japan was now going to become just like the
"Westminster" Cabinet-government British system. It has
moved more in that direction, and if Koizumi wins his gamble
in this election, will move even further so. But I also think the
'electoral determinists' who have argued in the 1990s that the
electoral system was going to change absolutely everything, are
wrong. Japan will not become as 'top down' as British
policymaking and future PMs will not have the centralized
power of Tony Blair and his cabinet. The reasons are simple:
Japan's pre-reform historical development of political parties,
in part due to the old SNTV electoral system, will guarantee
that there is some 'path dependence' in other directions and
also that the organizational development of the LDP will remain
partially decentralized. As Robert Pekkanen and I have argued,
koenkai continue because they still serve useful, if a bit different,
functions in the SMD electoral system for politicians; factions
will not be as great a factor in the future, but they may well
stumble along as more informal, less influential groups within the
LDP as long as they control and manage the party's
appointments to key legislative and party posts, and specialists
[zoku] within the LDP will continue as long as PARC's role in
policymaking and the need for training policymaking specialists
for the party, continues. These will all be counters to the
centralizing tendencies of the new electoral system and the
increasingly influential role of the PM and Cabinet in the party.

If Japan pre-1993 was on the other end of the continuum from
a British "Westminster" parliamentary system, it has now moved
down the continuum toward it; but it is most likely to remain
part of the way there and not become like Britain. I think
electoral determinists are correct in their predictions of the
consequences of electoral system incentives at the 'macro-level'
of the party system, types of issue appeals to voters, and
resources for a more centralized leadership; but they often
neglect the path dependence of the way organizations develop
historically and also the multi-functionality of institutions. Party
organization exists not only to win elections, but also to provide
career opportunities for their politicians and to make policy. I
believe Kaare Strom has labelled these party goals as 'votes,
offices, and policy.' Electoral systems provide powerful
incentives for mobilizing votes and shaping party organizations to
do so; but those incentives also have to compete with those of
incentives for offices and policymaking and the 'sunk costs' of
past development in shaping the political process. Japan is going
to be an interesting mix of these in the future, whether the LDP
or the DPJ or neither win convincingly in this election.

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:58 PM

September 01, 2005

[SSJ: 3828] PR voting

From: Joe Sasanuma (SASANUMA@BC.EDU)
Date: 2005/09/01

Asahi today had an interesting poll that indicates how the
LDP may do in the PR bloc in the next election. This is
the 5th such poll from Asahi.

The latest poll shows 29% of the people choosing the
LDP for the PR, while 14% chose the DPJ and 40%
were undecided. This compares to 24% and 16%,
respectively, from last time. This fact alone is interesting
because the last poll suggested that the gap between
the LDP and the DPJ was quickly shrinking, but it's
increased.

But much more interesting is where the LDP support is
coming from. Asahi found that LDP support in the most
urban areas (Tokyo's 23rd district and every prefecture's
1st district), the LDP dominates: the numbers from five
polls are 35%-32%-26%-24%-33% for the LDP and
17%-12%-9%-13%-11% for the DPJ. On the other
hand, in rural areas, the numbers are 28%-23%-28%-
24%-22% for the LDP v. 19%-19%-13%-16%-19%
for the DPJ. In other words, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the LDP is doing well (perhaps even improving) in
urban areas and the DPJ is doing well in rural areas,
which is the reverse of usual (I think the DPJ may have
done well in the PR even in rural areas in the last election,
but LDP's good polling in urban areas is certainly a change).

I had several questions about this:

1) The DPJ has done better than the LDP in the PR in the
last two elections, which helped propel the DPJ to top the
LDP in 2004 Upper House elections, and make big gains
in 2003 Lower House elections (but still trailed LDP by
60 seats in the SMD). If this overall PR poll holds up,
does it indicate problems for the DPJ? (Because I don't
think the DPJ can match LDP's performance in the SMD
no matter how well the party does).

2) Do these PR numbers indicate favorable/unfavorable
things for either party in the SMD, or should the two tiers
be analyzed separately?

3) If the answer to the above is that this poll does matter
for the SMD... The LDP's support has been in the rural
areas, and the DPJ in urban areas. If there is a "reversal"
going on in this election, does it specifically help/hurt either
party? I'm wondering this because the DPJ has a lot of
young incumbents who have been elected only once or
twice. It seems that LDP incumbents in general would be
better able to withstand head winds than most DPJ incumbents.

4) Related, it seems that the LDP has been rescued by the
CGP in big cities in the past (like Tokyo where the LDP-CGP
was able to match DPJ's performance in the last election),
but if this Asahi poll is correct, will the LDP need not rely on
the CGP as much? (An important question, it seems, because
the CGP has not had much time to prepare for this election,
and the LDP-CGP cooperation has not gone completely
smoothly because of Yashiro's candidacy in Tokyo)

I may be asking the wrong questions (I often do), but
perhaps those on the forum can ask better questions about
this poll, because I think it is very interesting. The Asahi
article can be found at:

http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0901/002.html

Joe Sasanuma
Boston College Law '07
Boston College '04

Approved by ssjmod at 03:17 PM

[SSJ: 3827] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Paul Midford (midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/09/01

Richard Katz wrote:

"Japan is still the only industrial democracy that is a one-party
dominant government."

A nit-picking correction (justified by my new location in
Scandinavia): Sweden continues to have a one-party dominant
government in the form of the Social Democrats. Whereas the
LDP has been dominant with a brief interuption of about 9
months in 1993-4, the Swedish Social Democrats have been
dominate since the 1930s, with only brief stint of a few years as
an opposition party at the end of the 1970s.

Cheers,

Paul Midford

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll Campus　　
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Tel.: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

[SSJ: 3825] Predicting the Future

From: Steven R. Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/09/01

I have to agree with Ellis and disagree with Ehud on the
degree to which the rebels understood what they were
doing. They did not leave with a plan. They came up with
a plan after they were kicked out. The idea that Koizumi
would, or was even capable of, sending in assasins to
defeat them in their own districts was unthinkable at the
time. What allowed Koizumi to pull it off was the new
electoral system. Question, "Who in their right mind
would run against an established incumbent with an
unassailable jiban?" Answer, "Anyone who is guaranteed
a seat in PR." In fact, I would bet that both Noda and
Hiranuma thought that opposing postal reform would be
a good way to enhance their chances of becoming the
next leader of the LDP, establishing their credentials as
potential alternatives to Koizumi. Politicians have no more
access to crystal balls than the rest of us.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 02:59 PM

[SSJ: 3825] The posters are interesting

From: Jonathan Lewis (jonathan_lewis@mac.com)
Date: 2005/09/01

Although the discussions here have shown that the LDP
rebels are but a sideshow in this election, the battles
between former and new LDP candidates are interesting
from the point of view of political communication.
Yesterday I went out to Yamanashi 2nd district to
photograph the election posters.

The incumbent, rebel Mitsuo Horiuchi, is standing as an
independent with the support of the local LDP, while the
national LDP is backing Koutarou Nagasaki.

Both candidates' posters carry the same LDP logo.

Both candidates' posters urge the voter to vote for the LDP
in the PR.

Both candidates' slogans centre on reform: Horiuchi's says
"Kaikaku wo! Yuuki to shinnen de" while Nagasaki uses the
standard LDP "Kaikaku wo tomeru na!"

Nagasaki's poster says he's the official LDP candidate; but
Horiuchi's says he's the official candidate of the Yamanashi
Prefecture LDP, and a former Chairman of the LDP Executive
Council.

The colours and layout of Horiuchi's poster are identical to the
one he used when he stood as a (national) LDP candidate in
2003. Only on closer examination do you notice that he's
wearing a slightly different necktie - stripes instead of spots.

Of course many people in the district will be aware of the
differences between Horiuchi and Nagasaki, but even so this
must be confusing for a good many voters.

In other "rebel districts", such as Tokyo 10, where the rebel is
standing for a different party, there is a clear distinction from the
LDP candidate.

Although I've only seen posters from a few districts so far, a
significant number of LDP posters specifically mention reform
of the postal system. This is quite unusual for LDP posters,
which tend to shun mention of specific policy issues.

I'm trying to get photographs of posters from as many of the
rebel districts as possible. Any contributions (from other
districts too) will be gratefully received.

This research is part of an ongoing project on Japanese election
posters with Brian Masshardt of Univ. Hawaii.

Best wishes,

Jonathan Lewis

Hitotsubashi University

Approved by ssjmod at 02:52 PM

[SSJ: 3824] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Kate Zhou (katezhou@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/09/01

>One comment on the power of the remaining few:

According to Olson in the Logic of Collective Action, the
fewer the number, the more powerful they lobby power.
Thus we may expect more power to the 14,000.
Kate Zhou
www.yifei.org

--
Kate Zhou, Ph.D.
Political Science
University of Hawaii
(808) 956-8777
(808) 956-6877 fax
2424 Maile Way, #634A
Honolulu, HI 96822

Approved by ssjmod at 02:45 PM

[SSJ: 3823] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/09/01

Thanks to Steve for the vote of confidence in my views. I
am not kidding when I say that that alone doubles my
confidence in my analysis! And thanks too to Richard and
Leonard for their responses to my post on Koizumi. I think
we disagree a bit but not as much as their messages implied.
Let me clarify: I didn't say that if Koizumi won all the
previous reforms or even a lot of economic reform would
take place under his watch. He's only got a year, and I think
he'd just be happy with getting the postal reform through and
declaring victory and walking away. I have never thought
that Koizumi was much of an economic reformer. I believe he
has three, now very interrelated goals that he's possibly on his
way to accomplishing 1)moving Japan more toward a "British
model" of parliamentary democracy [recall he spent a
formative year there in his youth] 2)getting postal reform, his
pet project through 3)destroying the Hashimoto faction. My
guess is that he sees all of these as part of the same package--
postal reform undercuts the Hashimoto faction whom I think
he sees as all the evils of the '1955 system' incarnate, and now
that the zoohan have given him the opportunity, if he wins this
one, he's helped to make the LDP a more centralized party
with party leaders having more influence. I personally don't
think Koizumi himself has ever been particularly interested in
the details of any eco policy except the postal reform/postal
savings issue, and had to cast himself as an economic reformer
just as any PM at this time in Japanese history would have had
to. He hired Takenaka to do all the real work so he wouldn't
have to.

So even if the LDP/Koizumi win a majority, we agree: don't
expect any major other overhaul of the economy or revisiting
the compromised issues previously. Richard and I don't
necessarily disagree on this point, but I'm more interested in
the political consequences of Koizumi and he's more interested
in the economic ones. Nor do I disagree with Len that Koizumi
even if he wins can't just waltz in and get anything he wants. But
if he does pull that off, he, any future LDP PMs will have more
influence in the party and with their own Diet Members in the
future than they did before Koizumi came into office using his
media image, and before he kicked out the zoohan and called
this election. If a future PM IS interested in real eco reform, he'll
probably be able to get more than Koizumi was able to during
his tenure because the LDP will have moved a few steps toward
being a more centralized party. Able to do what Tony Blair does?
By no means. But a lot more than previous PMs.

As for calling another election if LDP members still resist? He
doesn't have to. He'll get the postal reform, slightly altered through
the HOR as he did last time but with less opposition b/c what
LDP member is going to vote against it now? And he's counting
on winning the HOR vote to intimidate HOC members to go along
this time either because they'll be under much more tremendous
pressure to do so from their now unified HOR colleages, and/ or
also because some may possibly suffer the same fate as the zoohan
this time when the nomination process for HOC comes around.

Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
* Short bio/photo:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/ekrauss/index.html
* "Expert sheet" :
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/expertsheets/sh-krauss.html
* Recent research:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/ekrauss/papers.html
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 02:41 PM

August 31, 2005

[SSJ: 3822] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/31

I did not think this post would generate much conversation but
I am glad that it did.

First, Ellis' post goes into my personal scrapbook as a rare case
of someone agreeing with me. Obviously, I think he is right on
the button.

Second, my answer to John's question is that I do not know the
content of pensions and welfare that concern people. I guess that
it is simply a matter of whether we can feel safe or not but do not
know. By the way, the 30 per cent concern for postal reform
seems too high according to other polls, under 20 per cent being
more common.

Third, I need to clarify mysef in response to Peter's comments. I
am not particularly a fan of majoritarian democracy, though I do
think that a change in government would be good for Japan right
now. I also see an increasing coverage of the two-party aspect of
the campaign over the last several days. My comments were
directed at a different problem.

What I find fascinating is the difference between what I see and
what the media sees. We see different elections because we are
looking at different data. I look district by district and see a
two-party system. In the last election the DPJ finished first or
second in the PR vote in each and every SMD. If you want to
kick the LDP-Koumei coalition out, your only choice is the DPJ.
When I look at TV I see a one-party dominant system in which
LDP internal conflict is much more important than anything the
opposition might do. When the media began to look at the
districts, they began to see the election I see. We need to
remember that the media are not in the business of collected data
for scientific analysis. I, of course, think they should be, but any
newspaper or TV station that reported on stuff of interest to
political scientists would soon go broke. Horiemon vs Kamei is not
where the election will be decided but it does sell newspapers and
raise TV ratings. It is what voters are interested in and those reports
stimulate interest in the election. What the media reports has
tremendous influence on public opinion but they have less choice
about what to report than it seems. Any newspaper or TV station
that refused to report on the Koizumi theatre would lose out to those
that did. It is a market. I often get upset at journalists for not doing
my job for me and they often get upset at me for not doing their job
for them but the fact is that we have different jobs.

Fourth, I agree with Aurelia George Mulgan's comments below.

> More than any other Lower House election in Japan since
> 1955, voting for the LDP candidate means voting for the LDP
> leadership (i.e. Koizumi) and the LDP's policy agenda. Koizumi
> is leading his party into the election as a unified entity, because
> Koizumi/the LDP at the centre managed to kick out all those
> who didn't support his reform program (the litmus test being
> postal privatisation). This development struck me as quite
> revolutionary. In the past (both before and after electoral reform),
> as all of you know well, LDP candidates, especially in rural and
> semi-rural areas, often paid lip service to the leader and the
> party's manifesto, and competed on the basis of their own
> individual attributes and political standing/connections/ ability to
> bring home the pork etc. etc. What we've got now is more than
> just a shift from candidate-based elections to party-based elections.
> We've got a unified party-based/party leadership-based election.
> This is an important step on the road to a Westminster system,
> because it locks the LDP's Lower House membership into the
> party's policy manifesto (assuming a Koizumi/victory in some form
> or other). LDP resistance forces in the future now realise their likely
> fate - banishment from the party and loss of electoral endorsement.
> The upcoming election will be a test of many things, but the above is
> one of the most important in my view. Even if Koizumi loses, the
> precedent

This is precisely the point I was trying to make all along when I say
that Koizumi is making the LDP a more coherent party.

Finally, the socialists have come up with the best Japanese translation
of Tweedle-dee and Tweedle-dum. The say that the choice between
the LDP and the DPJ is like a choice between curry rice and rice curry.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:38 PM

[SSJ: 3821] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Arthur Alexander (arthur.alexander@att.net)
Date: 2005/08/30

Like Richard Katz, I may risk prosecution for the practice of
political science without a license.

I have been completing a book chapter on the privatization that
started in the early 1980s involving the railroads, NTT, JAL,
and Japan Tobacco (JT). JAL and three of the railroads have
been completely sold off by the government. However, the
government still owns 40 percent of NTT, half of JT, and 100
percent of the smaller island railroads and a freight line.

Here is my observation. In the early 1980s when this process
started, there were 100,000 tobacco farmers. Now there about
14,000. JT is obligated by the law to buy all domestic tobacco
output and it is given a monopoly in domestic manufacturing,
although imports have been completely deregulated. Despite JT's
preference for full privatization, a view that is shared by a few
Diet members and government staff, the finance ministry's advisory
council recommended only that the government's share be allowed
to fall to 50 per cent when this last came up in 2001.

Does electoral reform and Koizumi's revolution (if it works) make
this kind of support of tiny groups obsolete? I can understand Diet
support of 100,000 farmers, but 14,000?

On the other hand, we in the US have been denied beautiful,
delicious, and cheap Mexican tomatoes by a handful of Florida
tomato growers that are probably fewer than 14,000.

Approved by ssjmod at 03:25 PM

[SSJ: 3820] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/08/30

In response to Ellis Krauss:

>But I think Richard ... fails to see the connection between Koizumi's
>lack of real economic reform to date and what this election is
>about. ... one major reason Koizumi has had to
>water down any of his reform proposals, including postal reform,
>is exactly because of the zoku and other anti-reform elements in
>the party that have remained as legacies of the old electoral system,
>etc. This would have continued under any LDP government unless
>they were severely weakened.
>

While it is a significant achievement that the most diehard opponents of
reform have been purged from the LDP, many of Koizumi's allies, e.g.
Aoki, and perhaps the majority of the remaining party members, do not
really believe in Koizumi's reforms, only his coattails. If Koizumi wins
on Sept. 11, I doubt he will use the oppotunity to "water up" the
watered down sections of postal reform. Indeed, there is a possibility
of still further compromise to get it through the Upper House. As a
recent Nikkei column reads in part:
http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNKS/Nni20050830D30HH214.htm

> Waving the banner of "small government," the ruling Liberal Democratic
> Party stresses to voters that postal privatization will open the door
> to reaching that goal. But the privatization bills, which were shaped
> through compromise between the government of Prime Minister Junichiro
> Koizumi and anti-reform forces within his own party, will likely have
> a limited effect on rechanneling postal funds into the private sector
> and downsizing government, and may, instead, lead to bloated postal
> operations.
>
> Except for postal reform, the LDP's manifesto gives only a rough
> sketch of its policies, apparently because Koizumi's term as LDP
> president ends in September next year. Despite the fact that
> candidates who are elected will serve for four years, the ruling party
> provides no vision for fiscal reform in the post-Koizumi period. Even
> now, taxpayer money is being lavishly spent on constructing shinkansen
> bullet train lines and extending highway networks.
>

Ellis also writes:

>Second, Richard assumes that the only major outcome worth
>discussing is economic reform. But political reform itself is pretty
>important as it determines the form of governance that Japanese
>will enjoy or suffer from for years to come.
>

I plead guilty but I'd like to point out extenuating circumstances. I
wish I hadn't worded things so starkly: calling political reforms merely
a means to the end of economic reform. Of course, greater democracy is a
worthy end in itself. Political competition is as vital to a healthy
polity as business competition is to a healthy economy. So why did I
frame it in this way? For a few reasons.

Firstly, in my view, Japan's economic crisis is the principal driver for
its political crisis/evolution over the past decade or so. Without
economic reform that produces sufficient growth, I don't believe that
Japan can be politically stable. Yes, the end of the Cold War broke the
legitimacy of the JSP and JCP and made it possible for the conservatives
to divide. But it was economics that has forced, and continues to force,
centrifugal forces in the LDP and probably the DPJ as well. Some parts
of their base will be hurt by reform and some helped by reform. That
makes it hard for the parties to unify around clear politicies. But
surely the situation that allowed the LDP to be a catch-all coalition
for decades is now long over; i.e. that the economy was producing enough
growth for the LDP to redistribute the fruits of growth to everyone.
Now, it must apportion slices of a smaller pie. Aging exerabates this
and makes reform even more urgent. The security issues facing Japan are
also causing divisions, but I believe the economic forces are more
important as a driver.

Secondly, while evolution toward contested elections would be desirable
even if there were no economic malaise, it is the ongoing economic
malaise that makes it necessary and urgent NOW to have a political
system that can yield the required economic changes. That is the sense
in which I meant that the political changes were but a means to an
economic end.

Thirdly, Koizumi claims that he is booting out the opponents of postal
privatization precisely because "small government" is essential to
economic recovery. He campaigned in 2001 on the slogan: no recovery
without economic reform. So, Koizumi himself claims that his aggressive
political thrusts are a means to an economic end. Yet, the economic
content of the postal leaves, shall we say, a lot to be desired.

In response to Aurelia Mulgan:

I agree that, regardless of the economic impact, Koizumi has left some
lasting, and important, changes in the political process: including
PM-centric policymaking process, the destruction of the factions, the
PM's ability to choose the party's candidates and to do so on poliicy
grounds, the increased role of policy as a determinant of election
success, etc. These are are valuable in their own right. Nonetheless, I
see Koizumi as a transitional figure. What these process changes lead to
in terms of policy content once Koizumi is gone remains to be seen. What
also remains to be seen is how long it takes to get to the alternations
of parties in power. Japan is still the only industrial democracy that
is a one-party dominant government. Has Koizumi accelerated or delayed
the end of that system?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 03:16 PM

[SSJ: 3819] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/30

Two comments and a hakushu on some of the observations by
Ellis Krauss:

[In the daily newspapers] there is some
> variation, and sometimes even contradictions I'm seeing in
some of the coverage and interpretation of what is happening"
Isn't the variation of the coverage, if not the interpretation, an
interesting piece of news?!

> 2)The zoohan don't understand the new electoral system
> and that even if some of them win they can't sustain themselves
> over time, that is if Duverger and the 'wasted vote' hypothesis
> hold here as it should over time, as it should.

I don't have any evidence as to what the zoohan understand
about the effects of the changes in the electoral system. My guess,
FWIW, is that they understand them very well and act rationally
under the circumstances. They must have figured out that voting
for the postal reform bills would have decimated their reelection
prospects. They probably know the new parties wouldn't last, but
they do know that a party is required if one wants to improve one's
prospects by running in the PR elections in addition to running for
a seat in an SMD. They probably hope that, if they win a seat,
especially in their SMD, they would be welcome back into the LDP,
either soon after the election, or after Koizumi's term has ended next
year (and not extended, as had Nakasone's in 1986).

Considering how much Japanese
> have always looked to the US and Britain for 'models' of
> democratic government for Japan, often inappropriately, for once
> it would be approprtiate to bring Britain in at least and no one
> seems to be doing it!

Indeed!

I Wish I were in Japan right now.

Best regards.

Ehud

Approved by ssjmod at 03:06 PM

[SSJ: 3818] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Leonard J. Schoppa (ljs2k@cms.mail.virginia.edu)
Date: 2005/08/30

Ellis suggests, in his defense of Koizumi's political reform
accomplishments, that two out of three scenarios bode well
for economic reform. As long as Koizumi plus Komeito or
the DPJ win, we are on the road to more reform.

I think he's vastly underestimating the degree to which reform
could bog down even if Koizumi plus Komeito come through
with a majority, especially if it's small. Even if he gets the
postal reform, as Richard argues, that doesn't get us very far
since it is so watered down. Will Koizumi then revisit all of
the issues on which he compromised earlier (highway reform,
where he went ahead and approved the plan to build every
kilometer that was planned in the go-go pork barrel years?;
fiscal reform, where he has taken the consumption tax off the
table while he's in office; pension reform, where he booted
the issue down the road rather than confront the funding gap
facing the National Pension scheme; and gender role reform,
where he has been content to score points by putting a few
women in key jobs but hasn't confronted the barriers in the
employment system)?

Aurelia suggests that Koizumi has taught members of his LDP
that they will face the costs borne by the postal rebels if they
don't follow him where he leads, but can Koizumi credibly
threaten to call another election during his final year as PM?
Like Richard, I do not buy that the LDP has undergone a
conversion experience and will now stand aside for meaningful
economic reforms just because Koizumi plus Komeito gets a
majority this time.

Len Schoppa
Associate Professor
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
tel (434) 924-3192
fax (434) 924-3359
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~ljs2k

Approved by ssjmod at 02:58 PM

August 30, 2005

[SSJ: 3817] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/08/30

Something that Richard Katz wrote in his short essay on the
'One-Issue Campaign' triggered the following thought - which
probably goes without saying - but anyway here it is...

More than any other Lower House election in Japan since
1955, voting for the LDP candidate means voting for the LDP
leadership (i.e. Koizumi) and the LDP's policy agenda. Koizumi
is leading his party into the election as a unified entity, because
Koizumi/the LDP at the centre managed to kick out all those
who didn't support his reform program (the litmus test being
postal privatisation). This development struck me as quite
revolutionary. In the past (both before and after electoral reform),
as all of you know well, LDP candidates, especially in rural and
semi-rural areas, often paid lip service to the leader and the party's
manifesto, and competed on the basis of their own individual
attributes and political standing/connections/ ability to bring home
the pork etc. etc. What we've got now is more than just a shift from
candidate-based elections to party-based elections. We've got a
unified party-based/party leadership-based election. This is an
important step on the road to a Westminster system, because it
locks the LDP's Lower House membership into the party's policy
manifesto (assuming a Koizumi/victory in some form or other). LDP
resistance forces in the future now realise their likely fate -
banishment from the party and loss of electoral endorsement. The
upcoming election will be a test of many things, but the above is one
of the most important in my view. Even if Koizumi loses, the
precedent in the LDP may stick.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW@ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 07:12 PM

[SSJ: 3816] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/30

I found Richard Katz' post on 'The one-issue campaign' and
Koizumi's legacy very interesting. I think I am in the 3rd camp
of neither optimists nor pessimists about Koizumi's economic
legacy but rather that the latter will be determined by what
follows, either in his final year in office if he stays in power or
by his successors in the LDP if the LDP continues to rule. But
I think Richard underestimates other aspects of that legacy--the
political reform and fails to see the connection between Koizumi's
lack of real economic reform to date and what this election is
about. First, the latter: one major reason Koizumi has had to
water down any of his reform proposals, including postal reform,
is exactly because of the zoku and other anti-reform elements in
the party that have remained as legacies of the old electoral system,
etc. This would have continued under any LDP government unless
they were severely weakened. The defeat of postal reform has
been a blessing to Koizumi in two ways. It has allowed him to stage
a decisive battle against them on his pet issue and it has allowed him
to cast himself again as a reformer, something that was becoming
difficult to do previously because it's hard to run against your own
party when you have become the 'face' of the party yourself! In this
sense, the anti-reformers did Koizumi a huge favor.

Second, Richard assumes that the only major outcome worth
discussing is economic reform. But political reform itself is pretty
important as it determines the form of governance that Japanese
will enjoy or suffer from for years to come. If Koizumi wins this
election with a majority again and stays in power, he will have
succeeded in doing something that no previous postwar leader has
ever been able to do--move the LDP toward a more centralized,
"Westminster" style of parliamentary "Cabinet Government." The
overly optimistic electoral reformers wanted to move Japan more
in this direction and to give voters a clear choice on policy issues
rather than a pork-barrel, personalized, faction-ridden politics not
based on issue campaigning. That has been evolving gradually but
now it's emerging potentially in full force. Look at this election as
an example and compare it to previous elections under the old
electoral system. A dramatic difference. It's ALL about policy. It's
about choices for what policies and leaders you want to live under?
And if either the LDP and Koizumi/CGP OR the DPJ win this
election with a majority of seats, then the Japanese voter will be the
better off for what Koizumi has wrought. Only if neither win a
majority and the anti-reformers hold the balance of power will
everyone lose and Japanese politics have to go through a chaotic
period of probable policy stalemate.

So while I think Richard is correct in his possibilities about Koizumi as
an eco reformer, let's not ignore his possible accomplishments as a
political reformer. Whether he will be remembered for that, and this lay
the political infrastructure for further economic reform in the future,
remains to be seen and will be determined by whether the Japanese
voters understand the choices before them clearly enough.
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 06:52 PM

[SSJ: 3815] Election Trivia

From: Axel Klein (a.klein@uni-bonn.de)
Date: 2005/08/30

Looking through the political homepages and how they have
changed (or not changed) with the start of the official campaign
today, I came across an interesting manga-strip of the Kokumin
Shintou. It shows Koizumi as Hitler (with moustache and uniform),
greeting with his right hand in Nazi-Fashion and saying:

"Those who have opposed postal privatization will be excluded.
We will bring in assassins and wipe them out.
Sieg Heil" (Well, "sheegu hairu", that is)

I know of previous instances in which Koizumi was compared to
Hitler and his style of leadership to that of dictators. So it did not
surprise me that the last of the four drawings shows North-Korean
leader Kim Il Sung. He is leaning against a blackboard on which is
written: "Japan has become a dictatorship", and himself saying:
"Koizumi finally understood."

What I do not know is wether this kind of comparison is acceptable in
Japan or if the majority of politicians and voters just do not care?

You can find the manga-strip on http://www.kokumin.biz/. There you
need to click on "4koma" (down on the left). You will then see a
manga-strip comparing Koizumi to a storm and Watanuki to the
warming sun. Scroll down to the bottom of the strip and chose "4koma (1)".

Best,
Axel

Axel Klein, PhD
University of Bonn

Approved by ssjmod at 06:37 PM

[SSJ: 3814] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Peter Cave(petercav@hkucc.hku.hk)
Date: 2005/08/30

The postings from Steven Reed and Ellis Krauss are very interesting
indeed. Several questions spring to mind. The obvious one is, why
do the media see things as they do, and present them as they do,
rather than as Steve and Ellis think they should? Are there
understandings, conceptualizations, assumptions about politics,
democracy, and the role of the media that underpin this behaviour -
or are there other reasons for it? I hope someone will research these
questions.

Of course, the Westminster model is just one form of democracy,
with particular strengths and weaknesses. Those in Japan who would
see it as flawed as a democratic system have a point (even if one were
to argue that it has a claim to be as good as most or all competing
models), but the question is, what system, or what way of doing
politics, do they have in mind as preferable, and why?

Incidentally, on this morning's Ohayo Nippon (NHK), the political
commentator said quite clearly that the point at issue in the election
was whether there was to be a change of administration from a
Koizumi-Komeito coalition to a DPJ-centred government. This was
followed by a screen shot split in half between Koizumi on one side
and Okada on the other. There followed coverage of all the other
party leaders in the familiar 'egalitarian' mode, but there was also
what seemed to me like a clear analysis that the basis issue was, are
we going to choose Koizumi or the DPJ?

Peter Cave
M.A., M.Phil., D.Phil. (Oxon)
Assistant Professor
Dept of Japanese Studies
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
Tel: +852 2859-2879
Fax: +852 2548-7399
Email: petercav@hkucc.hku.hk
Homepage: www.hku.hk/japanese/peter

Approved by ssjmod at 06:26 PM

[SSJ: 3813] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/08/30

As always, I enjoyed Steve Reed's comments and I'd like to add
a few thoughts:

THE ONE-ISSUE CAMPAIGN

Koizumi's campaign tactics--a morality play between reform vs.
anti-reform--came through powerfully when I saw Heizo
Takenaka take time off from a busy campaign schedule in order
to fulfillment a commitment to speak to a Tokyo conference of
800 top students from all over Asia organized by Harvard.
Takenaka had been a visiting professor there during the late
1980s. He said the economy was well on the way to recovery.
The crisis is over. But now we have to think about the difference
between "reactive reform" and "pro-active reform." The former
is symbolized by the campagin to reduce NPLs. That was
successful and the financial crisis is over. He continued: The
symbol of pro-active reform is postal privatization. If we cannot
even do postal privatization, how can we ever do all the other
things we need to do in order to deregulate and get rid of
government protection that keeps Japan as a dual economy of
strong competitive sectors and weak protected sectors? So, I
(Takenaka) ask people in the DPJ: are you really against postal
privatization? They don't give a clear answer since some are really
for it, despite the party's position. So, now look at the campaign.
The DPJ is trying to change the subject. They are trying to bring up
pension, education, anything else in order to avoid talking about
the real issue: are you for or against reform, for or against postal
privatization.

It was very effective. Very clever. Talking about any other issue is
an attempt to avoid the real subject: are you for or against reform
(as defined by Koizumi, of course)?

It remains to be seen whether or not the DPJ can point out the flaws:
the lack of real substance in Koizumi's postal plan and that it's not
the only issue of reform.

But Koizumi's tactic is certainly working among some longtime DPJ
voters. My family is visiting Japan and we spent a day with a family
from Osaka, whose daughter went to nursery school with my
daughter when the father was sent to New York. The father is a
professional, a chemist, and a municipal government employee. Both
father and mother have voted for Minshuto for years. But this time
they're voting for Koizumi (that's how they put it). The reason is:
postal reform. This shows Koizumi really is for small government,
said the father. DPJ is against postal privatization. I asked: What
about other issues? Is postal so important? Yes, there are other
issues, they said, like pensions, but postal is the issue of the moment
that can help decide whether or not Japan will really move to small
government.

EVALUATION OF KOZUMI BY ASAHI

Give Koizumi his due on the political change--to be sure. But we
cannot ignore the points that Asahi so rightfully made in a recent
editorial: where is his genuine accomplishment after four years?
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200508270100.html

When it comes to the economic substance--for which the political
process reforms should be but a means to an end--Koizumi has come
up short. And it doesn't seem to bother him. He has greatly watered
down his postal bill so much that some of the original participants in
the reform commission quit in protest. Even at the end of the day--in
2017--postal banking and insurance are not totally seperated from
Japan post or govenrment ownership. Morever, these institutions,
whch know nothing about banking, lending or investing, are being
given more powers and could become the world's biggest and most
ineffectual private monopolies. Why big ineffectual private monopolies
are better than state monopolies is not clear to me. I agree with those
who want to abolish--not privatize--Japan postal savings and insurance.
Ed Lincoln, among others, has shown how this could be done over
ten years.

Koizumi's postal fight is not about economics, but about symbolism.
Symbolism of reform and of small government. There is little in the bill
that assures a better allocation of capital. Japan Post bank can simply
buy JGBs, as it has, rather than directly deliver money to MOF. But
Koizumi just wanted to get something through he could call reform,
and destroy his opponents in the process.

I guess there are a few ways to look on this, depending, in part, on
how optimistic you are about the LDP as the vehicle of substantive
reform.

1) The really optimistic view is that the political changes introduced
by, or as Ehud Harari pointed out, consolidated by Koizumi will
eventually lead to susbtantive economic changes. So, these political
changes, while coming up short in and of themselves, are the necessary
precursor to the ultimately important economic changes Japan must
make. In fact, Koizumi's current political achievements have made
eventual economic changes almost unavoidable. Or, at the very least,
a lot more likely.

2) The pessimistic view is that Koizumi has taught politicians that the
people will accept the symbols of reform while being denied the reality.
He has substituted charisma and a morality play for real action. He has
kicked out the most Jurassic parts of the LDP, thus appealing to the
demographically growing section of voters: the young, the urban,
women. And yet most of the LDP still resists real economic reform,
And Koizumi himself cares little about it. Especially about reform of
the private sector. For him, small government is the sum and substance
of reform and he hasn't even delivered on that. If this argument is true,
then there is no logical reason why these political reforms will lead to
necessary economic reforms. It could lead to nothing more than more
talk about the latter.

3) The meaning of Koizumi's legacy will be determned by what follows
him. Aging and other developments make the need for reform--including
real private sector reform as well as govt reform--more and more urgent.
The political changes achieved by Koizumi remove some of the most
important obstacles to such reform. But whether future politicians will
offer real reform instead of advertising remains to be seen. The Asahi
editorial is asking exactly the right questions. The Japanese people
should be asking these questions. If all they get from their leaders is:
"Don't look at that man behind the curtain," --and if they accept that
as sufficient--then Koizumi's notable political achievements will be for
naught. The DPJ is trying to ask these questions, but is rather hapless
and timid about it due to their own longstanding problems.

Koizumi has created a real potential for change in the right direction.
He has created an intellectual consensus. He has enshrined centralized
decision-makinng and the paramouncy of policy, not potholes, in
elections. That's just a potential. Whether that leads to real change
remains to be seen. If Koizumi succeeds merely in keeping a slightly
more modernized LDP in power for years to come through a new
image, then a vital opportunity will have been lost.

Personally, I lean to the third view combined with a greater determing
role for economics than some other observers take. I.e. while politics
determines what choices are made among the available alternatives,
economics limits what alternatives the real world makes available. I
believe that the switch to policy-oriented elections, plus the
increasing pressures of aging in a low-growth environment, will
eventually help push through an altenation of parties in power and more
thorough and substantive reform. The failure to reform will increasingly
cause more pain than making reforms. In that sense, Koizumi has pushed
the process forward, regardless of his own narrow focus and intentions.
In that sense, I still think Gorbachev is the best analogy. But how long
this process takes remains to be seen. I go back and forth on how long
it's going to take. But economics doesn't allow an indefinite delay on
certain choices (e.g. how do you pay for the elderly and how much or
little do you give them?)

Koizumi is a contradictory influence: he both pushed the process forward
(by giving the notion of reform intellectual hegemony and by destroying
the factions) and delayed it (by saving the LDP, at least until Sept.11).

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report

Approved by ssjmod at 03:36 PM

[SSJ: 3812] Re: LDP "rebel" list

From: Joe Michael Sasanuma (sasanuma@bc.edu)
Date: 2005/08/29

I don't exactly know from where each of the rebels are running (I
failed to keep track of that), but I presume it is mostly from the
district where 1) they ran in 2003, or 2) they used to run before
they moved to the PR in electoral cooperation.

The following is information for 37 rebels, their district in 2003,
and a note in parenthesis if they were not elected in the district in
2003. I know of three who are not running this time, so I put that
information in brackets.

Corrections welcome, particularly about the districts from which
they will be running this time.

Joe Sasanuma
Student of Boston College Law
Boston College '04

Hokkaido bloc:

Hokkaido's 10: Takafumi Yamashita (resurrected in the PR)

Kita Kanto bloc:

Saitama's 11: Ryuji Koizumi

Tokyo bloc:

Tokyo's 10: Kouki Kobayashi
12: Eita Yashiro (PR, in electoral cooperation with
Komeito)

Minami Kanto bloc:

Yamanashi's 2: Mikio Horiuchi
3: Takeshi Hosokawa

Toukai bloc:

Gifu's 1: Seiko Noda
4: Takao Fujii
5: Keiji Furuya
Shizuoka's 7: Minoru Kiuchi
Aichi's 7: Takashi Aoyama (resurrected in the PR)

Kinki bloc:

Kiga's 1: Osamu Konishi (resurrected in the PR)
Kyoto's 4: Hideo Tanaka
Osaka's 2: Akira Sato
Nara's 1: Masahiro Morioka (PR, in Costa-Rica arrangement)
2: Makoto Taki (resurrected in the PR)

Shikoku bloc:

Tokushima's 2: Shunichi Yamaguchi

Kyushu bloc:

Fukuoka's 10: Shouzaburo Jimi
11: Ryota Takeda
Saga's 2: Masahiro Imamura
3: Kosuke Hiro
Ooita's 1: Seiichi Eto (resurrected in the PR)
Miyazaki's 2: Taku Eto
3: Yoshihisa Furukawa
Kagoshima's 3: Tadahiro Matshushita (PR, Costa-Rica until 2003
when LDP decided the Costa-Rica arrangement was too confusing
for the voters and let the other guy run in the district and let
Matsushita run in the PR for the second straight time)
5: Hiroshi Moriyama

Chugoku bloc:

Tottori 2: Yoshihiro Kawakami
Shimane's 2: Hisaoki Kamei (PR, in Costa-Rica arrangement)
Okayama's 2: Akihiko Kumashiro [not running; running for mayor
of Okayama instead]
3: Takeo Hiranuma
Hiroshima's 6: Shizuka Kamei
No district: Kazuko Nosei [not running]

Hokuriku Shinetsu bloc:

Toyama's 3: Tamisuke Watanuki
Fukui's 1: Isao Matsumiya
Nagano's 2: Jin Murai (resurrected in the PR) [not running]

Tohoku bloc:

Akita's 2: Housei Nonoda
Aomori's 4: Kyouichi Tsushima (PR, in electoral cooperation)

Approved by ssjmod at 03:11 PM

[SSJ: 3811] Social Policy as election issue: question

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2005/08/29

Steve Reed wrote: "The Yomiuri poll also shows that 30 per cent of
voters are going to vote on the basis of postal reform while 40 percent
are going to vote on the basis of pensions and welfare."

Does anyone have any idea of what the contents of seeing "pensions and
welfare" as important might be? Do people want bigger pensions and
more welfare, or do they want reform to make the system economically
sustainable? (It used to be in the US that when "welfare" was
mentioned in polling results in meant people wanted to get rid of the
system, meaning public assistance, but we can be sure that few Japanese
feel that way.)

Social security has been a big issue for the Japanese public for many
years. The number of people picking "completion of the social security
system" (shakai hoshou seido no juujitsu) as a top priority in the
annual Cabinet Secretariat poll shot up in 1970 and stayed in the top
two or three position for years, rising in the late 80s. After the LDP
pushed the "Gold Plan" for old age services as its key campaign slogan
for the 1990 general election, social security was identified by voters
as the number-one issue in that election, and it has stayed high ever
since.

In the old days, we knew that mentioning this issue meant expansion,
but since the big "reform" push started, and especially the pension
debates, it is harder to know. The question wording doesn't help. I
couldn't actually find the Yomiuri poll Steve mentioned, but NHK had
one today with still stronger results: 45% of people polled said the
most important policy issue in the election is "social security policy
such as pensions and health care" (nenkin ya iryou nado no shakai
hoshou seisaku). Post Office reform got 18% by the way.

Probably there are some more penetrating surveys around, but does
anyone have a sense of this issue of how public opinion is running?
Is is just a valence issue--the more likely one is worried about
pensions the more likely to vote for the Democrats, regardless of
whether one wanted them bigger or smaller? Incidentally, it isn't all
that obvious why voters would prefer the Democrat's rather than the LDP
policy on pension unless they had really studied up (or even then . .
.)

jc
________________________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan.
7725 Haven Hall, 505 S State St
Ann Arbor MI 48109-1045
734-615-9134; fax 734-764-3522, home 734-662-5076.
jccamp@umich.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 03:01 PM

[SSJ: 3810] Re: Longer than I thought

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/29

Steve Reed's message about 'taking longer than he thought' was
as usual really interesting. I only want to respond right now to
one part of it though--about how the media and the public don't
seem to have quite caught on yet to the new electoral system.
Being in Japan right now and being able to see all the networks
and not just NHK that I get at home, and read the newspapers
daily [I've been buying about 3 per day since there is some
variation, and sometimes even contradictions I'm seeing in some
of the coverage and interpretation of what is happening] is really
eye-opening. It confirms exactly what Steve was saying in my
opinion.

I have been struck particularly by several things:
1)the media, for all their presentation of facts and uber-coverage
of the election, really needs a basic pol sci course sometimes.
They don't seem to get how much has really changed since SNTV
and that the zoohan group isn't really a viable political party under
the new electoral system, and neither is Gov. Tanaka's strange new
group. I knew that NHK would give all the parties, no matter how
small or non-viable equal coverage b/c they always do, but why do
the commercial nets? They don't have to and even if they are trying
to be 'balanced' why almost exactly equal time and coverage instead
of some variation?

2)The zoohan don't understand the new electoral system and that
even if some of them win they can't sustain themselves over time,
that is if Duverger and the 'wasted vote' hypothesis hold here as it
should over time, as it should.

3)The local media--the Japan Times had a summary of views on
the election in the local press and they seemed uniformly negative
about why Koizumi had to dissolve the Diet--the national media,
and the public, don't seem to understand what is really happening
in this election and the significance of it nor understand how a
"Westminster" parliamentary democracy can work. The significance
of this election in my opinion is not just whether DPJ gets a majority
or not; even if it doesn't, if Koizumi 'succeeds' and stays in power
and with CGP has a majority again, essentially teaching the zoohan
a lesson, then the LDP is fundamentally changed to be a much more
centralized 'Westminster' system. Even the few who understand this
somehow think this is anti-democratic. What is absolutely striking is
how few references anyone, from the media to Koizumi himself, have
made publicly about how what is at stake here is Cabinet government
versus possibly real policy stalemate if the zoohan do well, the DPJ
does well but not well enough to take power, and the LDP/CGP don't
quite get a majority. Nor has anyone explained that the way parliamentary
government works in Britain, for e.g. Considering how much Japanese
have always looked to the US and Britain for 'models' of democratic
government for Japan, often inappropriately, for once it would be
approprtiate to bring Britain in at least and no one seems to be doing it!

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 02:55 PM

August 29, 2005

[SSJ: 3809] Longer than I thought

From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/08/29

Tomorrow the official election campaign starts. There will
be a sharp drop in the quantity and quality of campaign
news as campaign regulations come into effect. I must
admit that I could use a break. The next big push will come
on the 12th when I have to start inputting and trying to
understand the results.

Up until this election I have felt pretty good about my
predictions. I bet on a two-party system and guessed that
it would take about three elections to get there. I thought
there would be a rather rapid evolution toward two serious
candidates per district followed by a slower and more
complex movement toward two-party competition at the
national level. Both major parties have also moved toward
greater coherence. Although I was not smart enough to
predict this one, I was not surprised. I had not anticipated
that it would take yet more time for the media, the
bureaucracy, and other institutions to adjust to the reality
of the two-party system. I study parties and elections and
understand what I study better than what I do not study.

I have been surprised that the media treats the DPJ as
just another opposition party. The two meaningless new
parties get nearly equal coverage. If you can get five
members of the Diet together, you can get equal air time.
If you can get ten members together, you can form two
parties and get double the air time. Once the LDP goes into
opposition, things should change. The LDP will not be
treated as just another opposition party but as the once
and future government. Thereafter a clear distinction will
be drawn between the two potential governing parties and
their potential coalition partners.

The debates on Sunday were both good political science and
good political theory. The DPJ argued that this election is a
choice of governments while the JCP argued that it is a choice
of parties. Majoritarian democracy is about a choice of
governments while consensus democracy is about a choice of
parties. The LDP defectors argued that member of the Diet
should be free to vote their conscious without fear of retribution
from their party leaders. Several polls indicate that voters
around the world want party-based elections with the choices
clearly outlined in manifestoes but also want their elected
representatives to ignore the party line and vote their conscious
once elected. Of course, if you want clear choices and alternation
in power, you must reduce your options to only two parties with
similar platforms and those parties have to exercise voting
discipline over their members.

I doubt that voters will be much impressed by the rebel line
about individual candidates voting their conscious during an
election campaign but the JCP may have scored some points
during the debate and their message that the Diet needs at least
one "true opposition party" to oppose Tweedle-dum and
Tweedle-dee may win them some votes.

Two other two-party mechanisms are working as expected but
at a slower pace than expected. Under the predominant party
system and multi-member districts, an ambitious politician was
well-advised to run for the LDP whether or not there was an open
seat available. One did not even need a nomination. If he won,
he would be nominated ex post. Under a two-party system with
single-member districts, an ambitious politician would be
well-advised to join the party which has no incumbent in the
district. Since the two parties are so similar, the main point is
to get a major party nomination without paying much attention
to which party that happens to be. This mechanism is working
but at a much slower pace than I had anticipated.

Similarly, under the predominant party system and
multi-member districts, an interest group was well-advised to
support the LDP even if they disagreed with LDP policy.
They could always find an LDP candidate who also opposed LDP
policy and he would represent their interests within the LDP
which meant being represented in government councils. To
vote for an opposition party meant registering a protest but
being unrepresented in government councils. Under a two-party
system with single-member districts, there should be only one
LDP candidate running in your district and she should support
LDP policy. If you do not like LDP policy, you would be
well-advised to support the DPJ. This mechanism has taken much
longer to get started that I had anticipated but it is happening.
Religious organizations that oppose Koumei are, to some unknown
degree, supporting the DPJ. One other recent straw in the wind also
indicates that this two-party mechanism is beginning to have an
effect. The post office political group in Hyogo Prefecture has
decided to take the "extraordinary step" of supporting the DPJ.
Up until this decision, the strongest move they have taken was to
declare a "free vote" supporting no party.

Since the new electoral system was enacted, I have been feeling
very good about my constant refrain, "It's going to take longer
than you think." Knowing the long-run equilibrium does not tell
you what is going to happen next nor how long the long-run will be.
Now I must add, "It's taking even longer than I thought." I continue
to feel happy about analyzing mechanisms rather than merely
positing an equilibrium, but I have been forced to revise my
estimates of how long those mechanisms take to work.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 04:58 PM

[SSJ: 3807] News Flash: Japanese Media Notices Japan's Two-Party System

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/27

Today the Asahi Shinbun summarized the choices available in the
upcoming election and discovered to its surprise that very few
districts look like Hiroshima 6th. In fact, 280 districts feature a
contest between the LDP and the DPJ. The news may be in
Hiroshima 6th but the election is being held elsewhere.

The Yomiuiri poll today shows that the mutouhasou is choosing
sides and that the Democrats are getting more than the LDP.
This is the normal pattern over the last several elections, postponed
this time by the media attention on the LDP rebels.

The Yomiuri poll also shows that 30 per cent of voters are going
to vote on the basis of postal reform while 40 per cent are going to
vote on the basis of pensions and welfare. The DPJ has finally
decided on a message and that is pensions and welfare. This would
augur well for the DPJ if there were enough time left in the campaign.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:28 PM

[SSJ: 3806] LDP "rebel" list

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrhardtgc@appstate.edu)
Date: 2005/08/26

Does anyone have a list of the LDP rebels and the districts they are
running in?

Thanks,

George

Approved by ssjmod at 02:57 PM

[SSJ: 3805] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrhardtgc@appstate.edu)
Date: 2005/08/26

> From: Walter Hatch (whatch@u.washington.edu)
> Date: 2005/08/25
>
> I am especially curious to hear how others answer your second
> question. As you know, I am not teaching this year -- but have,
> in recent years, assigned Schlesigner's "Shadow Shoguns" to give
> undergrads a readable take on the pre-94 LDP and then used
> Curtis' "Logic" to try to help them understand the various
> incarnations of the party in the late 90s.

This semester is the second time I'm using the Schlesigner book, and
I've come to like it a lot. At one level, it is an entertaining and
absorbing read. Many of my undergraduates said they enjoyed reading
it. At a deeper level, though, it provides surprisingly (for an
entertaining book) insightful analysis into the functioning of
Japan's political institutions. I do something similar to Walter,
assigning the Schlesigner book and Richardson's "Japanese
Democracy." I found that having read the Schlesigner book made it
much easier for the students to understand the more wide-ranging and
dense material in the Richardson book. Of course, it is somewhat
dated now, but surely you wouldn't teach them about the LDP without
discussing the Tanaka era.

George Ehrhardt

Approved by ssjmod at 02:54 PM

August 26, 2005

[SSJ: 3804] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Purnendra Jain (purnendra.jain@adelaide.edu.au)
Date: 2005/08/26

Two other books come to my mind in addition to what others have
already suggested.
Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2004
edition. This has chapters on Japan.

The other is
John Ikenberry amd Micheal Mastanduno, International Relations
Theory and the Asia-Pacific, 2003 - several chapters on Japan and
Japan-US relations.

Purnendra JAIN
Professor and Head, Centre for Asian Studies
Adelaide University, AUSTRALIA 5005
Ph : +61 8 8303 4688
Fax : +61 8 8303 4388
e-mail: purnendra.jain@adelaide.edu.au

Approved by ssjmod at 05:21 PM

[SSJ: 3803] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: David Leheny (dleheny@facstaff.wisc.edu)
Date: 2005/08/26

Hi --

In response to Robert Pekkanen's question about IR textbooks, I have
two recent suggestions for books on Japan's IR. Peter Katzenstein's
new _A World of Regions_ (Cornell UP, brand new) compares Asian
regionalism to European regionalism, and Katzenstein focuses a great
deal on the construction of informal networks that bind the region
together, sometimes emulating network structures in Japanese business
and political communities. This might be better for graduate courses
in IR or undergrad classes in globalization, but it will certainly be
worth a look.

Katzenstein has also co-edited (with Shiraishi Takashi of GRIPS) the
forthcoming _Beyond Japan: East Asian Regionalism_ (also Cornell). It
comes out in spring 2006 and will probably be too late for your
colleague's course, though I think it deserves an early plug.

This volume goes in different directions from _Beyond Bilateralism_
and _Remapping East Asia_ (both of which I use in my course, and
which I like very much; full disclosure, I have a chapter in
_Remapping East Asia_), addressing some less common themes in Japan's
relations with the region. There are chapters on politics (T.J.
Pempel), finance (Natasha Hamilton-Hart), business (Munakata Naoko),
and security (Rich Friman, Peter Katzenstein, Okawara Nobuo, and me),
of course, but also papers on social change in contemporary Japan (by
Bill Kelly and Merry White), a fascinating and highly unconventional
one on the environment (by Derek Hall), and another chapter (mine)
on Japanese and American constructions of "soft power" and pop
culture. Shiraishi's concluding chapter looks at the transformation
of middle-class life in East and Southeast Asia, and the effects of
Japanese consumer tastes on those important shifts.

Anyway, the seminars and papers were fascinating (for me, anyway),
and I assume that the finished collection will be very useful for
courses.

Cheers,

Dave

**************************************************
David Leheny
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin-Madison
dleheny@facstaff.wisc.edu
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/leheny

Approved by ssjmod at 05:13 PM

[SSJ: 3802] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Yoichiro Sato (satoy@apcss.org)
Date: 2005/08/25

My colleague, Satu Limaye and I are working on an edited volume titled
Japan in A Dynamic Asia (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming--early
2006?), looking at Japan in three contexts: historical, growing regional
multilateralism, and bilateral relations with Asian countries (including
China, DPRK, ROK, Russia, ASEAN, Australia, and India). It somewhat
resembles Inoguchi and Jain's (Palgrave, 2001) approach with lots of
update details. There will be a paperback edition.

Yoichiro Sato, Ph.D
Associate Professor, Regional Studies Department
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Honolulu, Hawaii

Approved by ssjmod at 05:03 PM

[SSJ: 3801] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: T.J. Pempel (pempel@berkeley.edu)
Date: 2005/08/25

Three quick thoughts:

--There is an extensive and long text book by Glenn Hook et al.
Japan's International Relations with Routledge. Covers various bilateral,
regional and global elements; is quite detailed and theoretically
sensitive, and has a new edition out. The downside is that it is long and
may provide more detail on various things than are sought.

--Inoguchi Takashi has a book on Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era
of Global Change. It has an argument about the policy directions and main
elements, but is thin on early postwar, is in hard cover only, and may not
follow the 'traditional' chronoligcal and geographical approaches that are
often favored

--Kazuhiko Togo (former MOFA official) has abook entitled Japan's
Foreign Policy 1945-2003 :The Quest for a Proactive Policy. It's very
traditional in the topics covered and it gives a "Japanese" perspective.
It's also in paperback, but by Brill, which is not always easy to access.

Hope these help.

T.J.

T.J. Pempel
Director, Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
510-642-2816
510-643-7062 Fax
pempel@socrates.berkeley.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 04:57 PM

[SSJ: 3800] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Walter Hatch (whatch@u.washington.edu)
Date: 2005/08/25

Robert (hi neighbor),

If he wants a survey-type approach, David should consider the
J-Asia chapters in Hook, Gilson, Hughes, Dobson, "Japan's
International Relations," which has just been updated and
republished this year by Routledge. If David wants something
more pointed, but still "sweeping," he might consider a
provocative chapter from Gavan McCormack, "The Emptiness
of Japanese Affluence" (Sharpe, 1996), which is entitled "The
Regional State: Asia and the Dilemmas of National Identity."
McCormack, as you know, is a political historian, and he goes
back to 45.

I am especially curious to hear how others answer your second
question. As you know, I am not teaching this year -- but have,
in recent years, assigned Schlesigner's "Shadow Shoguns" to give
undergrads a readable take on the pre-94 LDP and then used
Curtis' "Logic" to try to help them understand the various
incarnations of the party in the late 90s. But the latter book is
already out of date -- as is just about everything else out there.
If I were teaching this year, I think I would assign much of Ethan's
book.

Walter
=============

Walter Hatch
Assistant Professor, Department of Government
Colby College

Editor, "The Japanese Economy"
M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Until Sept. 2006:
Visiting Scholar, Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington

Approved by ssjmod at 04:51 PM

[SSJ: 3799] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Ehud Harari(msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/25

Michael J. Green. Japan's Reluctant Realism. Palgrave 2001.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 04:45 PM

[SSJ: 3798] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Christopher Hughes (C.W.Hughes@warwick.ac.uk)
Date: 2005/08/25

Dear Robert,

I hate to blow our own trumpet, but I would recommend Japan's
International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security 2nd edition,
by Glenn Hook, Julie Gilson, myself, and Hugo Dobson (London,
Routledge, 2005).

This is what you might call a mono-text: a cross between a monograph,
as it has a central and integrated thesis throughout, but also has textbook
features because of its very comprehensive and deep coverage.

It has four integrated sections on Japan's relations with the US, East
Asia, Europe and International Organisations.

The section on East Asia covers Japan's relations with China, Taiwan,
North and South Korea, and the ASEAN states. It covers not only
political ties, but also security relations, traditional and
non-traditional, and political economy issues of finance, trade,
production etc. It covers the period from the post-war right up until
2004 and the Asian tsunami. In total the East Asia section runs to
about 100 pages, making it ideal for students as well as specialists.
The book itself totals about 600 pages.

The book also has extensive appendices with a chronology of post-war
Japanese history, detailed economic statistics, key treaties and documents,
useful websites, and an extensive bibliography. We have some nice photos
and cartoons.

T. J. Pempel very kindly said about it:
'The second edition of Japan's International Relations builds on the range
and explanatory power of the first edition by adding important and
insightful new material on Japan's rapidly changing foreign relations.
Japan's relations with Iraq, Okinawa, North Korea and China have all
been moving at an explosive pace and the authors do a wonderful job of
analyzing the most important of these activities and distilling just what
is really changing and what has remained the same'.

The first edition was used widely in the UK, US, Australasia and parts of
East Asia.

More information on the book can be found at
http://search.tandf.co.uk/bookscatalogue.asp?URL=https://ecommerce.tandf.co.uk/catalogue/DirectLink.asp?ResourceCentre=SEARCH&ContinentSelected=0&CountrySelected=0&USSelected=0&ChangeCountry=0&search_text=0415336384&SearchGroup=ISBN&results_order=ByTitle&quer

Or on Amazon at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0415240980/qid=1125040200/sr=8-1/ref=pd_bbs_1/002-2428802-6926458?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

Hope your friend might look into using this book.

Best

Chris

Dr Christopher W. Hughes
Senior Research Fellow &
Deputy Director
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
University of Warwick
Coventry
CV4 7AL
UK
Tel Office: 44 (0)24 7657 2631
Fax: 44 (0)24 7657 2548
Email: c.w.hughes@warwick.ac.uk=20
Web Site: wwww.csgr.org

Approved by ssjmod at 04:41 PM

[SSJ: 3797] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Paul Midford (midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/25

Hi Robert,

Here are my suggestions for your first question:

Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy
Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003)

G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the
Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)

For more historical background on Japan's Asia policy, try

Wolf Mendl, Japan's Asia Policy (Routledge, 1995).

Hope this helps!

Cheers,

Paul

**************
Paul Midford
Professor
School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University
Phone, Fax: +81-79-565-7957, 7605

Approved by ssjmod at 04:17 PM

[SSJ: 3796] Re: 2 Textbook Questions

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/24

Dear Robert:

One possibility for the text is Glenn D. Hook, et.al, Japan's International
Relations: Politics, economics, and security [Routledge, 2001]. About the
most comprehensive thing on Japan's foreign relations in print I think A
bit voluminous but specific chapters can be assigned. Another is Reinhardt
Drifte's Japan's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; From Economic
Superpower to What Power? [Macmillan/St. Antony's 1997]. It deals with
aspects like Japan's 'soft power' that T.J. and I did not have articles on
in Beyond Bilateralism. Finally, on Japanese security, there are two by
Chris Hughes. One is on military security and is probably the best and most
recent thing out there: Japan's Reemergence as a "Normal" Military Power
[Adelphi Paper no. 368-9; 2004 paperbound] I think it's now distributed by
Routledge or Oxford, not sure]; and also his Japan's Security Agenda:
Military, Economic & Environmental Dimensions (Hardcover; Routledge)
which as the title implies deals with all aspects of Japan's "comprehensive
security' policies not just military. It's available only in hardbound so a
bit expensive though.

Of course, I may be biased but I still think Beyond Bilateralism is a great
book and he should continue to require that too!

Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 04:12 PM

August 25, 2005

[SSJ: 3795] 2 Textbook Questions

From: Robert Pekkanen (pekkanen@u.washington.edu)
Date: 2005/08/24

I have two questions about course textbooks (for US university courses). Any
suggestions from SSJ-FORUM members on what has worked well in their courses
would be welcome.

First, a China specialist colleague of mine at the University of Washington
asked me for recommendations on a book on Japan's IR for a 400 level course
"International Relations of the Asia Pacific" on Japan or Japan-US? He
already assigns Krauss and Pempel's Beyond Bilateralism--and says he is
looking for something "that looks at the sweep of Japan's role in East Asia
since 1952 or that looks at things other than those found in Krauss and
Pempel."

Second, what do most members assign for a book on the LDP in their courses?

Thanks for your guidance.

Best,

Robert Pekkanen
University of Washington

Approved by ssjmod at 02:45 PM

August 23, 2005

[SSJ: 3793] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/08/23

In response to Len:

I did not mean to imply that the reform would be "real" or "effective".
I only meant that several bills will be passed in rapid (by Japanese
standards) order that were designed to project an image of reform.
I do not understand the economy and have never given the first
thought to what moves the Nikkei up or down.

The House of Councillors is a different problem. If the LDP wins, they
will be no problem. Koizumi's threats now carry tremendous weight.
We need not worry about anyone voting their conscience. If the DPJ
wins, the LDP could take the DPJ's stand this time: "We are in favor
of reform, just not this particular reform." This would be a risky gamble
at best and very dumb at worst, but they might do it anyway.

By the way, the Yomiuri reports that there are now only seven kenren
who still support the rebels. I hope some of them continue to fight the
good fight so we can analyze the variance that results.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:42 PM

August 22, 2005

[SSJ: 3792] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/08/22

Koizumi has beaten the rebels. Four of the 37 rebels have already
thrown in the towel and decided not to run. The Kamei and Hashimoto
factions are not supporting rebels from their own faction, breaking a
tradition that has been part of the LDP since its very founding. The
part of the Kamei faction that voted for reform is asking the newspaper
to stop referring to it as the former Kamei faction trying to cleanse itself
of its anti-Koizumi image. Many prefectural federations supported their
rebels in traditional LDP fashion, but some of those have been to change
their minds and support the outsider candidates who are running
against the local incumbent. Others are threatening sanctions for those
who support the rebels. Koizumi promised to change Japan by changing
the LDP and the LDP has changed. He promised to break the LDP if it
would not pass postal reform and he has done so.

He is successfully fielding candidates against his enemies. The closest
parallel in Japanese political history may be the way Yoshida Shigeru
changed the Liberal Party. The Liberals started out as an
anti-bureaucratic party but in 1949 Yoshida recruited ex-bureaucrats
into the party who then became his most reliable supporters. Koizumi
is running against the bureaucracy and is recruiting new candidates
who have no local organizations and are therefore dependent upon him.
It also turns out that many of these new candidates are ex-bureaucrats.
Yoshida centralized the Liberal Party under his own leadership and
Koizumi is doing the same for the LDP.

Koizumi is also still beating the DPJ. The key coup was getting
Horie-mon to run against Kamei. Horie presents the precise image that
the DPJ and Koizumi both wish to project, a young guy who stands up to
the establishment and changes things. Horie is also the single most
attractive media personality in Japan. The media now act as if the whole
election were taking place in Hiroshima 6th district. Koizumi's enemy is
Kamei and the DPJ is irrelevant.

Someone should definitely do a study of the media coverage of this election
(and perhaps all of the Koizumi elections). So far, at least, Kamei and
Watanuki (and now Horie) have gotten more air time than Okada. Japan
has a two party system but the media have yet to notice. They still think
the primary battle is among factions within the LDP and seem to have
convinced the voters as well.

The most recent Yomiuri poll has bad news for the DPJ. First, for the first
time under the new electoral system the opposition has failed to gain
support after the election has begun. The DPJ lost support in the first
several days of the campaign. When asked about Okada's image, 46 per cent
say they have no impression at all. Voters have insufficient information to
form an opinion. Elections used to be the only time the opposition could get
air time but Koizumi has fixed it so that they don't even get time during
the election. This has to go down as the most successful media campaign in
Japanese history.

The DPJ is, of course, helping Koizumi out. Koizumi framed the election as
"postal reform, yes or no" and the DPJ's only response has been, "there are
many more issues". The LDP, ably supported by Koumei, sends a single
message. The DPJ wants to campaign on the issue so they have no particular
message to be on or off. The governing coalition is unified and on message.
On Sunday, Koumei actually attacked the DPJ for agreeing with the LDP on
constitutional and defense issues. The opposition (now including the Kokumin
Shintou) is a message-free cacophony. The JCP and SDP attack the DPJ as
often as they attack the LDP.

Nevertheless, looking district by district, the LDP still has many problems
and the DPJ looks competitive. Christopher Hood quite properly doubts the
possibility of a clear election verdict. Perhaps it is time to do a quick
and dirty calculation of the odds.

First, I count Koumei as part of the LDP coalition. For electoral purposes
this is clearly the case. They are campaigning in sync. The SDP and JCP,
though they get equal air time, are electorally irrelevant. Their messages
are simply not part of the current debate. Neither will win an SMD seat so
they are reduced to running sacrificial lambs in the hope of winning some
PR seats. My guess is that they will get around 5 seats combined. That
leaves the rebels.

The rebels are dependent on the SMDs. Right now only the Kokumin Shintou
is qualified to win PR seats, though the Shintou Nippon may find one more
person to join and make them an official party qualified to run in the PR
tier. (Note how parties that want to keep doing things we have always done
them and whose candidates sport an average age over 60 can still be "new".)
The post office group is supporting them wholeheartedly and they may actually
win a PR seat or two. Remember, however, that the lower house PR is not a
nationwide district so the bar is much higher than in the upper house. I
guess zero PR seats.

To win an SMD against LDP and DPJ competition, a rebel probably needs an
unassailable jiban. I checked the numbers and only 11 fit that category.
Even candidates with unassailable jiban may lose, however. Will their
supporters remain loyal even when it seems clear that, even if they do win,
they will no longer be part of the ruling party and can therefore no longer be
trusted to bring home the bacon?

Are rural voters loyal or instrumental? I expect the two parties
(LDP-Koumei and DPJ) to win all but 10 to 15 seats. The error margins to
that expectation are huge and I am probably leaning toward the low end but
I would still bet against a tie and therefore for more rapid reform after the
election.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 03:18 PM

[SSJ: 3791] Re: Factions etc.

From: Leonard J. Schoppa (ljs2k@cms.mail.virginia.edu)
Date: 2005/08/19

Steve Reed is willing to bet on "reform."

> There are two main possibilities, the Koizumi LDP (plus Koumei) wins
> or the Democrats win. If there is a near tie, small parties may hold the
> balance of power. If either the LDP or the DPJ wins, there will be
> substantial reform implemented rapidly (in Japanese terms). Both are
> running on reform platforms and both platforms look pretty much the
> same. I would bet on reform after this election.

Of course that requires some idea of what "reform" is and how to know
when it's happened. I would certainly agree that if Koizumi is seen as
having "won," he will claim a mandate and try to push through postal
reform in the form he proposed this summer. If the Democrats win, they
will try to push through their own version of postal reform. In neither
case, however, is it clear that these plans would do much to redirect the
flow of savings from pork barrel projects to market-based investments
(which is how we should judge whether the system has truly been
reformed). Both have long phase in periods and loop holes that will
allow much of this money to continue flowing to pork. My personal
opinion is that the Democrats' plan (putting a ceiling on deposit size that
will cut the amount of money flowing INTO the postal system is more
promising than Koizumi's attempt to influence the OUTFLOW of money
through privatization and splitting of postal services), but neither is sure
to have the promised effect.

Even if both parties are likely to PUSH FOR this reform, however, that
doesn't mean it will happen. If Koizumi wins, he will likely be more
reliant on Komeito than before and won't have changed the balance of
seats in the Upper House at all. In one year, he is supposed to resign,
so opponents will have a strong incentive to delay things until he is gone.
Those hoping to succeed him as LDP leader will have an incentive to
see him fail in some way that gives them an edge in the race. Unless
Koizumi is willing to threaten ANOTHER early election, he will no
longer have this threat to hold over the heads of his LDP rivals. Koga
and Komura, two LDP figures mentioned as contenders to succeed
Koizumi, both abstained on the postal bills but are still in the party. In
this scenario, Koizumi will have eliminated 37 of his opponents, but we
should not assume that this means he will be able to force his party to do
whatever he wants.

The chances that the DPJ wins on its own is very slim, but if they do it
will be with the smallest of margins. They may have to rely on votes from a
few Socialists or Communists. They won't have anything close to a majority
in the Upper House, so if they want to push through their plan, they will
have to rely on legislation-specific pacts with the LDP or Komeito. It will
not be easy for the DPJ to deliver the promised postal legislation.

Then there's the question of whether either party will be able to do
anything more to "reform." Koizumi is opposed to increasing the consumption
tax. Without putting that on the table, it will be hard to broker a fiscal
reform package or a consolidation of the pension system, both of which are
things Japan needs to accomplish soon. Koizumi has been implying for some
time that postal reform is his LAST big reform, so I don't see him doing
much more in his final year. The DPJ has promised big cuts and a few
increases, but we know how hard it is to cut budgets, and here the same
constraints mentioned above apply.

I doubt we could ever agree enough on how to measure "reform" to actually
bet on it, but I would certainly advise anyone who is thinking of doing so
(by putting money into the Nikkei??) not to do so.

Len Schoppa
Associate Professor
Department of Politics
University of Virginia
schoppa@virginia.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 03:17 PM

August 19, 2005

[SSJ: 3790] Re: Factions etc.

From: Christopher P. Hood (c_p_hood@yahoo.com)
Date: 2005/08/18

> From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
> Date: 2005/08/18

Agree with the above, but not necessarily the conclusion. If a small
former LDP party ends up holding the balance of power, which is
quite possible, then reform will become very unlikely.

The one thing I would bet on after this election is another election
following not too far down the line. This would either be as a result
of disagreements between the largest party after the election & minor
party or parties it is in coalition with or due to further realignments
and political reform being pushed for by Koizumi if he comes out on
top this time around. After all, it is in his personal interest to finish
the job he has started with the calling of this election & the beginning
of the end of the faction system (potentially... as they could easily
return, even if only in a less formal manner).

Cheers,

Christopher Hood

Dr Christopher P. Hood
Director, Cardiff Japanese Studies Centre, Cardiff University
Associate Fellow, Chatham House

See http://www.hood-online.co.uk/contact.html for contact details
Homepage: http://www.hood-online.co.uk/

Approved by ssjmod at 02:22 PM

August 18, 2005

[SSJ: 3789] Factions etc.

From: Steve Reed (stevemichiko@s5.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/08/18

The Kamei and Hashimoto factions have broken up. Kamei forming
a new party was the final stroke, but they already had two separate
headquarters. The Hashimoto faction has issued directions not to
support any of the rebels, though I doubt that everyone obeys those
directions. I think Koizumi has defeated the factions. Koizumi's own
faction, the Mori faction is fine and growing, but seems to have little
influence over Koizumi. They may not disappear but Ellis and Robert's
study may well be the last study ever done of a fading phenomenon.

Talking to journalists, I am amazed at how the mass media has been
conned into thinking this election is about 300 or so LDP candidates
running against 35 rebels (another rebel retired yesterday). I am willing
to bet that the 35 rebels will not win a majority of the seats in the Diet.

There are two main possibilities, the Koizumi LDP (plus Koumei) wins
or the Democrats win. If there is a near tie, small parties may hold the
balance of power. If either the LDP or the DPJ wins, there will be
substantial reform implemented rapidly (in Japanese terms). Both are
running on reform platforms and both platforms look pretty much the
same. I would bet on reform after this election.

Steve Reed

Approved by ssjmod at 05:43 PM

[SSJ: 3788] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/18

In a previous message I said:
"I don't recall that disagreement
over policy positions caused a breakup of a faction."

Well, the "revolt" of Ozawa and his group in 1993 over electoral reform
could be viewed as a case in point, but that also was a case of a PARTY
split over policy, not just a FACTION split over policy.

Best regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 05:23 PM

[SSJ: 3787] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/17

> Ehud Harari writes:

>Ellis is correct about the recent changes. A breakup of the Hashimoto and
>Kamei faction over the postal reform issue would corrobrate Ellis'
>argument.
>
>My emphasis was on the past. Even the "colonizing" factions consisted of
>members with different policy positions. I don't recall that disagreement
>over policy positions caused a breakup of a faction.

ESK: Yes, Ehud is correct about the past--factions even if they colonized
particular policy areas on PARC were diverse as to policy positions. Sorry,
didn't realize you were discussing the past. I think the fact that this
breakup of a faction [Kamei,etc.] has occurred now over a policy issue is
indicative of the fact that the lines of cleavage in the LDP have changed
from the 'vertical' one of factional competition and rivalry in the past
which were not cleavages along policy lines and which incorporated diverse
policy positions, to 'horizontal' cleavages over policy between the PM and
Cabinet and other party leaders vs. zoku giin which incorporate diverse
factions. As Robert Pekkanen and I have pointed out in our JJS article, if
the bad news after electoral reform for those with reform expectations was
that zoku, factions, and PARC continued, the 'good news' is that conflict
within the LDP is over policy [as is the case in most other parliamentary
parties] and not primarily over personnel leadership struggles]

Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
oShort bio/photo: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss.php
o"Expert sheet" :
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-es.php
oRecent research:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-rs.php
oCurriculum Vitae:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-cv.php
oAbout IR/PS: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/about/about.php
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 05:15 PM

[SSJ: 3786] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/17

Ellis Krauss writes
> 3)I would have to disagree with Ehud Harari therefore on the question of
> the relevance of factions to policymaking. Indeed, because factions
> determine such party and legislative postings, and because some
> factions 'colonize' some key executive positions in PARC divisions and
> House committee positions more than others, the conjunction of 'zoku giin'
> and factional affiliation can occur. Indeed, it is exactly because the
> Hashimoto and Kamei factions colonized posts that we have the current
> situation in the party when Koizumi tried to break both the influence of
> the yusei zoku and the Hashimoto factions by postal reform.

Ellis is correct about the recent changes. A breakup of the Hashimoto and
Kamei faction over the postal reform issue would corrobrate Ellis' argument.

My emphasis was on the past. Even the "colonizing" factions consisted of
members with different policy positions. I don't recall that disagreement
over policy positions caused a breakup of a faction.

Best regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 01:44 PM

August 17, 2005

[SSJ: 3785] Re: The Future of Japan

From: Peter Cave (petercav@hkucc.hku.hk)
Date: 2005/08/17

In response to the remarks of Machimura, as reported by Jiro Saito:
> "There are many disputed facts in modern history. So, the teacher's
> ideology influences how modern history is taught and, as the teachers'
> union exemplifies, many teachers are biased for the left. The unwritten
> rule among boards of education is that teachers should teach Japanese
> history up to the end of the Edo era and leave out the modern period."

These remarks shed a glaring spotlight on what is wrong with much of
Japanese secondary education in the humanities. Machimura's assumption
seems to be that if something is disputed, you should avoid teaching it.
The idea that students might learn from considering why an issue is
disputed, what the grounds for the arguments are, and how a judgement among
the various points of view might be made - all this seems quite absent from
his implicit view of education. This is an obvious comment, I admit. I
might possibly be doing Machimura an injustice, of course - he might
disapprove of the 'unwritten rule' that he cites. (Not that I think it is
an unwritten rule - it's news to me that most BoEs or schools have a policy
of omitting everything after 1868.)

Approved by ssjmod at 04:17 PM

[SSJ: 3784] 11 September 2005 Election: Campaign endorsement

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/15

In 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his support for George
Bush's re-election campaign. (For one report, see Patrick Goodenough,
"Japanese Leaders Favor Bush over Kerry," CNSNews, 18 October 2004,
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=\Politics\archive\200410\POL20041018b.html.)

And on 15 August 2005, _The Washington Post_ shared with their
readers the editors' hope that the "Democratic Party of Japan is defeated
in September, partly because the DPJ "is critical of the prime minister's
pro-U.S. foreign policy" and partly because it "promises to withdraw
Japanese troops from Iraq."

Quibbles and hand wringing aside, _The Washington Post_ endorsed
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Among other citations, see Washington Post
Editors, "The Case for Action," _The Washington Post_, 5 February 2003,
page A22.

To read Monday's four-paragraph endorsement of Koizumi, click on
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/14/AR2005081400901.html

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
.....................................
//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\///\\\//\\\//\\\
\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\.~.

Approved by ssjmod at 12:27 PM

[SSJ: 3783] The Future of Japan

From: Hiro Saito (hirosophy@hotmail.com)
Date: 2005/08/15

Did anyone watch NHK's program "The Future of Japan: Japan in Asia" last
night (as well as two special programs on the Yasukuni Shrine over the
weekend)? The Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura said more or less the
following, in response to a few participants in their early 30s who asked
"Why were we not taught modern Japanese history at school?" when discussing
how ignorant Japanese are about what Japan did to Asia during the first half
of the 20th century:

"There are many disputed facts in modern history. So, the teacher's ideology
influences how modern history is taught and, as the teachers' union
exemplifies, many teachers are biased for the left. The unwritten rule among
boards of education is that teachers should teach Japanese history up to the
end of the Edo era and leave out the modern period."

At least two female participants raised objections and argued that modern
history can be a great educational material precisely because it is
disputed: students can explore the nature of historiography (or what it
means to write a history) by examining problems of evidence, interpretation,
political influence, and so on. I nodded in agreement.

But I think it's not only history but also civic education that Japanese
schools should teach differently. Lessons of civic education in Japan tend
to dwell on memorization of the Constitution, rights and duties of citizens,
organization of the political system as well as the economy; they don't
provide students with opportunities to experientially explore what it means
to participate in the process of political decision-making and solving
social problems collectively. That is, they tend to fail to educate students
to become active citizens, though things may be changing now.

Hiro Saito
Department of Sociology
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Approved by ssjmod at 11:02 AM

[SSJ: 3781] DPJ not dead yet

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/15

First, many thanks to Asano-san for correcting my error. I am suffering
from information overload, I guess, but it is always better to have your
errors corrected.

I have just gone over all of the electoral districts and the DPJ looks
better locally than it does on national TV. Usually, it is the reverse. Most
notably, the DPJ has more incumbents and more continuing candidates than
they have in the past. These candidates will be harder to ignore than some
youngster with no name recognition, which has been the norm in the past.
They are also running their share of new ex-bureaucrats.

There are too many unanswered questions to make any predictions so I decided
to ask the questions.

In approximately 36 districts (one rebel retired because she had no SMD) the
choice will be an old-LDP independent, a new-LDP Koizumi nominee, and a DPJ
candidate. The DPJ could be completely ignored in these districts but it
should depend to some degree on the DPJ candidate. What if she is an
incumbent? How will people in these districts vote in the PR tier? Most
notably, how will LDP supporters who also support the local rebel vote in
PR? I rather imagine that Kamei supporters will have a hard time writing LDP
on their PR ballots. Traditional supporters from the post office may vote
for Kamei but they may not vote for the LDP in PR.

In 14 districts, the LDP nominee is a candidate who abstained on postal
reform and therefore cannot run as a true Koizumi representative of the new
LDP. How will that work out? Many other known Koizumi opponents are running
as LDP nominees. These voters cannot vote "for postal reform" in any
meaningful way.

In approximately 240 districts the choice will be between the DPJ and the
LDP without any particular reference to postal reform. How will that work
out? In many of these districts two LDP candidates are fighting with each
other, again with no reference to postal reform. Quite a few LDP candidates
have also had serious corruption charges raised against them. A big issue
can drown out the effect of corruption charges, but will postal reform be
that important in districts with no rebel?

Koizumi is winning the national debate right now but can he keep the focus
on postal reform for a whole month? Postal reform has been excellent
political theater but as policy it proves hard to explain to voters. The DPJ
is finally getting some air time. Their slogan ("don't give up on Japan")
is dumb but the 500-day plan is a good idea. Okada is saying, "what the LDP
cannot do we can do in 500 days." This was Koizumi's slogan in the 2003
election, "What an LDP cabinet cannot do, a Koizumi cabinet can do."

>From now until election day, there will be only one voice that devoted to
the praises of postal reform, Koizumi's own. Even among his supporters,
there is little enthusiasm. There will be many voices criticizing Koizumi,
including both the opposition parties and the LDP rebels. The rebels and the
DPJ will repeat, "We are not against postal reform, only against Koizumi's
bill." The longer the campaign goes own, the better for the DPJ. (Koizumi
originally wanted an earlier election date but Koumei wanted more time.)

Approved by ssjmod at 10:55 AM

[SSJ: 3780] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Ellis Krauss (ekrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/13

A couple of brief comments to three of the posts on Koizumi this week [I've
been travelling and just saw them]:

1)I agree completely with Aurelia George Mulgan's view of Koizumi as trying
primarily to reform the political structure in a 'Westminster' direction. I
personally think this, along with postal reform which he sees as crucial to
undermining the Hashimoto faction and its relation to the evils of the '55
system' are his primarily goals as PM, much more so than economic reform

2)To Benoit Leduc's question of "why have factions survived a whole decade
after electoral reform so well? " I would refer him to my article with
Robert Pekkanen "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The
Discreet Charm of the LDP?" in the Jan 2004 issue of the Journal of
Japanese Studies in which we tried to address exactly this question [along
with why koenkai and PARC has survived] and the major answer we believe is
that although factions have mostly lost two of their three major previous
functions--electoral nomination and funding, and even the main role under
Koizumi in Cabinet post selection, and this accounts for why factional ties
have weakened so much since electoral and campaign finance reform--they
have retained their role as the 'gatekeepers' for disposition of key party
and legislative posts. If you don't belong to a faction, you can forget a
bright political career and getting any decent party and legislative
committee assignments. Robert and I are currently writing a book and and
also with Ben Nyblade of UBC articles analyzing in greater depth this and
other questions of the organization of the LDP pre-and post-electoral
reform.

3)I would have to disagree with Ehud Harari therefore on the question of
the relevance of factions to policymaking. Indeed, because factions
determine such party and legislative postings, and because some
factions 'colonize' some key executive positions in PARC divisions and
House committee positions more than others, the conjunction of 'zoku giin'
and factional affiliation can occur. Indeed, it is exactly because the
Hashimoto and Kamei factions colonized posts that we have the current
situation in the party when Koizumi tried to break both the influence of
the yusei zoku and the Hashimoto factions by postal reform.

Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
* Short bio/photo:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/ekrauss/index.html
* "Expert sheet" :
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/expertsheets/sh-krauss.html
* Recent research:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/irps/faculty/ekrauss/papers.html
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 10:47 AM

August 11, 2005

[SSJ: 3779] Re: very minor correction to "Grading Koizumi"

From: Masahiko Asano (asanom@d9.dion.ne.jp)
Date: 2005/08/11

> Mie 4th is an interesting case. Fujii won his SMD but is in a
> tag-team arrangement with Kaneko.

That should have been "Gifu 4th" - Mas

Approved by ssjmod at 05:30 PM

[SSJ: 3778] On carpetbagging (Re: Koizumi election - 7 thoughts)

From: Robert Weiner (rw96@cornell.edu)
Date: 2005/08/11

Paul Midford wrote:

> This evening's Kobe Shimbun notes that Yuriko Koike, the
> Environmental Minister, who was elected in the Kansai PR bloc, and did
> not run in Hyogo 6th under a Costa Rica agreement in the last
> election, will now be running against an opponent of postal
> privatization in the 10th Tokyo district! This is the first time I
> have seen this sort of carpet bagging in Japan (although perhaps
> others on this list can remember other examples).

Switching districts within the same prefecture is more common. Switches
across prefectures do occur, but only occasionally, and usually by
desperate fringe candidates. Koike is helped by (among other advantages)
her background as a newscaster. Last I saw, Hatoyama Kunio was planning
to switch from Tokyo to Fukuoka (his grandfather's home turf), though that
may have changed in the last few days -

- Rob

Approved by ssjmod at 05:25 PM

[SSJ: 3776] Margin of victory for 37 ronin

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/08/11

Does anyone know the 2003 margin of victory of the LDP in the 37
districts at stake (and possibly 14 more since the LDP has said that
abstainers must pledge in writing to support K's postal plan in order to
get the LDP endorsement)? If it's small, then dividing the LDP vote
could hand the seat over to the DPJ.

Richard Katz

Approved by ssjmod at 02:20 PM

[SSJ: 3775] Grading Koizumi

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/11

Koizumi is still getting A's.

First, he has gotten the party to deny the nomination to all of those who
voted against postal reform. This is not unprecedented but it is rare and it
is different under the new electoral system. In 1980 Prime Minister Ohira
was furious at those who absented themselves from the Diet (including
Koizumi) and allowed a motion of no confidence to pass. He wanted to deny
them all the LDP nomination but cooler heads prevailed. (Katou Kouichi
talked about the 1980 events on TV.) In 1993 those who helped pass a motion
of no confidence in their own government were indeed denied the nomination.
They ran as independents and those that won were allowed back into the LDP.
This seems to have been the precedent that the current back bench rebellion
was counting on. Talk of a new party seems to have been talk of a temporary
new party that would disappear right after the election as everyone returned
to the LDP. There are precedents for parties that serve as temporary homes
for independents as well.

Yet, the heiritsu-sei is different. Most importantly, independents cannot
win PR seats. Several of the rebels were elected in PR because they finished
second in their SMD. Mie 4th is an interesting case. Fujii won his SMD but
is in a tag-team arrangement with Kaneko. It is Kaneko's turn to run in the
SMD and Fujii is supposed to run in PR but cannot. Koizumi will not have any
trouble finding an LDP candidate to run against Fujii in this district.
There are several other similar cases. In some cases the LDP candidate was
running in PR because the LDP was supporting a Koumei candidate in his
district. The Koumei candidate now has to face an LDP PR incumbent.

Koizumi has gone one step further. He is seriously trying to run an LDP
candidate against every single rebel. The LDP has never systematically
attempted to unseat back bench rebels. (Factions have been known to target
factional rebels.) Under the heiritsu-sei, running a nominee against an
incumbent sounds like electoral suicide but Koizumi has gotten the party to
commit to doing it. Cooler heads are not prevailing. Local LDP organizations
are lining up behind their incumbent rebels but the central party seems dead
set on running a pro-reform nominee in every district (counting Koumei as
pro-reform). One prominent rebel in Tokyo 10th is now running against a
member of the cabinet who had been looking for an SMD to run in. If he
really gets someone to run against established incumbents, the LDP will have
moved a giant step toward becoming a coherent political party. I would have
bet against him a week ago but no longer.

All Japan experts know how this works. The LDP runs two candidates in a SMD,
dividing the vote and giving the seat to the Democrats. It is called
tomodaore. I have looked at previous cases in which the LDP runs two
candidates in a district (one running as an independent). At least in rural
areas the result tends to be that the Democratic candidate is ignored
completely and comes in third, or even fourth after the Communist. Remember
that the Democrat's primary (only?) advantage is their claim to be the
alternative to the LDP. We will see cases in which the rebel wins his SMD,
the LDP nominee comes in second winning a PR seat and the DPJ comes in
third. The question is how many such cases will we see and how will the seat
totals add up.

I have been confidently predicting a Democratic victory. All they have to
say is: "See, we told you. No matter who is prime minister, the LDP cannot
enact real reform. You know they can't. We think we can. Give us a
chance." This is the Ozawa line and I think it is a winner. Yet my
confidence has faded for two reasons. First, the Democrats have not been
saying this yet and have instead concentrated on issues that bore the
public. Parties have been known to lose winnable elections by running bad
campaigns. Second, and more importantly, Koizumi has made a powerful effort
to define postal reform as the litmus test of reform and cast the Democrats
as no different from the LDP backbench rebels. As unlikely as this may
sound, it is working so far. Running someone in every district is to give
each and every voter the chance to vote for or against postal reform. Giving
the voters a clear and simple choice is good electoral politics.

The Democrats always have trouble getting air time on TV. The news is all
about internal LDP battles. Elections normally solve their problem because
you have to give the opposition equal time. So far, however, the news is
still all about Koizumi versus the rebels. I wonder what they will say when
they get the chance.

In one sense, Koizumi's LDP is more coherent than it has ever been: all
official candidates "agree" on at least one issue: postal reform. We have
already had one candidate who abstained on postal reform experience a change
of heart in order to get a nomination.

LDP prefectural federations are lining up behind their incumbents and in the
past local support always trumped central party support. I know of no
exceptions. We will soon see whether parameters have changed.

Finally, I wonder what will happen in districts where there is no
anti-Koizumi LDP candidate?

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 02:15 PM

[SSJ: 3774] Re: Koizumi election - 7 thoughts

From: Paul Midford (midfordp@ksc.kwansei.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/11

I few quick thoughts on Yves' thoughtful post.

> 3. More on bicameralism: it is now clear that the threat of
dissolution (the key power of the Prime Minister in a parliamentary
system, together with the power of appointment and dismissal of the
cabinet) does not work well in a true bicameral system. The PM threat
is less credible with UH members who are safe from the threat. The UH
rebels can hurt the PM without directly paying the price. They shift
the price to their colleagues.

I entirely agree with this observation, and would only add that it has
been interesting watching the debate on Constitutional reform
regarding bicameralism. Predictably, early proposals for weakening
the upper house have more or less disappeared as it has become
apparent that Komei and upper house members from the LDP and DPJ would
not support the idea.

> 4. The mystery of postal reforms: as pointed by others yesterday,
postal reforms are a strange battle field. They hurt the LDP badly,
yet are not supported by the public. First, the public sees them as a
very low priority and has little interest. Second, when pushed, the
public opposes them. The latest opinion poll showed 72% opposition to
the reforms.

Which poll is this? The polling results I have seen (such as NTV)
show that a plurality in the low 40s has supported postal reform. A
snap poll I saw in Kobe Shimbun this evening (I think it was a Kyodo
poll) showed support for postal reform rising from the mid 40%s to
over 50% since dissolution; the poll also showed support for
dissolution but also "understanding" for the position of diehard
opponents of postal reform. Although Yves is right that postal reform
is not a priority for the public, this is only true for most
supporters of postal reform. Opponents on the other hand tend to be
very strongly opposed.

> 5. Looking forward: a likely and dangerous twist. Obviously, Koizumi
whose primary qualities include the art of political maneuvering
(kabuki expert) and the art of strategy, has a few more moves up his
sleeves for the coming month. My hunch is that Koizumi will use a Karl
Rove-like strategy to try to win the elections, namely use foreign
policy, patriotism and nationalism ("values") to whip up public
support, since public support won't come for the sake of postal
reforms. Here are the steps: - state that the election is about postal
reforms, then start raising new issues - cater to the very base of the
conservatives, splitting them from their base, by going to Yasukuni on
August 15 and taking the nationalist mantle.

I believe this would be a loosing strategy for Koizumi. It might have
some positive effect on the Conservative base, but why would a voter
in a rural district with a pro-postal nationalist LDP politician who
prays at Yasukuni regularly vote for an anti-postal pro-Koizumi
candidate simply because Koizumi goes to Yasukuni or raises other
nationalist symbols? The postal issue in these districts is likely to
trump nationalism. Postal reform opponents in other rural districts
are also likely to support DPJ reform opponents over LDP candidates
who supported reform, again, Koizumi's nationalist gestures not
withstanding.

More importantly, beyond the conservative base, and against all
expectations (including mine in the wake of the anti-Japan
demonstrations in China this Spring), Japanese public opinion has
clearly entered backlash mode against nationalist policies. Koizumi,
not China, got most of the blame for the demonstrations and the bad
state of relations. Last fall the public was evenly split about
whether Koizumi should continue visiting Yasukuni, now a clear majority
says he should stop going. In short, Yasukuni and bad relations with
Asia are one of Koizumi's biggest weak spots. The DPJ will make
repairing relations with Asia a central theme and might even talk up
their pledge that a DPJ PM will not visit Yasukuni. It's not just the
DPJ that has criticize Koizumi on this. The business community has
become increasingly critical. When even Nakasone and Koga, the head
of the Japan Bereaved Families Association, start criticizing Koizumi
for visiting Yasukuni and ignoring Asian objections, you know he's in
trouble.

One more observation, in part in reaction to a post by Robert Weiner.
This evening's Kobe Shimbun notes that Yuriko Koike, the
Environmental Minister, who was elected in the Kansai PR bloc, and did
not run in Hyogo 6th under a Costa Rica agreement in the last
election, will now be running against an opponent of postal
privatization in the 10th Tokyo district! This is the first time I
have seen this sort of carpet bagging in Japan (although perhaps
others on this list can remember other examples). This would seem an
act of desperation, since Koike, as a new comer to the district (not
to mention being from Kansai!) will have an up hill battle. Since the
DPJ generally runs well in all Tokyo districts this would seem to
offer them a golden opportunity to pickup this seat. It is also
interesting to see if PR incumbents will be widely used for
carpetbagging this time.

Best,

Paul

As of August 15, 2005:

Office:

Paul Midford
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll, NTNU
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

**************
Paul Midford
Professor
School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University
Phone, Fax: +81-79-565-7957, 7605

Approved by ssjmod at 02:09 PM

[SSJ: 3773] Re: very minor correction to "minor subplot"

From: Robert Weiner (rw96@cornell.edu)
Date: 2005/08/10

> Socialist vice-party-leader Yokomitsu Katsuhito has left the party

That should've been "Katsuhiko" - Rob

Approved by ssjmod at 01:59 PM

August 10, 2005

[SSJ: 3772] Re: Koizumi election - 7 thoughts

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/10

Several points raised in Dr. Yves Tiberghien's analysis stimulate
further questions.

If Koizumi does lose his bet in calling the snap election, it will
be interesting to what extent his defeat will be due to voters who don't
care much about postal reform but who take advantage of the opportunity to
express their unhappiness with the LDP for other reasons.

One area where interested Japanese publics diverge from the LDP
more strongly is in anticipation of further LDP efforts to make amending
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution seem acceptable.

For example, a report on a recent anti-war rally in Tokyo noted
"more than 3,000 local groups" that were formed "to seek public support
for Article 9" (Japan Times Staff, _The Japan Times_, online edition, 31
July 2005,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050731a3.htm ).

Unless I am mistaken, even parties like Komeito will more likely
follow public opinion on Article 9 than go out in front on this issue.

But assuming that Koizumi emphasizes nationalism in the campaign,
what if anything will the PM say about Article 9? And if he does mention
Article 9, how saliently will he do so?

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
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Approved by ssjmod at 02:46 PM

[SSJ: 3771] minor subplot: socialist extinction?

From: Robert Weiner (rw96@cornell.edu)
Date: 2005/08/10

A minor subplot: The Yomiuri reports that Socialist vice-party-leader
Yokomitsu Katsuhito has left the party and will run as a DPJ candidate in
the Oita 3 SMD (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20050809i105.htm).
Yokomitsu says (for what it's worth) that "running under the Socialist
label would be difficult." This from a PR incumbent in the Socialists'
strongest region and second-strongest prefecture (after Okinawa), and who
came within about a percentage point of beating the LDP head-to-head in
that SMD last time.

I've been surprised in recent elections that the Socialists held onto as
many seats as they did, few as these were. Their time may finally be up.
Since the party is already an effective non-entity in the Diet, the most
immediate question here may be whether Socialist voters -- still a
significant bloc in some districts -- are prepared to switch to the DPJ
when their candidates drop out or switch themselves -

- Rob

Approved by ssjmod at 02:41 PM

[SSJ: 3770] LDP regulars and dissidents

From: Robert Weiner (rw96@cornell.edu)
Date: 2005/08/10

I sent these comments to NBR's Japan Forum in response to a post there by
John de Hoog -- apologies to those of you on NBR's list already.

John wrote there:
> [ . . . .] I don't think it is
> likely that the LDP members who voted against the postal reform bills,
> and who are therefore not being allowed to run as official LDP
> candidates by the party leadership, will form a new party. What's more
> likely to happen is that they will be backed by their local LDP chapters
> in their home districts, and the party leaders back in Tokyo will be
> forced either to run someone against them or not to back any candidate
> in those districts.

I don't necessarily disagree, but what's the explicit reasoning? Forming
a new party would have at least one clear advantage: it'd allow the
dissidents to gain PR seats, something that'd certainly be possible in
some regions. On other hand, a new party would make their dissident
status more explicit, which (all else equal) could make the LDP more eager
to run opponents and less eager to take the dissidents back later. It
might also force the dissidents to spend time and effort better directed
to their individual campaigns. Do people think these disadvantages
outweigh access to PR seats? And are there other, more salient pros and
cons?

John also wondered whether LDP leaders might be "foolish enough to
run candidates opposing the wayward members, thereby splitting the LDP
votes." Again, I don't necessarily disagree that this would be foolish --
I'm just not sure, so my first thought is "*how* foolish, exactly?" In
some districts, the DPJ is likely too weak to win even with the gift of a
split LDP vote. When dissidents come from such weak-DPJ districts, the
regular LDP can run a candidate without fear of throwing the race to the
DPJ. The question is how many such districts there are. Has anyone out
there (including shuukanshi reporters) analyzed this already?

- Rob

Approved by ssjmod at 02:38 PM

[SSJ: 3768] Re: using newspaper files for content

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2005/08/09

Thank you very much. That is quite helpful. Best of luck with your
research. jc

________________________________________
From John Creighton Campbell
Professor and Associate Chair, Political Science
University of Michigan.
7725 Haven Hall, 505 S State St
Ann Arbor MI 48109-1045.
734-615-9134; fax 734-764-3522, home 734-662-5076.
jccamp@umich.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 01:34 PM

[SSJ: 3767] Koizumi election - 7 thoughts

From: Yves Tiberghien (ytiberghien@wcfia.harvard.edu)
Date: 2005/08/09

SEVEN THOUGHTS ON THE COMING ELECTIONS:

Thanks to Purnendra for starting this debate on the Koizumi elections and to
Benoit and Steve for very enlightening comments on the overall evaluation of
Koizumi's era.

We seem to stand at another fascinating moment in Japanese politics, one
that could prove as exciting as the 1993 moment (or even more if the DPJ
comes on top). Is it just one new twist in a long protracted transition in
slow motion or is it a decisive political break?

For four years, the battle of chicken between Koizumi and LDP conservatives
seemed destined to last in a state of stable equilibrium. Koizumi holds them
in check by threatening election and the conservatives partly control the
legislative agenda and extract concessions at all stages. The actual threat
of election was supposed to stay off the equilibrium path. It is a strange
moment when we suddenly switch into this off-the-equilibrium path behavior.

Here are seven early thoughts on the election. I look forward to further
debates:

1. There is a great irony in the Upper House (UH) vote: the UH members owe
their positions to elections in 2001 and 2004 where they survived largely
thanks to Koizumi's power. Of course, this must be checked at the individual
level. It may be that the 18 dissenters and 8 abstainers actually had secure
seats and did not depend on Koizumi for their reelections. In some ways, the
careful trick built by the LDP to use Koizumi as the poster reform boy to
stay in power is falling apart. A vote in 2001 or 2004 for Koizumi was a
vote for the LDP, partly for LDP conservatives, thanks to the parliamentary
system. The mask fell this week.

2. Under Koizumi, we saw the Japanese political system becoming more
Westminster-like. It if often a good exam question to ask why Japan behaves
so differently from, say, Canada, the UK, or Australia, when its
constitution is so similar? The key question is that of Prime Minister
leadership. For long, it was clear that bureaucratic dominance (which
predated the 1947 constitution) was part of the answer. The Hashimoto
reforms (as pointed by Benoit) dealt with this to an extent larger than
initially though. The next answer was to look at party norms and party rules
within the LDP. Koizumi fiercely attacked those and had considerable success
in suddenly aligning political behavior with constitutional rules. Now, a
third key difference comes to the fore: bicameralism. True bicameralism
appears as a key difference with the UK, Canada, or Australia.

3. More on bicameralism: it is now clear that the threat of dissolution (the
key power of the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system, together with the
power of appointment and dismissal of the cabinet) does not work well in a
true bicameral system. The PM threat is less credible with UH members who
are safe from the threat. The UH rebels can hurt the PM without directly
paying the price. They shift the price to their colleagues.

4. The mystery of postal reforms: as pointed by others yesterday, postal
reforms are a strange battle field. They hurt the LDP badly, yet are not
supported by the public. First, the public sees them as a very low priority
and has little interest. Second, when pushed, the public opposes them. The
latest opinion poll showed 72% opposition to the reforms. It is therefore a
strange choice for Koizumi to make a stand on. The Koizumi logic was always
to leverage public support against the LDP's old guard. In addition, the
reforms were themselves heavily watered down and further compromises
appeared under negotiations up to Monday. Furthermore, Koizumi rushed the
process at the end. Increasingly, to me, the great postal battle seems to be
a political trap chosen by Koizumi to defeat the LDP's old guard and reshape
the LDP. The Koizumi strategy is to use this battle to expel key
conservatives and win the election without them. If he succeeds, he will
have won a big victory over his adversaries. In fact, the strategy seems to
have been chosen 2 years back in the Fall of 2003 after the elections, when
the economy went on an upturn, as confirmed to me by a close adviser to the
PM at the time.

5. Looking forward: a likely and dangerous twist. Obviously, Koizumi whose
primary qualities include the art of political maneuvering (kabuki expert)
and the art of strategy, has a few more moves up his sleeves for the coming
month. My hunch is that Koizumi will use a Karl Rove-like strategy to try to
win the elections, namely use foreign policy, patriotism and nationalism
("values") to whip up public support, since public support won't come for
the sake of postal reforms. Here are the steps:
- state that the election is about postal reforms, then start raising new
issues
- cater to the very base of the conservatives, splitting them from their
base, by going to Yasukuni on August 15 and taking the nationalist mantle.
There is little to loose, now that China said loud and clear that it would
veto the UN reforms and that the G4 failed to gain the support of the
African Union.
- then whip up public support by playing up China's veto of UN reforms and
terrorist threats.
- expect another possible foreign policy coup (similar to Koizumi's surprise
visit to North Korea a few years back).
** Note the choice of Sept 11 for the election date.
This use of nationalism in order to gain support for unpopular economic
reforms is of course worrying for the health of democracy. It is happening
in the US, but also in some European countries (see Sarkozy in France, even
Aznar in Spain until last year).

6. A potential model for Koizumi: Tony Blair. In fact, Tony Blair could
overcome a deep split within his own party and still win the election
decisively because the opposition was so weak and divided. That is because
the wedge issue (Iraq in the UK, postal reforms in Japan) is one that cannot
be used by the opposition against the PM, since the opposition might have
acted in the same way as the PM. Here again, the DPJ may not be able to gain
from the LDP fiasco.

7. Finally, a lively scenario: if Koizumi loses his bet and the DPJ
marginally comes on top. We would then enter into very fun waters. First,
the Komeito behavior will be fascinating to follow. Will the Komeito really
become the FDP of Japan? Second, it would be great case study for Japanese
bicameralism. Indeed, even a DPJ-Komeito-Socialist coalition in the LH would
have no UH majority. That would make for a very unstable coalition that
might last not even 10 months at in 1993-1994. That may be the last Koizumi
trick: coming back in power in 2006 after a DPJ collapse with a new revamped
LDP.

Yves T.

--------
Yves Tiberghien, Ph.D.
Academy Scholar
Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs

Tel in France/Europe: +33-2-98-06-78-48
Cell phone: +33-6-27-76-57-51

1033 Massachusetts Avenue
CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138
TEL: 617-868-5939
FAX: 617-495-8292
Email: ytiberghien@wcfia.harvard.edu
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/academy
Personal Web site: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/tiberg/
GMO Politics Website: www.gmopolitics.com

Assistant Professor (on leave)
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia,
Email: yvestibe@politics.ubc.ca

Approved by ssjmod at 01:13 PM

August 09, 2005

[SSJ: 3766] LDP election threats

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/08

The article cited below selectively quotes from three newspapers
in Japan:

Agence France-Presse, "Japan PM Koizumi vows to be 'merciless'
against ruling party dissenters," _Yahoo! News_, 9 August 2005,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20050809/wl_asia_afp/japanvotekoizumi;_ylt=AnFcco93v3fhu.Eu9FcR3IwBxg8F;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
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Approved by ssjmod at 06:27 PM

[SSJ: 3765] Elections - 11 September 2005 - Two discussions

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/08

See Peter Garnham, "Analysts Fear for Yen after Vote," _Yahoo!
News_, 8 August 2005, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/080705A.shtml

Shuzo Mochida, "Postal Reform Fiasco Begs the Question: IS LDP Fit
to Govern?" (editorial), _The Asahi Shimbun_, online edition, 8 August
2005, 12:25 p.m. ET,
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200508080201.html

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
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Approved by ssjmod at 11:50 AM

[SSJ: 3764] Re: using newspaper files for content analysis

From: Shunichi Takekawa (stakekaw@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/08

I do not have much idea about "kaigo hoken mondai" in general. I do not
know anything about the format of Asahi or Mainichi CD-ROM. In this
message I let you know something based on my experience for my
dissertation research. Though, this may not apply to your case.

I am analyzing editorials and articles of Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun for some
topics. But I am not primarily interested in those topics but trying to figure
out how their editorials affected their news coverage.

I once checked their online archives such as Kikuzo (Asahi) and Yomidas
Bunshokan (Yomiuri) to see what kind of articles they published to cover
Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho mondai (New History Textbook problem) in 2001.
Then I found I should set up multiple keywords to find articles that I wanted
to read.

For example, "atarashii rekishi kyokasho" is not necessarily the best key
word since reporters of the two dailies used different words to refer to
this problem such as "rekishi kyokasho mondai", "kyokasho mondai", or
"kentei de gokakushita rekishi kyokasyo no ichibu". It seemed "kyokasho"
was the best key word. But "kyokasho" is too general so this brought too
many articles that I do not need to see.

Besides, when they covered this issue very extensively like the textbook
passed Monbusho Kentei, the dailies added many articles such as comments
and analyses by scholars without saying "rekishi kyokasho" or others. Since
those articles were put next to the main stories of the issue, they did not
necessarily say "kyokasho mondai."

As a result, I understood that if I relied on the online archives, I would
miss many articles. Since I planned to do qualitative and quantitative content
analyses at the same time, I should not miss too many articles. I thus
decided to go back for shukusatsuban and open each page for a certain period.

I do not know if there is another word to refer to "kaigo hoken." But I
guess it is possible for reporters to say "rojin kaigo mondai" first and discuss
"hoken" for 'rojin kaigo' especially atthe early stage of this issue.

In general, many different reporters cover the same issue in the same
newspaper if the issue is big. And, those reporters may belong to different
sections. Political reporters (seijibu kisha) may use different wordings from
social affairs reporters (shakaibu kisha) or international affairs reporters
(gaishinbu kisha) even though they report on the same issue but from
different perspectives. This may create different ways to refer to the same
issue.

---------------------------------
Shunichi Takekawa
PhD Candidate (Political Science)
University of Hawaii at Manoa
++++++++++++++++++++++++
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~stakekaw/

Approved by ssjmod at 11:41 AM

August 08, 2005

[SSJ: 3763] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Aurelia George Mulgan (a.georgemulgan@adfa.edu.au)
Date: 2005/08/08

In response to Steven Reed's illuminating analysis about grading Koizumi,
I'd like to make a couple of observations. In his willingness to attack his
own party, Koizumi stands out amongst Japanese prime ministers. I can think
of no Japanese prime minister who has made such a concerted attack on the
independent power base of his own party, namely the means by which
individual LDP Diet members have been able to build electoral coalitions
independently of the party and its leadership. In terms of his reform
agenda, Koizumi has used both postal privatisation and cuts in public works
spending to mount this attack. What's ultimately behind it? I think Koizumi
wants to centralise power within the party in the hands of the president and
his hand-picked LDP executive. His prior goal, however, is to centralise
policymaking power in the hands of the prime minister and his hand-picked
cabinet (the political executive). In this sense, party reform is ultimately
a means to an end. Koizumi is not trying to reform the party for its own
sake, but as a necessary condition to bring about wider political reform as
well as public sector/economic reform. He is a conviction politician with
the normal expectations of a prime minister in a parliamentary cabinet
system. The party the forms the government is supposed to follow it. This
goes back to a point I've made elsewhere. There can be nothing but
hard-fought, piecemeal structural reform in Japan without political reform.

Aurelia George Mulgan
University of New South Wales/ADFA

Approved by ssjmod at 06:22 PM

[SSJ: 3762] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Benoit Leduc (bleduc@uottawa.ca)
Date: 2005/08/08

I would like to share a few comments and a question that relate to this
debate. One of Hashimoto's secretaries I had interviewed a few years ago
commented that Hashimoto's greatest ability was to achieve a balance
between the expectations of the party and that of the bureaucracy. This
comment was justified by the fact that Hashimoto undertook reforms that
were sponsored by portions of the bureaucracy, often within METI. It
appears that Hashimoto would adopt very ambitious reform goals so as to
voluntarily leave space for negotiation and compromise with the LDP and
with concerned interest groups. In fact Hashimoto was sometimes criticized
for giving in to the influence of the Zoku, but the structure of the LDP
has always made it imperative to compromise. Hashimoto was only better at
listening to the parties involved in the policy process.

Hashimoto is known to have provided the PM office more influence over
policymaking by creating a number of councils within the Cabinet Office,
but he never attempted to fundamentally change the structure of the party.
His influence as faction leader was certainly too beneficial for him to
alter the structure of the LDP. In fact, Hashimoto seemed to have made
his opposition to Koizumi and all of his reforms a personal concern.

Koizumi's attempt at centralizing policymaking in the Cabinet Office could
only be possible by building on Hashimoto's reforms. Interestingly some of
the social scientists that entered the Cabinet Office under Koizumi as
consultants were the same that researched Hashimoto's reforms,
particularly the ones aiming at increasing competition in the service
sector. Koizumi attempted to build on Hashimoto's "legacy" in other ways
also. He used the greater influence of the Cabinet by having his reform
backed in the newly created economic council, he had his reform proposal
approved by Cabinet in spite of the opposition of the party, he displaced
high level bureaucrats that posed a hurdle to reform and he ultimately
imposed a majority vote in the General Council of the LDP (rather than the
more consensual manner of his predecessor).

Factions played a major role in Koizumi's defeat in the Upper House today
(August 9th) since the majority of votes against postal reform came from
the majority of previous-Hashimoto Faction members (5 votes against) and
from the majority of Kamei Faction members (12 votes against) on a total
of 22 LDP members voting against postal reform. The role of factions was
already obvious in the opposition against Koizumi since 2001, particularly
before the Hashimoto scandal arose. It now appears that Koizumi's failure
to obtain the approval of faction leaders for his reform will play a role
in bringing down the government.

With the change in the electoral system of Japan in 1993, it has been
argued that the disappearance of the multi-member districts would bring an
end to factionalism in the LDP (because the factions organized elections
against one another); it was also argued that the 1995 and 2001 LDP
financial reforms that centralized party finances would eliminate the
factions' role as election backers. The last nail to the factions' coffin
would come from a centralization of the approval of electoral lists and
the choice of LDP candidates in each district.

My question is why have factions survived a whole decade after electoral
reform so well? I am not aware whether the LDP managed to centralize the
approval of electoral lists or whether factions are active on this front;
this would be key to explaining Koizumi's defeat today, as S.Reed
suggested.

I believe that factions play a crucial role in organizing the vote in the
LDP General Council and thus still play an important role within the LDP,
but there may be other explanations.
I agree with S.Reed that an LDP electoral defeat would benefit an internal
reform of the party. If you recall, reforming the LDP has generally failed
ever since the time PM Suzuki first attempted it in 1976. In fact,
Koizumi looks more alike to Suzuki than to Hashimoto today. So much for
grading him.

I would also suggest that a change in power would benefit Japan's position
within Asia by enabling a less conservative outlook on the region and its
history, particularly in relation to Korea and China. Note that the last
economic speech by the ASEAN economic minister (Singapore) referred to
Japan only 3 times versus 25 times for China; and this in spite of the
weight of Japan's investment in the South. Fortunately it takes more than
one speech to make a trend.

Benoit Leduc

Approved by ssjmod at 06:14 PM

[SSJ: 3761] Re:using newspaper files for content analysis

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/08

John:

I don't know a lot about it and am not doing something similar. I suggest
you try the data center at SHAKEN (Tokyo U.).

Regards,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 06:04 PM

[SSJ: 3760] Re: Grading Koizumi

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/08/08

I agree with most of Steven's analysis.

Another example of Koizumi's low level of performance on administrative
reform is his position on civil service reform, which Hashimoto vigorously
promoted as an extension of administrative reform, but recently hit a snag.
My research reveals that other than lip service every now and then, Koizumi
has shown very little interest and has done very little to promote reform.
More than one insider has told me that Koizumi couldn't care less.

I also agree that factions are a far cry from what they used to be, but this
applies to electoral politics and cabinet-formation politics not to
policymaking. Members of a given faction used to take different positions on
policy issues, and as Steven points out regarding the present Hashimoto and
Kamei factions, they still do. I am even tempted to argue that the
irrelevance of factions to policymaking has become more salient. Ages ago, I
found out that, while factions had been irrelevant to policy making, they
used to become relevant at one point: close to LDP presidential elections.
If and when members'positions differed from that of their faction leader,
and that difference of position could negatively affect the presidential
prospects of the respective faction leader, those "dissidents" would close
ranks behind their faction leader or keep a low posture. This finding has
later been corroborated by other studies, prominently by Haru Fukui. But in
the LDP presidential elections in April 2001, several members of the
Hashimoto faction came out publicly against his candidacy. This, indeed, was
a far cry from what factions used to be.

Regards.

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 04:49 PM

[SSJ: 3759] Koizumi - Election

From: Purnendra Jain (purnendra.jain@adelaide.edu.au)
Date: 2005/08/08

Now that the Upper House has rejected the Postal bill, I would be
interested in hearing commentaries from my colleagues about Koizumi's
future as a general election is likely in mid-September (11 Sept?
-sounds quite ominous 9/11). Is he likely to win? Whether the LDP will
survive as a united party or will it see another split? If the LDP
remains intact, who might challenge Koizumi? I guess this will be of
interest to many of the SSJ forum members.
Purnendra Jain
University of Adelaide

Approved by ssjmod at 04:35 PM

[SSJ: 3758] Diet election on Sunday, 11 September 2005

From: Vincent K. Pollard (pollard@uhunix2)
Date: 2005/08/08

See Agence France-Presse, "Japan to Hold Snap Election on
September 11: Report," _Yahoo! News_, [dateline: Tokyo], 8 August 2005,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20050808/wl_asia_afp/japanpoliticspostvote;_ylt=Au4lrzFJefHTIJcRZQgNxRdvaA8F;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
.....................................
//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\///\\\//\\\//\\\
\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\.~.

Approved by ssjmod at 04:31 PM

[SSJ: 3757] Grading Koizumi

From: Steven R. Reed (sreed@fps.chuo-u.ac.jp)
Date: 2005/08/06

I have a couple of comments on the Hashimoto versus debate, but I must admit
that I have been busy lately and have not paid enough attention to what has
gone before. I apologize to Ellis and/or John if I misinterpret or
inadvertently ignore any of their comments.

I agree that a Prime Minister Hashimoto would have accomplished a lot more
important reforms than has Prime Minister Koizumi. However, I also think
that Prime Minister Hashimoto was not an option. If Hashimoto had led the
party into the election, the LDP would have lost. The LDP won only because
Prime Minister Koizumi ran against the LDP.

If we judge Koizumi as an administrative reformer, he must be judged a
dismal failure. Postal reform, even if accomplished and especially in its
current watered down form, is not an important reform and not even a
populist reform that will win votes for the LDP. It is, in large part, just
the prime minister's pet project.

If we judge Koizumi as a party reformer, however, he will get much better
grades, at least for effort. Postal reform is a direct attack on the LDP's
standard electoral strategy since Tanaka Kakuei. It is also a direct attack
on the Hashimoto faction. The opposition to Koizumi is centered in the
Hashimoto and Kamei factions but neither could get even a majority of their
members to vote against Postal Reform. The factions are not dead, but they
are a far cry from what they used to be.

Koizumi has also withstood backbencher pressure better than any other LDP
leader. Postal reform may be little more than the prime minister's pet
project but, as Koizumi keeps repeating, "You should have known this was
going to happen when you chose me as party leader." No other LDP leader has
ever pushed his pet project so hard and so successfully against a major
backbench rebellion. The closest parallel is Miki's refusal to cover up the
Lockheed Scandal.

If you remember back when Koizumi was selected, many commentators in this
Forum suggested that it was a conspiracy. The party would use Koizumi to win
an unwinnable election and control him thereafter. The first part of the
plot worked perfectly well. This is yet another lesson in why one need never
pay much attention to conspiracies. No conspiracy ever works out as planned
(cf. Watergate).

Pushing postal reform and reducing the power of factions is a way of turning
the LDP into a more coherent party, one that can produce an election
manifesto before an election and enact if elected. That would be a major
reform of the LDP. Again remember back a couple of years when many in this
Forum were talking about how badly the DPJ is split over policy. My
consistent response was, "The LDP has the bigger problem."

If Koizumi succeeds in reforming the LDP (and I would not bet on it), it
might well be the only successful party reform ever carried while the party
was in power. Party reform in Western Europe has consistently occurred when
in opposition, usually onl;y after consecutive defeats. (I would be
interested in knowing of any exceptions.) The closest parallel is the DC in
Italy. There repeated reforms had about as much effect as the repeated
attempts by the LDP to ban factions.

I think Koizumi has done more to reform the LDP than any previous party
leader and give him an A for effort. For a final grade, however, we must
await the test results. The first test is the election: Will the LDP be able
to refuse the nomination to those who voted against postal reform? Will they
be able to run LDP nominees against the defectors if they form a new party?
The second test is choosing the next party leader: How will Koizumi's
successor be selected? Will he follow through on reforming the party or try
to return to politics as usual? The final exam will be the next LDP
administration: Will the party make an honest effort to enact the promises
they made during the election? Stay tuned and keep your red grading pencils
handy.

SReed

Approved by ssjmod at 01:24 PM

[SSJ: 3756] using newspaper files for content analysis

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2005/08/05

I wonder if someone with more experience than I in counting Japanese
newspaper articles on particular topics using electronic databases can
give me some advice. Yoshikuni Ono and I have been trying to trace
coverage of some old-age policy issues, particularly Kaigo Hoken, from
the early 90s. So far we have just used what we can get at Michigan,
which are CD-ROM collections of full-text Asahi and Mainichi. Some of
the results are inconsistent between the two papers (looking at
year-to-year change), and some of the yearly changes within one
newspaper seem odd as well. When we looked into it, there seem to have
been changes in the criteria for "clipping" and how keywords work,
possible changes in the editions included, etc.

I'm not looking for specifics, but I'm wondering if somebody knows a
lot about this stuff, or perhaps is trying something similar and would
like to work together in figuring out the problems.

Yours, jc

From John Creighton Campbell
Professor and Associate Chair, Political Science
University of Michigan.
7725 Haven Hall, 505 S State St
Ann Arbor MI 48109-1045.
734-615-9134; fax 734-764-3522
jccamp@umich.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 01:16 PM

August 04, 2005

[SSJ: 3753] "Hiroshima Cover-up Exposed"

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/08/03

Some -- but not all -- of Greg Mitchell's "Special Report" in
_Editor & Publisher_ on Monday, 1 August 2005, is known.

The URL is
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001001583

Vincent K. Pollard
. . . . . . .

http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/
.....................................
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\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\

Approved by ssjmod at 03:20 PM

[SSJ: 3752] Re: Hashimoto

From: George Ehrhardt (ehrharg@muohio.edu)
Date: 2005/08/03

> From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
> Date: 2005/08/02
>

I suspect the following two points are not coincidental...

> As I noted, I know several METI former high
> level bureaucrats who think he is/was wonderful and would have made
> a great
> PM.
>

> he was also more likely as PM again to continue
> the zoku system and reliance on former bureaucrats, i.e., two
> characteristics of the '55 system' than Koizumi has.
>

George Ehrhardt

Approved by ssjmod at 03:12 PM

August 03, 2005

[SSJ: 3751] Re: Hashimoto

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/02

John:

Thanks for follow up on my message about Hashimoto. In the event anyone
else is interested in hypthetical political speculaton, FYI: I wasn't
particularly arguing against Hashimoto's skills or talents, or that he
might have made a good PM. As I noted, I know several METI former high
level bureaucrats who think he is/was wonderful and would have made a great
PM. I was specifically responding to the post by Alexander Kinmont which
suggested that Koizumi was rebuilding the 1955 system [I don't see that at
all!] and has brought former bureaucrats back into his administration. My
feeling was that while Hashimoto might have made some good reforms like
strengthening the kantei he was also more likely as PM again to continue
the zoku system and reliance on former bureaucrats, i.e., two
characteristics of the '55 system' than Koizumi has. Nor do I think he
would have had, for better or worse, the public support to attempt to carry
out even some of the reforms Koizumi has attempted, whatever their results.
He was unpopular by the end of the 1990s, doesn't have Koizumi's media
image, and as the recent scandal involving him indicates, was also more
likely to get into some sort of difficulty that would undermine his
dedication to 'reform.'
Best,
Ellis

Approved by ssjmod at 01:15 PM

August 02, 2005

[SSJ: 3750] Hashimoto

From: John Campbell (jccamp@umich.edu)
Date: 2005/08/01

I just sent the below to the NBR list but I don't think it belongs
there so I am sending it to SSJ in hopes somebody might want to talk
about Hashiryuu. I followed his career for quite a while because of my
interest in old people and social policy (he was the boss of that field
from early 70s into the 80s) and I think he is a more interesting
politician than his recent role would imply . jc

> Ellis Krauss wrote:
>
> 1)If not Koizumi, Japan would have had Hashimoto as he was the
> chief competitor for the LDP Presidency. It is ridiculous to say "well,
> maybe there is someone better as an alternative out there" in the
> abstract--in no political system, including the U.S., are more than a
> relatively small number of people likely to gain the highest office.
> Mr. Hashimoto may be quite smart, and I know many Japanese
> bureaucrats who would certainly have preferred him to Mr. Koizumi,
> but he also was the heir and beneficiary to exactly the '1955 system'
> that Mr. Kinmont thinks, erroneously, that Koizumi is rebuilding.

I think one could make a good argument that Japan would be much better
off, including more reformed in some respects, if Hashimoto had not
been knocked off by an electoral failure and had managed a long term
as prime minister. He was after all responsible for the strengthening
of the Kantei that several have touted.

As Hashimoto's role as hit-man for Nakasone within the LDP in the
Administrative Reform era might indicate, he is not simply a product
of Tanaka-style machine politics (less so than, say, Ozawa). And
while arrogant and generally disliked he actually has some political
skills.

I could elaborate on this argument but I doubt many Japan Forum
members are that interested in speculative political history. SSJ
Forum is a better venue and I'll stick this over there too if anyone
wants to follow up.

Yours, jc

Approved by ssjmod at 01:26 PM

August 01, 2005

[SSJ: 3749] Re: Election scenarios; Koizumi's fate

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/08/01

Just a bit of historical trivia but Prime Minister Yoshida also lost a vote
of no confidence and resigned in December 1954. I believe there may have
been one other case in the 1950s but can't recall or find what it was. The
opposition Socialist Party and other opposition parties under the 1955
system used to introduce such no confidence votes all the time as a
procedural delaying tactic since according to Diet procedures, no
confidence resolutions take precedence over all other pending legislation
and thus Diet sessions could be delayed for a few days with this tactic,
and with the short, 180 day, Diet regular Diet session such delaying
tactics could force the LDP to either shelve legislation the opposition
strongly opposed to get on to other bills it wanted passed, or have to
sacrifice the latter, or indulge in a 'snap vote' [kyookoo saiketsu'] which
was not popular with public opinion. But only once or twice in the 1950s,
Ohira in 1980 and Miyazawa in 1993, did a PM actually lose a no confidence
vote.
Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
oShort bio/photo: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss.php
o"Expert sheet" :
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-es.php
oRecent research:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-rs.php
oCurriculum Vitae:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-cv.php
oAbout IR/PS: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/about/about.php
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 03:55 PM

[SSJ: 3748] Re: Election scenarios; Koizumi's fate

From: Paul Midford (Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no)
Date: 2005/08/01

As usual, Richard Katz asks the timely and right questions. For what
it is worth, here is my take.

> 1) Is there any precedent for the PM being defeated by members of
his own > party on a bill that he effectively labeled a vote of
confidence, and then > not resigning? Is it likely that Koizumi would
dissolve the Diet, calls elections and then remain the President the
LDP and its standard-bearer in the election. I would assume he would
be under great pressure to resign.

The most comparable and probably best remembered example is Kiichi
Miyazawa's loss of a no confidence vote in the Lower House in June
1993. Although this loss was not a vote on a piece of legislation, it
was tied to his decision to put off electoral reform (i.e. moving from
the then multi-seat district system to the current single seat/PR
parallel system in place since 1996). Miyazawa did not resign, but
the LDP members who voted against him bolted from the party and formed
two new parties. Rather than take responsibility, Miyazawa and the
party leadership blamed the dissidents. It wasn't until after the LDP
failed to gain a majority in the subsequent election that Miyazawa
resigned as head of the party. Koizumi has given every indication
that he will stay on as head of the LDP and target the dissidents in
the next election.

Perhaps the biggest difference with the Miyazawa precedent is that if
the postal privatization bill fails, it will fail in the upper house,
not the lower house. The Prime Minister has no power to dissolve the
upper house, which is one reason why the bill is apparently in even
more trouble in that chamber than in the lower house. Koizumi clearly
wants to dissolve the lower house if the bill looses in the upper
house to punish the dissidents, but there is some debate about whether
this is constitutional given that the bill passed in the lower house.

> 2) How much power does the LDP executive really have to punish the
dissident Diet members? Can they expel them from the party? If so,
those expelled could presumably run as independents or in a new party.
In the case of past defections, the koenkai have gone with the
candidate, not the party. How much money do these candidates get from
the LDP under the rule changes? Who decides who gets how much? On the
PR list, who draws up the order of candidates? Can dissidents be
punished this way?

The LDP executive can deny LDP endorsement to dissident members. In
the case of PR members, this means they are off the ticket entirely.
Of course, many PR members probably have a district where they have
run or would like to run, but this is a big disincentive for PR
members to bolt party discipline. I have not looked at the breakdown,
but I would expect that few if any PR members are among the open
dissidents. Dissidents who already represent a district can run and
probably in most cases win as independents. The LDP can choose to
punish them after the election by refusing to let them back in the
party. Given a secure majority, this is almost certainly the path
Koizumi will choose. Unless they join the kaiha of another party the
dissidents would suffer the loss of various priviledges. If the LDP
is still in power, they would also no longer be on the ruling side.

An important question is whether the dissidents would try to form
their own party, a sort of anti-Koizumi old testament LDP. The
dissidents could make the difference between the LDP controlling a
majority of the lower house or not, and if so, they can probably
topple Koizumi. Koizumi could respond by leaving the LDP, as he has
often threatened to do. In short, if postal privatization fails in
the upper house we are almost guaranteed to see at least small pieces
of the LDP breaking off.

> 3) Where would the Komeito puts its votes in key urban districts in
such a scenario? I note a statement from Komeito Secretary-General
Tetsuzo Fuyushiba raising the possibility--albeit reluctantly--of
switching to an alliance with the Minshuto if the LDP were to lose.

Komeito does not appear likely to switch sides until after an
election, at earliest. On the other hand, as was noted last summer,
Komeito support for LDP candidates in last summer's Upper House
elections was substantially lower than had been the case with the
previous lower house election. According to one estimate I have seen,
almost half of Komeito voters in prefectural races without a Komei
candidate voted for non-LDP candidates.

Thinking about the voting pattern in last summer's upper house
election, the internal split in the LDP, and Minshuto's continued
momentum, I would have to say that the DPJ stands an excellent chance
of denying the LDP a majority this time, if not winning an outright
majority themselves. Although there is no reason to assume that last
summer's voting pattern would be repeated this time, the LDP will
likely have trouble keeping the votes it had last summer, much less
convincing Minshuto supporters to switch or stay home. Last summer's
pattern, if repeated would suggest the next Diet would have a Minshuto
with about 230 seats and an LDP of about 160, almost the reverse of
what we see today. In such a Diet it would seem quite likely that
Komei would switch sides.

Cheers,

Paul Midford

As of August 15, 2005:

Office:

Associate Professor Paul Midford
Head of Japan Program
Office # 10504
Department of Sociology and Political Science
Dragvoll Campus
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
NO-7491 Trondheim
Norway

Office Phone: +47 - 73 59 16 03
Fax: +47 - 73 59 25 64
Email: Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

P.S. I landed my next position as well as my current one by responding
to advertisements posted on SSJ-Forum. Based on my experience, I have
to say that SSJ-Forum is a great place to find an academic job, and
perhaps advertise for one as well.

**************
Paul Midford
Professor
School of Policy Studies
Kwansei Gakuin University
Phone, Fax: +81-79-565-7957, 7605

Approved by ssjmod at 12:36 PM

[SSJ: 3747] Re: [3746] Election scenarios; Koizumi's fate

From: Ehud Harari (msehudha@mscc.huji.ac.il)
Date: 2005/07/29

> 1) Is there any precedent for the PM being defeated by members of his own
> party on a bill that he effectively labeled a vote of confidence, and then
> not resigning? Is it likely that Koizumi would dissolve the Diet, calls
> elections and then remain the President the LDP and its standard-bearer in
> the election. I would assume he would be under great pressure to resign.
>
In 1980, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi suffered a non-confidence vote. The
issue concerned state financing, but the main reason was a power struggle
within the LDP. Ohira dissolved the Lower House, retained his position as
LDP president, and "led" the LDP's election campaign. The LDP won a
resounding victory, but Ohira did not live to capitalize on it; he died
suddenly during the campaign. One of the reasons for the LDP victory was
"sympathy vote." Had Ohira not died during the campaign and had the party's
fortunes been less impressive, the anti-Ohira forces within the LDP led by
Fukuda Takeo might have been able to pressure Ohira to resign his party
presidency and the prime ministership, or prevent his reelection as party
president (thus forcing his resignation as prime minister) when his term as
party president ended.

Regards,

Ehud Harari

Approved by ssjmod at 12:24 PM

July 29, 2005

[SSJ: 3746] Election scenarios; Koizumi's fate

From: Richard Katz (rbkatz@ix.netcom.com)
Date: 2005/07/29

A few questions for our election experts:

1) Is there any precedent for the PM being defeated by members of his own
party on a bill that he effectively labeled a vote of confidence, and then
not resigning? Is it likely that Koizumi would dissolve the Diet, calls
elections and then remain the President the LDP and its standard-bearer in
the election. I would assume he would be under great pressure to resign.

2) How much power does the LDP executive really have to punish the dissident
Diet members? Can they expel them from the party? If so, those expelled
could presumably run as independents or in a new party. In the case of past
defections, the koenkai have gone with the candidate, not the party. How
much money do these candidates get from the LDP under the rule changes? Who
decides who gets how much? On the PR list, who draws up the order of
candidates? Can dissidents be punished this way?

3) Where would the Komeito puts its votes in key urban districts in such a
scenario? I note a statement from Komeito Secretary-General Tetsuzo
Fuyushiba raising the possibility--albeit reluctantly--of switching to an
alliance with the Minshuto if the LDP were to lose.

By the way, in the last several days, the currency markets have begun to
take note of the possibility that the bill might fail. It's a negative for
the yen. Until recently, most Wall Street currency watchers were ignoring
the story; China was the big story.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report.

Approved by ssjmod at 03:14 PM

May 26, 2005

[SSJ: 3718] General Association of Korean Reseidents in Japan

From: Vincent K Pollard (pollard@hawaii.edu)
Date: 2005/05/25

The 50th-anniversary celebration of Chongryun received greetings
from Kim Yong Nam of the DPRK leadership and from PM Koizumi in his role
as President of the LDP.

For summaries, see Japan Times Staff, "Chongryun Marks 50 Years of
Promoting North Korea," _The Japan Times_, online edition, 25 May 2005,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050525a7.htm.

Vincent K. Pollard
- - - - - - - - - -

WEBSITE - http://www2.hawaii.edu/~pollard/

U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i ' i S y s t e m

//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\///\\\//\\\//\\\
\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\//\\\..

Approved by ssjmod at 04:37 PM

May 12, 2005

[SSJ: 3707] Re: [SSJ: 3705] Electoral Data

From: T.J. Pempel (pempel@berkeley.edu)
Date: 2005/05/12

I think Steve Reed has this data....

T.J. Pempel

At 05:26 PM 5/11/2005, you wrote:
>---- Message 1 of 1 ----
>
>From: gene park (idenshikoen@gmail.com)
>Date: 2005/05/09
>
>
>
>Hello,
>
>Does anyone know of databases that contain all of Japan's post-war =20
>elections data from lower house and upper house elections? I am aware
>of the Lijphart Elections Archive, but I was hoping that there
>might something out there that also includes more recent elections.
>
>Thank you in advance for any help.
>
>-Gene Park
>

T.J. Pempel
Director, Institute of East Asian Studies
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
510-642-2816
510-643-7062 Fax
pempel@socrates.berkeley.edu

Approved by ssjmod at 11:03 AM

[SSJ: 3705] Electoral Data

From: gene park (idenshikoen@gmail.com)
Date: 2005/05/09

Hello,

Does anyone know of databases that contain all of Japan's post-war =20
elections data from lower house and upper house elections? I am aware
of the Lijphart Elections Archive, but I was hoping that there
might something out there that also includes more recent elections.

Thank you in advance for any help.

-Gene Park

Approved by ssjmod at 10:02 AM

April 28, 2005

[SSJ: 3701] Re: [SSJ: 3700] Privatization of postal system

From: Ellis Krauss (EKrauss@ucsd.edu)
Date: 2005/04/28

To J. Minoru Sasanuma:

I agree that privatization of postal system is important for Koizumi's
credibility in his remaining time in office [he is already approaching
'lame duck' as it is]. However, I think your scenarios exclude one other
that is possible and which is based on variables we can't necessarily know
for sure. The variables are 1)how important the bill is to Koizumi as the
culmination of his political career 2)how much he cares whether he finishes
out his potential time in office [especially relative to 1) and 3)how
frightened much of the LDP is of a leadership succession now given the
potential PM candidates available? The missing scenario is: if this bill is
more important than staying in office for the rest of his time as LDP
president, then he might very well threaten to resign to get several of
the recalcitrants to fall into line or perhaps even do so if that doesn't
work. How effective this will be depends on 3). So I think there are too
many unknowns to make a prediction at this point.
Best,
Ellis

=============================================
Professor Ellis S. Krauss
Graduate School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies [IR/PS]
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519 USA
Email: ekrauss@ucsd.edu Home Fax: 760-943-8881
oShort bio/photo: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss.php
o"Expert sheet" :
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-es.php
oRecent research:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-rs.php
oCurriculum Vitae:
http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/academics/f-krauss-cv.php
oAbout IR/PS: http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/about/about.php
=============================================

Approved by ssjmod at 01:01 PM

[SSJ: 3700] Privatization of postal system

From: J. Minoru Sasanuma (sasanuma@pegasus.rutgers.edu)
Date: 2005/04/28

I wanted to ask the people in the forum about how the postal system
privatization bill will affect Koizumi's administration.

I think everyone was pretty much in agreement that winning the two
by-elections last Sunday was important for Koizumi. Had he lost either
one, those who are opposed to the privatization in the LDP would have
used the loss as a proof of voter's disapproval of the whole plan, and
Koizumi would have had to answer to that. Koizumi luckily didn't, but
it's clear that not too many in the party thinks the two victories are
a sign of voter's approval of privatization, either. Polls support
this. Voters simply don't care about privatization. But Koizumi is
obsessed with the idea, and he keeps on marching forward.

The opposition within the party is very significant, and I am very
curious as to how this will pan out. The party's General Council took
a very unusual step of approving the submission of the bill to the
Diet, but not its contents. It seems the key issue from now on will
be whether the party would bind the party members to vote in support of
the bill.

I see several scenarios. Which one do you think is most likely? (or
perhaps you see some other possibilities).

1) Koizumi will continue to chip away at the bill to placate the
opposition. But I find even this to be insufficient to fully satisfy
the opposition, because it seems they are simply opposed to the concept
of "privatization," even if in name only, whereas Koizumi is obsessed
with privatization, even if in name only.

2) The party succumbs to the pressure, does not bind the members to a
yes-vote, and Koizumi doesn't have enough votes. According to Asahi,
there only needs either 47 defection in the Lower House, or 20 in the
Upper (provided the non-LDP parties also vote no). Anecdotal evidence
suggests this much defection is possible. If so, Koizumi is faced with
a political embarrassment: what he staked his political career on is
rejected by his own party. Will he dissolve the Diet, which will
certainly split the LDP, or will he resign, which is probably not his
style? (He can't do niether, can he???) Either one is a major event,
considering Koizumi has provided some semblance of stability by being
in office for four years.

3) The party leadership binds the members to vote yes. This is
political hardball. I think such a scenario will limit the amount of
defections, and the bill will probably pass. But the furor from the
opposition will be certain, and they won't cooperate with anything else
that Koizumi would want to do. Koizum's term expires on September of
next year, which is more than a year from now. If this scenario pans
out, Koizumi will be the lamest duck of all lame ducks.

I see no winning situation for Koizumi. How about you?

Joe Sasanuma, Rutgers School of Law -- Newark, Boston College, Class of
2004

Approved by ssjmod at 10:05 AM

April 14, 2005

[SSJ: 3690] Party manifestos

From: Peter Cave (petercav@hkucc.hku.hk)
Date: 2005/04/13

Given the interest in the topic of political party manifestos in Japan in
recent years, forum participants might be interested in the following column
by Martin Kettle in The Guardian, which argues that manifestos in Britain
are changing their form and function (and gives some historical context
about their development).
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,1457472,00.html

Peter Cave
M.A., M.Phil., D.Phil. (Oxon)
Assistant Professor, Department of Japanese Studies
The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2859-2879
Fax: (852) 2548-7399
Email: petercav@hkucc.hku.hk
Homepage: www.hku.hk/japanese/peter.html

Approved by ssjmod at 02:06 PM

March 15, 2005

[SSJ: 3673] Manifesto?

From: Yusaku Horiuchi (yusaku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au)
Posted Date: 2005/03/14

Does anyone know where I can get the English translation of LDP's
manifesto (used for the 2004 Upper House election). I understand that
the English version of DPJ's manifesto is available online:

http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto4/index.html

If there is no complete (official?) translation of LDP's manifesto, I
would like to obtain the summary of LDP and DPJ's manifestos
(particularly, about pension reforms) in English. Does anyone know
such a thing?

Approved by ssjmod at 10:31 AM