南京大虐殺は戦後の一部の日本人が考えたような、一部の軍人だけの規律違反行為ではなかった。日本軍が南京で恐怖の虐殺をおこなったとき、城内における欧米諸国の人たちは連合して日本大使館と占領軍当局に対し交渉し暴行制止を要望したが、日本大使館からの返事は「帝国陸軍は南京に打撃を与える決心をした」ということであった。中日間の全面戦争勃発後、日本当局は一貫して中国と戦争状態に入ったことを承認しておらず、これは「膺懲」を目的とした「事変」であり、いかなる残虐手段を取ってもよく、いかなる交戦国間の国際法も無視し、交戦国の住民と捕虜に対する慣行規則も守る必要はないという態度であった。当時の中国の首都を攻略した直後に行われたこのような暴行は、日本軍閥が中国人民を洞喝し中国の抗戦意志をくじく目的でやったのである。
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The 'Nanking Massacre' was not mere disobedience against military discipline by a group of soldiers as had been partly the postwar Japanese interpretation. When terrible murders took place in Nanking, westerners staying inside the city demanded that the Japanese Embassy and the occupational authority stop the violence. In reply to the demand, the Japanese Embassy said, "The Imperial Army had already decided to attack Nanking." After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese authority not only consistently denied an entry into belligerency with China, but also regarded it as an 'incident' for the purpose of 'giving punishment'. Therefore, no rules of engagement nor the international humanitarian law in regard to the treatment of inhabitants and the POWs could be applied for this incident. Japanese violence just after the capture of the then capital city of Nanking was intended for the Japanese military clique to frighten Chinese people and to diminish their will to fight.
たしかに、三十万人も殺害しようとするならば、組織的計画的に実施しなければできない。当然、動員計画から作戦命令まで数多くの公文書があるはずだが、その主張を裏付ける「証拠」は現在に至るまで何ら提示されていない。「日本政府が中国に宣戦布告をしなかったのは、中国に対し戦時国際法を適用しないためであった」からだといって、「いかなる残虐手段を取ってもよく、いかなる交戦国間の国際法も無視し、交戦国の住民と捕虜に対する慣行規則も守る必要はない」ということにはならない。
If the massacre of 300,000 persons had been planned, systematic planning procedures would have been necessary. If so, there must have been many official documents regarding mobilization plans through operation plans. However, no such documents were presented as evidence. The Prosecution alleged that "the Japanese government did not declare war against China so as not to apply the international humanitarian law." This was one-sided speculation developed by the CCP.
なるほど日本政府は支那事変後も宣戦布告をしなかった。しかしその理由は、正式に宣戦布告して名実ともに国際法上の戦争状態に入ると、中立義務を課せられるアメリカなどの国々から軍事物資を輸入できなくなるからであった。なお中国政府も同じ事情から宣戦布告をしようと思えばできたのにしなかったし、アメリカ政府もまた支那事変を「戦争」だとみなさなかった。
It is true that Japan did not declare war, but it was because of an avoidance of an embargo on munitions of war. Once Japan officially declared war both in name and in reality, it would become forbidden to import munitions of war from neutral nations such as the U.S. Neither did the KMT for the same reason, and the U.S. government did not consider this incident as war, either. 43
ただし「事変」において、戦時国際法をいかに適用すべきかについては、当時の日本政府もかなり神経を使った。国際法上、戦時か平時かでその適用内容は全く異なっていたからである。そして日本軍(中支那方面軍)は国際法学者との協議の上、十二月七日、南京城攻略にあたり全軍に「南京城の攻略及び入城に関する注意事項」を示達した。その内容は、事変が国際法上の「戦争状態」にあることを認めた上で、「不法行為の厳禁」「外国権益の保護」「失火注意」などを命じている(資料一)。事変であっても戦時国際法は遵守すべしというのが、日本軍の公式方針であった。このような現存する命令書について触れないのはフェアではない。
Then the Japanese government was nervous about how to apply the international humanitarian law in the 'incident', because interpretation and application of the international humanitarian law were quite different depending on whether the nation was at war or not. After the consultation made with the scholar of international humanitarian law, on capturing of Nanking on December 7, the Japanese Army (the Central China Area Army) notified the whole troops of the instruction entitled All the Orders and Words of Advice Concerning the Capture of and Entry into the Walled City of Nanking. It included, with the recognition of a 'state of war', 'strict prohibition of illegal actions', 'protection of foreign rights and interests', 'caution to an accidental fire' and so on. It was an official principle of Japanese Army to have to abide by the international humanitarian laws: even this conflict was an incident. It was unfair for the Prosecution not to pay attention to the existing order.
【資料一】「南京城の攻略及び入城に関する注意事項」
一、日本軍が外国の首都に入城するのは有史以来のことで世界が注目する大事件なので、将来の模範となるような心組をもって、各部隊が乱入して同士討ちをしたり、不法行為をすることがないようにすること。
二、部隊の軍紀・風紀を特に厳粛にし、苟も名誉をけがすがごとき行為は絶対にないようにせよ。
三、外国権益及び外交機関には絶対に接近しないこと。また、国際委員会が設定した安全区には必要のある場合を除いて立ち入りを禁じ、必要地点に歩哨を配置する。
四、外国権益の位置を徹底し絶対に過誤がないようにせよ。
五、掠奪行為や不注意による失火は厳罰に処する。軍隊と同時に多数の憲兵補助憲兵を入城せしめ不法行為を摘発せしめる。
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註一 ･･････ 一九三七年十二月七日、南京総攻撃に際し中支那方面軍が全軍に示したものの要旨。原文は漢字カタカナ混じり文なので、現代語風に書き改めた。原文は『南京戦史』百四十六〜百四十七頁参照。
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All the Orders and Words of Advice Concerning the Capture of and Entry into the Walled City of Nanking
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The substance thereof was as follows:
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The entire world has been paying sharp attention with the realization that the capture and entry into a foreign capital by the Japanese Army is an event, which is quite unprecedented in the history of our country and will remain permanently as a model case in the future. In view of the above fact, all troops should absolutely refrain from forcing their way violently into the city, from fighting among themselves, and from making any illegal acts.
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Military discipline and morale of each unit should be most strictly maintained so that both Chinese soldiers and civilians may respect the dignified manner of the Japanese troops and may also pledge allegiance to them. Thus, any such acts as would dishonor the Japanese Army should never be taken under any circumstances.
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You are never permitted to approach any places for foreign rights and interests particularly diplomatic organs that are illustrated in an annexed sketched map. You should never enter any neutral zones where diplomatic corps have been established unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (At that time, the Japanese Army has perceived that the Safety Zone was established by diplomatic corps, but in fact, by the Safety Zone Committee.) Sentries should be posted in all necessary points. Moreover, you are prohibited to enter Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and the mausoleum of the Emperor Hsiao of the Ming Chao Era and other resting places of patriotic revolutionists that are situated outside of the walled city of Nanking.
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Units to enter the walled city should be especially selected by the divisional commanders. The words of advice for the capture of the walled city of Nanking especially all the places of foreign rights and interests inside the wall, should be thoroughly given beforehand to all in order that no mistakes may be made for any reason whatever. If necessary, sentries should be posted.
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Severe punishment is to be given to those who loot or who cause a fire to break out, even because of their carelessness. A great number of military policemen should be made to enter the walled city at the same time as troops in order to prevent all unlawful acts.
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そもそも日本には、中国で民間人を大量殺害しなければならない動機がなかった。最近よく対比されるナチス・ドイツのホロコーストには「ユダヤ人絶滅政策」という"動機"があった。もし〈南京大虐殺〉があったならば、必ずそこにも何らかの動機があったはずだ。実は告発側に最も欠落しているのが、この動機論なのである。日本には「中国人絶滅政策」などなかった。動機について告発側は「中国人民を洞喝するため」と説明する。しかしそのことを裏付ける証拠は何も示されていない。
In those days Japan had no motive for conducting the mass killing of the Chinese citizens. In Germany, the holocaust, which might be frequently compared with the so-called 'Nanking Massacre' recently, was driven from a 'dominant motive' under the 'policy for extermination of Jewish people'. If the 'Nanking Massacre, had actually existed, there might have been some motivation. Indeed it was an argument of motivation that the Prosecution never tried to dispute so far. The Japanese had no 'policy to exterminate the Chinese'. The Prosecution explained that the motive was to threaten Chinese people. But no evidences were shown to prove it.
逆に日本には、不法行為発生を避けなければならない動機ならば存在した。
On the contrary, Japan had a motive to avoid illegal actions.
資源の少ない日本は当時、輸入の六十五％は英米圏からであり、武器や燃料の多くを英米圏に依存していた。満洲事変では対日禁輸を検討したうえで見送ったアメリカ政府は、支那事変が勃発してからは本格的な対日経済制裁を検討し始めていた。もし日本軍が南京で国際法に違反して、市民や捕虜に対する残虐行為を繰り返し、南京に残留した欧米人たちから指弾されるようなことになれば、英米から経済制裁を受けることになりかねず、致命的な打撃を受ける。こうした状況を熟知していた日本政府にとって、首都南京での無用の不法行為は絶対に避ける必要があったのである。
In those days Japan, running short in natural resources, entirely relied on the U.S. and Europe for the import of munitions and fuel, actually 65% of the import was from the U.S. and Europe. The embargo from the U.S. was barely avoided at the close of the Manchurian Incident, but at the start of the China Incident, the U.S. government began to think of drastic economic sanctions against Japan. In this situation, if the Japanese Army had constituted an infringement of international humanitarian laws in the manner of repeatedly committing atrocities to citizens and POWs, westerners would have been critical and the U.S. and Europe would have started economic sanctions against Japan accordingly. The fatal damage to Japan would have been inevitable. Having been well aware of these circumstances, the Japanese government had to absolutely avoid unnecessary and unlawful acts.
【争点六】
敗残兵掃蕩作戦は組織的殺人だったのか
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Argument 6
Was the mopping-up operation a systematic murder?
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日本軍は十三日から十六日までの四日間、南京城の内外で戦闘の一環として組織的に掃蕩作戦を実施し、民間人を装って潜伏した中国兵を多数摘発、その一部を処刑している。これらの作戦は民間人を殺害する目的ではなかったが、民間人を装った中国兵を逮捕したため、あたかも日本軍が民間人を組織的に殺害したかのような誤解を、南京城内に残留した欧米人たちに与えたようである。
For four days, from December 13 through 16, the Japanese troops had the systematic mopping-up operation and found many Chinese soldiers hiding disguised as citizens. And some of them were put to death. In the operation, the Japanese troops had no intention of killing non-combatants. But arresting the hiding soldiers disguised as non-combatants created a great deal of misunderstanding among the westerners, giving the impression the Japanese troops had systematically committed the murder of civilians.
告発側は次のように主張する。
The Prosecution asserted as follows:
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十二月十三日朝、日本軍が南京城内に入ってきた。中国軍の城内での抵抗はすでに停止したにもかかわらず、日本軍は「掃蕩」の名義で城内において虐殺や強姦を重ね、財物を意のままに略奪した。四個師団の日本軍は十二月二十一日まで城内でそのような大規模な恐怖活動を続けた。そのあと城内に残った第十六師団は引き続き虐殺や略奪を組織的に行い大虐殺は六週間続いた。
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On the morning of December 13, the Japanese Army entered the city. Even after the Chinese Army had already ceased resistance, the Japanese Army repeated atrocities, rapes, and looting in the name of 'mopping-up' operation. Inside the city, four divisions of Japanese troops continued such horrific activities in the large scale until December 21. And then the 16th Division remained inside the city and continued subsequently systematic massacres and looting for six weeks.
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日本軍は城内に入ると、まず退避中の住民に対して発砲し手榴弾を投げたので、路上は一面に死体が溢れた。続いて日本軍は城内を軒並み捜索し、なんの防備もない「国際安全区」に入って、軍人と疑われた大勢の青壮年、避難民および武器を放棄した将兵を、数珠つなぎに縛って南京の郊外に連行し集団虐殺を行った。
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As the Japanese Army entered the city and threw hand grenades at inhabitants taking shelter, the streets were filled with dead bodies. Following this thrust, the Japanese troops made a search for stragglers from door to door and entered in the defenseless Safety Zone. Many young people suspected to be soldiers, refugees, and disarmed soldiers, were all chained one to another with the ropes and taken out of the city of Nanking and killed.
国際法上適法だとは言え、日本軍はなぜ誤解されるような掃蕩作戦を敢えて実施したのか。その理由は主として三つある。
Why did the Japanese Army dare to practice the mopping-up operation, which would easily cause misunderstanding, even though it was legal under the international humanitarian law? Three reasons would be explained.
第一は、中国側が停戦に応ぜず、敢えて南京を戦場にしたことである。日本軍は十二月九日正午に、無用な犠牲者が出ることを避けるため飛行機で「投降勧告文」を投下した。中国国民政府側が日本軍の勧告を受け入れ開城すれば南京戦は避けられたが、中国側は勧告を無視した。降伏勧告を拒否して防衛軍が立て寵もれば国際法上の「防守都市」となり、無差別攻撃を受けても文句は言えない。残留市民にまで戦火が及ぶことを知りながら、降伏を拒んだ蒋介石の責任がまず問われるべきである。
First, the KMT refused to cease fire and dared to make Nanking a battlefield. On December 9, at noon, the Japanese Army scattered 'Bills advising surrender of the Chinese Army' from the plane in order to avoid unnecessary victims. 45
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Bills advising surrender of the Chinese Army
The Japanese Army, one million strong, has already conquered Chiangnan. We have surrounded the city of Nanking... The Japanese Army shall show no mercy toward those who offer resistance, treating them with extreme severity, but shall harm neither innocent civilians nor Chinese military personal who manifest no hostility. It is our earnest desire to preserve the East Asian culture. If your troops continue to fight, war in Nanking is inevitable. The culture that has endured for a millennium will be reduced to ashes, and the government that has lasted for a decade will vanish into thin air. This commander-in-chief issues Bills to your troops on behalf of the Japanese Army. Open the gates to Nanking in a peaceful manner, and obey the Following instructions.
If the KMT had accepted the Japanese summons and opened the fort, there would have been able to avoid the battle in Nanking, but the KMT ignored them. When the defense force entrenched themselves in the city, the city was turned into a 'Defense City' in term of the international humanitarian laws, and they could not make any complaint as to an indiscriminate attack. First of all, Chiang Kai-Shek should have assumed the responsibility for refusing to open the city, while knowing that the citizens would become victims.
第二の理由は、南京防衛軍の最高指揮官・唐生智が陥落直前の十二日午後八時、「各隊各個に包囲を突破して、目的地に集結せよ」という無責任な命令を下して幕僚と共に南京から脱出してしまったことである。最高指揮官を失った中国軍は、日本軍によって包囲された南京に取り残され、ある部隊は組織的戦闘を続行し、またある部隊はパニックに陥って逃走、掠奪に走った。
The second reason was that Tang Sheng-zhi, the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison, made the irresponsible order toward each unit on December 12, at 8:00 p.m. just before the fall of Nanking, saying "each unit must break through the surrounding army by itself and then re-assemble at the target point," and he, himself, fled with his staff officers from Nanking. Without the commander-in-chief, the Nanking Garrison was left behind in the city surrounded by the Japanese Army, then some Chinese troops continued systematic battles, and others ran away in panic into looting.
日本軍としては正式な降伏意志が示されない以上、戦闘行動を続けざるを得ない。そして中国軍は掃蕩作戦を開始した十三日の時点でも戦闘を続けていた。現に南京郊外の湯水鎮で十三日、上海派遣軍司令部は、中国軍に襲撃されている [三十七]。
As long as the enemy did not announce formal surrender, the Japanese Army had to continue the battle. As of December 13, the Chinese Army was keeping a state of war. Actually at Tang-chui-chen in the suburbs of Nanking on the 13th, the headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was attacked by Chinese troops.
もし仮に中国軍の最高指揮官が明確に降伏意思を伝え、日中両軍の間で停戦が合意され、日本軍の指揮下で南京城内に立て籠もった中国軍が整然と武装解除に応じていれば、掃蕩作戦を展開する必要はなかっただろう。
If Tang Sheng-zhi had clearly shown the intention of surrender to the Japanese Army, and the cease-fire agreement had been made, and the remaining soldiers in the city had accepted orderly disarmament, the mopping-up operation would not have been practiced.
理由の第三は、これら「降伏しなかった中国兵たち」の多くが民間人の服装に着替えて「便衣兵」となり、こともあろうに二十万人近い民間人が避難していた安全区に潜伏したことである [三十八]。中には、指揮官の命令で組織的に武器を所有したまま潜伏した部隊もあった。明らかにゲリラ活動の準備を安全区で進めていたのである [三十九]。この非戦闘員を装う「便衣兵」は、一九〇七年に締結された「陸戦の法規慣例に関する条約」(第四ハーグ条約)附属規則第二十三条の「背信行為」に該当し、国際法違反であった [四十]。日本軍が掃蕩作戦を実施して便衣兵を逮捕・監禁したことはあくまで合法的行動であった。
Third, many of 'Chinese soldiers who had not surrendered,' were hiding disguised in civilian garments, and lay hidden in the Safety Zone in which no less than 200,000 of civilians had been seeking refuge. Some of them were still armed by the order of their commander.46 The Chinese troops were apparently making preparation for the guerrilla warfare. This attitude, having the 'Chinese Plain-clothes soldiers' pretend to be non-combatants would be considered to come under Article 23 in 'Regulation respecting the laws and customs of war on land' (the 4th Hague Convention) concluded in 1907 that specifies an 'act of disloyalty' and it infringed on the international humanitarian law. Therefore, it was legal activity that the Japanese Army conducted the mopping-up operation to arrest and to intern the Chinese Plain-clothes soldiers.
では、日本軍は掃蕩作戦をどのような方針で行ったのか。〈起訴状〉が指摘しているように、虐殺や掠奪を指示または容認したのか。
How was the mopping-up operation practiced? As the indictment pointed out, did the Japanese Army instruct or authorize massacre and looting?
上海派遣軍第九師団歩兵第六旅団は十三日、作戦実施に当たって「外国権益保護」「勝手な行動厳禁」「敵意のない市民は保護せよ」「掠奪禁止」等を命じている(資料二)。注目すべきは、中国兵を直ちに「殺害せよ」とは命じていないことである。あくまで「逮捕・監禁」であった。ただし「青壮年はすべて敗残兵または便衣兵とみなし、すべてこれを逮捕監禁せよ」としているが、これは前述したように、中国兵が民間人を装って潜伏したため、平服を着ていても青壮年はすべて疑わなければならなかったからである。
On the 13th prior to practice of the operation in the whole Nanking city, the 6th Infantry Brigade under the 9th Division of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force ordered 'protection of foreign privilege', 'prohibition of unduly behavior', 'protection of non-antagonistic civilians', 'prohibition of looting', and so on. What was more remarkable in the rules of engagement was not to kill Chinese soldiers immediately, but 'arrest and intern'. But the rules of engagement included 'arrest and internment of all the youth looked upon as stragglers.' This meant, as stated above, the Japanese Army might as well suspect all the youth even in civilian clothes, because Chinese soldiers disguised as civilians lay hidden.
【資料二】「掃蕩実施に関する注意事項」
一、軍司令官の注意事項を一兵に至るまで徹底させた後、掃蕩を実施せよ。
二、外国権益の建物は敵がこれを利用している場合のほか、立ち入りを厳禁する。重要な箇所には歩哨を配置せよ。
三、掃蕩隊は残敵掃蕩を任とし、必ず将校の指揮する部隊をもって実施し、下士官以下各個の行動を絶対に禁ずる。
四、青壮年はすべて敗残兵または便衣兵とみなし、すべてこれを逮捕監禁せよ。青壮年以外の敵意のない支那人民、とくに老幼婦女子に対しては寛容の心をもって接し、彼らをして皇軍の威風に敬迎させよ。
五、銀行、銭荘等には侵入を禁止し、歩哨を配置せよ。
六、家屋内に侵入し掠奪に類する行動は厳に戒め、必要以上の物品を濫用廃棄してはならない。
七、放火は勿論、失火といえども厳罰に処する。
十、火災を発見したならば、掃蕩隊は消火につとめよ。
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Rules of Engagement as to mopping-up
(issued by Major General AKIYAMA Yoshimichi, the commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade prior to an entry into the city at 10:00 a.m. dated on Dec. 13th.47)
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Execute mopping-up after seeing to it that the precautions per the brigade commander are thoroughly enforced to all ranks.
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Entry into any buildings belonging to foreign interests is strictly forbidden, unless said building is being used by the enemy. Post soldiers on sentry at important places.
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Mopping-up units are in charge of wiping out enemy stragglers and are to be commanded by officers at all times. Anyone ranking in non-commissioned officer or below is absolutely forbidden to act independently.
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Regard young people and adult males as stragglers or Plain-clothes soldiers, and place them under arrest. With that exception, Chinese civilians other than young people and adult men who do not behave in a hostile manner, especially the elderly, women and children are to be treated kindly and open-mindedly, so as to have them respect for the dignity of the Japanese Army.
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Post sentries at public or private banks, but do not enter such establishments.
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Take precautions against entering private houses and taking actions similar to looting, and prohibit from abusing and abandoning unnecessary amount of articles.
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Anyone who commits arson or cause an accidental fire shall be severely punished.
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In case of fire, the mopping-up units, as well as any other units in the vicinity of the fire, shall endeavor to extinguish it.
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註一 ･･････ 歩兵第六旅団が十二月十三日午前十時城内侵入に際し示した「命令」の抜粋。原文は、『南京戦史』百八十六〜百八十七頁参照。
註二 ･･････ 上海派遣軍司令部が「南京陥落」を声明したのは、十三日の午後十時。この段階では、中国軍の抵抗は城外でも続いており、城内でも激しい市街戦があることを想定しており、あくまで戦争時の戦闘行動としての「掃蕩」作戦であった。
註三 ･･････ 三で示されているように、掃蕩部隊は必ず将校の指揮に率いられ、無秩序に発砲することはでさなかった。
註四 ･･････ 七及び十で「火災」について触れているのは、占領に際して被害を増加させないためと、進駐する日本軍の宿舎等を確保するためと思われる。
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It was 10:00 p.m. of Dec.13 when the headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force issued the official statement on the 'fall of Nanking'. At that time, the Chinese Army still continued the resistance outside and inside the castle. That is, the 'mopping-up operation' was a military action ordinarily taken place in wartime. As indicated in paragraph 3, every mopping-up unit was always commanded by officers, so that anyone could not open fire thoughtlessly. The reason why paragraph 7 and 10 referred to a 'fire' was to prevent from increasing damage on occupation and to secure military installations for the Japanese Army.
以上のような状況を踏まえれば、〈起訴状)には明らかな誤りがある。
Considering the above situation, it should be able to point out the following misunderstandings in the indictment.
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一、城内の中国軍が抵抗をやめたのは十三日の夕方になってであり、城内突入に成功した十三日早朝の段階では日本軍は激しい市街戦を予想していた。また、城内に入ったのは四個師団全員ではなく、その中から選抜された約一万名にすぎない。
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It was not until on the late afternoon of December 13, 1937, that Chinese troops inside the walled city gave up their resistance. On early morning of the 13th when Japanese troops successfully approached the city, severe battles were expected in the streets.
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二、掃蕩戦は、大量の敵兵が潜伏している敵地での軍事作戦である。いつどこから狙撃されるか分からない恐怖の中で主要な建物を探索した日本軍兵士に、掠奪や強姦をする精神的時間的余裕があるはずがないし、何よりも掠奪や強姦は命令によって禁止されていた。
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The mopping-up operation was a military action in the enemy's territory where many soldiers were hidden. Under the strain and with fright at unexpected sniping, Japanese soldiers searched about among main buildings. They could not have had time for looting or rape, nor could they mentally afford to, and furthermore looting and rape was prohibited by the order.
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三、日本軍が城内に入った時、住民のほとんどは安全区に集結しており、退避中の住民に手榴弾を投げることなどあり得ない。また、路上にあった死体は、日本軍入城前にあったもので、加害者は中国軍である。
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When Japanese troops (about 10,000 soldiers) entered the walled city, most of the Chinese citizens had already assembled in the Safety Zone, and it was absolutely impossible for Japanese soldiers to throw hand grenades into the crowd of people who were seeking refuge. Dead bodies had already been on the street before the Japanese Army entered the city. They were victimized among themselves.
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四、安全区委員会は「安全区に中国兵はいない」と断言し、日本軍による安全区捜索を拒んだが、実際は大量の中国兵を匿っていた。このため日本軍(歩兵第七連隊の約千六百名)が捜索したところ、小銃九百六十挺、同弾薬三十九万発、手榴弾五万五千発など大量の武器・弾薬を押収すると共に敗残兵七千名が潜伏しているのを発見、逮捕した[四十一]。その後も安全区で不審火などが相次ぐため、十二月二十四日から翌年一月五日まで、安全区の住民を対象に兵民分離工作を実施したところ、多数の武器弾薬とともに将校率いる約二千名の中国軍兵士を発見、逮捕している。
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The Safety Zone Committee declared "there is no Chinese soldier in the Safety Zone" and refused to let the Japanese troops search the Safety Zone. But actually the committee had been harboring a great number of Chinese soldiers. Therefore, the Japanese troops (about 1,600 soldiers) carried out a search. As a result, a large amount of arms and bombs: 960 rifles, 390,000 bullets, 55,000 hand grenades and so on were found. At the same time, 7,000 stragglers were identified and arrested.48 Following the search, continuous arsons occurred. Therefore, the Japanese Army distinguished soldiers from inhabitants from December 24, 1937, through January 5, 1938, and found and arrested 2,000 of Chinese soldiers led by officers, along with a large amount of weapons and munitions.
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本来非武装であるべさ安全区は、なんの防備もない中立地帯などではなかった。中国兵が潜伏し大量の武器が隠されていた危険地帯だったのである。
The Safety Zone had to be a neutral zone without defense, but it was not a disarmed area, but a dangerous zone where Chinese armed soldiers were lying hidden with a great deal of arms.
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五、掃蕩戦を通じて日本軍は多くの中国兵を逮捕した上、城内の南京刑務所などに収容した。収容された捕虜は約一万人ほどで、その半数は十二月末に労務者として上海に送られ、残りも、一九四〇年おうちょうめいに発足した汪兆銘の南京政府軍に編入された[四十二]。処刑されたわけではない。
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Through the mopping-up operation, many arrested Chinese soldiers were put into prisons and the interned POWs were about 10,000 in number. A half of them were sent to Shanghai as laborers at the end of December 1937 and most of the remainder were admitted into the Army of the Nanking Government led by Wang Ching-wei, established in 1940. Namely, they were by no means given immediate execution.
民間人を保護する方針を掲げつつも兵士との疑いのある青壮年の民間人も逮捕・監禁したのは事実だが、これらの責任の多くは「中立区」と言いながら多数の中国兵を匿った安全区委員会及び、二十万以上の難民がいる南京を敢えて戦火に巻き込み、国際法違反の便衣隊を使用した中国側に問われるべきである。
On one hand, the Japanese Army intended to follow the policy to protect civilians, and on the other hand, it was true that the Japanese Army arrested and confined the youth suspected as combatants. As to these affairs, the Safety Zone Committee and the KMT had to mainly assume responsibilities. Because the committee had harbored a great number of Chinese soldiers while it kept saying "The Safety Zone is a neutral zone" and the KMT dared to involve into war the city of Nanking where no less than 200,000 inhabitants were living in addition to having intentionally used Plain-clothes soldiers against the international humanitarian law.
【争点七】
日本軍は捕虜殺害の方針だったのか
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Argument 7
Did the Japanese Army have a policy of killing POWs?
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告発側はまた、「日本軍は初めから捕虜を殺害するつもりだった」として次のように批判する。
The Prosecution asserted "Japanese troops primarily had an intention of killing the POWs," and said as follows:
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日本の敗戦の時、軍部は戦争犯罪の審判に使われる可能性のある文書を全部焼却することを命令したので、日本軍内部での南京大虐殺関係の命令書をみつけだすことは困難である。
しかし当事者のその後の告発によると、南京攻略・占領前、上海派遣軍司令官朝香宮鳩彦中将は「捕虜を全員殺せ」との命令を下して、命令の末尾に「閲読後焼却せよ」との注をつけたということである。
第十六師団長中島今朝吾中将の一九三七年十二月十三日の目記にも「大体捕虜ハセヌ方針ナレバ･･････適当ノ個処二誘キテ処理スル予定ナリ」と記されている。中島の日記にはまた、南京市内の多くの技術者と労働者を「処理」した結果、市区が長時間にわたる断水停電になって当市の警備を担当する日本軍にも多大の不便をもたらしたと書いてある(『中島第十六師団長日記・南京攻略戦』)。また、戦後発見された別の日本軍部隊の戦闘詳報にも「捕虜処理」の記録が残っている。
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At the time of Japan's surrender in World War II, as military authorities were ordered to burn all the documents which were supposed to be used in the courts against the war criminals, it was, therefore, difficult to locate documents concerning the 'Nanking Massacre'.
But according to prosecution by the person concerned, before the Nanking occupation, Prince ASAKANOMIYA Yasuhiko, the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force ordered that all POWs should be killed, and at the end of the document, put a note that 'documents should be burnt after being read.'
NAKAJIMA Kesago, the divisional commander of the 16th Division wrote in his diary on December 13, 1937: "Our general policy is not to take the POWs... All POWs should be dealt in the appropriate way in accordance with the circumstance." Furthermore his diary read, 'dealing' of many engineers and laborers in the city resulted in hours' suspension of power and water supply, and the Japanese Army was forced, as well, to lead an inconvenient life. (The Diary of General NAKAJIMA) Also, there were battle reports of the different Japanese unit found after the war, revealed 'dealing of POWs'.
朝香宮中将の「捕虜殺害命令」というのは、デービッド・バーガミニが『天皇の陰謀』(一九七一年)という本で主張したことだが、その内容は、アメリカの歴史家たちから大きな疑問を投げかけられている。
Prince ASAKANOMIYA's 'order for killing POWs' was referred to in Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York, William Morrow and company, Inc., 1971) by David Bergamini. However, American historians pointed out that the contents of this book were greatly suspicious.
たとえば、アメリカン大学名誉教授リチャード・フィンは、アイリス・チャン著『ザ・レイプ・オブ・南京』に関連して、「朝香宮やその参謀が、『捕虜はすべて殺せ』という、かの悪名高い命令を発したという、信頼に足る証拠もない」と指摘している [四十三]。
For example, Richard Finn, Emeritus Professor of American University, criticized Iris Chang's The Rape of Nanking saying, "She referred to that notorious order for Prince ASAKANOMIYA and his staff to 'kill all POWs', but her statement was of no reliable evidence." 49
また、スタンフォード大学歴史学部長デビツド・ケネディは『アトランティック・マンスリー』一
九九八年四月号に寄稿して次のように述べている。
For another example, David M. Kennedy, the chief of history department of Stanford University, contributed to the Atlantic Monthly (April 1998), and demonstrated his opinion as follows:
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「バーガミニは、明らかに奇抜な論点に基づいて書かれた自著『天皇の陰謀』(一九七一年)で、南京虐殺とその他の残虐行為を正面から天皇ヒロヒトの責任であると決めつけようとした。しかし(アイリス・)チャンは『不幸にして、バーガミニの著作は定評ある歴史家たちの痛烈な批判を浴びている』点を認めざるを得なかった。だが、これは控えめな表現というものだ。現に評者の一人は、バーガミニの記述は、『歴史ドキュメンタリー作成のあらゆる基準を無視した場合にのみ信用できる』と述べているのである。歴史家のバーバラ・タックマン女史は、バーガミニの主張は、『ほぼ完全に、著者の堆論と悪意ある解釈を好む性向の産物である』と述べている[四十四]」
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She [Iris Chang] is clearly tempted to argue that the Rape of Nanking resulted from formal political decisions taken at the highest levels, an argument whose virtually lone proponent is the historian David Bergamini, whom Chang repeatedly cites. In a decidedly eccentric book, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (1971), Bergamini tried to lay the blame for Nanjing and much else squarely at the feet of Emperor Hirohito. Chang is obliged to concede that "unfortunately, Bergamini's book was seriously criticized by reputable historians." That's putting it mildly. One reviewer observed that Bergamini was "believable only by violating every canon of acceptable documentation." The historian Barbara Tuchman said that Bergamini's thesis "appears to be almost entirely a product of the author's inference and of his predilection for the sinister explanation."
一方、中島師団長の日記には確かにこうした一節が存在するが、「処理」が「殺害」を意味すると解釈するのは短絡にすぎる。
Certainly there was a passage: "All POWs should be dealt in the appropriate way in accordance with the circumstance" in NAKAJIMA's diary, but the passage didn't necessary mean 'murder of the POWs'.
南京戦の四カ月前の八月五日、陸軍次官は「交戦法規ノ適用二関スル件」という通牒を出し、戦闘の惨害を軽減するためにも「交戦規則(国際法)を努めて尊重し降伏を申し出てきた敵兵を殺害するな」と命じている [四十五]。この通牒を踏まえて上海派遣軍第十三師団司令部は十月九日、「戦闘に関する教示」という訓令を出し、「多数の倖虜が出た場合は射殺せずに集結監視した上、司令部に報告すること。一方、捕虜が少数ならば適宜処置すること」を命じた [四十六]。
The Vice-Minister of war ordered in his notification dated on August 5, 1937, four months before the battle in Nanking, entitled 'Application of Rules of Engagement' that in order to reduce the ravages of war "endeavor to respect the international humanitarian law and do not kill enemy soldiers who apply for surrender." Based on 'Application of Rules of Engagement, Rules of Engagement Concerning Warfare' was anew issued on October 9, 1937, by the 13th Division Headquarters, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. The Section 11 of that new notice, entitled Treatment of POWs', read as follows:
- When capturing a great many POWs, do not shoot them dead, but have to have them disarmed, assembled in one location and kept a watch on, and report their presence to division headquarters. As to small number of POWs, however, appropriately deal with them after designated interrogation.
この訓令を出した日、上海派遣軍の飯沼参謀長は各師団の参謀長を集めて「彼等(中国政府)は日本軍に捕われば殺されると宣伝しあり、之を是正する」よう命じている [四十七]。つまり、この「訓令」の目的は「日本軍に捕らわれれば殺される」という中国軍の宣伝を是正することにあった。是正するためにも「日本軍に捕まっても殺されない」という事実を中国兵に知らせる必要がある。
The same day when this notice was issued, IINUMA, the chief of staff of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force gathered all the chiefs of staffs of respective divisions and said "the KMT is carrying out spreading a rumor that POWs will be killed once captured, therefore, in order to eliminate their propaganda, it is necessary to let the Chinese soldiers know that they will never be put to death." 50 Namely the purpose of this 'notice' was to alter the rumor through the Chinese propaganda that 'POWs would be killed once captured.'
こうした文脈から考えれば、「捕虜の適宜処置」を単純に「捕虜処刑」と解釈することはできない。むしろ「適宜釈放」を意味したと考える方が妥当である。実際、第十三師団の山田栴二歩兵第百三旅団長は捕虜を釈放しようとした(ただし捕虜の暴動が起こったため鎮圧を余儀なくされた) [四十八]。
Considering such context, an expression of 'proper dealing with POWs' should be taken not so much a 'execution of POWs' as a 'discretionary release of POWs'. In fact, YAMADA, the brigadier of 103rd Brigade belonging to the 13th Division tried to set the POWs free. (But, he had to hold off the plan until the riot was calmed down.) 51
以上、日本政府の公式文書における「捕虜の取り扱い方針」とは、戦争の惨禍を軽減するためにも国際法に基づき、日本軍の命令に服さないなど特別の事情がない限り、多数の捕虜は殺さずに監禁し、少数の場合は適宜釈放せよ、というものであったと見るべきであろう。この方針に基づき、南京戦でも数千名もの投降兵を捕虜として収容した実績がある。
The policy for treatment of POWs' described in the Japanese formal documents directed that if there were many, not to kill but confine, and to appropriately release in case of a small number, based on the international humanitarian laws in the effort of reducing the ravages of war, except particular cases against orders. This policy was carried out in the Nanking battle and thousands of stragglers were interned as POWs.
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「捕虜をすべて殺害せよ」とする公式文書は存在しない上、公式文書にそれとは逆のことを明示している以上、「日本軍は初めから捕虜を殺害する方針だった」との非難は全く成り立たない。
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In addition that there did not exist the formal documents 'ordering to kill all POWs,' the existing formal documents had been saying clearly contrary to the accusation. Therefore, there was absolutely no ground for such criticism that 'the Japanese Army's policy was to kill all POWs from the beginning.'
三、組織的大規模掠奪・強姦はあったのか
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3. Systematic large scale looting and rape
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【争点八】
日本軍は組織的に掠奪を行ったか
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Argument 8
Did the Japanese Army practice systematic looting?
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掠奪について〈起訴状)は日本軍が大量殺害の一環として"組織的"に行ったと非難している。この掠奪に関する日本軍の方針はどうだったのか。
Relative to the looting, the indictment accused the Japanese Army of committing the looting as a part of the systematic massacre. What was the policy of the Japanese Army against the looting?
日本軍の松井司令官は攻略に当たって全軍に「注意事項」を布告し、「日本軍が外国の首都に入城するのは有史以来のことで世界が注目する大事件なので」「掠奪行為や不注意による失火は厳罰に処する」と厳命した。その方針に基づき、掃蕩作戦を担当した先の歩兵第六旅団は十二月十三日午前十時頃、「掃蕩実施に関する注意事項」を下達し、「外国権益への立入り禁止」「掠奪禁止」「軍紀厳正」等を命じた。翌十四日、安全区の掃蕩を担当した歩兵第六旅団第七連隊長も「捕虜、外国権益に対する注意」を下令、「安全区への他の部隊の立ち入りは禁止」「外国人との間に無用の誤解を生まないように」と細かい注意を与えている(資料三)。
MATSUI, at the time of the offensive entry into Nanking, strictly ordered all the troops that 'the whole world would pay attention to Japan's entry to the capital of a foreign country, which had never been experienced ever since,' so that looting or accidental fire would be severely punished. Based on this policy, on December l3, about 10:00 a.m., the 6th Infantry Brigade engaged in the mopping-up operation of the whole Nanking city, issued the 'notification in practice of the operation', 'prohibition of entry to the Foreign rights and interests', 'prohibition of looting', and 'rigid maintenance of the military discipline'. On the 14th the next day, the commander of the 7th Regiment under the 6th Infantry Brigade which took in charge of the mopping-up operation of the Safety Zone, also ordered his soldiers 'Rules of Engagement as to POWs and foreign rights and interests.' 52 He gave the detailed order by saying 'prohibition of other troops' entry to the Safety Zone' and 'avoidance of misunderstanding between the foreigners' prior to starting the first mopping-up of the Safety Zone:
【資料三】「捕虜、外国権益に対する注意」
一、担当区域内には、無用の軍人の立ち入りを厳禁し、歩七以外の部隊の勝手な行動を絶対に禁止せよ。
二、各隊の捕虜は、その担当地区内の一か所に収容し、その食糧は師団に請求せよ。
三、歩兵第七連隊は城内に宿営するのではなく、掃蕩隊として入城したものである。掃蕩が完了したならば、城外に出ることを忘れてはならない。
四、外国権益内に敗残兵が多数いる見込みであるが、これに対しては語学堪能者を選抜してあたらせるから、各隊は外方より監視しておけ。
五、言語不通のため外国人との間に誤解を生じ衝突することがないよう気をつけよ。
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註一 ･･････ 歩兵第七連隊長が十二月十四日、初めて「安全区」掃蕩を行うにあたって示した「注意事項」の抜粋。原文は、『南京戦史』百九十三頁参照。
註二 ･･････ 一で示されているように、選抜された「掃蕩部隊」(約千六百名)以外は、「安全区」は立ち入り禁止であった。
註三 ･･････ 二によって、「安全区」で摘出した敗残兵は「即時処刑」するのではなく、まず「収容」する方針だったことがわかる。
註四 ･･････ 四について解説しておく。「安全区」には、外国権益、つまり欧米の大使館や欧米企業の建物等が多数存在していた。日本軍が国際社会との摩擦を避けるために、こうした「外国権益」には立ち入らないことは中国側に広く知られていたため、中国軍は意図的に「外国権益」に潜伏するようになっていた。
註五 ･･････ 四及び五を読めばわかるように、日本軍は、言語不通のために南京に在住する欧米人たち、つまり国際委員会のメンバーと無用な摩擦が起こることに極めて神経質になっていた。
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Rules of Engagement as to POWs and foreign rights and interests
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Strictly prohibit an entry of soldiers, except those on duty, into the Safety Zone, and furthermore absolutely prohibit any arbitrary activities by corps other than the 7th Infantry Regiment
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Intern POWs whom each unit captured into a camp of a place in the Safety Zone, and request their provisions to the Division.53
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The 7th Infantry Regiment has not come to stay in the walled city, but entered as a mopping-up unit. Therefore do not forget to get out of the walled city upon completion of the mopping-up.
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It is anticipated that there exist a large number of stragglers in the area of foreign rights and interests. As for them, I will select and assign interpreters who are proficient in foreign languages, each unit has to keep watch on the foreign rights and interests from outside.54
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Be careful to avoid being misunderstood and conflicts with foreign people due to language differences.55
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これらの方針がいかに徹底していたか。第九師団第三十六連隊長の脇坂次郎・陸軍大佐は東京裁判に提出した宣誓口供書の中で、ある主計中尉が道端に落ちていた中国の婦人靴片足を持ち帰っただけで軍法会議にかけられたことを紹介している [四十九]。主要貿易相手国である米英との摩擦を避けるためにも、日本軍は南京で日本兵が不法行為を起こさないよう細心の注意を払い、たとえ靴一足でも軍法会議にかけたのである。
How drastically did these principles prevail? WAKISAKA Jiro, the commander of the 36th Regiment, the 9th Division stated in his affidavit presented to the IMTFE that such was rigidity of orders that a certain paymaster lieutenant was given penalty at the military court only for carrying woman's shoe of this pair found on the street back to his unit. 56 The Japanese Army was greatly concerned about soldiers' illegal actions in Nanking in order to avoid friction with key trade partners such as the U.S. and the U.K. As a result even pocketing of a pair of shoes could be a case which had to be tried by the court-martial.
では、どの程度の掠奪があったのか。
How often did looting take place?
留意すべきは、日本軍入城前に、中国政府関係者や富裕階級が脱出した際に主な家財を持ち出している上、陥落直前に中国兵が掠奪に走っていたため、既にかなりの被害に遭っていたという事実である。
We must pay attention to the fact that before Japanese soldiers entered the city, Chinese government authorities and the wealthy had already taken their property away, and just before the fall, Chinese soldiers had already looted, and considerable damage was caused.
ところが、この掠奪に関して、例えばダーディン特派員は、十二月十八日付「ニューヨーク・タイムズ」に「日本軍の掠奪は市全体の掠奪といってもよい程だった。建物はほとんど軒並みに日本兵に押し入れられ、それもしばしば将校の見ている前でおこなわれたし、日本軍は何でも欲しいものは奪いとった。･･･アメリカ大使の私邸さえも襲撃を受けた」と書いている。しかし、この記事は、前述したようにペイツから渡された安全区委員会作成のメモに基づいて書かれた可能性が高い。
Concerning the looting, however, T. Durdin wrote in the New York Times dated on December 18:
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The Japanese looting amounted almost to plundering of the entire city. Nearly every building was entered by Japanese soldiers, often under the eyes of their officers, and the men took whatever they wanted... Even the home of the United States Ambassador was invaded.
This article was written, as mentioned before, based on the Safety Zone Committee Memorandum which had been handed over from Bates to Durdin, though.
それでは、安全区委員会はどのような認識なのか。これまでも引用してきた安全区委員会の被害届を集計すると、日本兵による掠奪事件は伝聞も含め百七十九件である。安全区委員会のマギーが東京裁判で「日本兵は手当たり次第に中国人から取り上げた」と証言したが、反対尋問を受けて、マギーは自分で目撃した掠奪事件は「日本兵がアイス・ボックスを盗んだ事件」たった一件だけだと証言している [五十]。
Then, how much was the Safety Zone Committee aware of looting? According to documents, so far referred to in this paper, those demonstrated the total number of looting by Japanese soldiers was 179 including those in rumor. Although Magee, member of the Safety Zone Committee, testified in the IMTFE by saying 'the Japanese soldiers took everything away from the Chinese residents', he confessed in the cross-examination, what he himself witnessed was nothing but one case that 'a Japanese soldier deprived of some electric ice boxes.' 57
実際のところ、どの程度の被害があったのか。
In fact, how bad was the damage?
日本軍占領下の南京に初めて外部から外国人が入ってきたのは、一九三八年一月六日朝、アメリカ大使館のジェームス・エスピー副領事とジョン・アリソン三等書記官であった。アリソンは、直ちにアメリカ関係の被害状況を確認した。すると、ダーディン記者によればアメリカ大使公邸も日本軍の掠奪の対象となったはずなのに、アリソンは一月八日、ワシントンの国務長官宛に「いわゆる『安全区』内にあるアメリカ人財産は、気まぐれな略奪やコソドロがあったことを除けば、一般に被害は少なかった」と電報を打っている [五十一]。
It was on the morning of January 6, 1938 when foreigners entered the walled city of Nanking under the Japanese occupation for the first time. They were James Espy, the vice consul at the American Embassy to Nanking and the third Secretary John M. Allison. Allison immediately investigated the damage made against the U.S. interests. In spite that the correspondent reported the residence of American Embassy was one of the targets of looting, Allison sent a telegram on January 8 to the Secretary of State in Washington that 'American property in the so-called Safety Zone received relatively small damage, except for occasional looting or thefts.' 58
これらの報告を裏付けるように、大掠奪があったとされる十二月十二日から十八日までに安全区委員会が記録した「日本軍の掠奪による被害」は次の通りである。
The record written by the Safety Zone Committee endorsed this report, and it detailed the 'damage due to looting committed by the Japanese soldiers', from December 12 through 18 when a massive looting was supposed to have occurred, as follows:
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「自動車五両、自転車六両、オートバイ数両、牡牛二頭、ブタ一頭、小馬数頭、米三袋、フトン五百枚、手袋二、牛乳一ビン、砂糖ひとつかみ、鍋一個、ゴミ箱一、万年筆六本、灯油半缶、ローソク若干」
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